Tag: Sarbanes-Oxley Act

DOJ Implements New Whistleblower Reward Program

Companies who submit healthcare claims to private payors, provide financial services to customers, interact with domestic or foreign public officials, or otherwise operate in highly regulated industries should take note that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken another significant step in its ongoing effort to encourage new whistleblowers with information about potential corporate criminal malfeasance to report that information to the government. On August 1, 2024, the DOJ announced its long awaited Corporate Whistleblower Awards Program. The program seeks to fill “gaps” in existing whistleblower programs by providing awards of up to 30% of forfeited proceeds for reporting criminal conduct that is not otherwise covered by an existing system for awarding whistleblowers. The silver lining for companies is that the program incentivizes the whistleblowers to cooperate with the company’s internal compliance function. DOJ also provides for a presumptive declination of criminal charges for companies that self-report to DOJ within 120 days of the time the issue is first raised internally by the whistleblower, providing strong incentives for companies to investigate issues quickly.

The program represents the DOJ’s latest effort to increase the number of voluntary self-disclosures of corporate criminal activity. In January 2023, the DOJ announced its revised Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self Disclosure Policy, which sought to expand the incentives for companies to voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, cooperate with DOJ investigations, and take prompt and full remedial measures. The policy’s primary incentive was the prospect of a presumed declination for companies who followed its mandates.

As we discussed in a previous post, efforts to increase voluntary self-disclosures continued in April 2024 when the DOJ launched a Pilot Program on Voluntary Self Disclosures for Individuals. That initiative expanded the scope of potential whistleblowers by including those complicit in wrongdoing, granting them eligibility for immunity from prosecution in return for reporting the activity. In substance, that structure incentivized both individual wrongdoers and the corporations for whom they worked to be the first to report criminal activity. By pitting the would-be whistleblowers and the companies against each other, the DOJ effectively constructed a prisoners’ dilemma where the government stood to benefit regardless of which party acted first.

The program is a different verse from the same hymnal. It offers a different (but more traditional) incentive for whistleblowers – the opportunity for financial reward – while maintaining the goal of increasing the number of voluntary self-disclosures. The program seeks to achieve that objective by motivating those who are aware of misconduct, but perhaps are otherwise unable to qualify for a bounty under the current framework or otherwise uninterested in reporting the activity without a personal benefit.

The Basic Framework

Under the program, eligible individuals who voluntarily provide original information to the government in certain areas of focus and cooperate with the resulting investigation stand to receive 30% of any criminal or civil forfeitures over $1 million in accordance with a defined payment priority. The program lays out a basic structure for determining whether an individual is entitled to an award, but also affords the DOJ substantial discretion in deciding whether to make such awards, and in what amount. The key elements are:

  • Areas of focus – The program identifies four subject matter areas: 1) violations by financial institutions, their insiders and agents involving money laundering, fraud, and fraud against or non-compliance with regulators; 2) foreign corruption and bribery and violations of money laundering statutes; 3) domestic corruption violations including bribes and kickbacks paid to domestic public officials; and 4) healthcare offenses involving private or non-public healthcare benefit programs and fraud against patients, investors or other non-governmental entities in the healthcare industry, or other violations of federal law not covered by the federal False Claims Act (FCA).
  • Eligible individuals – The program excludes several categories of individuals, including those eligible to report under other whistleblower programs and those who “meaningfully participated” in the criminal activity reported (although those who played a “minimal role” can still participate).
  • “Original information” – Essentially, independent non-public knowledge or analysis in the individual’s possession is considered “original” information. Notably, information can be deemed “original” if it “materially adds to the information that the Department already possesses.” Information that the individual has already reported through the company’s internal whistleblower, legal or compliance procedures can still be deemed “original,” provided the individual also reports that information to the government within 120 days of reporting internally. Privileged information is not considered “original” unless the crime, fraud or other exception to state attorney conduct rules apply.
  • “Voluntary” submission – The information must be reported before the DOJ or any federal law enforcement or civil enforcement agency initiates any inquiry relating to the subject matter.
  • “Cooperation” – Individuals who report must also cooperate fully with the DOJ’s investigation, including by participating in interviews, testifying before a grand jury or at trial, producing documents and, if requested, working in a “proactive manner” with federal law enforcement. This could include clandestine activities to gather evidence, such as recording phone calls or wearing a wire.
  • Criteria for determining amount of award – The program lists several factors that could militate in favor of increasing or decreasing the whistleblower’s financial award. Increases may be justified by the significance of the information provided, by the nature and extent of assistance provided, and, notably, by participation in internal compliance programs. Decreases may be appropriate where the reporting individual was a minimal participant in the underlying activity, or where the individual unreasonably delayed reporting, interfered with the company’s internal compliance and reporting systems, or had management or oversight responsibilities over the offices or personnel involved in the conduct.
  • Payment priority – When the victim is an individual, he or she must first be compensated “to the fullest extent possible” before a whistleblower can recover. When the victim is a corporate entity or government agency, the whistleblower jumps the line and is compensated first.
  • Relationship to the Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self Disclosure Policy – While the program incentivizes whistleblower reports to the DOJ, a simultaneous amendment to the self-disclosure policy provides that “if a whistleblower makes both an internal report to a company and a whistleblower submission” to the DOJ, companies who self-report that conduct within 120 days of the internal report “will still qualify for a presumption of a declination[.]” This amendment underscores the DOJ’s focus on increasing self-disclosures, inasmuch as it effectively removes the need for them to be truly “voluntary.” A company that receives a complaint through its whistleblower program may still be eligible under the self-disclosure policy even if the individual has already reported the conduct to the DOJ, but it has a limited time to investigate and decide whether to self-report the conduct.

Key Takeaways

Reading the tea leaves, we see several potentially significant takeaways for companies evaluating the program’s likely impact.

  1. As a starting point, companies should evaluate whether and to what extent their operations create new reporting opportunities under the program, and thus necessitate action. That process should involve answering the following questions:
    • Does the company operate in one of the areas of focus? If so, the program creates new opportunities and incentives for whistleblowers, and the company must assess whether it is prepared to address an increase in reports and to recognize that a reporter may have already disclosed information to the DOJ.
    • Is the company publicly traded? If so, the company is already subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which should mean that systems are already in place to receive, investigate and determine whether to take action, including potentially making a voluntary self-disclosure. The program provides an opportunity to reassess the efficacy of those systems but should not necessarily require the creation of new ones. Note that even those companies with existing whistleblower programs should consider the need to expand those systems to cover new areas of focus. For example, a company with a SOX whistleblower policy should consider the need to expand its scope to cover domestic corruption violations, which may not otherwise be covered.
    • Does the company submit claims to government payors? If so, it is already subject to the FCA and should already have a system in place to analyze internal compliance concerns. If that system focuses on or prioritizes issues regarding government payors, the company should expand its focus to include claims and conduct regarding private payors, which may now be subject to whistleblower bounties under the program.
  2. For privately held companies operating in the areas of focus that are not subject to the FCA, the program necessitates a thorough and candid assessment of the risk the program creates. Depending on the extent of that danger, companies should consider the following measures:
    • Create, or enhance as necessary, internal reporting mechanisms to receive and evaluate whistleblower reports.
    • Publicize the company’s expectation that employees should promptly report concerns internally about potential violations of law or company policy, making clear that no retaliation will result from reports made in good faith.
    • Design a process for investigating whistleblower reports based on their nature and seriousness. Establish criteria for identifying those that can be investigated by HR, those that require the involvement of in-house counsel, and those that must be handled by outside counsel. If there is any possibility of criminal exposure, ensure an appropriate investigation is conducted and concluded in time to allow the company to determine whether to self-report in the 120-window for a presumptive declination.
  3. All companies should have in place a system for quickly and accurately evaluating whether to voluntarily self-disclose violations. This process is a multi-factor calculus that considers a range of factors, including primarily the merits of the underlying information and the amount of financial loss or gain that resulted. While decision-making in this context varies by situation, one essential element remains constant: the need for accurate information regarding the nature, scope and effect of the underlying conduct.

Only time will tell exactly how the program will impact the number and nature of whistleblower reports. But companies can take practical steps now to gauge whether and to what extent they are likely to be affected and begin installing the measures necessary to minimize the risk that might otherwise result.

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© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section

Road to Victory Just Got a Little Easier for Whistleblowers

In 2017, a federal jury found whistleblower Trevor Murray was wrongfully terminated after he refused “to change his research on commercial mortgage-backed securities.” He won over $900,000. On appeal in 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned Murray’s award, finding whistleblowers who bring a retaliation claim against their employer under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) must prove their employer acted with “retaliatory intent.”

Earlier this month, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in, issuing a unanimous decision in Trevor Murray v. UBS Securities LLC, et al. The justices found that the Second Circuit was wrong. That is, “when it comes to a plaintiff’s burden of proof on intent under SOX, they only need to show that their protected activity contributed to an unfavorable personnel action, such as a firing.” Once the plaintiff does this, the Supreme Court found the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that “it would have taken the same adverse action regardless of the employee’s protected activity.” The justices found the law is intended ”to be plaintiff-friendly.”

In light of this development, employers should continue to be diligent in documenting the reasons that lead to an employee’s termination. This is especially true if that employee may be found to have engaged in a protected activity, cloaking them with certain whistleblower protections.

In siding with whistleblower Trevor Murray, the justices rejected UBS’ position that a separate finding of retaliatory intent is required for whistleblower protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or SOX, which governs corporate financial reporting and recordkeeping.
© 2024 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Supreme Court Upholds Corporate Whistleblower Protections in Landmark Ruling

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling holding that whistleblowers do not need to prove that their employer acted with “retaliatory intent” to be protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The decision in the case, Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, has immense implications for a number of whistleblower protection laws.

“This is a major win for whistleblowers and thus a huge win for corporate accountability,” said leading whistleblower attorney David Colapinto, a founding partner of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto.

“A ruling in favor of UBS would have overturned more than 20 years of precedent in SOX whistleblower cases and made it exceedingly more difficult for whistleblowers who claim retaliation under many similarly worded federal whistleblower statutes,” Colapinto continued.

“Thankfully, the Court was not swayed by UBS’ attempt to ignore the plain meaning of the statute and instead upheld the burden of proof that Congress enacted to protect whistleblowers who face retaliation,” added Colapinto.

In an amicus curiae brief filed in the case on behalf of the National Whistleblower Center, the founding partners of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto outlined the Congressional intent behind the burden of proof standard in SOX.

“In crafting the unique ‘contributing factor’ test for whistleblowers, Congress left an incredibly straight-forward legislative history documenting the value of whistleblowers’ contributions, the risks and retaliation whistleblowers faced, the barriers the previous burden of proof presented for whistleblowers, and Congress’ explicit intention to lower that burden of proof for whistleblowers,” the brief states.

In the Court’s opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor likewise pointed to the Congressional intent of SOX’s contributing-factor burden of proof standard:

“To be sure, the contributing-factor framework that Congress chose here is not as protective of employers as a motivating-factor framework. That is by design. Congress has employed the contributing-factor framework in contexts where the health, safety, or well-being of the public may well depend on whistleblowers feeling empowered to come forward. This Court cannot override that policy choice by giving employers more protection than the statute itself provides.”

This article was authored by Geoff Schweller.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on Supreme Court Whistleblower Rulings, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

SEC Commissioner Signals Need to Fulfill Mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Develop “Minimum Standards” for Lawyers Practicing Before the Commission

In remarks on March 5, 2022, on PLI’s Corporate Governance webcast, Commissioner Allison Herren Lee of the Securities and Exchange Commission stated that 20 years after its enactment, it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and establish minimum standards for lawyers practicing before the Commission.1  Commissioner Lee, who announced that she will not seek a second term when her current one ends this month, took issue with what she called the “goal-directed reasoning” of some securities lawyers—that is, focusing primarily on the outcome sought by executives, rather than the impact on investors and the market as a whole.  Such lawyering, Commissioner Lee observed, has a host of negative consequences, including encouraging non-disclosure of material information, harming investors and market integrity, and stymying deterrence.  The solution, Commissioner Lee opined, is to fulfill the mandate of Section 307, which empowered the Commission to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers.”2

Over the last 20 years, the Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before the Commission.  There are good reasons for the Commission’s inaction, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, the fact-specific nature of materiality determinations, and the traditionally state-law basis for the regulation of attorney conduct.  Commissioner Lee, moreover, did not propose specific new rules and recognized that the task was difficult and should be informed by the views of the securities bar and other stakeholders.  Nor did she say that action by the Commission was imminent; it is unclear whether the Commission has authority to promulgate new rules under Section 307 given a 180-day sunset under the statute that occurred in 2003.  Indeed, neither Commissioner Lee nor any of the other SEC commissioners have issued statements on this topic since the PLI webcast.  SEC Enforcement Director Gurbir Grewal has, however, indicated an increased emphasis on gatekeeper accountability in order to restore public trust in the market.3  Nonetheless, given the Commission’s existing authority to impose discipline under its Rules of Practice, practitioners should be mindful of the potential for increased scrutiny moving forward.

Background

In the wake of corporate accounting scandals involving Enron, Worldcom, and other companies, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 “[t]o safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets.”4  The Act was aimed at “combating fraud, improving the reliability of financial reporting, and restoring investor confidence,”5 including by empowering the SEC with increased regulatory authority and enforcement power.6  To that end, the Act includes provisions to fortify auditor independence, promote corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures, and enhance corporate fraud accountability.7

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed just six months after the collapse of Enron in December 2001, and neither the House nor Senate bills originally contained professional responsibility language.8  Hours before the Senate passed its version of the Act, however, the Senate amended the bill to include language that would eventually become Section 307.9  Around the same time, 40 law professors sent a letter to the SEC requesting the inclusion of a professional conduct rule governing corporate lawyers practicing before the Commission.10  The letter picked up on a 1996 article by Professor Richard Painter, then of the University of Illinois College of Law, which recommended corporate fraud disclosure obligations for attorneys similar to those imposed on accountants by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.11  Senator John Edwards, one of the sponsors of the Senate floor amendment of the bill, emphasized the importance of including professional conduct rules for attorneys in such a significant piece of legislation, stating that “[o]ne of the problems we have seen occurring with this sort of crisis in corporate misconduct is that some lawyers have forgotten their responsibility” is to the companies and shareholders they represent, not corporate executives.12

In its final form, Section 307 imposed a professional responsibility requirement for attorneys that represent issuers appearing before the Commission.  Specifically, Section 307 directed the Commission, within 180 days of enactment of the law, to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers,”13 and, at minimum, promulgate “a rule requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the issuer or any agent thereof to appropriate officers within the issuer and, thereafter, to the highest authority within the issuer, if the initial report does not result in an appropriate response.”14

Since the enactment of Section 307, however, the Commission has promulgated only one rule pursuant to its authority, commonly known as the “up-the-ladder” rule.15  The up-the-ladder rule imposes a duty on attorneys representing an issuer before the Commission to report evidence of material violations of the securities laws.  When an attorney learns of evidence of a material violation, the attorney has a duty to report it to the issuer’s chief legal officer (“CLO”) and/or the CEO.16  If the attorney believes the CLO or CEO did not take appropriate action within a reasonable time to address the violation, the attorney has a duty to report the evidence to the audit committee, another committee of independent directors, or the full board of directors until the attorney receives “an appropriate response.”17  Alternatively, attorneys can satisfy their duty by reporting the violation to a qualified legal compliance committee.18  To date, the SEC has never brought a case alleging a violation of the up-the-ladder rule.

Commissioner Lee’s Remarks

In her remarks, Commissioner Lee stated that it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 and consider whether the Commission should adopt and enforce minimum standards for lawyers who practice before the Commission.  Commissioner Lee criticized “goal-directed reasoning” employed by sophisticated counsel in securities matters, and cited as an example Bandera Master Fund v. Boardwalk Pipeline,19 a recent decision in which the Delaware Court of Chancery rebuked the attorneys involved for their efforts to satisfy the aims of a general partner instead of their duty to the partnership-client as a whole.  The Court, specifically, stated that counsel “knowingly made unrealistic and counterfactual assumptions, knowingly relied on an artificial factual predicate, and consistently engaged in goal-directed reasoning to get to the result that [the general partner] wanted.”20  Bandera and cases like it, according to Commissioner Lee, are emblematic of a “race to the bottom” caused by pressure on securities lawyers to compete with each other for clients, while failing to give due consideration to the potential impact on investors, market integrity, and the public interest.

In Commissioner Lee’s view, “goal-directed” lawyering not only falls short of ethical standards but causes harm to the market and reduces deterrence.  Commissioner Lee expressed concern that, in an effort to give management the answer it wants, lawyers may downplay or obscure material information.21  Although recognizing that materiality determinations are fact-intensive, Commissioner Lee said that should not provide blanket cover for legal advice aimed at concealing material information from the public.  Non-disclosure has a host of negative consequences, including distorting market-moving information, interfering with price discovery, misallocating capital, impairing investor decision-making, and eroding confidence in the financial markets and regulatory system.  Further, such lawyering diminishes deterrence by creating a legal cover for inadequate disclosure, making it more difficult for regulators to hold responsible individuals accountable.  This type of legal counsel, in Commissioner Lee’s view, “is merely rent-seeking masquerading as legal advice, while providing a shield against liability.”

Commissioner Lee stated that the existing framework governing professional conduct is not adequate to hold lawyers accountable for such “reckless” advice.  According to Commissioner Lee, state bars—the principal source for lawyer discipline nationwide—are not up to the task because they lack resources, expertise in securities matters, and the ability to impose adequate monetary sanctions.  Additionally, Commissioner Lee noted that state law standards focused mostly on the behavior of individual lawyers, assigning few responsibilities to the firm for quality assurance.  Indeed, state law standards are mostly drafted in a “one-size-fits-all fashion” according to Commissioner Lee, and do not take into account the different issues faced at large firms that represent public companies, which are quite different from a solo practitioner handling personal injury or estate law matters.  Likewise, although the SEC has the power under Rule 102(e) of its Rules of Practice to suspend or bar attorneys whose conduct falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,” there has been little effort to define or enforce that standard.22  Nor has the SEC rigorously enforced standards of attorney conduct under the one rule it has issued under Section 307, the “up-the-ladder” rule.

Commissioner Lee stated that it was time for the Commission to fulfill its mandate under Section 307.  Although not proposing any specific rules, Commissioner Lee offered the following concepts as a starting point:

  • Greater detail on lawyers’ obligations to a corporate client, including how advice must reflect “the interests of the corporation and its shareholders rather than the executives who hire them”;
  • Requirements of “competence and expertise” (as an example, disclosure lawyers should not opine on materiality “without sufficient focus or understanding of the views of ‘reasonable’ investors”);
  • Continuing education for securities lawyers advising public companies (similar to requirements set by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board for minimum hours of qualifying continuing professional education for audit firm personnel);
  • Oversight at the firm level (similar to quality-control measures implemented at audit firms);
  • Emphasis on the need for independence in rendering advice (similar to substantive and disclosure requirements implemented in Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X for auditors);
  • Obligations to investigate red flags and ensure accurate predicates for legal opinions (similar to the obligations that an auditor must perform to certify to the accuracy of their client’s financial statements); and
  • Retention of contemporaneous records to support the reasonableness of legal advice.

Commissioner Lee noted that the content of any specific rules or standards will require “careful thought,” as well as assistance from the securities bar, experts on professional responsibility, and other interested parties and market participants.  She invited input from the legal community and other stakeholders and noted that she appreciated the complexity of the task and concerns of the American Bar Association and others regarding protection of the attorney-client privilege.  Indeed, outside auditors are generally regarded as “public watchdogs” and such communications between the corporation and an auditor are not entitled to the affirmative attorney-client privilege afforded to legal counsel.  Accordingly, regulating the legal profession using a similar framework to that applied to the accounting profession has sparked more controversy.  Nonetheless, in Commissioner Lee’s view, those concerns should be weighed against “the costs of there being few, if any, consequences for contrived or tortured advice.”

Implications

The Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it in the 20 years since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Commissioner Lee’s call for minimum standards, however, potentially signals increased scrutiny by the SEC with respect to lawyers who “practice before the Commission.”  As Commissioner Lee noted, that means “counsel involved in the formulation and review of issuers’ public disclosure, including those who address the many legal questions that often arise in that context.”23  Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee cautioned that she did “not intend with these comments to address the conduct of attorneys serving as litigators or otherwise representing their client(s) in an advocacy role in an adversarial proceeding or other similar context, such as in an enforcement investigation.”24

Although framing her call for standards in terms of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is not clear that the Commission will—or even can—promulgate any further rules under that authority.  Commissioner Lee did not state that she was speaking on behalf of the Commission or indicate that the Commission would be taking concrete, imminent steps to adopt such standards.  The Commission has not put its imprimatur on the remarks by incorporating them into a formal release or statement of policy.  Moreover, the text of Section 307 appears to foreclose the possibility of further rulemaking, as it provides that the Commission shall issue any such rules “[n]ot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this act,” i.e., January 27, 2003.  Consistent with that constraint, the SEC proposed the up-the-ladder requirements on November 21, 2002, in Release No. 33-8150, and the rule became final on January 29, 2003.25  But the SEC has not issued any other rule under Section 307 to date.

Even if official action under Section 307 may not be forthcoming, Commissioner Lee’s call for action should not be discounted.  Setting aside the up-the-ladder requirements, the SEC has authority under Rule 102(e) of the SEC’s Rules of Practice to censure or bar a lawyer from appearing or practicing before the Commission if found, among other things, “[t]o be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged and unethical or improper professional conduct.”26  Commissioner Lee cited prior SEC guidance to indicate that Rule 102(e) may apply to attorney conduct that falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,”27 a standard that has been left undefined to date.28  In practice, the SEC “will hold attorneys who practice before it to the standards to which they are already subject, including state bar rules.”29  At a minimum, then, Commissioner Lee’s objective of greater accountability may be achieved through a more aggressive application of Rule 102(e), which, as she noted, has generally only been applied as a follow-on penalty for primary violations of the securities laws by lawyers.

Commissioner Lee’s term expires on June 5, and she has announced that she intends to step down from the Commission once a successor has been confirmed.30  Should the Commission nonetheless take up her call to action in the future, it will be no easy task to adopt clear standards that can be implemented in a predictable manner.  In particular, Commissioner Lee’s focus on the role of lawyers in advising issuers on determinations of materiality and disclosure does not lend itself well to oversight or enforcement.  The well-established standard for materiality—whether “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”—is far from clear-cut.31  The Supreme Court, moreover, long has recognized that materiality “depends on the facts and thus is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.”32  As such, and as evidenced by the sundry cases concerning disclosure issues reversed on appeal, disagreement between litigants—as well as jurists—on matters of materiality and disclosure are par for the course.  If that is so, how can a lawyer’s advice on such matters (which will inevitably turn on the facts and the lawyer’s judgment and experience) be subject to oversight in any objective sense?

Even if lawyers’ materiality advice could be evaluated under objective standards, there are other difficulties.  First and foremost is that oversight of legal advice implicates the attorney-client privilege and the underlying benefit of candid advice from securities disclosure and corporate counsel.  As the Supreme Court has observed, the attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”33  Aside from situations in which the client has voluntarily waived privilege (as sometimes occurs in SEC investigations) or where another exception to the privilege applies, it is unclear how the SEC could evaluate legal advice without invading privilege.  Such attempts could have led to an increase in corporate wrongdoing as corporate executives could be more reluctant to seek expert legal advice.  In addition, it is unclear how regulators assessing materiality advice would—or could—balance an assessment of whether a lawyer has given the “correct” advice with a lawyer’s ethical obligations of zealous representation of the client.34  The divide between overreaching “goal-directed” reasoning and permissible zealous advocacy for the client is often murky, and reasonable minds can differ depending on the circumstances.  Moreover, it is already well-accepted that a corporate lawyer’s obligation is to the corporation as its client, not to any individual officer or director.35  That obligation carries with it ethical duties to “proceed as is reasonably necessary for the best interest” of the corporation, including when the lawyer is aware of violations of the law or other misconduct by senior management.36  In that sense, Commissioner Lee’s proposal could be viewed as a call for the SEC to take on enforcement of existing ethical rules, rather than for the development of novel “minimum standards.”

Ultimately, there are good reasons for the Commission’s reluctance to date to formally adopt minimum standards of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, and the fact-specific nature of materiality inquiries.  The manipulation of facts and bad reasoning targeted by Commissioner Lee are not only the exception, and difficult if not impossible to eliminate completely, but are largely covered by existing rules and practices.  Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee’s call for lawyers to strive for higher legal and ethical standards in their counsel should be welcomed.  Sound legal advice is not only important for issuer clients, but also for the financial well-being of investors, the integrity of the markets, and public confidence in the regulatory system and capital markets.  Enhancements in ethical standards for the legal profession could also lead to reputational benefits and greater integrity in the profession.  It remains to be seen whether Commissioner Lee’s remarks will serve as an aspirational goal for securities lawyers, or translate into concrete action by the Commission.

1 Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, Send Lawyers, Guns and Money: (Over-) Zealous Representation by Corporate Lawyers Remarks at PLI’s Corporate Governance – A Master Class 2022 (Mar. 4, 2022), [hereinafter “Commissioner Lee Remarks”].

2 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

3 Gurbir Grewal, Director, Division of Enforcement, Remarks at SEC Speaks 2021 (Oct. 13, 2021).

4 Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 432 (2014).

5 Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, Harvard Bus. Rev. (Apr. 2006).

6 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 7202 (2002).

7 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).

8 Jennifer Wheeler, Securities Law: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Irreconcilable Conflict with the ABA’s Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct?, 56 Okla. L. Rev. 461, 464 (2003).

9 Id.

10 Id. at 468-69.

11 See generally Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 225 (1996).

12 Wheeler, supra note 8, at 465 (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)).

13 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

14 Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003).

15 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7.

16 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).

17 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b)(3), (b)(4).

18 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c).

19 Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, No. CV 2018-0372-JTL, 2021 WL 5267734, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2021).  In Bandera, plaintiffs brought suit against a general partner for breach of a partnership agreement stemming from the general partner’s exercise of a call right without satisfying two requisite preconditions.  The court held for the plaintiffs and found the general partner had engaged in willful misconduct.  Id. at *51.  Contributing to the misconduct was the general partner’s outside counsel, who drafted an opinion letter justifying the general partner’s exercise of the call right.  Id.  Throughout the drafting process, the court found, that the outside counsel manipulated the facts in order to achieve the general partner’s desired conclusion.  Id. at *18-*47.

20 Id. at *51.

21 Commissioner Lee specifically cited, among other matters, environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) disclosures.  The Commission is currently considering additional climate change-related disclosures to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X.  See Jason Halper et al., SEC Proposes Climate-Related Changes to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP (Mar. 23, 2022); see also Paul Kiernan, SEC Proposes More Disclosure Requirements for ESG Funds, The Wall Street Journal (May 25, 2022, 6:26 pm ET).

22 Rule 102(e) states, in relevant part:

(1) Generally. The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter:

(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or

(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or

(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.

17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1).

23 Commissioner Lee Remarks, supra note 1.

24 Id.

25 Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8150 (Nov. 21, 2002); Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003); see also 2 Legal Malpractice § 14:114 (2022 ed.).

26 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e).  The Rules of Practice generally “govern proceedings before the Commission under the statutes that it administers.” 17 C.F.R. § 201.100.  The SEC has the authority to administer and enforce such rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. See Comment to Rule 100, SEC Rules of Practice (July 2003).

27 In the Matter of William R. Carter Charles J. Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (Feb. 28, 1981) (“elemental notions of fairness dictate that the Commission should not establish new rules of conduct and impose them retroactively upon professionals who acted at the time without reason to believe that their conduct was unethical or improper.  At the same time, however, we perceive no unfairness whatsoever in holding those professionals who practice before us to generally recognized norms of professional conduct, whether or not such norms had previously been explicitly adopted or endorsed by the Commission.  To do so upsets no justifiable expectations, since the professional is already subject to those norms.”).

28 In the past, the Commission has sought to discipline lawyers for violating securities laws with scienter, rendering misleading opinions used in disclosures and engaged in otherwise liable conduct, but not for giving negligent legal advice to issuers. See In the Matter of Scott G. Monson, Release No. 28323 (June 30, 2008) (collecting cases).

29 In the Matter of Steven Altman, Esq., Release No. 63306 (Nov. 10, 2010).

30 Statement of Planned Departure from the Commission (Mar. 15, 2022).

31 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).

32 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).

33 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).

34 Rule 1.3: Diligence, American Bar Association, (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); Rule 1.3 Diligence – Comment 1, American Bar Association,  (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).

35 See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.

36 Rule 1.13: Organization As Client, American Bar Association, cmt. 2  (last visited April 19, 2022).

Article By Jason M. Halper, William P. Mills, Erica Hogan, Adam Magid, James Orth, and Jayshree Balakrishnan of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

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