-
- Spencer Sheehan is a Plaintiff’s attorney who has filed hundreds of class action lawsuits against food companies for allegedly deceptive labeling and marketing. A small percentage of these lawsuits survive the motion to dismiss stage, let alone succeed on the merits. Indeed, many of his losses are suffered many times over as he has a practice of refiling essentially identical lawsuits in different jurisdictions, even after unfavorable rulings.
- His practices have increasingly drawn the ire of the courts, and this summer a United States District Court in Florida issued an order sanctioning him and making him responsible for attorney’s fees in the case.
- Specifically, the Court applied Florida fee shifting statutes, one mandatory and one discretionary, to hold Plaintiff and Sheehan responsible for the legal fees. However, the Court went further and sanctioned Sheehan for bad faith conduct. The Court noted Sheehan’s practice of re-filing failed lawsuits in other jurisdictions after “collect[ing] consumer plaintiffs through social media advertising.” Particularly troublesome to the Court was the contention that Sheehan was not an attorney of record for the Plaintiff even when his name appeared on the pleadings. The Court found that this was part of a broader practice of flagrantly violating court rules and that Sheehan had not been admitted pro hac vice to any of the twelve cases in which he is involved that are currently pending in the same district.
- Briefing in case continues as the Court decides on the final monetary award and whether or not to hold the local Florida counsel jointly responsible.
Tag: Sanctions
Congress Extends Statute of Limitations for Sanctions Violations
What Happened:
On April 24, 2024, President Biden signed into law the Fentanyl Eradication and Narcotics Deterrence (FEND) Off Fentanyl Act, as part of a national security legislative package, which, among other things, amended the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) to extend the statute of limitations for the enforcement of sanctions violations from five years to ten years (the Amendment). The ten-year statute of limitations applies to civil and criminal enforcement for all sanctions programs.
The Bottom Line:
The Amendment changes the lookback period for sanctions compliance from five years to ten years, impacting how sanctions compliance is treated internally at companies with international touchpoints, as well as counterparty diligence in corporate transactions. Companies will need to update their compliance programs to account for the extended period.
The Full Story:
IEEPA authorizes the President of the United States to impose economic sanctions by declaring a national emergency in response to any unusual or extraordinary threat to the national security of the United States that originates outside of the United States. IEEPA authorizes both civil enforcement actions and criminal prosecution against persons found to have violated US sanctions and previously established a five-year statute of limitations on enforcement.
As part of a broader national security package, President Biden signed into law the FEND Off Fentanyl Act on April 24, 2024. The Act requires the President to, among other things, impose sanctions under IEEPA on any person involved in the trafficking of Fentanyl through a forthcoming Fentanyl sanctions regime and amends IEEPA to extend the statute of limitations on enforcement to ten years. Critically, the extended statute of limitations under the Amendment applies not only to the forthcoming Fentanyl sanctions regime, but to almost all sanctions programs administered by the US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The Amendment also impacts other programs authorized under IEEPA, including some programs administered by the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), such as the Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) Program, as well as other programs administered by the Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury.
The Amendment impacts compliance obligations for US companies and others seeking to comply with US sanctions. For example, OFAC regulations implementing US sanctions include record-keeping requirements for financial institutions with respect to certain transactions that currently track the previous five-year limitations period under IEEPA and it is likely that OFAC will amend its regulations to increase record-keeping requirements to ten years. Similarly, OFAC guidance on effective sanctions compliance has pegged recommended record retention periods to the five year limitations period. For example, the “safe harbor” for service providers under the prohibition on maritime services for Russian oil under the Russian oil price cap sanctions requires that persons retain records for five years. It is likely that OFAC will update its guidance to reflect the new ten-year limitations period following the Amendment and companies should carefully consider updates to sanctions compliance programs accordingly.
The Amendment does not address retroactive application. Retroactive criminal prosecution (i.e., for conduct currently beyond the prior five year limitations period) raises constitutional concerns. It is currently unclear whether OFAC will seek to bring civil enforcement actions for conduct already beyond the five-year limitations period.
The new ten-year limitations period should also be considered in conducting sanctions diligence on external counterparties. Companies will need to consider the longer lookback period when evaluating potential mergers and acquisitions and when seeking or providing representations and warranties involving sanctions compliance.
AI Got It Wrong, Doesn’t Mean We Are Right: Practical Considerations for the Use of Generative AI for Commercial Litigators
Picture this: You’ve just been retained by a new client who has been named as a defendant in a complex commercial litigation. While the client has solid grounds to be dismissed from the case at an early stage via a dispositive motion, the client is also facing cost constraints. This forces you to get creative when crafting a budget for your client’s defense. You remember the shiny new toy that is generative Artificial Intelligence (“AI”). You plan to use AI to help save costs on the initial research, and even potentially assist with brief writing. It seems you’ve found a practical solution to resolve all your client’s problems. Not so fast.
Seemingly overnight, the use of AI platforms has become the hottest thing going, including (potentially) for commercial litigators. However, like most rapidly rising technological trends, the associated pitfalls don’t fully bubble to the surface until after the public has an opportunity (or several) to put the technology to the test. Indeed, the use of AI platforms to streamline legal research and writing has already begun to show its warts. Of course, just last year, prime examples of the danger of relying too heavily on AI were exposed in highly publicized cases venued in the Southern District of New York. See e.g. Benajmin Weiser, Michael D. Cohen’s Lawyer Cited Cases That May Not Exist, Judge Says, NY Times (December 12, 2023); Sara Merken, New York Lawyers Sanctioned For Using Fake Chat GPT Case In Legal Brief, Reuters (June 26, 2023).
In order to ensure litigators are striking the appropriate balance between using technological assistance in producing legal work product, while continuing to adhere to the ethical duties and professional responsibility mandated by the legal profession, below are some immediate considerations any complex commercial litigator should abide by when venturing into the world of AI.
Confidentiality
As any experienced litigator will know, involving a third-party in the process of crafting of a client’s strategy and case theory—whether it be an expert, accountant, or investigator—inevitably raises the issue of protecting the client’s privileged, proprietary and confidential information. The same principle applies to the use of an AI platform. Indeed, when stripped of its bells and whistles, an AI platform could potentially be viewed as another consultant employed to provide work product that will assist in the overall representation of your client. Given this reality, it is imperative that any litigator who plans to use AI, also have a complete grasp of the security of that AI system to ensure the safety of their client’s privileged, proprietary and confidential information. A failure to do so may not only result in your client’s sensitive information being exposed to an unsecure, and potentially harmful, online network, but it can also result in a violation of the duty to make reasonable efforts to prevent the disclosure of or unauthorized access to your client’s sensitive information. Such a duty is routinely set forth in the applicable rules of professional conduct across the country.
Oversight
It goes without saying that a lawyer has a responsibility to ensure that he or she adheres to the duty of candor when making representations to the Court. As mentioned, violations of that duty have arisen based on statements that were included in legal briefs produced using AI platforms. While many lawyers would immediately rebuff the notion that they would fail to double-check the accuracy of a brief’s contents—even if generated using AI—before submitting it to the Court, this concept gets trickier when working on larger litigation teams. As a result, it is not only incumbent on those preparing the briefs to ensure that any information included in a submission that was created with the assistance of an AI platform is accurate, but also that the lawyers responsible for oversight of a litigation team are diligent in understanding when and to what extent AI is being used to aid the work of that lawyer’s subordinates. Similar to confidentiality considerations, many courts’ rules of professional conduct include rules related to senior lawyer responsibilities and oversight of subordinate lawyers. To appropriately abide by those rules, litigation team leaders should make it a point to discuss with their teams the appropriate use of AI at the outset of any matter, as well as to put in place any law firm, court, or client-specific safeguards or guidelines to avoid potential missteps.
Judicial Preferences
Finally, as the old saying goes: a good lawyer knows the law; a great lawyer knows the judge. Any savvy litigator knows that the first thing one should understand prior to litigating a case is whether the Court and the presiding Judge have put in place any standing orders or judicial preferences that may impact litigation strategy. As a result of the rise of use of AI in litigation, many Courts across the country have responded in turn by developing either standing orders, local rules, or related guidelines concerning the appropriate use of AI. See e.g., Standing Order Re: Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) in Cases Assigned to Judge Baylson (June 6, 2023 E.D.P.A.), Preliminary Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence by New Jersey Lawyers (January 25, 2024, N.J. Supreme Court). Litigators should follow suit and ensure they understand the full scope of how their Court, and more importantly, their assigned Judge, treat the issue of using AI to assist litigation strategy and development of work product.
G7 Sanctions Enforcement Coordination Mechanism and Centralized EU Sanctions Watchdog Proposed
On Feb. 20, 2023, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Wopke Hoekstra gave a speech titled “Building a secure European future” at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium where he made a plea to “(…) sail to the next horizon where sanctions are concerned.” The Dutch Foreign Minister said European Union (EU) “(…) sanctions are hurting the Russians like hell (…)” but at the same time the measures “(…) are being evaded on a massive scale.” Hoekstra believes this is in part because the EU has too little capacity to analyze, coordinate, and promote the sanctions. However, arguably, there is also a lack of capacity at the EU Member-State level to enforce sanctions.
Against this background the Dutch Foreign Minister proposed to set up a sanctions headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, i.e., a novel watchdog or body to tackle the circumvention of EU sanctions. Such a body might represent the nearest EU equivalent to the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC both implements and enforces U.S. economic sanctions (issuing regulations, licenses, and directives, as well as enforcing through issuing administrative subpoenas, civil and administrative monetary penalties, and making criminal referrals to the U.S. Department of Justice). In Hoekstra’s words:
“A place where [EU] Member States can pool information and resources on effectiveness and evasion. Where we do much more to fight circumvention by third countries. This new HQ would establish a watch list of sectors and trade flows with a high circumvention risk. Companies will be obliged to include end-use clauses in their contracts, so that their products don’t end up in the Russian war machine. And the EU should bring down the full force of its collective economic strength and criminal justice systems on those who assist in sanctions evasion. By naming, shaming, sanctioning, and prosecuting them.”
The Dutch Foreign Minister’s proposal – which is also set out in a separate non-paper – apparently is backed and supported by some 10 or so EU Member States, including Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.
Additionally, on Feb. 23, 2023, the press reported the international Group of Seven (G7) is set to create a new tool to coordinate their enforcement of existing sanctions against the Russian Federation (Russia). The aim of the tool, tentatively called the Enforcement Coordination Mechanism, would be to bolster information-sharing and other enforcement actions.
Background
Like other Members of the G7, the EU has adopted throughout 2022 many economic and other sanctions to target Russia’s economy and thwart its ability to continue with its aggression against Ukraine. Nevertheless, currently EU Member States have different definitions of what constitutes a breach of EU sanctions, and what penalties must be applied in case of a breach. This could lead to different degrees of enforcement and risk circumvention of EU sanctions.
As we have reported previously, on Nov. 28, 2022, the Council of the EU adopted a decision to add the violation of restrictive measures to the list of so-called “EU crimes” set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which would uniformly criminalize sanctions violations across EU Member States. This proposal still needs the backing of EU Member States, which have traditionally been cautious about reforms that require amendments to their national criminal laws.
Next steps
The decision on when and how to enforce EU sanctions currently lies with individual EU Member States, who also decide on the introduction of the EU’s restrictive measures by unanimity. As such, the Dutch Foreign Minister’s proposal requires the backing and support of more EU Member States. If adopted, the new proposed body could send cases directly to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), assuming the separate “EU crimes” legislative piece was also adopted.
Notably, the Dutch Foreign Minister’s proposal appears to suggest a stronger targeting of third countries, which are not aligned with the EU’s sanctions against Russia or help in their circumvention (e.g., Turkey, China, etc.).
Whether or not an EU sanctions oversight body is established, the Dutch proposal signals the current appetite for enhanced multilateral coordination on economic sanctions implementation and tougher, more consistent enforcement of economic sanctions violations. The G7’s proposed Enforcement Coordination Mechanism points in the same direction.
©2023 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.
UK Prohibits Certain Investment in Russia
From 19 July 2022,1 it is a violation of UK financial sanctions for any person who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that they are carrying out, directly or indirectly, certain investment activity in Russia. These prohibitions follow the UK Government’s 6 April 2022 announcement of its intention to introduce an outright ban on all new outward investment in Russia.
The prohibitions are subject to exceptions and do not impact acts undertaken to satisfy obligations under a contract concluded before 19 July 2022, or an ancillary contract necessary for the satisfaction of that contract, subject to notifying Her Majesty’s Treasury at least five working days before the day on which any related act is carried out. There is also the option to apply for a specific Treasury licence, such as to enable humanitarian assistance activity or if connected with the provision of medical goods or services.
Furthermore, General Licence INT/2022/2002560 has been granted, taking effect from 19 July 2022 and expiring on 26 July 2022, allowing a seven-day wind-down period in respect of the prohibited activities.
What Is Prohibited?
The Regulations prohibit:
- Directly or indirectly establishing any joint venture with a person connected with Russia;
- Opening representative offices or establishing branches or subsidiaries in Russia;
- Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in Russian land and persons connected with Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia;
- Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a relevant entity or persons (other than an individual) with a place of business in Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia; and
- The provision of investment services directly related to all the activities summarised above.
Definitions
A “person connected with Russia” means:
- any individual or group of individuals who are ordinarily resident or located in Russia, or an entity which is incorporated or constituted under Russian law or domiciled in Russia;2
and is not:
- A Schedule 2 Entity, as detailed in the Regulations;3 or
- An entity domiciled outside of Russia or a branch, or subsidiary, of such a non-Russian entity.4
A “branch”5 means, in relation to a person other than an individual, a place of business which forms a legally dependent part of that person and which carries out all or some of the transactions inherent in the business of that person.
A “relevant entity”6 means a person, other than an individual, which has a place of busines located in Russia, but is not a person connected with Russia.
A person directly or indirectly “acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a person or entity”7 means:
- Acquiring any share in the person or entity;
- Acquiring any voting rights in the person or entity;
- Acquiring any right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of the person or entity; or
- Acquiring any means of ensuring that the affairs of the person or entity are conducted in accordance with the wishes of the person.
Exceptions
The exceptions8 introduced enables a person to deal directly or indirectly with:
- A transferable security otherwise prohibited by Regulation 16;
- A relevant security issued by a person connected with Russia; or
- A relevant security issued by a relevant entity.
Full definitions of the terms above are included within Regulation 60ZZA.
From 19 July 2022,1 it is a violation of UK financial sanctions for any person who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that they are carrying out, directly or indirectly, certain investment activity in Russia. These prohibitions follow the UK Government’s 6 April 2022 announcement of its intention to introduce an outright ban on all new outward investment in Russia.
The prohibitions are subject to exceptions and do not impact acts undertaken to satisfy obligations under a contract concluded before 19 July 2022, or an ancillary contract necessary for the satisfaction of that contract, subject to notifying Her Majesty’s Treasury at least five working days before the day on which any related act is carried out. There is also the option to apply for a specific Treasury licence, such as to enable humanitarian assistance activity or if connected with the provision of medical goods or services.
Furthermore, General Licence INT/2022/2002560 has been granted, taking effect from 19 July 2022 and expiring on 26 July 2022, allowing a seven-day wind-down period in respect of the prohibited activities.
What Is Prohibited?
The Regulations prohibit:
- Directly or indirectly establishing any joint venture with a person connected with Russia;
- Opening representative offices or establishing branches or subsidiaries in Russia;
- Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in Russian land and persons connected with Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia;
- Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a relevant entity or persons (other than an individual) with a place of business in Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia; and
- The provision of investment services directly related to all the activities summarised above.
Definitions
A “person connected with Russia” means:
- any individual or group of individuals who are ordinarily resident or located in Russia, or an entity which is incorporated or constituted under Russian law or domiciled in Russia;2
and is not:
- A Schedule 2 Entity, as detailed in the Regulations;3 or
- An entity domiciled outside of Russia or a branch, or subsidiary, of such a non-Russian entity.4
A “branch”5 means, in relation to a person other than an individual, a place of business which forms a legally dependent part of that person and which carries out all or some of the transactions inherent in the business of that person.
A “relevant entity”6 means a person, other than an individual, which has a place of busines located in Russia, but is not a person connected with Russia.
A person directly or indirectly “acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a person or entity”7 means:
- Acquiring any share in the person or entity;
- Acquiring any voting rights in the person or entity;
- Acquiring any right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of the person or entity; or
- Acquiring any means of ensuring that the affairs of the person or entity are conducted in accordance with the wishes of the person.
Exceptions
The exceptions8 introduced enables a person to deal directly or indirectly with:
- A transferable security otherwise prohibited by Regulation 16;
- A relevant security issued by a person connected with Russia; or
- A relevant security issued by a relevant entity.
Full definitions of the terms above are included within Regulation 60ZZA.
FOOTNOTES
1 Regulation 18B introduced via The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 12) Regulations 2022 [2022 No. 801], in force as of 19 July 2022.
2 Regulation 19A(2), The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 [2019 No. 855] – as amended.
3 See pp. 123-124.
4 Regulation 16(4D), Ibid.
5 Regulation 18B(8), The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 12) Regulations 2022 [2022 No. 801].
6 Regulation 18B(8), Ibid.
7 Regulation 18B(8), Ibid.
8 Regulation 60ZZA, Ibid.
Russian Sanctions Create Patent Risks
While multi-national sanctions recently imposed on Russia were intended to punish Russia for its aggression in Ukraine, the effects of the sanctions have led to a need for tough decisions for U.S. entities with patent interests in Russia. The prohibitions on financial exchanges with certain Russian banks will essentially prevent any payment of fees to Rospatent (the Russian patent office), and although a general license from the Department of the Treasury provides a short window for winding down certain administrative transactions, U.S. entities engaged in patent transactions with Rospatent only have a short time to make decisions about current and future patent activities in Russia.
Prohibited Activities
On February 28, 2022, the Department of the Treasury initiated prohibitions related to transactions involving certain financial institutions in Russia, including the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.1 The directive specifically prohibits a United States person (unless otherwise excepted or licensed) from engaging in any transaction involving the listed financial institutions, including any transfer of assets to such entities or any foreign exchange transaction for or on behalf of such entities. Under the directive, the prohibitions are specifically worded to include: (1) any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions of the directive; and (2) any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions of the directive.
Notably, the prohibited activities do not expressly prevent any transactions of a U.S. person with Rospatent. And although the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has cut off direct engagement with Rospatent for carrying out activities such as use of the Global Patent Prosecution Highway (GPPH) program2, Rospatent is not currently a sanctioned entity under the directive. This, however, is essentially a distinction without a difference. Moreover, since the USPTO (and also the European Patent Office) has already cut ties with Rospatent, there still remains the possibility that Rospatent itself will be added to the sanctions at a future date and thus completely eliminate any pursuits by U.S. persons with Rospatent.
The current sanctions directly affect entities seeking patent protection in Russia since payments of required fees related to patent applications and granted patents in Russia are processed through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. This includes a number of financial transactions, such as payment of government filings fees for directly filing a patent application in Russia or filing a national phase of an international PCT application in Russia, as well as incidental fees incurred during prosecution of pending Russian patent applications and payment of yearly maintenance fees for issued Russian patents. This would also include payment of yearly maintenance fees for patents obtained through the Eurasian Patent Organization (EAPO) and maintained in Russia since such fees paid to the EAPO must be forwarded to Rospatent. Because of the intertwining of Rospatent with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, any fees paid to Rospatent must be considered equivalent to making a transaction through said bank.
Patent prosecution in Rospatent requires engagement with a Russian patent practitioner. While U.S. entities pursuing patent interests in Russia are unlikely to directly engage Rospatent and pay fees that are ultimately processed through the prohibited bank, it is clear from the directive that strategies, such as routing payments through countries that are neutral in relation to sanctions, are prohibited. As noted above, the directive prohibits any transaction that actually “evades or avoids” the other prohibitions of the directive, as wells as any transaction that “has the purpose of evading or avoiding” the other prohibitions. This language appears to have the potential to ensnare purposeful non-adherence as well as actions that unwittingly end in non-adherence (e.g., forgetting to discontinue an automated payment of a patent maintenance fee to Rospatent).
Deadline for Administrative Transactions
U.S. entities still have time to complete administrative transactions with Rospatent despite the February implementation of the directive. On March 2, 2022, the Department of the Treasury issued a general license authorizing certain transactions that are otherwise prohibited by the directive.3 The license authorizes U.S. persons to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations or certifications to the extent such transactions are prohibited under the directive, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to such persons’ day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation. For at least U.S. entities whose day-to-day operations include securing and maintaining intellectual property, including in Russia, this license provides a window to complete activities and avoid violation of the directive. Currently, the transaction window provided under the license runs through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on June 24, 2022.
Forming a Russian Patent Strategy
The incursion of Russia into Ukraine has been underway for shortly more than one month, but there is no way to know when hostilities may cease. Moreover, even when peace is achieved, it is impossible to know how long the current sanctions against Russia may continue. Those familiar with patent law know that the business of obtaining patents is a deadline-driven venture, and uncertainty of time quickly breaks apart the paradigm. A “wait and see” approach thus has the potential to result in a loss of patent rights as well as possible liability for knowingly or unknowingly engaging in activities that are prohibited under the directive. Anyone engaged in patent activities in Russia thus would be advised to undertake a portfolio review and utilize the time remaining under the General License to form a plan that ensures compliance with the current sanctions. This can include at least the following items.
Anyone engaged in patent activities in Russia thus would be advised to undertake a portfolio review and utilize the time remaining under the General License to form a plan that ensures compliance with the current sanctions.
- Proceeding with Grant of Presently Allowed Applications – For Applicants that have received a Notice of Allowance with a due date after expiration of the General License, one may consider early payment of the fees. This should only be done, however, to the extent that it is possible to confirm that payment will be processed through Rospatent and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation prior to the expiration of the General License on June 24, 2022.
- Annuities on Granted Patents – Any patent annuity paid to Rospatent after the General License expires should be assumed to be in violation of the current sanctions. Patent holders that engage a patent annuity service should contact their provider to confirm that they have a plan in place for compliance with the sanctions. Some annuity services have, in fact, already announced that they will no longer make payments to the Rospatent until further notice. Presumably, for Russian patents with annuities due in 2022, early payment could be made in the hope that normalcy will ensure prior to the deadline in 2023, but such action should only be taken to the extent one can ensure that payment is processed through Rospatent and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation before the deadline. Even then, it may be advisable to consider whether “early” payment of patent annuities would be considered to be “ordinarily incident” to day-to-day operations of a person’s patent pursuits. In the alternative, a patent owner should confirm that any Russian patents are under a “do not pay” order with their annuity provider to avoid an unintentional, automated payment in violation of the sanctions.
- Filing a Direct or National Phase Patent Application – If a new patent application in Russia is planned, or if the deadline for national phase entry of a PCT application is approaching, one may consider early filing prior to the expiration of the General License. This could be done in the hope that a deadline for payment of future fees to Rospatent do not arise before the time that sanctions are lifted. This is seen to be a risky proposition since it is unknown how quickly Rospatent processes paid fees through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, and it is likewise unknown to what extent a fee paid to Rospatent before expiration of the General License but only processed through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation after expiration would be viewed as being in violation of the sanctions. Moreover, if Rospatent itself is later added to the sanctions, any early filings would be at significant risk for abandonment due to an inability to continue transactions with Rospatent.
- Filing Through EAPO as an Alternative to Russia – Russia is one of several countries where patent protection can be secured based on a granted patent from the EAPO. As of this writing, the banks utilized for processing financial transactions for the EAPO (AO UniCredit Bank and AO Raiffeisenbank) are not included in the U.S. sanctions. As such, direct filing or national stage entry with the EAPO can provide an alternate pathway for patent protection in Russia. The cessation of interaction between the USPTO and the EAPO would not have a bearing on this option, but care would need to be taken to ensure that all documents otherwise transferrable directly between the offices are handled by other routes. Once a patent is granted by the EAPO and Russia is elected as a country for maintenance of the patent, annuities paid to the EAPO are forwarded to Rospatent. As such, this alternative pathway is only effective for patents where annuities in Russia would not become due until after lifting of sanctions. As the average length of time for completion of patent prosecution with the EAPO is generally two or more years, one would hope that the current situation in Russia would be resolved within that timeframe. Again, however, uncertainty remains.
- Using Russia as an International Search Authority – Rospatent is one of the limited number of patent offices available for use as the ISA in a PCT application, and Rospatent may be preferred because of the relatively low cost relative to other ISA options. Search fees paid to the World Intellectual Proper Organization (WIPO) are forwarded to Rospatent when chosen as the ISA, and it is not possible to ensure that such fees paid to WIPO will be forwarded to Rospatent, and then to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation before the expiration of the General License deadline. As such, it is recommended to not use Rospatent as the ISA in any PCT application from now until sanctions are lifted.
- Enforcement of Granted Russian Patents – A comprehensive patent strategy in Russia must now also consider the relative value of any Russian patents in light of the recent decree on patent enforceability in Russia.4 Therein, any holder of a Russian Patent from a so-called “unfriendly” foreign state is required to give a mandatory license with no compensation to anyone in Russia wishing to exercise the right of use without consent of the patent owner. As with the entire situation, uncertainty reigns with this decree, and it is impossible to know when (if ever) rights of Russian patent holders from “unfriendly” states will be returned. Accordingly, a Russian patent strategy must consider not only options for proceeding in the near term to secure rights to the extent possible but must also consider the reality that any “rights” that are secured with a Russian patent are of no effect and will be for the foreseeable future.
Next Steps
For anyone with significant patent interests in Russia, time is of the essence for cementing a strategy for moving forward. For some, the most expeditious approach could be to simply close your file on any Russian patents and patent applications. If such approach is taken, careful attention must be made, as noted above, to ensure that any possibility of a fee being paid to Rospatent after June 24, 2022, is eliminated. For others, investments in Russia may not allow for a complete abandonment of possible future patent enforcement rights in Russia. If actions as noted above are taken to “batten down the hatches” of the Russian patent portfolio prior to the deadline in order to weather this storm, timing is again crucial in order to avoid unintentional engagement in sanctioned activities. Also, moving to patent filings through the EAPO as a starting point for Russia can be an effective workaround so long as Russian sanctions get lifted before any patent annuities through an EAPO patent would become due in Russia. Finally, in forming a strategy, one also must consider that even before its recent decree on patent enforceability, Russia was already one of nine countries on the United States Trade Representative (USTR) “Special 301 Report” of trading partners presenting the most significant concerns regarding insufficient IP protection or enforcement or actions that otherwise limited market access for persons relying on intellectual property protection.
1 Directive 4 Under Executive Order 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,” February 28, 2022, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury. See, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/eo14024_directive_4_02282022….
2 USPTO Statement on Engagement with Russia, the Eurasian Patent Organization, and Belarus, March 22, 2022. See, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-statement-engagement-r….
3 General License No. 13, “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 Under Executive Order 14024, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, March 2, 2022. See, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl13.pdf.
4 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 06.03.2022 No. 299 “On Amendments to Clause 2 of the Methodology for Determining the Amount of Compensation Paid to a Patent Owner When Deciding to Use an Invention, Utility Model or Industrial Design without His Consent, and the Procedure for its Payment.” See, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070005?index=0&r…
Apollo Settles Alleged Sanctions Violations: Aircraft Lessors Pay Attention
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury has broad delegated authority to administer and enforce the sanctions laws and related sanctions programs of the United States. As a key component of its enforcement authority, OFAC may investigate “apparent violations” of sanctions laws and assess civil monetary penalties against violators pursuant to five statutes, including the Trading with the Enemy Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.1
An “apparent violation” involves “conduct that constitutes an actual or possible violation of U.S. economic sanctions laws.”2 An OFAC investigation of an “apparent violation” may lead to one or more administrative actions, including a “no action” determination, a request for additional information, the issuance of a cautionary letter or finding of violation, the imposition of a civil monetary penalty and, in extreme cases, a criminal referral.3 Investigations of apparent violations by OFAC often lead to negotiated settlements where a final determination is not made as to whether a sanctions violation has actually occurred.4
Upon the conclusion of a proceeding that “results in the imposition of a civil penalty or an informal settlement” against or with an entity (as opposed to an individual), OFAC is required to make certain basic information available to the public.5 In addition, OFAC may release on a “case-by-case” basis “additional information” concerning the penalty proceeding,6 and it often does. Such additional information will sometimes include informal compliance guidance, cautionary reminders and best practices recommendations. Such information is routinely consumed by corporate compliance officers seeking fresh insight on ever-evolving compliance and enforcement trends, particularly in the context of proceedings relating to industries with which they are involved.
On November 7, 2019, OFAC released enforcement information that has caught the attention of the aircraft leasing community, particularly U.S. aircraft lessors and their owned or controlled Irish lessor subsidiaries.7 The matter involved a settlement by Apollo Aviation Group, LLC8 of its potential civil liability for apparent violations of OFAC’s Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR) that existed in 2014–5.9 Although the amount of the settlement was relatively modest, the enforcement activity by OFAC in the proceeding has attracted scrutiny by aircraft lessors because, for the first time in recent memory, a U.S. aircraft lessor has paid a civil penalty to OFAC for alleged sanctions violations.
At the time of the apparent violations, Apollo was a U.S. aircraft lessor which became involved in two engine leasing transactions that came back to haunt it.
In the first transaction, Apollo leased two jet engines to a UAE lessee which subleased them to a Ukrainian airline with which it was apparently affiliated. The sublessee, in turn, installed both engines on an aircraft that it “wet leased”10 to Sudan Airways, which was on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons within the meaning of the “Government of Sudan.” Sudan Airways used the engines on flights to and from Sudan for approximately four months before they were returned to Apollo when the lease ended. Meanwhile, in a separate transaction, Apollo leased a third jet engine to the same UAE lessee, which subleased the engine to the same Ukrainian airline, which installed the engine on an aircraft that it also wet leased to Sudan Airways. Sudan Airways used the third engine on flights to and from Sudan until such time as Apollo discovered how it was being used and demanded that the engine be removed from the aircraft.
Both leases between Apollo and its UAE lessee contained restrictive covenants “prohibiting the lessee from maintaining, operating, flying, or transferring the engines to any countries subject to United States or United Nations sanctions.”11 Thus, by allowing the engines to be installed by its sublessee on aircraft that were eventually wetleased to Sudan Airways, and flown to and from Sudan during the country’s embargo, the lessee presumably breached the operating restrictions and covenants imposed by Apollo in the leases. Moreover, once Apollo learned that the first two engines had been used, and the third engine was being used, for the benefit of Sudan Airways, it demanded that the third engine be removed from the aircraft that the sub-lessee had wet-leased to Sudan Airways, and this was done.12
One might reasonably conclude from these facts that Apollo acted like a good corporate citizen. So what did Apollo do wrong from a sanctions compliance standpoint?
OFAC stated that Apollo may have violated section 538.201 of the SSR, which at the time “prohibited U.S. persons from dealing in any property or interests in property of the Government of Sudan,”13 as well as section 538.205 of the SSR, which at the time “prohibited the exportation or re-exportation, directly or indirectly, of goods, technology or services, from the United States or by U.S. persons to Sudan.”14
What are the takeaways and possible lessons to be drawn by aircraft lessors from this settlement based upon these alleged violations and the facts upon which they were based?
First, according to OFAC, Apollo did not “ensure” that the engines “were utilized in a manner that complied with OFAC’s regulations,” notwithstanding lease language that effectively required its lessee to comply.15 OFAC is clearly suggesting here that aircraft lessors have a duty to require sanctions compliance by their lessees. And, in view of the fact that many sanctions programs are enforced on a strict liability basis, OFAC’s comment that Apollo failed to “ensure” compliance by its lessee and sublessees makes sense. Apollo was not in a position to avoid civil liability by hiding behind the well-drafted language of its two leases. If a sanctions violation occurred for which Apollo was strictly liable, the mere fact that its lessee’s breach of the lease was the proximate cause of the violation would not provide a safe harbor.
As an example of Apollo’s alleged failure to “ensure” legal compliance, OFAC observed that Apollo did not obtain “U.S. law export compliance certificates from lessees and sublessees,”16 a comment which is somewhat puzzling. To our knowledge, there is nothing in the law requiring a lessor to obtain export compliance certificates, at least not in circumstances where an export or re-export license is not otherwise required in connection with the underlying lease transaction. Moreover, as a practical matter, it would be difficult, at best, for an aircraft lessor to force the direct delivery of certificates from a sublessee or sub-sub-lessee with whom it lacks privity of contract. In view of the foregoing, one assumes that OFAC was looking for Apollo to install procedures by which its lessee would self-report on a regular basis its own compliance (and compliance by downstream sublessees) with applicable export control laws and the relevant sanctions restrictions contained in the lease.
Second, OFAC found that Apollo “did not periodically monitor or otherwise verify its lessee’s and sublessee’s adherence to the lease provisions requiring compliance with U.S. sanctions laws during the life of the lease.”17 In this regard, OFAC observed that Apollo never learned how and where its engines were being used until after the first two engines were returned following lease expiration and a post-lease review of engine records, including “specific information regarding their use and destinations,” actually conducted.
In view of the foregoing, OFAC stressed the importance of “companies operating in high-risk industries to implement effective, thorough and on-going, risk-based compliance measures, especially when engaging in transactions concerning the aviation industry.”18 OFAC also reminded aircraft and engine lessors of its July 23, 2019, advisory warning of deceptive practices “employed by Iran with respect to aviation matters.”19 While the advisory focused on Iran, OFAC noted that “participants in the civil aviation industry should be aware that other jurisdictions subject to OFAC sanctions may engage in similar deception practices.”20 Thus, according to OFAC, companies operating internationally should implement Know Your Customer screening procedures and “compliance measures that extend beyond the point-of-sale and function throughout the entire business of lease period.”21
As a matter of best practices, aircraft lessors should implement risk-based sanctions compliance measures throughout the entirety of a lease period, and most do. Continuous KYC screening by lessors of their lessees and sublessees is a common compliance practice. Periodic reporting by lessees as to the use and destination of leased aircraft and engines appears to be a practice encouraged by OFAC.22 Lessors can also make it a regular internal practice to spot check the movement of their leased aircraft through such web-based platforms as Flight Tracker and Flight Aware. If implemented by lessors, such practices may enable early detection of nascent sanctions risks and violations by their lessees and sublessees.
Finally, OFAC reminded lessors that they “can mitigate sanctions risk by conducting risk assessments and exercising caution when doing business with entities that are affiliated with, or known to transact business with, OFAC-sanctioned persons or jurisdictions, or that otherwise pose high risks due to their joint ventures, affiliates, subsidiaries, customers, suppliers, geographic location, or the products and services they offer.” Such risk assessment is an integral part of the risk-based sanctions compliance program routinely encouraged by OFAC, as outlined in its Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments on May 2, 2019.23 For aircraft and engine lessors, conducting pre-lease due diligence on the ownership and control of prospective lessees and sublessees, as well as the business they conduct, the markets they serve, the equipment they use and the aviation partners with whom they engage, are key to identifying and understanding the sanctions risks that a prospective business opportunity presents.
1 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties, Final Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 27714, 27715 (June 14, 2019).
2 31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A, Section I.A.
3 31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A, Section II.
4 31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A, Section V.C.
5 31 C.F.R. §501.805(d)(1). Such information includes “(A) [t]he name and address of the entity involved, (B) [t]he sanctions program involved, (C) A brief description of the violation or alleged violation, (D) [a] clear indication whether the proceeding resulted in an informal settlement or in the imposition of a penalty, (E) [a]n indication whether the entity voluntarily disclosed the violation or alleged violation to OFAC, and (F) [t]he amount of the penalty imposed or the amount of the agreed settlement.” Id. OFAC communicates all such information through its website. 31 C.F.R. § 501.805(d)(2).
6 31 C.F.R. § 501.805(d)(4).
7 See OFAC Resource Center, Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Apollo Aviation Group, LLC (Nov. 7, 2019) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Page…) (the Settlement Announcement).
8 In December 2018, Apollo was acquired by The Carlyle Group and currently operates as Carlyle Aviation Partners Ltd. According to the Settlement Announcement, neither The Carlyle Group nor its affiliated funds were involved in the apparent violations at issue. See id. at 1 n.1.
9 See 31 C.F.R. Part 538, Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (7-1-15 Edition). Note that most sanctions with respect to Sudan were effectively revoked by general license as of October 2, 2017, thereby authorizing transactions previously prohibited by the SSR during the time period of the apparent violations by Apollo. However, as is true when most sanctions programs are lifted, the general license issued in the SSR program did not “affect past, present of future OFAC enforcements or actions related to any apparent violations of the SSR relating to activities that occurred prior to the date of the general license.” Settlement Announcement at 1 n.2. See also OFAC FAQ 532 (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_other.aspx#sudan_whole).
10 A “wet lease” is “an aviation leasing arrangement whereby the lessor operates the aircraft on behalf of the lessee, with the lessor typically providing the crew, maintenance and insurance, as well as the aircraft itself.” See Settlement Announcement at 1 n.3.
11 Id. at 1.
12 Unfortunately, Apollo did not learn that the first two engines were used in violation of lease restrictions until they were returned following lease expiration and it conducted a post-lease review of the relevant engine records.
13 The alleged application of section 538.201 to Apollo in the circumstances confirms the broad interpretive meaning that OFAC often ascribes to terms such as “interest,” “property,” “property interest” and “dealings,” which appear in many sanctions programs.
14 The alleged application of section 538.205 to Apollo in the circumstances suggests that a U.S. lessor of aircraft and jet engines may be tagged with the “re-export” of such goods and related services from one foreign country to another, notwithstanding the existence of a contractual daisy-chain of lessees, sub-lessees, and/or wetlessees that actually direct and control such flight decisions. In the context of U.S. export control laws, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) define the term “re-export” to include the “actual shipment or transmission of an item subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country, including the sending or taking of an item to or from such countries in any manner.” 15 C.F.R. § 734.14(a)(1). Thus, for export control purposes, the flight of an aircraft subject to the EAR from one foreign county to another foreign country constitutes a “re-export” of the aircraft to that country.
15 Settlement Announcement at 1.
16 Id.
17 Id., at 1–2.
18 Id. at 3. (emphasis added).
19 Id. See OFAC, Iran-Related Civil Aviation Industry Advisory (July 23, 2019) (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190723.aspx)
20 Id.
21 Id. (emphasis added).
22 In Apollo, OFAC reacted favorably to certain steps alleged to have been taken by Apollo to minimize the risk of the recurrence of similar conduct, including the implementation of procedures by which Apollo began “obtaining U.S. law export compliance certificates from lessees and sublessees.” Id.
23 See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/framework_ofac_cc.pdf.
© 2019 Vedder Price
Export Sanctions List: Know Your Customer
If your company sells products to customers or distributors located in foreign countries during this time of sanctions and export controls, you should consider the surprising case of Cobham Holdings Inc. a cautionary tale.
The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) publishes a sanctions list of foreign individuals and entities to which U.S. companies may not sell goods or services without first obtaining an export license. OFAC may fine the U.S. companies that violate these sanction regulations. Prudent companies check the OFAC sanctions list before selling products to foreign customers. In fact, many companies have purchased software that searches the sanctions list for prohibited individuals and entities. If your foreign customer is not found on the sanctions list, your company is free to sell products to that customer.
That’s what Cobham Holdings Inc. thought, but on November 27, 2018 they settled a case with OFAC that involved sales to a foreign customer that was not on the sanctions list. Cobham agreed to pay a fine of $87,507 for exporting approximately $745,000 worth of silicon switches to Almaz Antey Telecommunications LLC in Russia between 2014 and 2015 when that entity was not named on OFAC’s list of “Specifically Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons”. Cobham used software to search for OFAC sanctions, the customer came up clean, and Cobham shipped the goods.
Cobham used the software to search for “Almaz Antey Telecom” but not “Almaz Antey.” If it would have searched for the latter, there were numerous hits for entities under the Almaz Antey umbrella, including the entity allegedly responsible for providing the missile that shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine in 2014. Upon further investigation, OFAC determined that Almaz Antey owned 51% of Almaz Antey Telecommunications LLC. As a result, OFAC initially informed Cobham that it would face potential fines up to $1.9 million.
Cobham was able to reduce the potential fine by agreeing to utilize new and improved screening software, along with a business intelligence tool and new internal checks for high risk transactions. Given that companies now know (or should know) of the potential pitfalls of using these software solutions as a stand-alone procedure, OFAC may not be so generous to the next company to run afoul of its sanctions and export controls through negligence or inadvertent software errors.
This case highlights not only the dangers of exclusively relying on software solutions to search the combined sanctions list, but the inherent risk of the vast number of related entities and the difficulty of understanding their ownership structure. Even if your customers come up clean on the sanctions search, if they are owned more than 50% by a sanctioned entity, then the transaction is still prohibited. Best efforts must be used to ensure that neither the foreign customer nor its majority owner is on the OFAC sanctions list, and a simple software solution or minimal approach may not be enough. A thorough analysis of all relevant facts and information related to your customers and sanctioned entities is vital to ensure your company will not run into the same snare as Cobham.
International Sanctions and the Energy Sector – Part 2: Russia
In the second part of this series we explore the EU and the US sanctions that have been imposed against the Russian energy sector.
RUSSIA
Background
The sanctions regimes against Russia were imposed in response to actual or alleged actions by the Russian government. These included the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine in 2014, plus the alleged malicious cyber activities aimed at interfering with or undermining the 2016 US presidential election.
They initially targeted a number of individuals and companies alleged to be involved in these actions or those close to the Russian government. However, they have since been expanded to include sanctions prohibiting activity in certain sectors of Russia’s economy (in particular its energy industry) and have also targeted a number of the so-called ‘Oligarchs’ and the companies in their control.
More recently, sanctions have been imposed in the wake of the Novichok nerve agent attack in Salisbury, UK.
This article concentrates on the sanctions directly targeting the Russian energy sector.
The EU Sectoral Sanctions
The EU sanctions targeting the Russian energy sector are primarily contained in Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (as amended) (the “EU Regulation”). They seek to inhibit oil exploration and production projects in Russia:
- in waters deeper than 150 meters;
- in the offshore area north of the Arctic Circle; or
- which exploit shale formations by way of hydraulic fracturing.
(the “Targeted Projects”)
The sanctions operate in two key ways. First, by preventing the sale, supply, transfer or export of the items listed in Annex II of the EU Regulation (which includes a number of items that can be used in the exploration or production of oil, for example, drill pipe and casing) by EU persons or from the EU for use in the Targeted Projects.1 Second, by prohibiting the direct or indirect provision of associated services necessary for the Targeted Projects, including: drilling, well testing, logging and completion services; and supply of specialised floating vessels.2
The EU Regulation also prohibits:
- certain dealings, directly or indirectly, with transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days and issued after 12 September 2014 by, or
- the making of loans or credit with a maturity over 30 days to,
certain Russian companies involved in the sale or transportation of crude oil or petroleum products, any non-EU subsidiaries owned 50% or more by them and any person acting on their behalf or at their direction.3 The companies currently listed in the EU Regulation are Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom Neft.
Finally, the EU Regulation states that prior authorisation is required in respect of the provision of certain assistance or financing related to the items listed in Annex II of the EU Regulation to individuals or entities in Russia or if the items are to be used in Russia.4
A separate EU regulation prohibits the sale, supply, transfer or export of certain goods and technology suited for use in the energy sector and for the exploration of oil, gas and mineral resources to Crimea or Sevastopol and any associated assistance of financing.5
The EU sanctions apply to anyone within the EU, any EU national or company incorporated in the EU (wherever they may be physically located), and to any business done in whole or in part in the EU.
The US Sectoral Sanctions
The US sanctions targeting the Russian energy sector are primarily contained in Executive Order 13662 (as amended) (the “Order”) and in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”).
The Order applies to “United States persons”.6 However, it could also apply to non-US persons in respect of any transaction that causes a US person to violate the Order or causes a violation of the Order to occur in the US.
In similar fashion to the EU Regulation, Directive 4 of the Order seeks to inhibit oil exploration and production from the Targeted Projects. It does this by preventing goods, services (other than financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production from being provided to certain restricted entities and their 50% or more subsidiaries.
However, following the introduction of CAATSA in August 2017, the US sectoral sanctions went a step further than their EU counterparts. In particular, CAATSA extended Directive 4 to include oil projects outside Russia in which the restricted Russian entities have a 33% or greater ownership interest or own the majority of the voting rights. The US sectoral sanctions can therefore impact projects located far from Russian borders.
The Order also attacks the ability of key companies in the Russian energy sector to access the international debt markets. Directive 2 of the Order prohibits new debt with a maturity of more than 60 days being issued to certain entities and their 50% or greater subsidiaries.
CAATSA contains various additional provisions impacting the Russian Energy Sector. In particular, it provides for the:
- mandatory imposition of sanctions on non-US persons who knowingly7 make a significant investment8 in a project intended to extract crude oil from deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale projects in Russia (section 225); and
- discretionary imposition of sanctions on a person (not limited to US persons) who knowingly:
- makes an investment of $1 million or more (or an aggregate value of $5 million or more over a 12‑month period), which directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of the ability of Russia to construct energy export pipelines; or
- provides goods, services, technology, information or support to Russia, which could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernisation or repair of energy export pipelines. (section 232)
That section 232 refers to “energy export pipelines” is significant. Unlike the previous sanctions targeting the oil sector, section 232 could be applied to pipelines carrying Russian gas, large amounts of which are imported by the EU.
These additional provisions purport to have extraterritorial effect, which means they are of concern to non-US persons who are otherwise outside the US jurisdiction. Any non-US persons breaching these provisions may become subject to secondary sanctions that would severely restrict their ability to do business with the US and to access the US financial system, and therefore the international financial system.
The Reaction of Energy Companies
The sanctions imposed on the Russian energy sector have received mixed reactions among energy companies. The differences between the EU and US sanctions, most especially the manner in which they are enforced, has led to the perception that US companies are more affected than their European counterparts.
Mostly, however, energy companies have been able to progress their projects unimpeded by the sanctions. This likely reflects the types of projects being progressed in Russia since the sanctions came into force.
The EU and US sectoral sanctions target oil exploration and production from deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale projects in Russia. Such projects are complicated and require the adoption of advanced techniques and technologies. Accordingly, they are typically more expensive than, for example, conventional shallow water or onshore drilling operations. Projects of this nature therefore tend to be uneconomic in periods of lower oil prices, such as those experienced since 2014. For these reasons, it is possible that such projects might not have been pursued since 2014 even in the absence of sanctions.
In fact, Russian oil production has increased from 10.86 million barrels per day in 2014 to 11.23 million barrels per day in 2017, making it the world’s third largest producer in 2017 behind the US and Saudi Arabia.9 This is a clear indication that the sanctions have not had a significant impact on the Russian energy sector’s ability to produce crude.
Looking Forward
It is questionable whether the sanctions imposed on Russia’s energy sector have been effective. They have not, it seems, prevented Russia from increasing its production of oil. Neither have they prevented all deepwater, Arctic or shale projects from being progressed. However, with higher oil prices than when the sanctions first took effect, the economics of such projects should become more palatable and Russia may begin to feel the impact of the sanctions to greater extents.
Furthermore, the extraterritorial aspects of CAATSA are likely to begin affecting the appetite of non-US persons to make significant investments in Russian energy export pipelines or in Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale projects. There is also the risk of further sanctions. The US Energy Secretary, Rick Perry, recently indicated that sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline are possible and that further energy‑related sanctions are planned.10 In addition, further sanctions on Russia in relation to the Novichok nerve agent attack in Salisbury, UK are expected, although it is not yet clear what form they will take and whether they will target Russia’s energy sector.11
In the first part of this three part series we considered the impact of President Trump’s decision to re-impose sanctions on Iran’s energy sector with effect from 5 November 2018.
________________________________________________________________
1 Article 3 of the EU Regulation.
2 Article 3a of the EU Regulation.
3 Articles 5(2) and 5(3) of the EU Regulation.
4 Article 4.3(a) of the EU Regulation.
5 Article 2(b) of Regulation EU No 692/2014.
6 United States persons is defined as “any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States” (Section 6(c) of Executive Order 13662).
7 “Knowingly” for these purposes means a person who had actual knowledge, or who should have known, of the conduct, circumstance or result.
8Guidance from the US Department of State that whether or not an investment is “significant” will be determined on a case by case basis taking into account inter aliathe nature and magnitude of the investment and its relation and significance to the Russian Energy Sector.
9here.
10here.
11 here.
United States Imposes Additional Sanctions Against Russian Entities and Individuals
On April 6, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced expanded sanctions against Russian entities and individuals, targeting a number of Russian oligarchs in the energy, banking, and other sectors and companies they own or control, as well as 17 senior Russian government officials. The Treasury Department also issued a detailed press release outlining the rationale for each of these designations. Given the prominence of the targeted oligarchs in Russian business and the extent of their business holdings, as well as the size and importance of the targeted companies in the Russian economy, the action could have a significant impact on companies doing business in Russia.
The OFAC action blocks the property and interests in property of the targeted entities and individuals when it comes into the United States or the possession or control of a U.S. person, and also prohibits virtually all dealings or transactions by U.S. persons with the targeted parties, who are now on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”). The sanctions also apply to entities that are owned 50 percent or more by sanctioned persons, including the newly sanctioned parties. Non-U.S. persons also could be impacted by the new designations, through potential exposure to secondary sanctions for undertaking significant transactions with these parties.
The action follows the enactment last year of the Countering Americas Adversaries through Sanctions Act of 2017 (“CAATSA”), as discussed in our client alert, which imposed certain sanctions on Russia that apply to U.S. and non-U.S. companies, and the release earlier this year of an Administration report to Congress that identified Russian oligarchs, as called for in CAATSA. A number of the individuals sanctioned in today’s action were identified in that report.
At the same time it announced the new designations, OFAC also issued two general licenses. One authorizes U.S. persons doing business with certain of the newly sanctioned entities to wind down their activities between now and June 5, 2018. The other general license authorizes U.S. persons to divest or transfer debt, equity, or other holdings in three of the blocked entities to non-U.S. persons (other than sanctioned parties) between now and May 7, 2018. OFAC also issued related guidance on these actions in the form of responses to new Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”).
Companies and Individuals Targeted by the Sanctions
The new sanctions were imposed under existing Executive Orders, but follow from the enactment last year of CAATSA, which among other things required (in CAATSA Section 241) that the Administration report to Congress on significant “senior political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation.” This report, filed with Congress on January 29, 2018, did not entail the imposition of sanctions against the individuals identified in the report. At the time, however, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin warned that some of the individuals could be later targeted for sanctions, saying that “there will be sanctions that come out of this report.”
Today’s designations target several individuals included in the CAATSA Section 241 report, and others who are closely tied to Russian President Vladimir Putin. In total, 26 individuals and 15 entities were designated today (including several non-Russian parties designated under sanctions authorities related to narcotics trafficking and several Russian parties designated for activities involving Syria).
Among the designated Russian oligarchs are close associates of President Putin who are operating in the energy sector, such as Vladimir Bogdanov, Director General and Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Surgutneftegaz; Victor Vekselberg, the founder and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Renova Group; Oleg Deripaska, the founder of
Russia’s largest industrial group Basic Element, which includes EN+ and Rusal; Igor Rotenberg, the son of previously sanctioned Arkady Rotenberg and owner of the gas drilling company,
Gazprom Burenie; and Kirill Shamalov, who married President Putin’s daughter in 2013 and is a minority shareholder of SIBUR.
Among the sanctioned Russian government officials are top managers of state companies and financial institutions, such as Alexey Miller, the Chairman of the Management Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gazprom; Andrey Akimov, the Chairman of the
Management Board of Gazprombank; and Andrey Kostin, the President, Chairman of the Management Board, and Member of the Supervisory Council of VTB Bank. Additionally, the sanctioned Russian Senator, Suleiman Kerimov, is connected to Russia’s largest gold producer, Polyus, and Duma member Andrei Skoch has ties to USM Holdings.
Notably, Russia’s major state-owned weapons trading company, Rosoboronexport, also was designated for asset-blocking for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the Government of Syria. Previously, Rosoboronexport had been targeted only by U.S. sectoral sanctions that restricted U.S. person dealings in new debt of Rosoboronexport of greater than 30 days’ maturity.
As noted above, the addition of these entities and individuals to OFAC’s SDN List has several important ramifications.
First, U.S. persons are required to block the property and interests in property—as broadly defined—of these parties when it comes into the United States or the possession or control of U.S. persons. A “U.S. person” for these purposes is a U.S. entity and its non-U.S. offices and branches; individual U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (“green-card” holders), no matter where located or by whom employed; and non-U.S. persons when present in or operating from the United States. Funds of SDNs that are blocked must be placed into segregated, “frozen” accounts and reported to OFAC within 10 business days.
Second, U.S. persons are broadly prohibited from transacting or dealing with SDNs, unless authorized by OFAC (such as through the two new general licenses described below or specific licenses issued by OFAC).
As noted above, the above-described restrictions extend not just to listed persons, but also to entities in which those persons own a 50 percent or greater interest, individually or collectively with other SDNs. The application of this long-standing OFAC rule is particularly significant here, where the named individuals have wide-ranging business holdings, since the sanctions on the designated oligarchs also apply to any companies in which they, individually or with other sanctioned parties, own a 50 percent or greater interest.
The designations also can impact non-U.S. persons dealing with the designated parties, as more fully described below.
New General Licenses
To minimize immediate disruptions to U.S. persons from these designations, OFAC issued General License 12,which temporarily authorizes all transactions and activities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the maintenance or “wind down” of operations, contracts, or other agreements, including the importation of goods, services, or technology into the United States involving one or more blocked entities identified in the general license.
For those entities listed on General License 12, U.S. persons may, until June 5, 2018, permissibly wind down operations, contracts, or agreements in effect prior to April 6, 2018. This General License also would apply to any entity owned 50 percent or more by entities listed in the General License. In FAQs issued with the new sanctions designations, OFAC explains that the blocked entities listed in General License 12 may, for the duration of the General License, make salary and pension payments, and provide other benefits, to U.S. persons. In addition, U.S. persons may continue to provide services to the listed entities until the License expires. General License 12 also permits U.S. persons to import goods into the United States from blocked entities listed on General License 12.
Significantly, although wind-down activities would include accepting payments from the enumerated entities, General License 12 clarifies that U.S. persons may not make payments to such entities; instead, any payments to, or for the direct or indirect benefit of, a blocked person—whether listed in General License 12 or not—must be deposited in a blocked, interestbearing account located in the United States. Therefore, although the new FAQs explain that U.S. persons may import goods into the United States from blocked entities listed on General License 12 until its expiration, any outstanding payments for such goods must be deposited into a blocked account.
Importantly, the list of blocked persons with whom U.S. persons may conduct wind-down activities is not coextensive with the newly designated individuals and entities. Instead, General License 12 covers only 12 of the 15 newly designated entities. It omits three newly designated entities—Gallistica Diamante, Rosoboronexport, and Russian Financial Corporation, each of which was designated under authorities other than those related to Russia—and all newly designated individuals. Therefore, General License 12 does not permit wind-down activities with these three entities, with any of the newly designated individuals, or with any entity owned 50 percent or more by the designated persons and not separately listed on General License 12.
OFAC also issued General License 13, which authorizes transactions and activities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to divest or transfer debt, equity, or other holdings in three blocked entities to a non-U.S. person (other than a sanctioned party), or to facilitate the transfer of debt, equity, or other holdings in those same three entities by a non-U.S. person to another non-U.S. person (other than a sanctioned party). General License 13 applies only to three of the newly designated entities: EN+ Group PLC, GAZ Group, and United Company RUSAL PLC. General License 13 expires on May 7, 2018.
The activities permitted by General License 13 include facilitating, clearing, and settling transactions to divest to a non-U.S. person debt, equity, or other holdings in the blocked persons, including on behalf of U.S. persons. The License does not authorize unblocking any property other than as described above, or for U.S. persons to sell debt, equity, or other holdings to, or to invest in the debt, equity, or other holdings in, any blocked person, including those listed on General License 13. (It also prohibits facilitating any such transactions.)
With respect to both General License 12 and General License 13, U.S. persons participating in transactions authorized by the licenses must file detailed reports with OFAC within 10 days of the applicable General License’s expiration. Those reports must include the names and addresses of the parties involved, the type and scope of activities conducted, and the dates on which the activities occurred. Reports under General License 12 are due on June 15, 2018, and reports under General License 13 are due on May 17, 2018.
Secondary Sanctions under CAATSA Sections 226 and 228
In addition to the direct implications for U.S. persons associated with the new SDN
designations, there are certain secondary sanctions risks for non-U.S. parties that have dealings with these parties.
Section 228 of CAATSA, in amending earlier legislation, requires that asset-blocking sanctions be imposed against non-U.S. persons that knowingly “facilitate a significant transaction…, including deceptive or structured transactions, for or on behalf of…any person subject to sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to the Russian Federation.” This would include any of the newly added SDNs or parties owned 50 percent or more, individually or collectively, by SDNs. And Section 226 of CAATSA, again amending earlier legislation, requires the imposition of mandatory secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions if the Treasury Department determines that they have knowingly facilitated “significant financial transactions” on behalf of any Russian person added to OFAC’s SDN List pursuant to existing Ukrainerelated authorities. In particular, foreign financial institutions can lose the ability to maintain or open U.S. correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts as a consequence of certain dealings with the individuals or entities designated today.
OFAC’s FAQ guidance clarifies the scope of these secondary sanctions authorities. Among other things, FAQ 545 provides that “facilitating” a transaction for or on behalf of a sanctioned person means “providing assistance for a transaction from which the person in question derives a particular benefit of any kind,” and sets out factors OFAC will consider in evaluating whether a transaction is “significant.” It also provides that a transaction is not “significant” if a U.S. person would not require a specific license from OFAC to conduct the transaction.
FAQ 542 provides guidance on the term “significant financial transaction” in the context of secondary sanctions against foreign financial institutions. It confirms, among other things, that “OFAC will generally interpret the term ‘financial transaction’ broadly to encompass any transfer of value involving a financial institution.” This would include, but is not limited to, the receipt or origination of wire transfers; the acceptance or clearance of commercial paper; the receipt or origination of ACH or ATM transactions; the holding of nostro, vostro, or loro accounts; the provision of trade finance or letter of credit services; the provision of guarantees or similar instruments; the provision of investment products or instruments or participation in investment; and any other transactions for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person serving as a correspondent, respondent, or beneficiary. FAQ 542 also provides that a transaction is not “significant” if a U.S. person would not require a specific license from OFAC to conduct the transaction.
In this regard, new FAQ 547 confirms that activity authorized by new General Licenses 12 and 13, if occurring within the time period authorized in these general licenses, would not be considered “significant” for purposes of a secondary sanctions determination. The new FAQ guidance also emphasizes that the “intent” of the new designations is to “impose costs on Russia for its malign behavior.” It indicates that the U.S. government “remains committed to coordination with our allies and partners in order to mitigate adverse and unintended consequences of these designations.”
© 2018 Covington & Burling LLP
Peter Flanagan, Corrine Goldstein, Peter Lichtenbaum, Kimberly Strosnider, David Addis, Stephen Rademaker, Elena Postnikova, and Blake Hulnick of Covington & Burling LLP