Tag: Russia

Increased Sanctions on North Korea Focus on China and Russia

Last week, President Obama significantly increased sanctions on North Korea through Executive Order 13722, which implements the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (H.R. 757). The Executive Order’s prohibitions and blocking provisions, and designation criteria are substantially more expansive than that Act. Concurrently with the issuance of the Executive Order, OFAC announced the designations of 17 North Korean government officials and organizations, 15 entities, two individuals, and identified 40 blocked vessels under various sanctions authorities.

While neither Congress nor the President imposed secondary sanctions per se, China and Russia should  interpret the Executive Order as a clear warning about their economic ties with North Korea. In the Iran sanctions program, secondary sanctions require that a foreign financial institution “knowingly facilitate or conduct a significant financial transaction” for a particular individual or entity. This evidentiary standard greatly limited the use of those sanctions authorities. The new sanctions against North Korea are clearly aimed at foreign business interests, but unlike secondary sanctions, this new authority does not have an evidentiary impediment to its implementation.

Transportation, Mining, Energy, and Financial Services

Subsection 2(a)(i) of the Executive Order authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to identify industries in the North Korean economy, the participants of which may be designated solely based on their operating within that industry. The Secretary of the Treasury determined that entities within the transportation, mining, energy, and financial services industries are subject to designation. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) then designated Ilsim International Bank and Korea United Development Bank for operating in the financial services industry.

OFAC’s authority to derivatively designate any bank that provides services to any identified North Korean bank creates de facto secondary sanctions. Executive Order 13722 authorizes OFAC to designate any individual or entity that provides services to any identified Korean bank. Therefore, any financial institution that provides an identified North Korean bank with an account, serves as an intermediary, confirms or advises a letter of credit, or provides any other service can be designated. The most likely targets of these derivative actions are Russian and Chinese financial institutions.

North Korean Slave Labor and Coal

The Executive Order authorizes OFAC to designate businesses that “have engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for the exportation of workers from North Korea, including exportation to generate revenue for the Government of North Korea.” According to open source reporting, North Korea has between 50,000 and 100,000 “state-sponsored slaves” predominantly located in China and Russia. The North Korean regime earns between $1.2 and $2.3 billion annually in foreign currency through these slave laborers. Apart from the appalling human rights violations, this practice finances the North Korean nuclear and missile development programs.

In addition to companies that utilize North Korean slave labor, entities that deal in metal, graphite, coal, or software to or from North Korea are now subject to designation, “where any revenue or goods received may benefit the Government of North Korea.” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 of March 2, 2016 address the sale of coal and iron from North Korea, but in a very limited manner. Unlike the United States sanctions program, the prohibitions do not apply to transactions  “exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs.” As a result of these substantial limitations, any application of the sanctions on coal and iron are likely to be enforced unilaterally by the United States.

Chinese companies are clearly the most susceptible to this designation criteria. According to the press release announcing the Executive Order and designations, “coal generates over $1 billion in revenue per year for North Korea.” Open source reporting also indicates that in 2015, North Korea supplied China with 19.63 metric tons of coal.

Return to a Comprehensive Sanctions Program

In addition to the designation criteria highlighted above, Executive Order 13722 also transitions U.S. sanctions against North Korea back into a comprehensive sanctions program. All property and interests in property of the North Korean government are now blocked, and the Department of Commerce licensing requirements are now supplemented with a prohibition on the exportation of goods and services.

OFAC released a series of 9 General Licenses to address issues that commonly arise from comprehensive programs. These include authorization of certain legal services, certain services in support of nongovernmental organizations,  transactions related to intellectual property, and noncommercial personal remittances.

Article By Jeremy P. Paner of Holland & Hart LLP.
Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.

Russia’s New Advanced Development Territories Law: Far East Focus

An initiative to spur investment in this underdeveloped region.

Amid the ongoing loud noise surrounding the situation in Ukraine (and in Syria) and the related sanctions and counter-sanctions, a new Russian development initiative seems to have slipped under the radar. But it is worthy of note—particularly for potential investors in Russia’s Far East. This has all the more potential importance in the context of Russia’s recent pronounced political and economic pivot toward Asia. The Law on Advanced Development Territories (the ADT Law, or the Law), enacted in December 2014 and entered into force in spring 2015 (and the related simultaneously adopted acts that make corresponding amendments to the Tax Code and some 20 other laws) set out the “rules of the road” for these ADTs.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and other top officials at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September spotlighted this ADT program prominently. A number of new projects were announced at that forum or earlier, and most recently at an international forum in Harbin, China.

In a separate related development, in July, a so-called “Free Port of Vladivostok” was established within Vladivostok city and a few neighboring municipalities – which provides benefits and incentives to investors similar to the ADT Law, and with an enhanced exemption regime for customs clearance and immigration. The fiscal benefits of the Vladivostok free port come into force in January 2016, but a major Korean conglomerate is reported to be eyeing this opportunity.

Background

The ADT regime is somewhat similar to Russia’s existing Special Economic Zones (SEZ), which came into being under the 2005 Law on SEZs and some earlier regulations. These programs have had only mixed success. But the central focus of the new ADT regime is different: while SEZs have been aimed primarily at spearheading various industries (such as innovative technologies, ports, or recreational complexes), the ADTs are to address the general unevenness in development across Russia’s vast territory by incentivizing investment in more depressed areas—starting with the underpopulated and relatively neglected Far East.

As initially drafted, the ADT Law was to be confined to the Far Eastern Federal District alone. This geographical limit no longer applies so generally under the Law as enacted. But for the first three years, under special transitional provisions, it will apply only in the Far East and in certain sole-core-employer cities “where the social and economic situation is particularly drastic.”

The Law further directs the government to appoint a special authorized body (AB) charged with various ADT supervisory and planning functions. So far only the new Ministry of Eastern Development (established in 2012) has been appointed as such an AB—for the Far Eastern Federal District. For all practical purposes the Law will apply essentially in the Far East, at least initially. The Ministry has already adopted various implementing regulations envisaged under the Law. Further, Deputy Prime Minister Yury Trutnev, who is also the president’s plenipotentiary in the Far Eastern Federal District, has pledged strong support for the ADT program alongside other measures for development of Russia’s Far East.

As of September, the government has already approved the establishment of nine ADTs, including Komsomolsk (in the Khabarovsky Krai), Khabarovsk (covering several districts within Khabarovsk City and elsewhere), Nadezhdinskaya (in the Primorsky Krai), and some others in Kamchatka, Yakutia, and Amurskaya Oblast. The first specific ADT projects announced at the Vladivostok Forum and on other occasions (taking into account the most recent Harbin EXPO) include the following:

  • Construction of a bitumen plant by a Chinese-owned Singapore company together with Russia’s Independent Petroleum Co. (NNK) in the Khabarovsk ADT
  • An Australian coal company’s proposed investment into the transport infrastructure of the Beringovsky ADT in Chukotka
  • Recreational infrastructure facilities (including a golf club) to be financed and constructed by a Japanese company in Vladivostok
  • A proposed major agricultural enterprise investment by Russian interests at Mikhailovsky ADT in Primorsky Krai (the precise location is not yet identified)
  • German investors’ readiness to provide some 20 billion rubles to the Kamchatka ADT
  • A planned 50 billion rubles investment for infrastructure development in the Primorsky ADT
  • A coal-loading terminal to be constructed by Sakhatrans in Khabarovsky Krai (estimated investment of 30 billion rubles)
  • A truck-building plant (and dealership and service centers) project to be undertaken together by Chinese Sinotruk and the Far-Eastern Road and Construction Company in the Komsomolsk ADT

Government Decree

Under the Law, an ADT is created by a government decree for a term of 70 years. Such decrees are based on a proposal by the Authorized Body. This proposal, in turn, is supposed to be based on preliminary agreements with one or more prospective investors into the planned ADT. A special federal government commission will also play a role in ADT selection and formation.

The relevant government decree will set out the main ADT parameters, including its territorial limits (no overlap with an SEZ is allowed), types of commercial activities eligible for benefits to ADT residents (in contrast to SEZs, there are no economic sector limits for such activities are established in the Law), minimum investment and technology requirements, and a few other aspects. These decrees presumably will take into account the preliminary agreements with prospective investors mentioned above.

Tripartite Agreement

After the base government decree is adopted, the AB (again, for practical purposes, this is the Ministry of Eastern Development for now) and the relevant regional and municipal authorities are to enter into a tri-partite agreement to regulate various obligations and procedures for the ADT in question. This includes the regional and municipal authorities’ obligations on transferring of land plots and facilities into ownership by or lease to the management company (see immediately below on this point) or granting the management company the authority to manage such land plots and facilities, financing and operation of the infrastructure facilities, the conditions for granting property and land tax holidays to ADT residents (see more on tax and other exemptions below), and other aspects.

Management Company

An important player in an ADT’s actual functioning is its management company (MC). Under the Law, an MC is a 100% federally owned joint stock company that is designated as such by the government. An MC will have a broad range of powers, authority, and functions for its ADT(s). For example, an MC will (itself or by delegation to a subsidiary) do the following:

  • Act as an infrastructure construction customer (in Russian, zastroischik)
  • Ensure or organize the functioning of the ADT infrastructure
  • Take ownership or lease of federally or municipally owned land plots, buildings, and various infrastructure facilities (on certain conditions)
  • Facilitate connection into the utilities networks for ADT residents and service providers
  • Draft proposals for relevant amendments to municipal and other zoning plans
  • Organize the construction of roads and installation of infrastructure facilities
  • Provide various services to ADT residents

The government has already appointed a joint stock company Korporatiya Razvitiya Dalnego Vostoka (in English, Far East Development Corp.) as such an MC—again, with respect to the whole Far East District.

ADT “Residents”

To become an ADT resident, a commercial company (or individual entrepreneur) needs to file an application with the MC that includes a business plan and proposal for the types of activities to be performed and the level of investments and then enter into an activities performance agreement with the MC reflecting the investment obligations as well as the MC’s obligations. The Ministry of Eastern Development in its capacity as AB has already approved a template of such agreement following the ADT Law guidelines. Per the Law, once an ADT is established and running, there are limits to the grounds for an MC to reject an application and refuse to enter into a contract with a potential resident. The main (and quite general) recognized ground is inconsistency between the applicant’s proposal and the ADT’s particular parameters. It remains to be seen how the activity agreements will be negotiated in practice, as more experience is gathered for substantial new proposed investments.

ADT residents will be incentivized by an array of fiscal and administrative measures, including the following:

  • Exemption from or reduction of taxes on corporate profit, mineral extraction, and property and land
  • Customs free zone (if approved by the decree enacting the ADT)
  • Reduction of Social Security payments
  • A system of special protections and guarantees regarding state supervision (only “joint inspections” by various authorities, to be conducted per a schedule approved by the AB, etc.)
  • Exemption from foreign employee quota (if approved by the ADT’s supervisory council)
  • Reduction of educational and medical care administrative burdens (including admission of foreign-trained doctors and use of best foreign educational methods)

Some of these incentives are fairly similar to those applied to SEZs, including tax and customs holidays and state-inspection limitations.

Conclusion

The new ADT Law appears to open real new investment opportunities, primarily in the Far East. Yet one should be mindful of various restrictions in using this Law’s benefits—including that the potential resident has to be registered within the ADT territory and, if it is a commercial company, it may not have branches or other subdivisions outside of the ADT  (sister companies are permitted). More preconditions apply to the associated tax benefits under the revised Tax Code. Time will tell how effective the ADT Law will be in attracting much-needed new investment to Russia’s Far East.

Article By Jonathan H. Hines & Alexander V. Marchenko of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
Copyright © 2015 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

New U.S. Restrictions on Russia: OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) Guidance and Industry-Specific Sanctions

Sheppard Mullin Law Firm

OFAC Expands the 50 Percent Rule

Last month, the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released new guidance related to entities owned or controlled by persons designated as a Specially Designated National (SDN) on OFAC’s SDN list.  Although the guidance leaves intact the current meaning “50 percent rule,” the rule will now allow OFAC to take a far broader approach in determining when the 50 percent rule applies.

Under the 50 percent rule, as it stood before the August 13 release of the updated guidance, all entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an SDN (i.e., any entity of which an SDN owns 50 percent or more) are considered designated by operation of law and must be treated as SDNs.  Thus, companies owned or controlled by SDNs are blocked, even if they are not themselves specifically listed on the SDN list.  It is unlawful for U.S. persons to conduct virtually any business with any SDN.

In a major expansion of the 50 percent rule, OFAC will now aggregate the ownership interests of SDNs when it determines whether the rule applies.  Specifically, the new guidance provides that “any entity owned in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or moreblocked persons is itself considered to be a blocked person” (emphasis added).  According to OFAC’S updated Frequently Asked Questions on the issue, “if Blocked Person X owns 25 percent of Entity A, and Blocked Person Y owns another 25 percent of Entity A, Entity A is considered to be blocked.”  Taken to the logical conclusion, the new approach means that an entity owned or controlled by a large number of SDNs, each with a small interest in the entity itself, may nonetheless be designated, and afforded the same regulatory treatment, as an SDN.

Notably, OFAC did not provide for a transition period as the new rule takes effect, nor is there any mention of a general authorization for companies to end involvement in now-potentially prohibited transactions.

More than ever, companies must focus on conducting appropriate due diligence when operating in the universe of potentially covered persons, entities, or transactions.  Due to the expansion of potentially blocked entities, American companies must determine what policies and procedures need to be in place for vetting would-be business partners before engaging in any transaction, so they do not inadvertently conduct unlawful business with SDNs.

Russian Industry Sector Sanctions

Separately, On August 6, 2014, the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule amending the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the most aggressive set of export controls against Russia in recent memory.  In short, the new rules will deny export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) licenses for certain dual-use items for use in Russia’s energy sector.

Specifically, under the new EAR section 746.5 and amendments to other sections, a license is now required to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) certain items when the exporter “knows or is informed that the item will be used directly or indirectly in Russia’s energy sector for exploration or production from deepwater …, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia that have the potential to produce oil or gas or is unable to determine whether the item will be used in such projects in Russia.”

The “certain items” referred to in the regulation include two classes of products: (1) any item subject to the EAR listed in Supplement No. 2 to Part 746, including fifty-two specific products listed by Schedule B number; and (2) any item specified in the following Export Control Classification Numbers: 0A998, 1C992, 3A229, 3A231, 3A232, 6A991, 8A992, or 8D999.  BIS includes the following list of illustrative examples of restricted products: “drilling rigs, parts for horizontal drilling, drilling and completion equipment, subsea processing equipment, Arctic-capable marine equipment, wireline and down hole motors and equipment, drill pipe and casing, software for hydraulic fracturing, high pressure pumps, seismic acquisition equipment, remotely operated vehicles, compressors, expanders, valves, and risers.”

With the exception of License Exception GOV, which authorizes certain exports and reexports to U.S. and foreign governmental agencies and intergovernmental organizations, no license exceptions are available to fulfill the new licensing requirement.  Thus, all exports of the restricted products will require a BIS license for export or reexport to Russia, regardless of whether those products were formerly exportable to Russia with no license required.  Further, the new BIS rule imposes a presumption of denial for license applications “when there is potential for use directly or indirectly for exploration or production” from deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia with the potential to produce oil.

The final rule does not contain a savings clause. That means any restricted products exported to Russia without a license on or after August 6 may be considered violations, even if the products were formerly exported under a license exception.

Those companies exporting items used in the exploration or production of oil or gas should immediately determine whether any of the products they export, reexport, or transfer to Russian end-users (or intermediaries with constructive or direct knowledge that the ultimate end-user is in Russia) are restricted products as defined in the new rule.  If so, companies should understand the implications of the new licensing requirements and the presumption of denial for license applications.  Further, if your company is unable to determine whether your products are used in the end-uses defined in the rule, the rule requires that such products be considered subject to the licensing requirements.  Thus, unless you can affirmatively determine that your products are not to be used for the energy-related activities defined in the rule, then your company should assume that its products are subject to the licensing requirements.

ARTICLE BY

J. Scott Maberry
Matthew L. Riemer
OF
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
Copyright © 2014, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

U.S. And EU Significantly Expand Sanctions and Export Control Restrictions Targeting Russia

In response to Russia’s continuing actions to destabilize Ukraine, the United States and EU took coordinated and significant steps on September 12, 2014, to expand and intensify sanctions targeting the Russian energy, defense, and financial services sectors. In tandem, the United States and EU also imposed additional restrictions on energy-related exports to certain entities in Russia, and the EU introduced new trade controls relating to certain dual-use exports.

In the United States, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) took three steps that target the Russian energy sector:

  • First, OFAC imposed a prohibition on the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: the provision, export, or reexport of goods, services (other than financial services), or technology in support of deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale exploration or production projects that: (1) have the potential to produce oil in or offshore of Russia; and (2) involve any of five major Russian energy companies: Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, or Surgutneftegas. U.S. parties impacted by these new sanctions have two weeks to wind down their activities with these Russian firms, under the terms of a new general license.

  • Second, BIS imposed a license requirement for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer to these same five Russian companies of any item subject to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) if the exporter, reexporter, or transferor knows that the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia. This action – achieved by naming these companies to the BIS Entity List – represents an expansion of the previous BIS restrictions relating to Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, and shale oil and gas projects, which we reviewed in our e-alert of July 30, 2014.

  • Third, OFAC added two Russian energy companies–Gazprom Neft and Transneft–tothegroup of companies whose ability to issue new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days is restricted. Those restrictions on new debt, which apply to U.S. persons and persons in the United States who transact in, provide financing for, or otherwise deal in such debt, were detailed in our e-alert of July 17, 2014.

    U.S. actions targeting the Russian defense and financial services sectors include new or expanded “sectoral sanctions” and the designation of Russian defense companies to BIS’s Entity List and OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. BIS also noted that it will “require licenses for an additional group of items destined to military end-uses or end-users in Russia,” but did not provide further elaborate on what this may entail.

    The new EU sanctions are set forth in two measures. First, Council Regulation No. 960/2014, which amends Council Regulation No. 833/2014 (described in our e-alert of August 4, 2014), introduces new restrictions on the access of certain Russian companies, including major Russian energy companies such as Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, to EU financing and financial markets. It also introduces new trade controls relating to certain dual-use and energy-related exports. Separately, Council Regulation No. 961/2014 designates 24 additional individuals for EU asset-freezing measures.

Collectively, the new U.S. and EU sanctions introduce a significant new range of trade controls, which will be of particular importance to companies in the energy, financial services, and defense sectors. The principal elements of the new sanctions are described below.

NEW U.S. SANCTIONS

A. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Energy Sector

Perhaps the most significant of the new U.S. sanctions are those targeting the Russian energy sector. The new U.S. measures have implications for both U.S. and non-U.S. companies that do business with the Russian energy industry, though they will impact U.S. and non-U.S. companies in different ways. As noted above, OFAC and BIS have taken three new steps to target the Russian energy sector.

OFAC Directive 4 and General License No. 2

The first key action targeting the Russian energy sector is OFAC’s issuance of a new directive – Directive 4 – pursuant to Executive Order 13662. Directive 4 prohibits the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: providing, exporting, or reexporting, directly or indirectly, goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production from deepwater (i.e., more than 500 feet), Arctic offshore, or shale projects that: (1) have the potential to produce oil in Russia or in maritime area claimed by Russia and extending from its territory; and (2) involve parties subject to Directive 4, their property, or their interests in property. These restrictions also extend to entities owned 50% or more by one or more sanctioned parties. Currently, five Russian energy companies are identified on the U.S. Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (“SSI List”) as being subject to Directive 4 – Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, and Surgutneftegas. Directive 4 also makes clear that any conspiracy to violate any of its prohibitions is prohibited, and that any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of Directive 4’s prohibitions is also prohibited.

At the same time that it issued Directive 4, OFAC expanded the guidance it offers on the sectoral sanctions through its Frequently Asked Questions. One of these “FAQs” (#412) explains that the prohibition on the exportation of services includes, but may not be limited to, drilling services, geophysical services, geological services, logistical services, management services, modeling capabilities, and mapping technologies. In contrast, Directive 4 does not prohibit the exportation or provision of financial services, such as clearing transactions or providing insurance related to the targeted activities. However, companies providing such financial services should ensure that those services do not constitute a prohibited dealing in new debt or new equity under Directives 1 or 2, which are addressed further below and apply independently of Directive 4.

Simultaneously, OFAC also issued General License No. 2 to authorize, for a limited time, certain wind down activities involving the Russian energy companies subject to Directive 4. Specifically, activities otherwise prohibited by Directive 4 are authorized until September 26, 2014, if they are “ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of operations, contracts, or other agreements involving persons determined to be subject to Directive 4 . . . that were in effect prior to September 12, 2014.” OFAC has made clear that General License No. 2 does not authorize the provision, export, or reexport of goods, services (other than financial services), or technology except as needed to cease operations involving the projects covered by Directive 4.

Any U.S. persons participating in transactions authorized by General License No. 2 are required, within 10 business days after the wind down activities conclude, to file a detailed report with OFAC covering the parties involved in the wind down activities and the date, type, and scope of such activities.

Finally, even if General License No. 2 appears to allow an export or reexport of goods, services, or technology related to wind down activities, companies should also confirm that there are no BIS restrictions applicable to the export or reexport before proceeding.

Expansion of BIS License Requirements for Certain Russian Deepwater, Arctic Offshore, and Shale Projects

The second key action targeting the Russian energy sector is BIS’s addition to its Entity List of the same five Russian energy companies currently subject to OFAC’s Directive 4 – Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, and Surgutneftegas. As a result of this action, BIS now requires all U.S. and non-U.S. persons to obtain a BIS license for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer to these five Russian companies of any item subject to the EAR if the exporter, reexporter, or transferor knows that the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia. Moreover, applications for such licenses will be subject to a presumption of denial if the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, a deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale project in Russia that has the potential to produce oil. BIS previously issued guidance addressing the scope of the Entity List, including circumstances where an entity is owned or controlled by an entity on the Entity List. That guidance is available here.

This BIS action – which targets the export, reexport, or transfer of any item subject to the EAR – represents a significant expansion of the BIS export restrictions that were announced in early August, which targeted only certain enumerated items, not any item, subject to the EAR.

Addition of Two Russian Energy Companies to the SSI List as Subject to OFAC Directive 2

The third key action targeting the Russian energy sector is OFAC’s addition of two Russian energy companies – Gazprom Neft and Transneft – to the SSI List as subject to OFAC’s Directive 2. Directive 2 was originally issued on July 16, 2014, pursuant to Executive Order 13662, and prohibited the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of entities identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 2, their property, or interests in property.

Because Gazprom Neft and Transneft are now subject to Directive 2, transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of Gazprom Neft and Transneft, Rosneft and OAO Novatek (which were added to the SSI List as subject to Directive 2 in July), and any entities owned 50% or more by one or more sanctioned parties is prohibited as to U.S. persons and within the United States.

Notably, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, which supersedes General License No. 1 of July 16, 2014, and which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days issued by a person subject to Directive 2.

It is important to highlight that Rosneft and Gazprom Neft are subject to both Directive 2 and Directive 4 (described above). OFAC has made clear that persons dealing with either Rosneft or Gazprom Neft must ensure that such dealings comply with Directive 2 and Directive 4 independently. For example, even if the provision of services to Rosneft is permissible under Directive 4 because the services qualify as “financial services,” the entity providing those services must separately ensure that the services do not run afoul of the prohibitions of Directive 2.

B. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Defense Sector

OFAC Directive 3

OFAC expanded the sectoral sanctions targeting Russia to also cover the defense and related materiel sector. U.S. sectoral sanctions targeting Russia had previously focused only on the Russian financial services and energy sectors.

In particular, OFAC issued a new directive – Directive 3 – prohibiting the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of entities added to the SSI List as subject to Directive 3, or their property or interests in property. Simultaneously, OFAC added Rostec, a Russia-based state- owned holding company for the Russian defense industry, to the SSI List as subject to Directive 3.

Like Directive 4, Directive 3 prohibits any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate Directive 3’s prohibitions. Likewise, Directive 3 prohibits any conspiracy to violate any of its prohibitions.

Notably, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, as discussed above, which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days issued by a person subject to Directive 3.

Addition of Five Russian Defense Companies to the SDN List and Entity List

Separately, OFAC added the following five entities that operate in the Russian defense sector to its SDN List pursuant to Executive Order 13661:

  • Almaz-Antey GSKB (aka Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern Main System Design Bureau, JSC): a subsidiary of the Almaz-Antey Concern (which was itself added to the SDN List pursuant to Executive Order 13661 on July 16, 2014) that designs and manufactures air defense systems for the Russian Ministry of Defense.

  • Dolgoprudny Research Production Enterprise: primarily engaged in the production of weapons and ammunition, including the Buk (SA-11 or SA-17) missile system.

  • JSC NIIP (aka Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design): a subsidiary of the Almaz-Antey Concern that develops anti-aircraft defense systems, including on-board radar systems for MiG and Sukhoi fighters, and anti-aircraft missile systems for land forces, including the Kub and Buk systems.

  • Kalinin Machine Plant JSC: a state-run company involved in the production of special purpose products, including launchers, anti-air missiles, and artillery guns for infantry and anti-air defense.

  • Mytishchinski Mashinostroitelny Zavod OAO: has produced weaponry and equipment, primarily anti-aircraft missile systems and chassis for tracked military vehicles.

U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any dealings with these designated entities or any entities that are owned 50% or more by one or more of the designated entities. Additionally, any property or interests in property of these designated entities that comes within the United States or the possession or control of a U.S. person must be blocked.

Simultaneous with the OFAC designations, BIS added these same five entities to its Entity List, which means that any person – including non-U.S. persons – must obtain a BIS license for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer of any item subject to the EAR to the five designated entities. Applications for such licenses will be subject to a presumption of denial.

BIS noted in making these designations that it “will also require licenses for an additional group of items destined to military end-uses or end-users in Russia.” BIS did not further elaborate on what this may entail. We note – as explained in our e-alert of August 4, 2014 – that the EU previously imposed a prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use goods and technology to Russia if those items may be intended for “military use” or a “military end-user.”

C. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Financial Services Sector

OFAC also has taken two key steps to expand and intensify the restrictions under Directive 1, which was originally issued on July 16, 2014, pursuant to Executive Order 13662 and which targets the access of certain entities in Russia’s financial services sector to U.S. capital markets.

First, OFAC amended Directive 1 to decrease the length of maturity of prohibited new debt from 90 days to 30 days. In its original form, Directive 1 prohibited the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity or new equity for persons identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 1 (i.e., certain Russian banks), their property, or their interests in property. In its new, amended form, Directive 1 prohibits the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity or new equity of persons identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 1, their property, or their interests in property.

Second, OFAC added Sberbank to the list of Russian banks subject to Directive 1. Thus, the prohibitions under Directive 1 are now applicable to new debt of longer than 30 days maturity and new equity of the Bank of Moscow, Gazprombank, the Russian Agricultural Bank, Sberbank, VEB, and VTB.

As noted above, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days or new equity issued by a person subject to Directive 1.

NEW EU SANCTIONS

The EU Council first agreed to the core framework of the sanctions on September 8, 2014. However, the cease-fire between the Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian armed militia — signed on September 5, 2014 — caused the EU Council to delay the entry into force of the new sanctions as the Council evaluated the cease-fire and the implementation of broader peace initiatives proposed earlier this month by the President of Ukraine.

The EU Council has signaled that it is prepared to take swift action to remove or reduce the new sanctions if the Russian Government demonstrates cooperation in resolving the conflict in Ukraine − or to further enhance the sanctions regime if Russia continues to contribute to the conflict.

The restrictions implemented on September 12, 2014 introduce a number of new measures, including features that do not have precedent in prior EU sanctions regulations. As in the case of the original version of Regulation 833/2014, the new provisions include a number of ambiguities that have already generated important questions from potentially affected companies, and the EU Member States will likely be called upon in the coming weeks to issue interpretive guidance relating to the new sanctions measures.

A. Additional Restrictions on Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

Regulation 960/2014 imposes a new prohibition − codified in Article 2a of the Amended Regulation 833/2014 − on the sale, supply, transfer, or export, directly or indirectly, of dual-use goods and technologies to any natural or legal person, entity, or body in Russia that is listed in Annex IV to the Regulation. Annex IV currently includes JSC Sirius, OJSC Stankoinstrument, OAO JSC Chemcomposite, JSC Kalashnikov, JSC Tula Arms Plant, NPK Technologii Maschinostrojenija, OAO Wysokototschnye Kompleksi, OAO Almaz Antey, and OAO NPO Bazalt. This new restriction on dual- use items supplements the existing prohibition, reflected in the original Regulation 833/2014, against the export of dual-use items to military end-users or for any military end-use in Russia.

Regulation 960/2014 also prohibits the provision to Annex IV parties of technical assistance, brokering services, or any “other services” related to dual-use items and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance, and use of those items. The provision to the Annex IV parties of financing or financial assistance for the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services, or other services is also prohibited.

The foregoing restrictions are expressed in the Regulation as prohibitions, rather than licensing requirements, thus implying that licenses will not be available to authorize transactions covered under the new restrictions. The new prohibitions are, however, subject to a number of important exemptions. Firstly, they do not apply to (i) the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items intended for the aeronautics and space industry, or the related provision of technical or financial assistance for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, or to (ii) the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items for maintenance and safety of existing civil nuclear capabilities within the EU, for non-military use, and for non-military end-users.

The foregoing provisions are also without prejudice to the execution of contracts or agreements concluded before September 12, 2014, and to the provision of assistance necessary to the maintenance and safety of “existing capabilities within the EU.” Regulation 960/2014 does not define the term “existing capabilities.”

B. New Oil and Gas “Services” Controls

Regulation 960/2014 also introduces a new Article 3a to Regulation 833/2014, prohibiting the direct or indirect provision of certain “services necessary for deepwater oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia,” including (i) “drilling,” (ii) “well testing,” (iii) “logging and completion services,” and (iv) “supply of specialised floating vessels[.]” The new measures supplement existing restrictions, set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation 833/2014, concerning transactions associated with oil and gas equipment listed in Annex II to Regulation 833/2014. The new Article 3a restrictions are not, however, limited to Annex II items or to any other defined products, and the Regulation provides no definition or guidance concerning the scope of the restricted “services.” Moreover, in contrast to Regulation 833/2014 and to trade controls restrictions in other EU sanctions regulations, which distinguish restrictions on exports of goods and technology from restrictions on the provision of related support (e.g., technical assistance, brokering, financing, or financial assistance), the general reference to “services” in Article 3a has invited questions − which are not easily resolved from the text of the Regulation − concerning whether the new measures are intended to capture the supply of goods, the mere provision of technical or other support, or both.

The Article 3a prohibitions are without prejudice to the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or a “framework agreement” concluded before September 12, 2014, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. The term “framework agreement” is not defined in Regulation 960/2014. However, it presumably carries a broader scope than the term “agreement” used in similar grandparenting provisions in Regulation 833/2014.

Finally, Article 3a exempts services that are necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment.

On a separate but related note, a recently published corrigendum to Regulation 833/2014 has clarified the scope of the restrictions on the provision of technical assistance, brokering services, financing, or financial assistance relating to the items listed on Annex II to that regulation. The corrigendum amends Article 4(4), correcting an error to the version of Regulation 833/2014 published on August 1, 2014, to make clear that competent Member State authorities may not authorize such assistance if the Annex II items are for Arctic or deepwater oil exploration or production or for a shale oil project unless the assistance concerns the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before August 1, 2014.

C. Additional Controls on Military Items

Regulation 960/2014 also amends Article 4 of Regulation 833/2014 to prohibit the provision of insurance and reinsurance relating to military items to Russian parties or for use in Russia; this prohibition applies in addition to the pre-existing prohibition against the provision of financing and financial assistance relating to military items.

D. Additional Financial Sector Restrictions

Regulation 960/2014 also amends Article 5 to Regulation 833/2014 to introduce a number of important new financial restrictions against designated Russian parties. The key amendments to Article 5 are as follows:

  • Regulation 960/2014 extends existing restrictions targeting “transferablesecurities” and “money market instruments” issued by Russian financial institutions listed on Annex III to Regulation 833/2014. Specifically, the new provisions introduce a restriction on the provision of “investment services” relating to those instruments, and lower the maturity period for covered instruments from 90 to 30 days (for instruments issued after September 12, 2014). Thus, Article 5 now renders it prohibited to “directly or indirectly purchase, sell, provide investment services for or assistance in the issuance of, or otherwise deal with transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued after 1 August 2014 to 12 September 2014, or with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued after 12 September 2014[.]”

  • The newly-introduced term “investmentservices” is defined as“ (i) reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments, (ii) execution of orders on behalf of clients, (iii) dealing on own account, (iv) portfolio management, (v) investment advice, (vi) underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis, (vii) placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis, and (viii) any service in relation to the admission to trading on a regulated market or trading on a multilateral trading facility.”

  • The definition of “transferablesecurities” has been amended to exclude negotiable securities giving rise to a cash settlement.

  • The amended Article 5 also introduces similar prohibitions on dealings in “transferable securities” and “money-market instruments” with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued after September 12, 2014, by (1) certain designated Russian military entities, as listed in the new Annex V to Regulation 833/2014, and (2) certain Russian entities active in the oil industry, as listed in the new Annex VI to Regulation 833/2014. Notably, the latter list includes major Russian oil and gas enterprises Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft (the oil branch of Gazprom). Those new restrictions also extend to any entity established outside of the EU that is majority-owned by any entity designated in Annex V or Annex VI.

  • Similar to the restrictions imposed by Regulation 833/2014 against AnnexIIIbanks,the foregoing measures contain an important carve-out, as they do not apply to affiliates of the listed entities that are established within the EU. However, as with the Annex III bank restrictions, they extend to any entity “acting on behalf or at the direction of” the Annex V or Annex VI designated parties or their non-EU subsidiaries.

  • Finally, Regulation 960/2014 prohibits making or being part of any arrangement to make new loans or credit with a maturity exceeding 30 days available to any party listed on Annexes III, V, or VI after September 12, 2014. The Regulation exempts from that prohibition (i) loans or credit that have a specific and documented objective to provide financing for non-prohibited imports or exports of goods and non-financial services between the EU and Russia, and (ii) loans that have a specific and documented objective to provide emergency funding to meet solvency and liquidity criteria for legal persons established in the EU that are majority owned by Annex III banks.

    As with the original Article 5, the foregoing restrictions are not asset-blocking measures — EU parties are not generally prohibited from conducting business with the Annex III, V, and VI parties if their activities do not trigger the specific restrictions outlined above.

    E. Additional Parties Subject to the Asset-Freezing Restrictions

    Regulation 961/2014 imposes travel bans and asset freezes on a further 24 individuals, including pro-Russian rebels, Russian lawmakers and state officials, and the chairman of the Russian Rostec conglomerate, Sergey Viktorovich Chemzov. This brings the total number of individuals subject to sanctions under this specific regime to 119, whilst the number of designated entities remains 23.

    In the same manner as prior EU sanctions measures, all funds and “economic resources” belonging to, owned, held, or controlled by the newly designated parties must be frozen. “Economic resources” include “assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds, but which may be used to obtain funds, goods or services.” In addition, Regulation 961 prohibits making available funds or “economic resources,” directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the designated parties.

    F. Jurisdictional Reach of the New Sanctions

    Consistent with the pre-existing sanctions measures, the jurisdictional scope of the new sanctions extends (1) to conduct by EU-incorporated entities and EU nationals anywhere in the world; (2) to conduct by any party, irrespective of nationality, in connection with activities occurring in the territory of the EU or (with regard to legal persons) in respect of business “done in whole or in part within the Union”; or (3) conduct on board any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State.

***

The new sanctions represent the latest, although perhaps not the last, restrictions relating to the crisis in Ukraine. The EU has signaled that it will closely monitor the implementation of the new restrictions and their impact, and it will consider supplemental measures if circumstances in Eastern Ukraine warrant and consensus among the 28 Member States can be reached. Likewise, the U.S. government has stated that additional sanctions targeting Russia could be forthcoming if Russia does not work toward a diplomatic resolution to the crisis in Ukraine.

We are following the above-mentioned sanctions and export control developments closely and will provide further updates as they evolve. We are particularly well-positioned to advise companies and individuals on compliance with the U.S. and EU sanctions related to the Ukraine crisis, as well as on the broader impact of the crisis on foreign investment in both Ukraine and Russia and other legal and commercial interests in the region.

ARTICLE BY

Peter Flanagan
Corrine Goldstein
Peter Lichtenbaum
Kimberly Strosnider
David Addis
David Lorello
OF
Covington & Burling LLP

Office of Foreign Assets Control Publishes New Syria and Ukraine Sanctions Regulations; Designates Russian Bank For its Involvement in Syrian Unrest

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The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) recently published a final rule amending and reissuing in their entirety the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (“SSR”), 31 C.F.R. Part 542. The reissued SSR contain six new general licenses, including one that authorizes the provision by a U.S. person or from the United States of services ordinarily incident to the supply to Syria of non-U.S. food, medicine, and medical devices that are non-sensitive in nature.

In addition, OFAC last week issued new Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations to implement executive orders that the Administration issued in March 2014, and designated a Russian bank (Tempbank) and the Chairman of its Management Committee (Mikhail Georgievich Gagloev) for providing material support and services to the Government of Syria.

Background on Syrian Regulations

Syria has been the target of U.S. economic sanctions since it was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. The SSR, which first went into effect in April 2005, constitute one of the primary regulatory regimes that implements these sanctions. (The Commerce Department’s Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) also broadly prohibit, absent licensing, exports and reexports to Syria of most items, other than food and non-sensitive medicines, that are of U.S.-origin or that incorporate more than de minimis U.S.-origin content.) Since the original issuance of the SSR in 2005, the Bush and Obama Administrations have issued executive orders broadening the U.S. sanctions against Syria by imposing new blocking measures and other trade restrictions. OFAC also has issued a number of general licenses authorizing certain otherwise prohibited transactions. These developments had created a complex patchwork of authorities imposing sanctions on Syria. OFAC’s overhaul of the SSR combines many of these authorities into a single, unified, and up-to-date set of regulations.

Incorporated Executive Orders

The reissued SSR, which went into effect on May 2, 2014, incorporate asset-blocking measures and other trade restrictions imposed under six executive orders issued between 2006 and 2012. As a result, Section 542.201 of the SSR now requires the blocking of all property and interests in property of the Government of Syria (including its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities) that are or hereafter come into the United States or the possession or control of a U.S. person, as well as such assets of Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”) sanctioned because they were determined to have undertaken activities specified in the executive orders. U.S. persons may not transfer, pay, export, withdraw, or otherwise deal in such blocked property. Consistent with OFAC guidance with respect to numerous sanctions programs, SSR § 542.411 clarifies that if a person whose assets are blocked under Section 542.201 owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest in an entity, that entity’s assets are also blocked even if that entity is not added to the SDN List.

The SSR also now contain certain other trade restrictions originally imposed by

Executive Order 13582 (effective August 18, 2011), which we discussed in our e-alert of August 19, 2011. These restrictions prohibit:

  • U.S. persons, wherever located, from making new investments in Syria (§ 542.206) ;
  • The export, reexport, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person or from the United States of any services to Syria (§ 542.207);
  • The importation into the United States of Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products (§ 542.208);
  • U.S. persons from engaging in any transaction or dealing related to Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products (§ 542.209); and
  •  U.S. persons from approving, financing, facilitating, or guaranteeing a transaction by a foreign person that would be prohibited if performed by a U.S. person or within the United States (§ 542.210).

General LIcenses and Statements of Licensing Policy

In addition to incorporating prior executive orders, the reissued SSR incorporate (at Sections 542.509 through 542.520 and 542.523) a number of general licenses that were previously posted on OFAC’s website, and add six new general licenses and three new statements of licensing policy. The new general licenses authorize the following transactions:

  • With certain limitations, the receipt of payment of professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses for the provision of authorized legal services to or on behalf of the Government of Syria and other blocked parties (§ 542.508);
  • All transactions in the United States between U.S. persons and persons who have been granted certain categories of U.S. visas; services in connection with the filing of applications for such visas; and services provided by accredited U.S. graduate and undergraduate degree-granting institutions for the filing and processing of applications to enroll in the institutions, and the acceptance of payments for submitted applications to enroll and tuition from persons ordinarily resident in Syria (§ 542.521);
  • Otherwise prohibited transactions between blocked SDNs and employees, grantees, or contractors of the U.S. federal government that are for official government business (§ 542.522);
  • The following services provided in the United States to non-Syrian carriers transporting passengers or goods to or from Syria (but not the Government of Syria or blocked parties): bunkers and bunkering services, services supplied or performed in the course of emergency repairs, and services supplied or performed under circumstances which could not be anticipated prior to the carrier’s departure for the United States (§ 542.524);
  • The provision by a U.S. person or from the United States of services ordinarily incident to the supply to Syria of non-U.S.-origin food, medicine, and medical devices that would be classified EAR99 if subject to the EAR (§ 542.525); and
  • Certain services related to conferences, performances, exhibitions, or similar events in the United States or a third country attended by persons who are ordinarily resident in Syria, other than the Government of Syria or blocked parties (§ 542.526).

The new general license found at Section 542.525 is a particularly noteworthy development, as it eliminates an anomaly in the prior sanctions regime’s licensing requirements. Under the general license now found at Section 542.510, U.S. persons are authorized to be involved in and facilitate the supply to Syria of food, medicines and medical devices authorized for supply to Syria by the U.S. Commerce Department. However, because the Commerce Department regulations do not apply to exports to Syria of most non-U.S.-origin items that contain 10 percent or less U.S. content by value, U.S. persons were not permitted by the OFAC general license to facilitate the supply of such non-U.S.-origin items to Syria; rather, a specific OFAC license was required. The new general license authorizes the provision of services by a U.S. person or from the United States related to the export and reexport to Syria of non-U.S.-origin food, medicines, and medical devices that would be classified EAR99 if subject to the EAR.

In addition, three new statements of licensing policy contained in the SSR clarify that specific licenses may be issued by OFAC on a case-by-case basis authorizing: (1) certain transactions involving Syria’s telecommunications sector that are otherwise prohibited by the SSR, in order to enable private persons in Syria to better and more securely access the Internet (§ 542.527); (2) certain transactions involving Syria’s agricultural sector that are otherwise prohibited by the SSR, in order to strengthen that sector in light of Syria’s food “insecur[ity]” (§ 542.528); and (3) certain transactions that are otherwise prohibited by Sections 542.206 through 542.210 of the SSR, including new investment related to Syrian petroleum and petroleum products for the benefit of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (§ 542.529).

New Syria Related Designations

In addition to reissuing the SSR, on May 8, 2014, OFAC announced 10 new Syria-related designations. These designations included six Syrian government officials and two Syrian refineries. OFAC also designated a Russian Bank (Tempbank) and the Chairman of its Management Committee (Mikhail Georgievich Gagloev) pursuant to Executive Order 13582 for providing material support and services to the Government of Syria, including the Central Bank of Syria and SYTROL, Syria’s state oil marketing firm. The Treasury Department statement announcing the designations noted that Tempbank has provided millions of dollars and facilitated the provision of financial services to the Syrian regime, and that Mr. Gagloev personally travelled to Damascus to make deals with the Syrian regime on behalf of Tempbank.

As a result of these designations, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions or dealings with these parties, and the property and property interests of these parties that are or come into the United States or the possession or control of a U.S. person are blocked. Further, the sanctions apply to any entity in which any designated person owns a 50 percent or greater interest (regardless of whether such entity is itself designated).

Publication of Ukraine Related Sanction-Regulations

Also on May 8, OFAC issued new Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations at 31 C.F.R. Part 589 to implement executive orders issued in March 2014 (EOs 13660, 13661, and 13662, which were the subject of our prior e-alerts on March 6, 2014, March 18, 2014, and March 21, 2014).

The newly issued regulations, which were effective immediately, do not substantively change the scope of the Ukraine-related sanctions program, but do provide directions for management of blocked funds and property, definitions, interpretations, and limited general licenses. The general licenses authorize transactions such as certain transfers of property between blocked accounts in a U.S. financial institution, debits from blocked accounts by a U.S. financial institution for normal service charges, the provision of certain legal services, the receipt of certain payments for the provision of authorized legal services, and the provision of emergency medical services in the United States.

OFAC stated that these regulations were being published in abbreviated form, and that it intends to supplement them with a more comprehensive set of regulations, which may include additional definitions, interpretive guidance, general licenses, and statements of licensing policy.

Article by:

Peter Flanagan
Corrine Goldstein
Peter Lichtenbaum
Kimberly Strosnider
David Addis
Sarah Liebschutz
Of:
Covington & Burling LLP

 

New G-7 Sanctions Against Russia

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The United States, in coordination with other G-7 nations, announced on Monday, April 28new sanctions on individuals and entities with ties to the Russian government and President Putin.  The newly announced sanctions build on earlier rounds of U.S. sanctions imposed on March 6, March 17, March 20 and April 11.  The United States also tightened license restrictions for high technology exports to Russia.  In addition to the new U.S. sanctions, the European Union, Canada and Japan also announced new sanctions against Russian individuals and entities.

Reasons cited for the new sanctions were Russia’s failure to abide by commitments it made to de-escalate the crisis during an April 17 meeting in Geneva among Russia, Ukraine, the United States and the European Union (also known as the Geneva accord) and continued Russian-supported efforts to destabilize Eastern Ukraine.  According to an April 25 statement by the G-7 leaders, Russia has failed to take actions required by the Geneva accord and has continued to escalate tensions through its “increasingly concerning rhetoric” and “ongoing threatening military maneuvers on Ukraine’s border.”

New U.S. Sanctions and Export Restrictions

The new U.S. sanctions issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, target seven individuals and 17 entities, including banks, construction companies and transportation companies, with connections to the Russian government.  These sanctions, like those previously announced, freeze the assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction of all sanctioned individuals and bar those individuals from obtaining visas to enter the United States.  The sanctions also prohibit U.S. persons, including U.S. companies and their overseas branches and divisions, from transacting business with any sanctioned individuals or entities.

In addition, the Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that it added 13 of the newly sanctioned entities to its Entity List (comprised of parties that are prohibited from receiving some or all items subject to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations without a license), and that it will immediately begin denying pending applications for licenses to export or re-export “high technology” items to Russia or Crimea that may enhance Russia’s military capabilities.  Concurrently, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of the U.S. Department of State announced that it is placing a hold on all licenses for exports of defense articles and defense services to Russia.

New EU Sanctions

In coordination with the new U.S. sanctions, the new EU sanctions add 15 individuals with ties to the Russian government to the European Union’s existing list of sanctioned individuals.

Other New G-7 Sanctions

The two remaining G-7 member states also imposed new sanctions on Russian individuals this week:  Canada announced sanctions against two Russian banks and nine individuals, and Japan announced visa bans on 23 as-yet-unnamed individuals.

Companies with interests in Russia or Ukraine or doing business with Russian enterprises are advised to ensure appropriate measures are in place to comply with the sanctions, including careful screening of all parties to transactions.

Article By:

Jay L. Eizenstat
Andrea L. Hamilton
David J. Levine
Raymond Paretzky
David Henry
Of:
McDermott Will & Emery

Starving the Bear: The United States Restricts Exports to Russia

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The pressure on Russia continues to build.  As we previously reported here and here, throughout March, the United States and other Western powers implemented a series of sanctions against individuals and entities deemed to be involved in the political destabilization of Ukraine.  Those sanctions were restricted to specific parties, including high ranking Russian and Ukrainian officials and – notably – one Russian bank.

The United States has now gone further, implementing restrictions that restrict trade with the entire country of Russia.  These sanctions are bound to have more bite.

Specifically, on March 26, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that, since March 1, 2014 and until further notice, it had not and will not issue licenses for exports or re-exports to Russia.  Commerce governs exports and re-exports of U.S.-origin commercial and “dual use” items.  While not all such items require a license for Russia, many sensitive items do.

On March 27, the State Department followed suit: it announced that, until further notice, it will not issue any authorizations for exports of defense articles or services to Russia.  This is essentially an absolute embargo on defense exports to Russia and Russian nationals: an export authorization is required for virtually any export of a defense article, technical data, or defense service to Russia (or any other country).

These two actions constitute a significant expansion of U.S. trade restrictions on Russia, particularly because the license restrictions apply to exports of both goods and technology.  Moreover, the restrictions apply to all Russian individuals and entities, as opposed to the very targeted economic sanctions previously imposed by the Treasury Department.

While the United States has acted quickly, it is not alone, as the European Union has also taken action, introducing targeted sanctions, including an asset freeze and visa ban, against designated parties responsible for human rights violations, violence, and use of excessive force with respect to Ukraine.  In addition, EU Member States have agreed to (i) suspend export licenses on equipment that might be used for internal repression and (ii) reconsider export licenses to Ukraine and Russia related to military technology and equipment.

Collectively, the sanctions imposed to date bring with them a host of practical challenges for companies conducting business in or with Russia.  Western banks may scrutinize transactions with Russian banks and other parties especially carefully in light of the new restrictions.  In some cases, a Western bank might hold up a legitimate transaction for further review if a Russian counterparty is involved.

Companies with current business ties in Russia must, therefore, consider the commercial and related risks of continuing that business.  The United States in particular is implementing sanctions rapidly, piecemeal, and often without much warning.  As the landscape of trade restrictions continues to change, companies must perform ongoing diligence with respect to their Russian business.  For example, companies should perform periodic rescreening of Russian business partners to ensure they do not appear on any U.S. prohibited parties lists.

Article By:

Thaddeus Rogers McBride
Cheryl Palmeri
Of:
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

United States Expands Sanctions in Response to Activities in Ukraine, Names First SDNs (Specially Designated Nationals)

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Early March 18, 2014, President Obama signed an Executive Order (E.O.) expanding on E.O. 13660, which was issued on March 10, 2014.  In addition to naming specific persons subject to the restrictions of E.O. 13660, including former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, the new E.O. expands the sanctions previously announced in response to recent actions of the Government of the Russian Federation in Crimea to include any person who is determined to:

  • Be an official of the Government of the Russian Federation;
  • Operate in the arms or related materiel in the Russian Federation;
  • Be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly of indirectly:
    • a senior official of the Government of the Russian Federation; or
    • a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or
  • Have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of:
    • a senior official of the Government of the Russian Federation; or
    • a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.

Effective immediately, all property and interests in property that are in the control of U.S. persons (including foreign branches) will be blocked, and subject persons will be prohibited from entry to the United States.  The complete list of blocked persons is available here.

As the situation in Ukraine continues to unfold and sanctions are expanded, U.S. companies should be particularly cautious in screening transactions in the region and maintaining records.  In addition, companies with affiliates in the European Union should be mindful of changes to EU sanctions that could impact business in the region.

Article by:

Of:

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP