Tag: Regulatory

Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) Liability And Private Equity Firms

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Last month’s decision out of the Delaware District Court in Woolery, et al. v. Matlin Patterson Global Advisers, LLC, et al. was an eye opener for private equity firms and other entities owning a controlling stake in a faltering business.  Breaking from the norm, the Court refused to dismiss private equity firm MatlinPatterson Global Advisers, LLC (“MatlinPatterson”) and affiliated entities from a class action WARN Act suit alleging that the 400-plus employees of Premium Protein Products, LLC (“Premium”), a Nebraska-based meat processer and MatlinPatterson portfolio company, hadn’t received the statutorily-mandated 60 days advance notice of layoffs.

According to the plaintiffs, Premium’s performance began to decline in 2008 and, upon the downturn, the defendants became more and more involved in Premium’s day-to-day operations, including by making business strategy decisions (e.g., to enter the kosher food market), terminating Premium’s existing President, and installing a new company President.  Things got bad enough that, in June 2009, the defendants decided to “furlough” all of Premium’s employees with virtually no notice and close the plant.  The defendants then, in November 2009, converted the furlough to layoffs, and Premium filed for bankruptcy.  According to the plaintiffs, Premium’s head of HR raised WARN Act concerns back in June, when the decision to close the plant and furlough the employees was made, and the defendants ignored the issue.

With Premium in bankruptcy, the plaintiffs, unsurprisingly, turned to MatlinPatterson and the other defendants as the targets of their WARN Act claim, asserting that they and Premium were a “single employer.”  The Court then applied the Department of Labor’s five-factor balancing test, namely (1) whether the entities share common ownership, (2) whether the entities share common directors or officers, (3) the existence of de facto exercise of control by the parent over the subsidiary, (4) the existence of a unity of personnel policies emanating from a common source, and (5) the dependency of operations between the two entities.  This test often favors private equity firms, and on balance it did so in Woolery too, with the Court finding that the plaintiffs had made no showing as to three of the five factors.  The Court nevertheless refused to grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint alleged that the defendants had exercised de facto control over Premium and then essentially giving that factor determinative weight.

No one should be surprised by the decision given the plaintiffs’ allegations, which had to be accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage.  They presented an ugly picture of a private equity firm dictating the most critical decisions (to close plant, layoff employees) and then attempting to duck the WARN Act’s dictates. The decision is nevertheless a cautionary tale for private equity firms and at first blush it presents a catch 22: (a) do nothing and watch your investment sink or (b) get involved and risk WARN Act liability.

So what is a private equity firm, lender or majority investor to do?  Obviously, the best scenario is to build in the required 60-day notice period or, if applicable, utilize WARN Act exceptions, including the “faltering company” and “unforeseen business circumstances” exceptions.  Even where that’s not possible, private equity firms and other controlling investors need not take a completely hands off approach.  They would, however, be best-served (at least for WARN Act purposes) to do the following:

  • Provide only customary board-level oversight and allow the employer’s officers and management team to run the employer’s day-to-day operations
  • Although Board oversight and input can occur, continue to work through the management team on major decisions, including layoffs and potential facility closures
  • Avoid placing private equity firm or lender employees or representatives on the employer’s management team
  • Have the employer’s management team execute employment contracts with the employer, not the private equity firm or lender, and have the contracts, for the most part, create obligations only to the employer
  • Allow the employer to maintain its own personnel policies and practices, as well as HR oversight and function

What the courts are primarily concerned with in these cases are (a) a high degree of integration between the private equity firm or lender and the actual employer, particularly as to day-to-day operations, and (b) who the decision-maker was with regard to the employment practice giving rise to the litigation (typically the layoff or plant closure decision).  Private equity firms and lenders that have refrained from this level of integration have had, and should continue to have, success in avoiding WARN Act liability and returning the focus of the WARN Act discussion to the actual employer.

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Supreme Court (Sort Of) Approves “Picking Off” Strategy in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Collective Action Cases

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If you have ever received a complaint alleging minimum wage or overtime violations from one of your employees, the United States Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division, or a similar state agency (in Wisconsin, the Labor Standards Bureau of the Equal Rights Division), you have probably considered the possibility that other employees might raise similar claims.  Depending on the size of your workforce, this single-employee headache could quickly evolve into a class action or collective action migraine.

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a single employee may file a wage and hour lawsuit on behalf of himself and other “similarly situated” employees.  The FLSA’s collective action mechanism requires potential plaintiffs to opt into the lawsuit, meaning that individuals must choose to participate in the case.  This mechanism differs from a class action lawsuit because individuals covered by a class certified by the court mustopt out of the case.  In other words, in a class action, an individual covered by a certified class must choose to not participate in the case.

Defense counsel have typically attempted to protect employers from prolonged and costly collective action litigation by “picking off” the named plaintiff(s) in lawsuits filed under the FLSA.  This “picking off” strategy refers to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a defendant to make an offer of judgment to the plaintiff.  An offer of judgment amounts to giving the plaintiff the full relief requested in the complaint and costs accrued by the plaintiff.  A plaintiff’s acceptance of a Rule 68 offer of judgment moots (i.e., a dispute no longer exists) the case as to the plaintiff, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction.

In the collective action context, however, employers have had mixed results on the issue of whether acceptance of a Rule 68 offer by the named plaintiff(s) also moots the claims of the potential collective group of affected employees.  The question also remained:  what happens when the named plaintiff(s) rejects the Rule 68 offer of judgment?

On Tuesday, April 16, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision, Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, that attempted to answer this question.  In this case, the employer, Genesis, made a Rule 68 offer of judgment to the plaintiff, Symczyk, while simultaneously answering the complaint and prior to Symczyk moving for conditional certification.  By its terms, the offer automatically expired after ten days.  Symczyk did not accept the offer, and Genesis moved for judgment in its favor, arguing that its offer of judgment mooted Symczyk’s claim and the potential collective action.  Symczyk did not contest Genesis’ argument that the offer fully satisfied her claim.  The district court agreed with Genesis and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that Genesis’ Rule 68 offer mooted Symczyk’s claim, but it disagreed about the effect the offer had on the potential collective action.  The court of appeals held that allowing a defendant to “pick off” named plaintiffs for the purpose of avoiding the certification of a collective action would run contrary to the purpose of the collective action mechanism permitted by the FLSA.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff “has no personal interest in representing putative, unnamed claimants, nor any other continuing interest that would preserve her suit from mootness.”  According to the Supreme Court, a Rule 68 offer of judgment that renders the claims of the named plaintiff(s) moot also eliminates the plaintiff’s interest in the collective action.  More importantly, the Supreme Court held that a collective action under the FLSA, even if “conditionally certified” by a court, does not give the “class” of potential plaintiffs “an independent legal status.”  A “conditional certification” simply results in “the sending of court-approved written notice to employees[.]“  Thus, the Supreme Court has given some legitimacy to the strategy of “picking off” named plaintiffs by offering them full relief through a Rule 68 offer of judgment.

Note, however, that the Supreme Court did not hold that an unaccepted Rule 68 offer renders a claim (the named plaintiff’s or the collective action claim) moot.  Because Symczyk waived these arguments in the lower courts, the Supreme Court simply assumed, without deciding, that the unaccepted Rule 68 offer rendered her claim moot.

While, at first blush, the decision seems like a great win for employers, it has potential limitations, many of which Justice Elena Kagan points out in her dissent, including the following:

  1. Symczyk waived several important arguments throughout the litigation, including the argument that the unaccepted Rule 68 offer in fact did not moot her individual claim.
  2. The Genesis case addresses a scenario in which no other plaintiffs had yet joined the collective action (due in part to the timing of Genesis’ offer to Symczyk and her failure to move for certificaiton).
  3. The Court simply ignored the limitations of a Rule 68 offer of judgment, including that Rule 68 only gives courts authority to enter judgment when the plaintiff accepts the offer and that “[e]vidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs.”

Despite the limitations of the Genesis decision, employers can take comfort in the Court’s indication of its leanings regarding collective actions.  In addition to the Court’s holding regarding the mootness issue, employers can also point to the Court’s statements calling into question the legitimacy of applying class action rules and precedent to collective actions under the FLSA.

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Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Proposes Increased Payments for Hospices

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On Monday, April 29, 2013, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released a proposed rule that updates Medicare payment rules and rates for hospice agencies for fiscal year (FY) 2014.  The proposed rule also clarifies diagnosis coding and modifies quality measures in the hospice quality reporting program.

Major provisions of the proposed rule include:

  • 1.1 percent increase in FY 2014 payments. The increase is the net result of an estimated inpatient hospital market basket increase of 2.5 percent minus 0.7 percent for reductions mandated by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and a 0.7 percent decrease in payments to hospices due to updated wage data and the continued phase-out of CMS’ wage index budget neutrality adjustment factor for hospices.
  • Hospices are to discontinue using certain non-specific diagnoses or non-principal diagnoses and, instead, should code with the principal diagnosis using the underlying condition that is the main reason for the patient’s care.
  • The ACA mandates that hospices begin reporting quality date in 2013 for the FY 2014 payment determination. Beginning with the FY 2016 payment determination, the rule proposes to eliminate the two current quality measurements and replace them with two other measures. The two measures CMS proposes to eliminate are: (1) the NQF-endorsed measure related to pain management, NQF #0209, and (2) the structural measure on participation in a Quality Assessment and Performance Improvement program.
  • Also for the FY 2016 payment determination, CMS proposes to implement the Hospice Item Set (HIS), which is a standardized patient-level data collection instrument. Hospices will need to complete the HIS upon admission and discharge for all patients starting July 1, 2014. Data collected from the HIS will factor into the payment determination for FY 2016.

Additional information on the proposed rule is available via CMS’s fact sheet.

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No “Safe Harbor” for BitTorrent Website Operator

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment ruling in favor of seven film studios finding that the defendant induced third parties to download infringing copies of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., et al.  v. Gary Fung, et al., Case No. 10-55946 (9th Cir., Mar.21, 2013) (Berzon, J.).

Seven film studios—including Columbia Pictures, Disney and Twentieth Century Fox—sued Gary Fung and his company isoHunt Technologies, claiming that Fung induced third parties to download infringing copies of the studios’ copyrighted works through Fung’s websites, such as torrentbox.com and isohunt.com—websites that help users find copies of videos to download and stream through a type of peer-to-peer file sharing network.

The district court found Fung liable for contributory copyright infringement for inducing others to infringe the studios’ copyrights and also found that Fung was not entitled to protection from damages liability under the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  After a permanent injunction was issued, Fung appealed.

On appeal, Fung challenged the full holding, including the scope of the injunction claiming that it was vague, punitive and an impediment to free speech.  The 9th Circuit, citing the Supreme Court decision in Grokster III (which also dealt with peer-to-peer file sharing technology), analyzed the facts of the present case under the four elements of the Grokster III inducement principle:  the distribution of a device or product, acts of infringement, an object of promoting its use to infringe copyright and causation.

Inducement Liability Under Grokster III

With respect to the first element of the Grokster III inducement liability standard, Fung argued that he did not develop or distribute products, nor did he develop the BitTorrent protocol used by his websites.  The 9th Circuit, however, distinguished copyrights as expression that are not necessarily in the form of products or devices. Thus, the court concluded that a copyright can be infringed through “culpable actions resulting in impermissible reproductions of copyrighted expression,” even if such actions are the provision of services used in accomplishing the infringement.

Fung was not able to rebut the second “acts of infringement” Grokster III factor after the studios presented evidence that Fung’s services were widely used to infringe copyrights by allowing uploading and downloading of copyrighted material. Accordingly, the court found for the studios on the second factor, noting that the “predominant use” of Fung’s services was for copyright infringement.

As to the third Grokster III factor, the court agreed with Fung that mere knowledge of a potential to infringe, or knowledge of actual infringing uses of a product or service, is not enough for liability.  Nevertheless, the court found there was more than enough evidence that Fung offered his services with the object to promote their use to infringe copyrighted material.  Specifically, the court found that the evidence showed Fung actively encouraged uploading files of specific copyrighted material; he provided links for certain movies and urged users to download those movies; he affirmatively responded to requests for help in locating and playing copyrighted materials; and, he even personally instructed users on how to burn infringing files to DVDs.  The court also referenced two points of circumstantial evidence raised by the Grokster III opinion, namely, that Fung took no steps to develop filtering tools to diminish infringing activity and that he generated revenue by selling advertising space on his websites.

Finally, as to causation, the court adopted the studios’ interpretation of causation and held that the acts of infringement by third parties need only be caused by the product distributed or services provided.  This was contrary to Fung’s theory of causation (which was also joined by amicus curiae, Google) wherein Fung claimed that the infringement must be directly caused by a defendant’s inducing messages.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act “Safe Harbor” Provisions

Fung also asserted affirmative defenses under three of the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions, 17 U.S.C. §512(a), (c) and (d). Although the studios argued that there can never be a DMCA safe harbor defense to contributory copyright liability inducement, the 9th Circuit disagreed, noting that the safe harbor provisions do not exclude vicarious or contributory liability from its protections. Even so, the court denied all of Fung’s safe harbor defenses.

In particular, the court concluded that Fung did not qualify for protection under §512(a) for transitory digital network communications because Fung’s torrent file trackers, not the third party users, were responsible for selecting the copyrighted data to be transmitted.

The court also concluded that § 512(c), relating to information residing on networks or systems at the direction of the users, was also not applicable because Fung had actual and “red flag” knowledge of infringing activity on his system due to his own active encouragement of infringement, as well as the fact that Fung did not dispute evidence that he personally used his isohunt.com website to download infringing material.

According to the 9th Circuit, Fung did not qualify for protection under §512(c) or §512(d) (for providers of information location tools) because Fung received a “financial benefit” from his services by selling ad space and because he had the “right and ability to control” the infringing activity, which was shown through evidence that Fung exerted substantial influence on the activities of the users of his websites.

Finding no available defenses under the DMCA safe harbors, the court affirmed summary judgment for the studios on the issue of liability under contributory copyright infringement.  However, the court found various terms of the lower court’s permanent injunction to be vague and unduly burdensome and remanded to the district court to modify certain employment prohibitions and to provide more specific language for several terms in the injunction.

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Top Five Traps for the Unwary in Spin-Offs

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A wave of corporate breakups has swept through the United States over the last few years as investors have taken notice of the fact that smaller companies focused on a single business tend to outperform their more diversified peers.  A primary vehicle for these breakups has been the spin-off transaction, in which a publicly traded parent company distributes the shares of the spin-off company (spinco) to its own shareholders, creating a new, independent publicly traded entity.  The New York Times, citing Dealogic, reported that there were 93 spin-off transactions worth $128 billion in 2011, and that 2012 kept pace with 85 spin-off transactions worth $109 billion.  The rationale for a spin-off often is to unlock the value in a business or division that is trapped in a larger corporate bureaucracy.  Conglomerates tend to spread capital across all of their divisions rather than focusing on the individual opportunities within each business that are the most promising.  Holding company structures also can make decision-making more cumbersome and equity incentives less incentivizing for division management who feel as though their hard work is being diluted by the underperformance of other divisions or businesses.

Spin-offs, however, are complicated transactions that require a great deal of advance planning.  In many cases, an announcement that a parent company is considering the spin-off of one of its businesses is actually the start of a “dual-track” process wherein the parent company considers and plans for a spin-off while also remaining open to potential bids from third parties to acquire the business.  In even more complicated cases, a parent company agrees to sell a business to an acquirer in connection with a spin-off transaction.

The vast majority of spin-off transactions are designed to qualify under the rules of the Internal Revenue Code as “tax free” to the parent company and the shareholders who receive the spinco stock.

With this in mind, any company considering spinning off a division or business should keep in mind the following five potential traps.

1.  Tax-Free Qualification – Legitimate Business Purpose 

The spin-off must satisfy a legitimate business purpose in order to qualify under both the tax-free rules of the Internal Revenue Code and the Securities Act of 1933.  The tax authorities require that the spin-off be motivated in whole or in substantial part by one or more legitimate corporate business purposes in order to ensure that the purpose of the transaction is not simply “tax avoidance.”  The business purpose requirement is one of many requirements under the tax laws to qualify for a tax-free spin-off.  Because the costs of triggering tax in a spin-off transaction often are very high, most parent companies obtain a legal opinion from outside counsel and obtain a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service as a condition to completing a spin-off transaction.  As discussed in relation to trap number five below, a legitimate business purpose for the spin-off also is required under the securities laws in order for the distribution of the spinco stock to not be treated as a “sale” of securities by the parent company or the spinco requiring Securities Act of 1933 registration and the strict liability standard of care that comes with such a registration.  See the article entitled, “Five Key Tax Considerations for Spin-Off Transactions” for a more in depth discussion of tax issues raised in spin-offs.

2.  Separation of Assets and Liabilities

Before a business or a division can be spun off, both its assets and its liabilities must be separated.  Large companies with long operating histories often find that the process of separating out the spinco business is not straightforward, because the legal entities that house the business might also house other businesses and divisions that share assets, services, products, employees, vendors and customers with the spinco business.  The pre-spin separation transactions should avoid triggering contractual defaults and remedies under commercial agreements, financing agreements, intellectual property licensing agreements, collective bargaining agreements, employment contracts, benefit plans, etc.  Often the spinco and the parent company or another legacy business must enter into complex sharing or licensing agreements or joint ventures relating to valuable intellectual property, such as trade names, trademarks or patents, as well as employee matters.  See the article entitled “Trademark, Domain Name and Other IP Considerations for Spin-Offs” for a more in depth discussion of IP issues raised in spin-offs and see the article entitled, “Employee Benefit Issues in a Spin-Off” for a more in depth discussion of employee benefit issues raised in spin-offs.

The sharing of liabilities is often the most complicated endeavour because of the slew of legal obligations that are triggered.  In allocating liabilities to the spinco, the parent company must evaluate the impact such allocation will have on the solvency of the parent and the spinco.  Parent company directors can face personal liability under state corporate law for making an unlawful dividend because the company lacked sufficient capital to make such a dividend or for rendering the parent company insolvent by distributing out the spinco business, and the parent company itself can face claims of constructive fraudulent conveyance—i.e., the parent company received less than equivalent value, and either the parent or spinco was rendered insolvent (assets do not exceed liabilities), the parent and/or spinco was left with unreasonably small capital to run its respective business, or the parent or spinco was left with debts that exceed its respective ability to pay those debts as they become due.  Parent company directors can rely on legal experts and financial advisors to assist them in satisfying their duty of care.  A solvency opinion from a nationally recognized provider of such opinions is often a condition to the consummation of a spin-off transaction.  Such an opinion may be helpful to the directors of the parent company and spinco for a variety of reasons: (i) it can help to show that the directors properly exercised their duty of care in determining to enter into the spin-off transaction; (ii) it can assist in rebutting a fraudulent conveyance claim; and (iii) it can assist in rebutting a claim that the company had insufficient capital to make such a dividend.

3.  Transition Services

While one of the key rationales for spinning off a business or division is to allow the enterprise to operate independently, the reality in most cases is that, at least during the first year or so post-spin, a spinco must rely on its former parent company to provide many key administrative and operational services during the spinco’s transition period to a self-sufficient, independent public company.  During the pre-spin planning period, companies should consider, among other things, which transition services will be required, how they will be provided, for how long and under what pricing terms.  Typical transition services include legal, internal auditing, logistics, procurement, quality assurance, distribution and marketing.  These arrangements often have durations that last between six and 24 months.  Many parent companies agree to provide such transition services purely on a cost basis, while others will use a “cost plus” or “market” rate.

4.  Spinco Management and Board of Directors

Again, while independence from the former parent company is a key benefit for most spincos, having corporate managers with institutional knowledge and history with the enterprise is an important factor in assisting the spinco to successfully transition to independence.  Many spinco management teams include members who have served as executives at the former parent company.  In many cases, these are managers who served as division leaders who reported to the parent company CEO or CFO and are now ready to step into executive roles on their own.  It is also common for between one and three members of the parent company board to agree to take seats on the spinco board to provide the new public company board with a source of the company’s history and culture to ensure a smooth transition.  However, because of the competing fiduciary duties that these directors will face if they hold seats on both the parent and spinco boards, it is important for the spinco board to also have a majority of truly independent directors.  Spinco directors who are former executive officers of the parent also must be aware that the stock exchanges and influential shareholder services firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services will not view them as being truly independent from a corporate governance standpoint for some time after the completion of the spin-off.  This will inhibit their ability to serve on key board committees of the spinco.

5.  Preparation of the Disclosure 

Under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s rules, a spin-off of the shares of a subsidiary to a parent company’s shareholders does not involve the sale of securities by either the parent company or the subsidiary as long as the following conditions are met: (i) the parent company does not provide consideration for the spun-off shares; (ii) the spin-off is pro rata to the parent company shareholders; (iii) the parent company provides adequate information about the spin-off and the subsidiary to its shareholders and to the trading markets; and (iv) the parent has a valid business purpose for the spin-off.

To meet the adequate public information requirement, parent companies are required to prepare and disseminate detailed “information statements” that effectively look like initial public offering registration statements for the spinco.  These information statements are filed with the spinco’s Form 10 registration statement, which is required in order to register the spinco’s shares under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and to permit listing of such shares on a national securities exchange.  The preparation of the spinco information statement can take up to three or four months and requires a great deal of effort and cooperation among the lawyers, the business leaders, the finance department, the human resources/employee benefits department and the auditors.  In addition, under New York law, a spin-off of all or substantially all of a company’s assets may require a vote of such company’s shareholders, while under Delaware law, such a requirement is much less likely.

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Imminent Withholding of Medicare Physician Payments Appears Likely

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by attorney Frank R. Ciesla of Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C. regarding the Medicare payment rate which are scheduled to go into effect January 1, 2012:

 

 

As of today, there still has not been a resolution of the threatened reductions to the Medicare payment rate which are scheduled to go into effect ten (10) days from now .  As you are aware, the Medicare Sustainable Growth Rate will require reducing payments by over 27% as of January 1, 2012.

While the news seems to be focused on the deadlock in regard to the payroll tax cut and extension of unemployment benefits, the issue regarding physician compensation is as vital, not only to the physicians, but to the Medicare population, as either of the other two issues.  The pending Republican proposal for resolving the physician payment issue is focused on reducing payment to other healthcare providers.  This appears to be unacceptable to the Democratic contingent in both the House and the Senate.

As of this point in time, Medicare will withhold all Medicare physician payments for services rendered during the first ten (10) days of 2012, until there is either:  (1) a resolution of the issue; or (2) implementation of the reduction because the Sustainable Growth Rate issue has  not been resolved.  Clearly, the providers of healthcare to the Medicare population are being held hostage in this crisis.

See our prior blog as to steps you can take regarding your continued provision of services to Medicare patients.

© 2011 Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C. All Rights Reserved

Thirty-Two Health Care Organizations to Participate in Pioneer ACO Program

Barnes & Thornburg LLP‘s Heather Fesko Delgado recently posted in the National Law Review  an article about  32 health care organizations from around the country will participate in the Pioneer Accountable Care Organization (ACO) program.

According to a U.S. Department of Health & Human Services media release that was issued earlier today, 32 health care organizations from around the country will participate in the Pioneer Accountable Care Organization (ACO) program.

Under the program, which is operated by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Innovation Center, groups of health care providers that have formed ACOs will be rewarded by Medicare based on how well they are able to both improve the health of their Medicare patients and lower their health care costs. HHS hopes the program will save up to $1.1 billion over the next five years by encouraging health care specialists “to provide better, more coordinated care for people with Medicare.”

The 32 Pioneer ACOs were selected from a pool of over 80 applicants. According to the media release, “selected Pioneer ACOs include physician-led organizations and health systems, urban and rural organizations, and organizations in various geographic regions of the country, representing 18 states and the opportunity to improve care for 860,000 Medicare beneficiaries.”

The first performance period of the Pioneer ACO Model will begin Jan. 1, 2012.

Additional information on the Pioneer ACO model can be accessed by downloading the CMS Fact Sheet here.

© 2011 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

NLRB Approves Significant Changes to Representation Election Procedures

Recently published  in The National Law Review an article byJ. Kevin Hennessy, Kenneth F. Sparks, Mark L. Stolzenburg and Lyle S. Zuckerman of Vedder Price P.C. regarding NLRB’s vote at a public meeting on November 30, 2011:  

In June 2011, the National Labor Relations Board issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that sought to significantly change the procedures for representation elections under the National Labor Relations Act. The purpose of the Proposed Rulemaking was to limit the time that an employer has to express its views to employees regarding unionization during a campaign. The NLRB held two days of hearings in July 2011 regarding the proposed rule and received over 65,000 written comments.

At a public meeting on November 30, 2011, by a 2-1 party-line vote, the NLRB voted in favor of a resolution to adopt many provisions of the rule proposed in June. While some of the more controversial provisions were not included, the amendments that the NLRB approved in its November 30 resolution will quicken the election process.

That said, the Board still must draft a final rule and vote on it. However, with the recess appointment of Board Member Craig Becker expiring on December 31, 2011, the Board will lose its three-member quorum and therefore will be unable to adopt rules or otherwise conduct business in any significant manner after that date. Senate Republicans have announced that they will remain in session between now and the 2012 elections, depriving President Obama of the ability to make any additional recess appointments to the NLRB. As a result, employers should expect that the Board will move quickly to prepare and vote on a final rule within the next few weeks.

The resolution that the Board adopted on November 30 contains six procedural amendments to be included in the final rule regarding changes to the election process:

1.  The final rule would amend the existing rule regarding the purpose of pre-election hearings, making them for the sole purpose of determining “whether a question concerning representation exists that should be resolved by an election.” The primary effect of this rule is to preclude litigation about most voter-eligibility issues, such as supervisory status, during pre-election hearings. It is unclear whether this would preclude parties from litigating the overall appropriateness of the petitioned-for bargaining unit. The resolution appears to be more restrictive than the rule proposed by the Board in June 2011, which would have allowed the parties to litigate eligibility issues in a pre-election hearing if those issues involved at least 20 percent of the proposed voting unit.

2.  Under current rules, parties may file post-hearing briefs as a matter of right. The amended rule leaves to the discretion of the hearing officer whether post-hearing briefs will be permitted. In most cases, the parties will be allowed to make closing arguments at the end of the hearing, and briefs will be permitted only where unique or complicated issues are involved.

3.  Current rules require parties to file separate appeals to seek Board review regarding pre-election and post-election issues. The amended rules eliminate all pre-election review by the Board, and will consolidate all issues for review, including election objections, in a single, post-election appeal. According to Chairman Pearce, this will avoid appeals of issues “that become moot as a result of the election.”

4. The fourth amendment eliminates the 25- to 30-day waiting period between issuance of a Regional Director’s Decision and Direction of Election and the scheduling of an election. The purpose of this waiting period is to allow parties to request review of the Regional Director’s decision by the Board, a process that is eliminated by the third amendment.

5. The fifth amendment would limit to “extraordinary circumstances” occasions when requests for special permission to appeal to the Board would be granted. Under this standard, the Board would entertain pre-election appeals only when the issue would “otherwise evade review.”

6. Currently the Board must consider any post-election requests for review. The sixth amendment would make Board review of post-election appeals discretionary, permitting the Board to summarily dispose of appeals “that do not present a serious issue for review.” This is the same standard that currently exists for pre-election reviews.

Several components of the rule proposed in June were not included in the Board’s resolution adopted on November 30. Those are (i) inclusion of employee e-mail address and telephone number on voter-eligibility lists provided to the union before the election, (ii) reducing the time that an employer has to provide the voter eligibility list to the union from seven to two days, (iii) requiring parties to state their positions regarding pre-election issues prior to the hearing and (iv) requiring an employer to provide a “preliminary voter list” before the pre-election hearing. However, on November 30, the Board reserved its right to continue considering these elements of the June rulemaking session.

As NLRB Member Brian Hayes noted at the November 30 public meeting during which the Board voted to adopt the resolution, the median time between the filing of a petition and an election in 2010 was 38 days, and about 95 percent of all elections occur within 56 days. The time target in most cases is for an election to occur within 42 days of the filing of a petition. The amendments approved in the Board’s resolution may have little effect on elections in which the parties agree about the composition of the voting unit and other details without a hearing. However, where there is a dispute over the eligibility of certain voters, elections will occur much more quickly than in the past. In addition, the amendments may increase uncertainty for employers during campaigns. Issues of supervisory status will not be resolved until after an election is over. As a result, employers may be placed at increased risk of unfair labor practice allegations for the conduct of individuals who were not deemed supervisors until long after a campaign concluded.

As a result of these rules that the NLRB is soon to adopt, employers should review their contingency plans for organizing drives and give serious thought to the content of condensed campaigns. Shorter election campaigns may soon be a reality.

© 2011 Vedder Price P.C.

Brief Filed in Litigation Challenging the NLRB’s Final Rule Requiring All Employers to Post Notice of Employee Rights Under the NLRA

Recently posted in the National Law Review  an article by Labor & Employment Practice of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP regarding the NLRB’s Final rule:

 

 

On August 25, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) issued a Final Rule (Rule) that requires all employers subject to the Board’s jurisdiction—i.e., the vast majority of employers doing business in the United States—to post a notice in the workplace informing employees of their right, among other things, to “[o]rganize a union,” to “take action . . . to improve your working conditions by, among other means, raising work-related complaints directly with your employer or with a government, and seeking help from a union,” and to “strike and picket.”

Under the Rule, the notice must be posted in the same place where other employment-related notices are posted, which may include the employer’s intranet or Internet site if the employer customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Failure to post the notice could have three adverse effects: (1) it will be an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), (2) it could toll the six-month statute of limitations for filing unfair labor practices, and (3) it could be used as evidence of an employer’s unlawful motive in unfair labor practice cases.

The Rule is scheduled to go into effect on January 31, 2012.

The Status of the Litigation Challenging the Rule

After the Rule was announced, three separate lawsuits were filed in federal court to block its implementation: two in Washington, D.C. (which were consolidated into one case) and one in South Carolina. The cases challenge, among other things, the NLRB’s authority to issue the Rule.

Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed on October 26 in the District of Columbia action and on November 11 in the South Carolina action. On November 15, John Kline, the Chairman of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Education and the Workforce, along with 35 other members of the House of Representatives, filed in both pending cases an amicus brief supporting the challenge to the Board’s authority to issue the Rule.

The amicus brief was authored by Morgan Lewis attorneys, led by Philip Miscimarra and including former NLRB member Charles Cohen. “Our brief was filed on behalf of thirty-six members of Congress, including John Kline, Chairman of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, many other members of that Committee, and additional House Members. Their interest in the litigation stems from the fact that legislative decisions are reserved for Congress. The Members we represent believe the NLRB’s creation of a notice-posting obligation—which Congress did not place into the National Labor Relations Act—is contrary to the NLRA and exceeds the NLRB’s authority,” Miscimarra said.

The brief highlights for the first time in either litigation important legislative history showing that the original version of the NLRA contained a notice provision and a specific unfair labor practice relating to the notice provision. Led by Senator Robert Wagner, the sponsor of the law, a unanimous Senate Labor Committee intentionally eliminatedthe notice provision before the NLRA became law. “As the legislative history makes clear, Senator Wagner himself, together with his colleagues, thought there should be no requirement for companies to provide notification to employees. It is time for the NLRB to honor those wishes and abandon its ill-fated notice requirement,” said Cohen.

The amicus brief also discusses how Congress intentionally limited the NLRB’s jurisdiction to actual parties in pending cases—a limitation that was deemed by Congress to be central to the NLRA’s constitutionality. Finally, the amicus brief argues that the new NLRB-created notice obligation undermines important rights afforded by other statutes that explicitly provide for notice provisions. View a copy of the amicus brief at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/AmicusBriefUSHouseMembers_DC_15nov11.pdf. A decision regarding whether the NLRB had the authority to issue the Rule is expected before the current implementation date of January 31, 2012.

Copyright © 2011 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Government Coercion As A Vehicle To Alter Healthcare

Posted on November 14, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by attorney Frank R. Ciesla of Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C.  regarding  the Massachusetts Legislature, which previously mandates health insurance for all, has now moved into its next stage of attempting to contain the cost of healthcare:

 

The front page of the New York Times on Tuesday, October 18, 2011 stated that the Massachusetts Legislature, which previously mandates health insurance for all, has now moved into its next stage of attempting to contain the cost of healthcare.  One way of containing the cost that has been applied around the globe is to regulate the rates charged by insurers, which forces insurers to regulate the rates paid to providers.  Another way is to set an overall budget for healthcare as is done in Canada or certain European countries.  As the Times describes the Massachusetts plan, the approach being considered there is a flat “global payment” to networks of providers for keeping patients well.   All of these approaches alter the way providers are paid and attempt to shift the risks to the insurance companies or the providers.  In my opinion, each of these approaches illustrates the use of the governmental power of coercion to alter the healthcare field.

This use of coercion is shown in various ways in the Affordable Care Act (ACA), by penalizing employers for not providing healthcare insurance so that employer provided healthcare is no longer “voluntary,” by penalizing individuals who do not obtain healthcare insurance, and by requiring the expansion by the states of the State Medicaid programs to cover a larger portion of the population.

Coercion is not new to the healthcare field.  The federal government has long used its power of coercion to compel individuals and employers to pay the Medicare tax, and while Medicare Part B is voluntary, higher income individuals who select Part B are required to pay a higher premium than the vast majority of individuals participating in Part B.  The Medicare and Medicaid programs, while “voluntary” for physicians but not for hospitals in New Jersey, sets the rates they pay.

One of the new approaches to cost control under the ACA is the creation of Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) in which some of the risk of patient outcomes is shifted to the providers.

What is missing so far in the discussion of ACOs and in the Massachusetts debate, is a general obligation on the part of the beneficiaries as to their compliance with medical instructions, as well as their election to live a healthy lifestyle.  The government has exercised some coercion in this area, for instance, with significantly higher taxes on cigarettes as well as the numerous bans on smoking in various places.  Society’s experience with Prohibition has made it clear that that is not the approach to take again, in the area of cigarettes, or quite frankly, in any other area.  It should be noted that we are seeing calls for the legalization of marijuana and the taxation of marijuana rather than continuation of the current prohibition against the use of marijuana.  A similar approach is being taken in the area of alcohol with higher taxes on alcohol.

Whether or not this coercive tool, taxation or in the case of smoking, prohibition in certain areas, will be extended to other activities or circumstances, such as obesity, which result in additional healthcare costs is yet to be seen.  However, the changing of the paradigm in the healthcare delivery system, from payment to providers for the care they render to patients (whether or not the party is compliant with medical directions or the patients choose an unhealthy lifestyle) to shifting the risk resulting from bad patient conduct to the providers, is a giant step into the unknown.  One question that will need to be addressed is what authority will providers have in this new paradigm to require patient compliance with both medical directives and with lifestyle changes.

© 2011 Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C. All Rights Reserved