Tag: real estate

Avoiding Commercial Lease Disputes – Clearly Reflecting the Intent of the Parties is Key!

A commercial lease symbolizes a consensual relationship between parties that can be enduring and rewarding, or short-sighted and emotionally and financially taxing.

Entering into a clearly drafted lease agreement at the outset of the relationship helps to set expectations, which minimizes the possibility of disputes over how the lease should be interpreted.

However, not all commercial leases are clearly drafted, and disputes often arise between the parties over such issues as:

  • How the property can be used,
  • Who has responsibility for maintaining the property,
  • Effect of short term non-payments of rent caused by factors beyond the control of the tenant or just sheer forgetfulness, and
  • Who gets what when the lease terminates.

Disputes can also arise over the interpretation of provisions in commercial leases which deal with insurance coverage and liability of the parties.  Commercial leases typically include provisions which require one or both of the parties to have and maintain property and liability insurance policies with specific amounts of coverage.  These clauses also may include provisions which address the responsibility of the parties for damages or personal injuries.

Insurance and liability clauses are very important, and clearly drafting such clauses when the lease is created can minimize disputes between the parties regarding their obligations and liabilities under the terms of the lease.  Understanding how North Carolina Courts interpret such clauses may help the parties draft clear and unambiguous provisions which will set appropriate expectations and minimize the risk of future disputes between the parties.

The North Carolina Supreme Court recently published an opinion which addresses this issue and provides guidance on how the North Carolina courts should interpret insurance and liability provisions in commercial leases.  On December 7, 2018, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed a decision of a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in the case of Morrell v. Hardin Creek, Inc.  The issue decided by the Court was whether the insurance and liability provisions of a commercial lease operated as a complete bar to the tenant’s claims for damage against the landlord and other defendants.  In a split decision, the Court determined that the clear and unambiguous language of the subject lease indicated that the parties intended to discharge each other from all claims and liabilities resulting from hazards covered by insurance.

In Morrell, the tenant was in the business of manufacturing and distributing specialty pasta.  The tenant entered into a commercial lease for a building located in Boone, North Carolina.  During the term of the lease, an inspection of the premises found that modifications needed to be made to the building in order for the building to comply with state regulations regarding the production of food.

The lease contained a provision which allowed the tenant to alter or remodel the premises.  That provision also included language which stated that the parties agreed to discharge each other from all claims and liabilities arising from or caused by any hazard covered by insurance regardless of the cause of the damage or loss.  The landlord agreed to make the modifications in exchange for an extension in the term of the lease.  The project was completed but later discovered to be in violation of certain building code provisions related to fire sprinkler systems.

The violations were discovered when the sprinkler pipes burst and flooded the premises.  The flooding destroyed the tenant’s inventory and specialty equipment.  The tenant sued the landlord for negligence and other claims relating to the damages.  The landlord moved for summary judgment and asserted that the damages discharge clause in the provision of the lease which allowed the remodeling barred all of the tenant’s claims against the landlord.

The trial court agreed with the landlord and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  On appeal, a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that the provision of the lease was ambiguous in that it did not clearly reflect the intention of the parties to bar negligence claims.  The landlord filed an appeal to North Carolina Supreme Court based on the dissent in the Court of Appeals and for discretionary review of additional issues, which the Court allowed.

In its analysis of the case, the North Carolina Supreme Court discusses well-established principles of North Carolina law regarding the interpretation of contracts and, more specifically, provisions in contracts which exempt parties from liability ­­– so-called “exculpatory” clauses.  The Court cites to prior decisions which held that the intent of the parties is the deciding factor in contract interpretation cases.

Also, the Court states that contract provisions which exempt individuals from liability for their own negligence are not favored in the law.  As a result, such provisions will not be construed to exempt a party from liability for its own negligence or the negligence of those acting for that party in the absence of explicit language clearly showing that this is the intent of the parties.

So, when a provision that exempts a party from liability for its own negligence is well drafted, and the intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously shown, the provision exempting the party from liability will be upheld.

With regard to the exculpatory language of the lease in question in Morrell, the tenant acknowledged the broad and expansive nature of the language while also arguing that the breadth of the clause did not satisfy the general rule that such clauses must contain explicit language which clearly shows the intent of the parties to exclude liability.  The Court was not persuaded and stated,

[Tenant’s] chameleonic construction of this contractual language is unworkable.  Given the ‘broad and expansive’ nature of the phrase ‘all claims and liabilities . . . regardless of the cause of damage or loss,’ it is a challenging exercise to conjure up language in an exculpatory clause that would meet [tenant’s’] implied standard for unambiguity regarding waiver of negligence-based claims other than to require such a waiver to explicitly mention the term ‘negligence.’

The parties had agreed that the hazard of flooding which caused the tenant’s damages was covered by insurance.  For this reason, the Court found that the exculpatory language of the lease barred the tenant from bringing an action against the landlord for all claims and liabilities caused thereby, including business losses.

The tenant also argued that the exculpatory provision was limited by language contained in another provision of the lease which required the tenant to maintain insurance and to indemnify the landlord.  The Court stated that, in effect, the tenant was asking the Court to add limiting language to the exculpatory clause based on inferences made from the separate insurance clause.  The Court rejected the argument and stated,

This Court cannot creatively interpret the parties’ actual lease agreement in the manner urged by [tenant], and must instead enforce the parties’ intent as evidenced by the clear and explicit language of the lease.

The Court was very clear that North Carolina Courts must enforce contracts as written and may not, under the pretext of construing an ambiguous term, rewrite the contract for the parties.

The bottom line is that disputes over the interpretation of provisions in commercial leases can potentially be avoided if issues like the one describe in Morrell are thoroughly addressed and the intention of the parties is explicitly and unambiguously stated in the lease.

As always, those who need assistance with drafting commercial leases, or with a dispute over the interpretation of the terms of a commercial lease, should consult an attorney who is experienced in the area of drafting commercial leases or litigating commercial disputes.

 

© 2019 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.
This post was written by Eric J. Remington of Ward and Smith, P.A.
Read more on commercial lease agreements on the National Law Review’s Real Estate page.

Recent Utah Decision Enforces the Importance of Eminent Domain Provisions In Commercial Leases

A recent Utah case serves as a cautionary tale of the importance of eminent domain provisions in commercial leases. In Utah Dep’t of Transportation v. Kmart Corp., 2018 UT 54, 428 P.3d 1118, the Utah Supreme Court examined a provision in Kmart’s shopping center lease which provided the lease terminated if eminent domain left Kmart’s “points of ingress and egress to the public roadways…materially impaired.” In 2010, the Utah Department of Transportation (“UDOT”) condemned property which provided access to the property Kmart leased. Both Kmart, as tenant, and its landlord, FPA, sought compensation from UDOT for the condemnation of the access point. In 2012, the Utah Supreme Court held that Utah’s just compensation statute required courts and appraisers to determine the value of a condemnation award for each party’s property interest separately using the “aggregate-of-interests approach” and remanded it to the district court for further proceedings. Upon remand, after review of separate appraisals of FPA’s and Kmart’s respective property interests, the district court determined UDOT’s condemnation “materially impaired access and caused the [l]ease to terminate” and awarded Kmart $1.4 million plus interest. UDOT appealed.

On appeal, UDOT urged the Utah Supreme Court to adopt the “termination clause rule” which had been adopted by other jurisdictions. Under that rule, when a lease’s termination clause is triggered, the tenant loses its claim to just compensation because any of the tenant’s continuing interest in the leased property is extinguished.

Kmart argued the 2012 Utah Supreme Court decision, where the “aggregate of interests” approach was adopted, rendered UDOT’s “termination clause rule” argument meaningless. Kmart argued that a condemnation clause’s sole purpose is to determine the landlord’s and tenant’s separate shares of condemnation awards. Because the “aggregate of interests approach” determined the value of each party’s interests separately, there was no reason to contract for each party’s share of the award. Thus, said Kmart, the condemnation clause in its lease should have no effect.

The Utah Supreme Court disagreed with Kmart and instead adopted UDOT’s “termination clause rule.” In rejecting Kmart’s argument, the court explained the “aggregate of interests” rule addressed only the value of a party’s property interest. In contrast, the “termination clause rule” dictated whether a tenant even had a property interest following condemnation. Put another way, the “termination clause rule” determines what is owned where the valuation method determines what is owed.

In examining Kmart’s lease, the Utah Supreme Court determined the termination clause was triggered when condemnation left “points of ingress and egress to the public roadways…materially impaired.” Because the district court already concluded UDOT’s taking left access “materially impaired,” the termination clause—in terminating Kmart’s lease—extinguished Kmart’s property interest. Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court held Kmart was not entitled to just compensation since it no longer had an interest in the property.

Issues relating to condemnation clauses in leases have also arisen in Wisconsin. In 1980, the Wisconsin Supreme Court tacitly acknowledged that it had “become customary” to include condemnation clauses in leases. Like Utah, Wisconsin courts hold that these clauses can terminate the tenant’s interest and bar any claim the tenant would have had to a portion of a just compensation award.

The importance of reviewing condemnation clauses in leases is often undervalued. Unclear drafting of condemnation clauses may also result in landlords having to share condemnation proceeds with tenant. Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 288 N.W.2d 794 (1980). Clauses that fail to contemplate Wisconsin’s specific eminent domain rules can also result in the inability of landlords to collect attorney fees. Van Asten v. State, 214 Wis. 2d 135, 571 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1997).

The Kmart case serves as a warning as to the drastic effects that a condemnation clause can have on the compensation of leasehold interests in a condemnation. To avoid the potentially devastating results of a poorly worded condemnation provision, landlords and tenants should request their real estate attorneys review the condemnation provisions in their leases to confirm that their rights are adequately protected.

 

©2019 von Briesen & Roper, s.c
This post was written by Joseph J. Rolling of von Briesen & Roper, s.c.
Read more real estate news on NLR’s Real Estate type of law page.

The Real Estate Problem of Retail

The retail sky is falling.  At least that is how it appears from recent and unprecedented number of retailers filing for bankruptcy. From iconic stores such as Sears and Toys ‘R’ Us, to department stores such as Bon Ton, to mall stores including Brookstone, The Rockport Company, Nine West, among others.  The reasons given for such filings vary as much as their products but one theme seems to be constant — the inability of retailers to maintain “brick and mortar” operating expenses in the era of online shopping.  Accordingly, it appears that what some retailers actually have is a real estate problem.

Another troubling theme of many retail filings is the use of bankruptcy courts to achieve a quick liquidation of the company, rather than a reorganization.  Chapter 11 filings over the past several years have shown a dramatic shift away from a process originally focused on giving a company a “fresh start” to one where bankruptcy courts are used for business liquidation.  The significant increase in retail Chapter 11 cases and the speed at which assets are sold in such cases is disturbing and provides a cautionary tale for developers and landlords alike.  Indeed, such parties need to be extremely diligent in protecting their rights during initial negotiations as well as when these cases are filed, starting from day one, lest they discover that their rights have been extinguished by the lightning speed of the sale process.

Recent statics suggest that the average time to complete a bankruptcy sale is only 45 days from the petition date.  Moreover, under the Bankruptcy Code, and arguably, best practices, the sale will close shortly after court approval thereby rendering any appeal likely moot.  This leaves little time for parties to protect their rights.

Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) permits a debtor to sell property free and clear of interests in the property if certain conditions are met.  Unlike a traditional reorganization, which requires a more engaging process, including a disclosure statement containing “adequate information,” a sale under Section 363 is achieved by mere motion, even though it results in property interests being entirely wiped out.  Not only are property rights altered by motion, rather than by an adversary proceeding or a plan process, but these sale motions are being filed in retail cases as “first day motions” and concluded in as short as a month and half.

Even more alarming is that the notice accompanying such motions can be ambiguous as to how it will impact parties such as developers who have multiple interests in retail/multi-use properties.  Often, the reference to the developer and its property is buried in a 20+ page attachment in 8 point font, listed in an order only the debtor (or its professionals) understands.  If that was not concerning enough, these notices are being served by a third-party agent who may not have access to the most updated contact information necessary to ensure that non-debtors are actually receiving the notices in time to properly protect their rights.  It is not uncommon for these notices to be inaccurately addressed and not be received until after an order is entered; an order which will undoubtedly contain a provision that notice was proper.

Notably, despite Section 363(f)’s reference solely to “interests” (the group of things that an asset may be sold free and clear of), these sales are commonly referred to as sales free and clear of “claims and interests.”  Lacking an actual definition, courts have expansively interpreted “interests” to include “claims.”  Indeed, it is now the norm for bankruptcy courts to enter extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting 363 sales that extinguish every imaginable potential claim (rather than merely “interests”).  While consistent with the overall spirit of the Bankruptcy Code to promote maximization of value through the alienability of property, it comes at the expense of those holding an interest in that property, such as a mall or shopping center developer.

Fortunately, there are certain well-accepted exceptions to the courts’ expansive application of “interest.”  Courts generally limit a debtor’s attempt to use Section 363 to strip off traditional in rem interests that run with the land.  When faced with such attempts, courts routinely constrain the interpretation of the statute to block the sale free and clear of an in rem interest.

The majority of state laws have long treated covenants, easements, and other in rem interests that are said to “run with the land” as property interests.  Although clearly falling within the common definition of “interests,” courts routinely hold them not to be strippable interests for purposes of a Section 363(f), as being so ingrained in the property itself that they cannot be severed from it, or, alternatively, that the in rem interests are not included in Section 363(f)’s use of the term “interests.”

The protection afforded to in rem interests should provide forward-thinking transactional attorneys with a valuable opportunity to insulate many rights and remedies for their developer clients.  A hypothetical real estate transaction is illustrative — consider a transaction in which a developer sells two parcels to a large retailer as part of a retail/mixed use shopping center and takes back a long-term ground lease for one of the parcels. There are a number of methods available to document this deal: a sale-leaseback agreement; a separate contract to convey in the future secured by a lien; entry into a partnership, joint venture, or similar agreement. When analyzed with respect to the risk of a potential retailer bankruptcy, these mechanisms are inferior to the use of a reciprocal easement agreement (“REA”) or similar devise that creates an in rem property interest that runs with the land in favor of the developer.

If traditional contractual methods are used, the documents run the risk of being construed as executory contracts in the retailer’s subsequent bankruptcy case, subject to rejection, leaving the developer with only a prepetition claim.  A lien in favor of the developer would only marginally improve its position, as any lien will likely be subordinated to the retailer’s development financing and therefore of little value.  But, based on the current state of the law, a non-severable REA or similar document recorded against the retailer’s property will not be stripped off the property absent consent or a bona fide dispute. Thus, rights incorporated into a properly drafted and recorded REA provide the developer with a level of “bankruptcy-proofing” against a potential future retailer bankruptcy. Further, as REAs in mixed-use developments are the norm in the industry, they are likely to be accepted, if not embraced, by the retailer’s construction lender, making their adoption that much more likely.

The lesson is be forward thinking and be diligent.

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP.

They Are Taking Our Common Area!

The power of eminent domain, also referred to as condemnation, refers to the power of the government or other quasi-governmental entity, such as a utility company, to take private property for a public purpose.

The law requires “just compensation” to be paid when a taking occurs.  What happens, however, when the property taken is common area owned by a community association, property owners’ association (“POA”), or homeowners’ association (“HOA”) (collectively, “Association”)?

In a subdivision or planned community managed by an Association, the common area and elements are typically owned by the Association.  However, the individual property owners have easement rights granting them the right to use the common area (for example, parks, playgrounds, swimming pools, tennis courts, streets and walkways, and other commonly shared property).  An easement is a property right that, if taken, requires the payment of just compensation to the holder of the easement; in this case, the various lot owners in the planned community or subdivision.  In the case of a condominium, the condominium unit owners actually own the common area in fee simple as tenants in common.  This fee simple ownership, if taken, would normally require the payment of “just compensation” to the unit owners for the value of the property interest lost as a result of the taking.

The taking of common area and common elements can significantly impair the value of the lots, homes and units in a community.  Picture, for example, a DOT taking where an elevated highway is built where the community’s swimming pool once stood.  Are the lot and unit owners entitled to just compensation for the value of the common area taken and the damage done to their property values in a condemnation proceeding?  The answer is “yes, no, and maybe.”

Uniform Planned Community Act/Uniform Condominium Act

In states such as North Carolina that have enacted legislation that substantially follows the Uniform Planned Community Act (“UPCA”) and the Uniform Condominium Act (“UCA”), the Association is granted the power and authority to act for all of the lot owners or unit owners in a condemnation or eminent domain case where common area is taken.  The Acts provide that the portion of the just compensation award “attributable to the common elements taken” shall be paid to the Association.  The Acts and the governing documents of the planned community or condominium dictate how the just compensation paid to the Association can be used or disbursed.

It would seem that, despite this law, a lot owner or unit owner whose property value has been substantially affected by the taking of common area should also be entitled to compensation for the reduced value of the lot or unit.  In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas, for example, the Kansas DOT took lots in a subdivision that were subject to Restrictive Covenants preventing the construction of anything but single-family homes on the subdivision lots. The Court held that the single-family home restriction was a “property right” of the remaining lot owners in the subdivision that was taken when a highway bridge was constructed on the taken lots.  The Court sent the case back to the trial court with instructions to determine the damage that each lot owner had sustained as a result of the taking.

Fiduciary Duty

The officers and directors of an Association have a fiduciary duty to properly respond to and deal with a taking.  The Association should take advantage of any opportunities that arise before the taking actually occurs for input into the nature and extent of the taking, including, in the case of roads or highways, their location and design.  Typically, the condemning entity will have an appraisal done estimating the value of the property to be taken and the just compensation that should be paid to the property owner or, with common elements, the Association.  Often times it will be incumbent upon the Association to retain its own appraiser to ensure that a fair price is paid.  The condemning entity will certainly have legal counsel, and the Association would be wise to retain its own legal counsel to provide guidance through this process and to ensure that the Association is fulfilling its fiduciary duty.

Conclusion

The taking of a common area or common elements by a condemning entity can be a devastating and traumatic occurrence for an Association and its members.  The Association needs to understand the process and deal with it appropriately.  Having an attorney who is experienced in both the areas of community association law and eminent domain law will be essential.

 

© 2019 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.
This post was written by Ryal W. Tayloe and Allen N. Trask, III of Ward and Smith, P.A.

New Jersey Appellate Panel Countenances Beach Easement Condemnations for Federal Funding

A New Jersey appeals court recently upheld the Township of Long Beach’s exercise of eminent domain to acquire beachfront access easements in the consolidated appeal of Twp. of Long Beach v. Tomasi, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) – the latest chapter in a series of disputes between coastal New Jersey municipalities and owners of beachfront property within those municipalities.

The Township of Long Beach sought federal funding pursuant to the “Sandy Act,” which authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) to protect the New Jersey shoreline through beach replenishment and dune construction projects funded either in whole or in part by the federal government. See Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (Sandy Act), Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4. In order to obtain such federal participation and funding, the township was required to comply with conditions set forth in the Army Corps’ engineering regulations, including the requirement that participating municipalities provide “reasonable public access rights-of-way” to the beach, defined as “approximately every one-half mile or less.” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ER 1105-2-100, Planning Guidance Notebook 3-20 (2000); see also N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9.

As the township’s shoreline did not have the required public access, it resolved to obtain public access easements in various locations to achieve compliance with the Army Corps and NJDEP regulations such that it would be eligible for inclusion in an ongoing shoreline protection project undertaken by those entities. Accordingly, the township passed appropriate resolutions authorizing it to condemn and acquire via eminent domain four public access beach easements, including a ten-foot-wide strip of land along the defendants’ properties. After unsuccessfully negotiating with the defendants to purchase the easements, the township initiated condemnation proceedings in the Superior Court, giving rise to the Tomasilitigation.

In September 2017 the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the township and held that it had properly exercised its eminent domain power in acquiring the beach easements for public use. The defendants appealed and sought reversal based on their contention that the township was unable to establish either necessity or proper public purpose for the condemnations. More specifically, the defendants argued that reasonable beach access already existed in the township such that there was no necessity to condemn the easements under the Public Trust Doctrine or otherwise; and that the stated impetus for the condemnations, i.e. seeking federal funding, could not constitute a viable public purpose.

On December 20, 2018, the two-judge appellate panel issued its decision affirming the lower court and rejecting both of the defendant-appellants’ primary arguments. The court noted its “limited and deferential” review of municipal exercises of eminent domain power, cited the traditionally broad conceptual scope of public use, and held that the township’s undertaking to protect its shoreline – including conforming to state or federal requirements to obtain project funding – was a proper public use or purpose.

There are several relevant takeaways from the Tomasi decision, though they should be understood with an important caveat. The court resolved the narrow question before it without engaging in a comprehensive or detailed legal analysis and as a result, land use practitioners and municipal personnel should be cautious not to overstate the holding in this brief unpublished opinion. Nevertheless, the Tomasi decision is significant based on its factual distinctions from more traditional beach easement litigations.

Specifically, the easements at issue in Tomasi were for perpendicular access to the beach and ocean rather than for dune construction. Though both dune construction and access easements relate to shore protection, the former directly enable and contribute to such protection, whereas the latter are merely incidental to it. In that sense, the Tomasi easements are arguably less justifiable than dune construction easements in the eminent domain context – and the defendants in Tomasi appeared to base their public purpose-driven arguments on precisely that premise. However, the court evidently did not find the above-described “direct vs. incidental” distinction meaningful and rejected the defendants’ argument, finding that pursuing federal funding for shoreline protection was a sufficient public purpose for eminent domain purposes.

Under the facts of this case, that is a logically defensible outcome, as the township’s acquisition of the access easements was a de-facto prerequisite for constructing dunes and otherwise protecting its shoreline area, per the Army Corps and NJDEP regulations. Accordingly, a possible implication for future cases is that the precise nature of the condemnation easement in question will not necessarily be dispositive, and the focus of a reviewing court’s inquiry instead will be whether such an easement is ultimately necessary to effectuate the contemplated shoreline protection program.

It is unclear if this premise informed the court’s decision in Tomasi. To the extent that it may have, it would be valuable for municipalities, property owners, and land use practitioners to know that the court employs a functional analysis in evaluating public use / purpose in eminent domain cases. Similarly, but conversely, it would be equally valuable for those stakeholders to know that the court did not equate access easements with dune construction easements but rather expanded the scope of eminent domain by permitting condemnation for easements which are merely incidental to shore protection.

Accordingly, the ambiguity in this space following the Tomasi decision is worth monitoring, both in that litigation as the Supreme Court considers whether to hear a (presently unfiled but) likely forthcoming appeal, and in future cases with similar or slightly different facts. Though its implications are presently limited, the Tomasi case clearly stands for the proposition that beach access condemnation easements to obtain federal funding for shore protection projects are permissible exercises of municipal eminent domain power.

 

© 2018 Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C. All Rights Reserved

Are You Ready for the Next Downturn? Ninth Circuit “Cramdown” Cases Affecting Real Estate Lenders

Plan Approval in a Multi-Debtor, Single-Plan Context

In In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., the Ninth Circuit addressed the Chapter 11 reorganization plan approval process where a single plan was proposed for multiple affiliated debtor entities whose cases were being administered jointly. Generally, for “cramdown” plans, the Bankruptcy Code requires that at least one class of impaired creditors vote in favor of a plan for it to be approved. In Transwest, a mezzanine lender who was the sole creditor for two of the five debtor entities and whose loan would be extinguished under the single, jointly administered plan, argued that impaired class approval had to occur on a per debtor basis, and that since it was the only impaired class member for two of the debtors, its votes against the plan in those debtor cases barred confirmation (as there were no impaired classes of creditors in those cases voting in favor of the plan). The bankruptcy court, the district court, and the Ninth Circuit rejected that position, holding instead that impaired class approval applied on a per plan basis, and that the votes of the impaired class of creditors of the other three debtors established consent from an impaired class across all debtors, and supported plan confirmation. The Ninth Circuit is the first circuit-level court to address this issue, and the lower bankruptcy courts remain split on the issue.

Potential Impact

Lenders, particularly mezzanine lenders, who lend to one or more isolated borrowing entities within a corporate group of debtor entities may not have the voting control in the plan confirmation process they assume exists to block “cramdown”, and should factor that reality into their risk assessments.

“Cramdown” Value = Replacement Value (even if it’s less than foreclosure value)

In In re Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership, the Ninth Circuit, in an en banc opinion, addressed how a secured creditor’s interest should be valued in the context of a “cramdown,” i.e. where the debtor seeks to retain and use creditor’s collateral in the reorganization plan and the value of that collateral is to be determined based on the proposed use of the property. Valuation of the property in the “cramdown” context was critical to how much the secured creditor would recover under the proposed plan, given that amount of its secured claim would be determined by the value of the property. The Sunnyslope case presented a highly unusual circumstance where the foreclosure value of the apartment complex collateral was significantly higher than its replacement or use value due to the existence of low-income housing covenants that would be extinguished in a prospective foreclosure.

Despite the higher foreclosure value supported by the secured creditor, the Ninth Circuit affirmed application of the replacement value standard for determining the secured creditor’s present value of its claim under the plan. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit affirmed prior precedent holding that only a property’s replacement value – to be determined in light of its “proposed disposition or use” – could be utilized for determining the amount of a secured claim in the cramdown context. In applying its replacement value standard in Sunnyslope, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that the highest and best use of collateral may not dictate the value of a creditor’s secured claim, even where the replacement value, as determined by the collateral’s anticipated use or disposition, is lower than its foreclosure value.

Potential Impact

Lenders facing a potential “cramdown” of its secured claim, based on present value of its claim against real property, should carefully analyze the potential difference between a property’s foreclosure value and its replacement value and adjust expectations accordingly.

© 2010-2018 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

This post was written by Michael R. Farrell of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP.

California Commercial Building Owners Required to Submit Energy Use Disclosures by June 1, 2018

AB 802, California’s energy use disclosure law, requires owners of commercial buildings containing more than 50,000 square feet to report their energy performance by June 1, 2018. Building owners who have missed the June 1, 2018, reporting deadline are urged to report as soon as possible. The California Energy Commission (CEC) has the authority to issue fines for noncompliance, after allowing a period of 30 days to correct a violation.

Assembly Bill 802 (AB 802)

AB 802 replaced the State’s prior energy use disclosure law, AB 1103, which had required building owners to make disclosures regarding a building’s energy use at the time of a sale, lease, or finance. (View our previous alert.)

Unlike AB 1103, energy use disclosures are no longer tied to transactions under AB 802. Instead, AB 802 directs the CEC to create an annual, statewide building energy use benchmarking and public disclosure program for (1) all commercial buildings containing over 50,000 square feet gross building area, and (2) all multifamily complexes with 17 or more tenant units that are direct billed for energy.

AB 802 requires annual energy consumption reports from each building. Building owners must authorize their utility provider to record and upload their building’s energy data to EPA’s Portfolio Manager, a free reporting tool provided by the United States EPA that allows building owners to compare their building’s energy efficiency with similar buildings.

Compliance Requirements

Owners of buildings in California that have a gross floor area of 50,000 square feet or greater are required to benchmark their energy performance annually, and report the results to the CEC per the following schedule:

  • For disclosable buildings with no residential utility accounts, reporting is due by June 1, 2018, and annually thereafter.

  • For disclosable buildings with 17 or more residential utility accounts, reporting is due by June 1, 2019, and annually thereafter.

AB 802 also requires that energy utilities provide building-level energy use data to building owners, owners’ agents, and operators upon request for buildings with no residential utility accounts and for buildings with five or more utility accounts. The CEC will publicly disclose some of the reported information beginning in 2019 for buildings with no residential utility accounts, and 2020 for buildings with residential utility accounts.

Implications for Owners of Buildings in Cities with Existing Programs

The cities of San Francisco, Berkeley, and Los Angeles already have local benchmarking and public disclosure programs whose requirements exceed those of the state program. Per the state regulations, a local jurisdiction may request that the CEC provide an exemption from the state reporting requirement for buildings located in the local jurisdiction. If the exemption is approved, the owners of buildings in that jurisdiction may report to the local jurisdiction only, and will not be required to report to the CEC.

 

© 2010-2018 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Tax Reform – Consolidated Appropriations Act Provides Added Bonus for LIHTC Projects

On March 23, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 1625), a $1.3 trillion dollar spending bill that funds the federal government through September 30, 2018. In addition to preventing a government shutdown, this omnibus spending bill incorporated the following key provisions that help to strengthen and expand the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC):

  • A 12.5% increase in the annual per capita LIHTC allocation ceiling (after any increases due to the applicable cost of living adjustment) for calendar years 2018 to 2021.
  • An expansion of the definition of the minimum set-aside test by incorporating a third optional test, the income-averaging test. Pursuant to the Code, a project meets the 40-60 minimum set aside test when 40% of the units in the project are both rent restricted and income restricted at 60% of the area median income. Under the new law, the income test is also met if the average of all the apartments within the property, rather than every individual tax credit unit, equals 60% of the area median income. Notwithstanding, the maximum income to qualify for any tax credit unit is limited to 80% of area median income.

This legislation is a great win for affordable housing advocates who have been pushing for LIHTC improvements through the Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act, introduced in both the Senate (S. 548 sponsored by Senators Cantwell and Hatch) and the House (H.R. 1661 now sponsored by Congressmen Curbelo and Neal) in 2017, as discussed previously in a prior blog post.

We will continue to provide updates on legislation related to Tax Reform.

Read more coverage on tax reform on the National Law Review’s Tax page.

Copyright © by Ballard Spahr LLP
This post was written by Maia Shanklin Roberts of Ballard Spahr LLP.

Construction Liens on Leased Commercial Premises

In general, a contractor or supplier is entitled to file a lien against a commercial property if they have performed work or provided materials pursuant to a written contract with the owner. These lien claims must be filed within 90 days of the last date of providing materials or services for the project.

On the other hand, if a contractor or supplier is providing materials or services for a tenant of a commercial property, the rules are different. The differences as to what the lien may attach to are discussed in detail below.

If the tenant of the property entered into a contract for the improvement of the property and the owner directly authorized the improvement in writing, the lien may attach to the real property. The proper way to ensure that a lien may attach to the real property is to have the owner of the property sign off on and approve any contract for the improvement of the real property.

As a contractor or supplier, it is suggested that you obtain the owner’s authorization which would thereby allow you to assert a lien claim against the property itself in the event of non-payment. This can become a very powerful tool on collecting an unpaid balance, as an action to foreclose upon the lien could be brought. This would place a great deal of pressure on the tenant to pay the outstanding balance.

Conversely, if the owner of the property does not sign off on or agree to the improvement to the real property, a lien claim would only attach to the lease hold interest of the tenant. Under these circumstances, the lien claim would not attach to the real property itself, but instead, solely to the lease hold interest held by the tenant.

The question then becomes what would be the value of the lease hold interest.

Depending upon the use of the property by the tenant, the lease hold interest could be quite valuable, or it may be close to worthless. Obviously, if the tenant is fully invested in the property the lien claim may carry substantial value, as it may force the tenant to satisfy the claim. Then again, if the lease hold interest is solely an office or two within a commercial property the lien claim may not possess significant value.

The above provides a general overview as to a lien claim on a commercial property which is occupied by a tenant. It is suggested, as a contractor or supplier, that you have the owner sign off for improvements. This gives you greater leverage when attempting to collect on a lien claim, and also, could force the sale of the property to satisfy same.

This post was written by Paul W. Norris of STARK & STARK.,COPYRIGHT © 2017
For more Construction & Real Estate legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

California Supreme Court Rules Homeowners Forfeited Right to Challenge Coastal Development Permit Conditions By Undertaking Work Authorized By Permit

The California Supreme Court ruled on Thursday in Lynch v. California Coastal Commission that two homeowners who obtained a coastal development permit (CDP) from the California Coastal Commission (Commission) to construct a new seawall forfeited their right to challenge mitigation conditions attached to the permit because they accepted the benefits conferred by the permit by undertaking the work authorized.

Key procedural takeaway: With exceptions noted below, if a permit applicant accepts a proffered CDP and acts on that permit – even while expressly reserving its asserted right to challenge the legality of the permit – the permittee has forfeited its right to subsequently challenge the permit in court.

Key takeaway on the merits of the claim: None. Since the Supreme Court ruled that the permittees had forfeited their right to challenge the CDP by undertaking the authorized construction, it found no need to address the underlying merits of the permittee’s challenge. In particular, the Court left unaddressed the contention that the mitigation conditions were unconstitutional, including the condition that limited the life of the seawall to 20 years unless reauthorized at the end of the term.

Homeowners Challenge CDP Conditions

The homeowners, Barbara Lynch and Thomas Frick, sought a CDP (more precisely, an amendment to the 1989 CDP authorizing construction of the existing seawall) to authorize demolition of an existing seawall, construction of a replacement seawall and rebuilding of a lower stairway providing access from the bluff to the beach. The Commission granted the CDP allowing seawall demolition and reconstruction but imposed several permit conditions.

The homeowners filed an administrative writ petition in superior court challenging the following three permit conditions: (1) a prohibition on reconstruction of the lower stairway; (2) a 20-year expiration period on the seawall permit and a prohibition on relying on the seawall as a source of geologic stability or protection for future blufftop redevelopment; and (3) a requirement that prior to expiration of the 20-year period, the homeowners must apply for a new permit to remove the seawall, change its size or configuration, or extend the authorization period.

Around the same time, the homeowners recorded deed restrictions on their property stating that the CDP conditions were covenants, conditions and restrictions on the use and enjoyment of their properties, satisfied all other permits conditions, obtained the permit and demolished and reconstructed the seawall.

Lower Court Rulings

The trial court issued a writ directing the Commission to remove the three challenged conditions from the CDP and found that the conditions prohibiting reconstruction of the stairway and imposing a 20-year expiration period were not valid. The appellate court reversed the trial court, determining that plaintiffs had waived their claims and, in any event, both conditions were valid.

California Supreme Court Ruling

Though the Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the trial court decision, it did so on a different basis. The appellate court’s ruling rested on the concept of waiver while the Court found that the homeowners forfeited their right to challenge by accepting the benefits of the permit. The Court explained that forfeiture differs from waiver in that forfeiture results from a failure to invoke a right and waiver denotes an express relinquishment of a known right. The Court identified the crucial point as being that the homeowners “went forward with construction before obtaining a judicial determination of their objections.” By accepting the benefits of the CDP and undertaking the permitted project, the homeowners effectively forfeited the right to maintain their otherwise timely objections.

The Court rejected the homeowners’ argument that because the challenged permit conditions did not affect the design or construction of the seawall, it was possible to challenge the conditions while the project was being built. Such a rule, the Court said, would effectively expand the Mitigation Fee Act (Gov. Code, §§ 66000 et seq.), which establishes a procedure for developers to proceed with a project and still protest the imposition of “fees, dedications, reservations, or other exactions.” Not included in this list, however, are land use restrictions. The Court stated that only the Legislature has the power to declare that permits may be accepted and acted upon, even while the underlying land use restrictions imposed as a condition of that permit are being challenged in court.

The Court did note that there are potential remedies available to permit applicants. Responding to the homeowners’ protest that imposing a forfeiture under the circumstances present here – where the seawall was in danger of collapsing into the sea thus allowing no time to delay repairs until resolution of the litigation – the Court offered two solutions. First, property owners can address imminent dangers by obtaining an emergency permit from the Commission under Public Resources Code section 30624. Second, property owners can try to reach an agreement with the permitting agency to allow construction to proceed while a challenge to permit conditions is resolved in court, which the court noted could prevent a finding of equitable forfeiture. Neither remedy appears to have been pursued in this case.

Insights

Developers and property owners should view the unanimous Court’s holding as applying beyond CDPs and should thus proceed with extreme caution when faced with objectionable permit conditions. By refusing to extend the Mitigation Fee Act’s “pay and protest” option beyond fees and exactions, this decision gives permitting agencies leverage to impose potentially controversial permit conditions, knowing that permit applicants are often constrained in terms of time and money when choosing between moving forward with objectionable permit conditions or going to court. Legislative action on this issue could provide some relief, but may not be likely for the foreseeable future.

This post was written by Courtney A. Davis and James T. Burroughs  Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP.