Tag: Pregnancy Discrimination

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Max Scherzer, a $5 million settlement, and How They All Relate to Workplace Parental Leave Policies

Washington Nationals’ pitching ace Max Scherzer recently took parental leave and helped shine a light on a hot employment topic: ensuring that employers’ parental leave policies are fair and gender-neutral.

This issue also gained attention in May 2019 when JPMorgan Chase, one of the world’s largest banks, reached a $5 million settlement about the bank’s parental leave program. As part of the settlement, the bank will make payments to a group of male employees who were discouraged from taking 16 weeks paid parental leave to care for a new child. The settlement also directs JPMorgan Chase to implement a parental leave program that is fair and gender-neutral. JPMorgan Chase denied the allegations.

At first glance, JPMorgan Chase’s parental leave program seemed gender-neutral. It offered 16 weeks of paid leave for “primary caregivers” and 2 weeks for “secondary caregivers.” The bank, however, allegedly applied the policy differently when a male employee versus a female employee requested leave. That is, female employees requesting parental leave were presumed to be the primary caregivers, while male employees were presumed to be the secondary caregivers. The plaintiffs claimed that, for a male employee to receive parental leave as a primary caregiver, he had to show that his spouse or domestic partner had returned to work, or that he was the spouse or partner of a mother who was medically incapable of caring for the child. Female employees who had given birth themselves were not subject to this requirement.

The named plaintiff in the settlement, Derek Rotondo, requested 16 weeks of parental leave as a “primary caregiver” after the birth of his second child. Human resources, according to Rotondo, informed him that a father requesting parental leave would only be considered a “primary caregiver” if he could show that the mother had to return to work before the 16 weeks elapsed, or that she was “medically incapable” of caregiving. Rotondo could not demonstrate either option, and he received only two weeks of parental leave.

Rotondo then filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission challenging JPMorgan Chase’s practice of denying primary caregiver leave to fathers. He also filed a class action complaint on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals. Rotondo received 16 weeks parental leave, and the five thousand other male employees who were denied parental leave as a “primary caregiver” will be compensated from a fund created by the $5 million settlement.

This is not the first time that a step towards gender equality was taken in a case involving male plaintiffs who sought caregiver benefits, only to find out that the benefits are not available to them because they are men. Rotondo was represented by lawyers from the A.C.L.U.’s Women’s Rights Project, which was founded by now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the early 1970’s. Ginsburg was an A.C.L.U. lawyer when she argued Moritz v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue System before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

Moritz was the first federal court case to hold that discrimination on the basis of sex is unconstitutional. In that case, Moritz claimed a tax deduction for the cost of a caregiver for his mother, but the IRS denied it because the agency only allowed the deduction to be claimed by women and formerly married men. Ginsburg argued that no rational basis in the law exists for treating men and women differently. Moreover, she argued that the proper remedy was to allow men to claim the deduction as well, instead of eliminating the deduction for everyone.

Of course, in some families one parent is the primary caregiver to the children and one parent, for whatever reason, needs to return to work more quickly than their partner. The larger problem (for companies and their employees) is where the employer presumes a connection between an individual’s gender and that individual’s role at home. Doing so presumptively differentiates among employees and their parental leave needs based on sex. The settlement between JPMorgan Chase and their employees demonstrates that companies do so at their own risk.

As Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted, “[w]omen will have achieved true equality when men share with them the responsibility of bringing up the next generation.”

 

© 2019 Zuckerman Law
This article was written by Eric Bachman of Zuckerman Law.
For more on parental leave policies, please see the Labor & Employment page on the National Law Review.

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act: New Pregnancy Provision Taking Effect in August

Colorado Anti-discriminationOn August 10, 2016, a new pregnancy provision of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) will take effect. While the CADA had previously been interpreted as prohibiting pregnancy discrimination and requiring accommodations for pregnancy, the new provision strengthens and clarifies those protections. Indeed, the amendment will require more of employers and will make it easier for plaintiffs to prevail than federal anti-discrimination law. This greater pregnancy protection, combined with the fact that the CADA was amended in 2013 to allow successful plaintiffs to collect compensatory and punitive damages (remedies previously unavailable under the CADA), make it more likely that employers will face lawsuits under the CADA. Accordingly, employers need to be especially careful to comply with the new amendment.

Accommodation

The bill requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodations to an applicant or employee for health conditions related to pregnancy or the physical recovery from childbirth under the following conditions: (1) an accommodation is necessary to perform the essential functions of the job, (2) the employee has requested an accommodation, and (3) the accommodation would not impose an undue hardship on the employer. As in the disability context, once an employee requests an accommodation, the employee and employer are required to engage in an interactive process. Importantly, an employer may also require a note from a licensed healthcare provider before providing an accommodation.

While accommodations are to be tailored to the employee, the bill does give examples of reasonable accommodations, including, more frequent or longer break periods, more frequent restroom and refreshment breaks, limitations on lifting, light duty, and modified work schedule. An employer is not required to create a new position or hire additional employees to provide a requested pregnancy accommodation. However, if an employer provides or is required to provide a particular accommodation to another group of employees, the bill creates a rebuttable presumption that the same accommodations for a pregnant employee would not impose an undue hardship on the employer.

Employers should also note that to preserve a pregnant employee’s ability to work, the bill prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to accept an accommodation that has not been requested or is not necessary. Similarly, the bill prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to take leave if the employer can provide another reasonable accommodation.

Adverse Action

The bill also prohibits taking adverse action against an employee who requests or uses a pregnancy accommodation. Significantly, the bill prohibits more employment practices than other sections of the CADA. Other sections of the CADA specifically make it improper to “refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, to harass during the course of employment, or to discriminate in matters of compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . ” For pregnancy, adverse action is defined as “an action where a reasonable employee would have found the action materially adverse, such that it might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Accordingly, the bill likely covers a broader range of conduct than the other sections of the CADA.

Notice

To help educate employees about their rights under the new law, the bill requires employers to give new employees notice of their rights under this section at the start of employment. Further, employers are required to give current employees notice by December 8, 2016. Moreover, employers are required to post a notice in the workplace (along with the other employment law posters).

Although the bill does not provide a remedy for an employer’s failure to provide notice to existing or new employees, employers should comply with those provisions.

Remedies

Before filing a lawsuit, an employee who believes she has suffered an adverse action or improperly denied an accommodation under the new bill must file a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission within six months of the conduct. Once the employee has exhausted the administrative remedies, she may sue for back pay (up to two years reduced by what the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence), front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.

Action Plan

In anticipation of the new bill taking effect on August 10, 2016, employers should:

  • Review all job descriptions to ensure that they clearly identify the essential functions of each job.

  • Review handbooks and policies to ensure that they clearly define the procedures for an employee to request a pregnancy-related accommodation.

  • Draft the required notice of rights for distribution to current employees on or before December 8, 2016.

  • Draft the required notice of rights for distribution to new employees.

  • Update on-boarding policies and procedures to include providing the required notice of rights.

  • Review the accommodations provided to other classes of employees to understand the accommodations that may be presumed reasonable for pregnancy-related accommodations.

  • Train the employee or employees who will respond to pregnancy-related accommodation requests on the requirements of the bill.

  • Train managers on the requirements of the new bill, including the prohibitions on taking adverse actions against employees who request or use accommodations and the prohibitions on requiring employees to accept accommodations that are unwanted or unnecessary.

  • Update employment law postings to include a notice of rights under the bill.

Article By Gillian McKean Bidgood of Polsinelli PC
© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

Employers Take Note: The Supreme Court’s Game-Changing Decision in Young v. UPS Requires Review of Pregnancy Accommodation Policies and Practices

Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP

Earlier today, the Supreme Court issued a much-anticipated decision in the closely watched case of Young v. UPS, holding that a plaintiff may be able to prove unlawful failure to accommodate a pregnancy-related condition through evidence that other non-pregnant employees were provided with the requested accommodation.  As further explained in this Alert, theYoung v. UPS decision promises dramatic changes in how pregnancy discrimination and accommodation claims are viewed and handled by courts nationwide, and requires employers to review and, if necessary, change their relevant policies and practices.

Young v. UPS involves former UPS driver Peggy Young, who, upon becoming pregnant, was put on a lifting restriction by her doctor:  no lifting of more than 20 pounds during the first 20 weeks of pregnancy, and no lifting of more than 10 pounds through the remainder of the pregnancy.  At that time, UPS required its drivers to be able to lift a minimum of 70 pounds.  As a result, the company told Young that she could not return to work until the restriction was released.  The lower federal court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS, holding that no pregnancy discrimination had occurred, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.  In one of its most important employment discrimination decisions in decades, today the Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision, allowing Young to proceed in her pregnancy discrimination claim.

The Supreme Court held that an individual may establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination by “showing actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were based on a discriminatory criterion.” Put another way, an employee may establish her prima faciecase of pregnancy discrimination by pointing to some evidence that the employer’s actions were discriminatory.  As the Court explained, the burden of making this showing is “not onerous,” and, significantly, does not require the plaintiff to show that non-pregnant employees who were allegedly treated more favorably were in similarly situated positions.  Rather, the employee needs only to show that: (1) she was pregnant at the relevant time; (2) her employer did not accommodate her; and (3) her employer did accommodate others who are similar only “in their ability or inability to work.”  The Court reasoned that Young could satisfy her prima facie burden by pointing to evidence that UPS had policies accommodating non-pregnant employees’ lifting restrictions – for example, its Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and job injury policies provided for light duty-type arrangements – but the same accommodation was not extended to pregnant employees.

The Court went on to explain that once the plaintiff meets the initial burden of establishing her prima facie case, then, as is typical in discrimination cases, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denying the requested accommodation.  While this burden traditionally set a comparatively low bar for employers to overcome, the Court cautioned that an employer’s reasoning that “it is more expensive or less convenient” to extend protection to pregnant women will not suffice, though the Court did not elaborate as to what articulated reasoning will, in fact, be deemed to be legitimate and sufficient.  If an employer is able to satisfy its burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the final burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that reason to be pretextual.  While showing “pretext” traditionally has presented a comparatively high bar for plaintiffs to overcome, here again the Court lent a helping hand to plaintiffs in pregnancy discrimination cases by holding that this burden may be met if the employee can point to evidence that the employer’s policies “impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s ‘legitimate, non-discriminatory’ reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather – when considered along with the burden imposed – give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”  In Young’s case, for example, the Court reasoned that if the facts are as Young says they are, she may be able succeed in her claims by proving “that UPS accommodates most non-pregnant employees with lifting limitations while categorically failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting limitations,” thereby giving rise to an inference of intentional discrimination based on pregnancy.

Today’s Supreme Court’s decision in Young v. UPS is a game changer for pregnancy discrimination and accommodation cases.  Setting lower burdens for plaintiffs and a higher burden for employers to overcome than, arguably, ever before seen from the Court in employment discrimination cases, at a minimum employers can expect that going forward it will be substantially easier for plaintiffs to succeed in pregnancy discrimination and accommodation claims, and that policies that tend to negatively impact pregnant employees – particularly where there is evidence that the requested accommodations have been provided to non-pregnant employees – are likely to be scrutinized and may well be deemed to be unlawful.  It is important for employers to review their policies and practices with today’s ruling in mind, and to make whatever changes necessary to ensure appropriate accommodation of, and no adverse effect with respect to, pregnant employees.  Any requests for pregnancy-related accommodations must be taken seriously and evaluated thoughtfully, so as to ensure compliance and help prevent claims.

ARTICLE BY

Sonya Rosenberg
Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP

EEOC Expands Reach of Pregnancy Discrimination Act

Michael Best Logo

On July 14, 2014 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued its first “enforcement guidance” on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) since 1983.  One of the more significant aspects of the Guidance is the EEOC’s view of an employer’s duty to accommodate pregnant workers under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The EEOC now takes the position that employers must accommodate a pregnant employee’s work restrictions to the same extent it accommodates non-pregnant employees with similar restrictions.

This means, in the EEOC’s view, that employers who offer light duty work to individuals injured on the job must also offer light duty work to pregnant employees with work restrictions, regardless of the fact that the light duty policy only applies, by its terms, to those employees who have restrictions stemming from a work related injury.

The EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance is quite extensive.  The entire Guidance document can be found here.

The EEOC also issued a “Questions & Answers” document, found here.

As if that wasn’t enough summer reading, the EEOC also issued a “Fact Sheet” that summarizes the PDA’s requirements here.

Article By:

Mitchell W. Quick
Of:
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP