Tag: patent

PTO Litigation Center Report – January 14, 2014

Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox

Listed below are all new filings before PTAB of requests for inter partes review (IPR) and covered business methods review (CBM).  Since the last report, no new requests for ex parte reexamination at the USPTO have been posted.  This listing is current as of 9:30 AM on Tuesday, January 14, 2014.

New IPR Requests

Trial Number – IPR2014-00346
Filing Date – 1/13/2014
Patent # – 8,364,295
Title – INTERACTIVE SOUND REPRODUCING
Assignee – BOSE CORPORATION
Petitioner – SDI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Status – Pending
Tech Center – 2600

Trial Number – IPR2014-00347
Filing Date – 1/13/2014
Patent # – 8,504,631
Title – METHOD APPARATUS AND BUSINESS SYSTEM FOR ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS WITH ONLINE AND OFFLINE RECIPIENTS
Assignee – EVERYMD.COM LLC
Petitioner – GOOGLE INC. and TWITTER, INC.
Status – Pending
Tech Center – 2400

New CBM Review Requests

There have been no new requests for CBM review since the last report.

Newly-Posted Reexam Requests

Control # – 90/013,118
Date – 1/13/2014
Patent # – 6,435,450
Inventor –  SHIELDS, John et al.
Assignee –  SASCO
Title – MULTI-COMPARTMENT PARALLELING REEL HAVING INDEPENDENT COMPARTMENTS
Co-pending Litigation – SASCO v. Weber Electric Mfg. Co., Case No. 8:13-cv-00022-CJC-JPR, CD Cal.

 

Article by:

PTO Litigation Center

Of:

Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.

Does Wireless Media Innovations Have a Lock on Tracking Shipping Containers in a Shipping Yard?

Womble Carlyle

Wireless Media Innovations, LLC (“Wireless”) asserts patent infringement of two patents against Flowers Foods, Inc. (“Flowers”) in a complaint filed in the Middle District of Georgia on November 19, 2013.  The patents cover monitoring methods and systems for containers.

Wireless claims United States Patent No. 6,148, 291 (the ‘291 Patent) and United States Patent No. 5,712,789 (the ‘789 Patent) have been directly infringed by Flowers by its use of “yard management systems and operative methods associated therewith to monitor the locations, movement, and load statuses of containers in at least one of [Flowers’] facilities.”  Literal infringement as well as infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is alleged.  Wireless asserts that the infringement has been willful (as Flowers has had knowledge of the patents of Wireless “at least as of the filing date of this Complaint.”

The complaint is fairly described as a “notice pleading” that does not delve into the nuances of the Flowers monitoring systems or the Wireless patent claims.  The ‘291 Patent is a combination of detailed specifics in the specifications and broadly written claims.  Pictured below is a composition of selected figures from the patent:

Wireless Media Innovations, patent infringement, litigation, intellectual property

Contrasting with the complexity of the drawings and the 948 lines describing the preferred and alternate embodiments within the 47 page patent is the relatively simple first and twenty-first claims – reprinted below:

Claim 1

A computerized system for monitoring and recording location and load status of shipping containers relative to a facility with an associated yard defined by a boundary within which containers are to be monitored by the system, and a controlled entry point to the boundary, the system comprising:

means for recording identification codes of containers which enter the boundary,

means for communicating and recording information on movements, location and load status of containers within the boundary in response to movement and changes in location and load status of containers made according to instructions received from the facility,

means for generating reports of recorded information on locations and load status of containers within the boundary, and

means for generating reports on container locations and load status relative to designated docks associated with a facility.

Claim 21

A method for using a computer to monitor usage of one or more docks associated with a facility, wherein the usage involves the presence or absence of a container at a dock, the method comprising the steps of:

(a)    recording the presence of an identified container at a particular identified dock,

(b)   recording the absence of an identified container at a particular identified dock,

(c)    producing a report which identifies monitored docks and identifies containers present at identified docks, and also identifies docks at which a container is absent.

The ‘789  Patent is similar in scope, but it does not require the use of a computer.

The case is Wireless Media Innovations, LLC v. Flower Foods, Inc.., No. 7:13-cv-00155-HL, filed 11/19/13 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, Valdosta Division, assigned to U.S. District Judge Hugh Lawson.

Article by:

Kirk W. Watkins

Of:

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC

Design Patent Case Digest W.Y. Industries, Inc. v. Kari-Out Club LLC

Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox

 

Decision Dates: August 25, 2011 and November 12, 2013

Courts: D. NJ and United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Patents: D469,689

Holding: The terms of the ‘689 Patent are construed; AFFIRMED by the Federal Circuit.

Opinion: Plaintiff W.Y. Industries, Inc. sued Kari-Out Club LLC for infringement of U.S. Design Patent D469,689, entitled Rectangular Stackable Container. W.Y. Industries sells rectangular plastic food containers. Kari-Out makes competing food containers. The Court adopted W.Y. Industries’ verbal claim construction and denied Kari-Out’s request to include additional language, which described the functional features of the patented design.

W.Y Industries’ design patent claims the “ornamental design of a rectangular stackable container as shown and described” in the drawings of the patent. According to the Court, construing a design claim as that which is shown in the patent drawings is typical of design patents since, in most cases, drawings better depict a design than a written description. However, when the drawings contain functional features, an enhanced verbal claim construction may help to clarify exactly which features are claimed and which are not. In this case, the parties agreed that certain elements of the patented design are functional. Therefore, the court concluded that a detailed verbal claim construction will be helpful to the jury.

Both parties agreed to a claim construction from W.Y. Industries’ response to an interrogatory. The claim construction specified that the ornamental features of the container include the rectangular shape and radiused corners on the base and lid, certain raised and recessed portions, and particular dimensions; it also identified a number of other specific features. Kari-Out requested to include additional narrative describing the functional features of the design in the claim construction. The Court denied the request for two reasons. First, design patents protect only the aesthetic aspects of a design. Second, Kari-Out’s additional description of the claims was based on information uncovered during a deposition. Claim construction, however, must be rooted in the written record, including “the claims themselves, the written description, and the prosecution history.”

Kari-Out appealed to the Federal Circuit. On November 12, 2013, the Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court decision in a Rule 36 judgment.

Article by:

Of:

Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.

The Top Ten Things You Should Know About The Innovation Act of 2013 (For Now)

Andrews Kurth

 

Companies that find themselves either defending against patent infringement lawsuits or enforcing their own patent infringement claims should pay close attention to the Innovation Act of 2013 (H.R. 2639). The Innovation Act (“the Act”), which was introduced by Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), made it out of committee and has now been passed by the House, is aimed squarely at non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), i.e., companies that own patents but that do not sell any products or provide any services themselves. While NPEs may be the primary target, the Innovation Act, if passed, will impact all patent litigation, not just NPE efforts. Likewise, while primarily having a potentially negative impact on plaintiffs, the Act will also have potentially negative impacts on defendants. With bipartisan support and the backing of the White House, the Innovation Act may be the first such legislation to pass.

The Innovation Act makes numerous amendments to Title 35, the section of U.S. Code embodying U.S. patent law. These changes include introducing a discovery delay and other discovery changes, fee shifting, customer suit staying and party-of-interest transparency, heightening pleading requirements and expanding post-grant review. If nothing else, NPEs and their targets should know the following about these changes and the Innovation Act:

Discovery: Perhaps the most expensive and intrusive aspect of any U.S. patent litigation is the discovery process. Indeed, the expense and process of discovery is often the most effective tool used by plaintiffs to bring defendants to settlement, as the process can begin early in the case before any substantial determinations regarding the merits are decided. As a result, defendants are often forced to spend up to hundreds of thousands of dollars going through the discovery process before having any idea whether infringement is a substantial risk or not. The Innovation Act significantly neuters this tool and makes other significant changes to discovery in patent cases:

1. The Act limits discovery to only matters relevant to interpreting the claims until such time as the claims are actually interpreted. Claim interpretation is often dispositive of the merits of the case. Consequently, defendants would be able to dispose of frivolous cases before the expensive discovery process or make settlement decisions more fully informed of the risks; and

2. The Act seeks to better balance discovery costs between the parties, ordering the Judiciary Conference to address the presumably unfair burden placed on defendants and place a higher burden of costs on plaintiffs.

Fee Shifting: Another area in which U.S. patent litigation, indeed U.S. litigation as a whole, differs from foreign litigation is that, except in extreme cases, each party bears its own litigation costs. Currently, NPEs often file suit against multiple defendants. Each defendant is often offered a settlement for an amount much less than that defendant’s anticipated litigation costs. As defendants settle, the settlement price typically is increased for other defendants, further encouraging early settlement. Consequently, many defendants that otherwise believe they have a strong non-infringement case will settle because the cost of achieving victory is substantially higher than settling. This strategy would not work in most foreign countries since, in those countries, the losing party pays the winning party’s fees and costs. The Innovation Act would align U.S. patent litigation with this practice and eliminate the strategy of leveraging high litigation costs for early settlement.

3. In other words, under the Act the Court can force the losing party to pay the winning party’s attorney fees and costs. If passed, this would have a dramatic effect on patent litigation defendants’ decision making process and the typical enforcement strategy of many NPEs. By allowing Courts to shift the litigation costs to the losing side, defendants may be significantly motivated to litigate when they have a strong case even if the price of settlement is relatively low. Combined with the discovery delay described above, defendants will have considerable incentive to remain in the case at least through claim interpretation and to fight infringement claims if the claim interpretation is favorable…

4. …but, by allowing Courts to shift litigation costs to the losing side, defendants’ potential exposure may also be much higher. If the defendant ultimately loses a case, the Court presumably could order them to pay the plaintiff’s litigation costs, particularly if it was apparent that they should have settled. Consequently, the Act’s changes will necessitate defendants making smart decisions about their risk exposure. Fortunately, the discovery delay will enable defendants to economically make more effective decisions by delaying significant discovery costs until after claim interpretation.

5. The Act’s fee-shifting provisions also allows for the limited joinder of parties (such as those covered by transparency provisions described below) to satisfy the award of litigation costs. In principle, this provision could be used against defendants as well as plaintiffs.

The other changes mentioned above may also cast a chill on the NPE business and other patent plaintiffs.

Customer Suit Staying

6. The Innovation Act requires the staying of patent lawsuits against a defendant’s customer. Plaintiffs often sue a defendant’s customers in order to pressure the defendant into settling, often on terms less favorable than the defendant’s actual liability would dictate. Under the Act, an action against a customer may be stayed if the customer agrees to be bound by the results of a suit against the manufacturer. Consequently, customer suit staying takes away another pressure point for plaintiffs.

Post-Grant Review Expansion

7. The Innovation Act expands the post-grant review available against covered business methods (“CBMs”), making CBM review a more effective tool to fight back against patent lawsuits. Specifically, the Act makes the CBM review program permanent and codifies the broad interpretation of what is a CBM.

Heightened Pleading Requirements

8. Currently, many plaintiffs merely name the patents infringed and, in some cases, the products or services infringing. Heightened pleading requirements require more detailed initial pleading by plaintiffs, including greater details describing how a defendant’s products or services infringe the asserted patent claims.

Party-of-Interest Transparency

9. The actual parties of interest are often not discernible from patent complaints. Many NPEs are shell companies that serve the purpose of hiding the actual party asserting the patent. The Innovation Act requires detailed descriptions of the plaintiff’s business and identification of the real party or parties-of-interest behind the asserting plaintiff. Such transparency makes next to impossible for plaintiff’s to hide their true identity and may impact litigation strategies currently used by NPEs and other plaintiffs.

10. Additionally, the party-of-interest transparency provisions of the Act also permit possible joinder of the real party or parties-of-interest behind the asserting plaintiff. This provision gives real teeth to the Fee Shifting provisions of the Act as it may prevent a real party-of-interest from hiding behind a shell company with limited or no resources and avoiding the consequences of the Fee Shifting provisions.

Keep in mind that the Innovation Act will not just affect the Act’s main target, NPEs. Indeed, the Innovation Act has the potential to affect others. Defendants that choose to fight a patent lawsuit rather than settle could find themselves on the losing end of the fee-shifting provisions. Also, the Act may encourage a delay in sharing sales numbers until after claim interpretation, with the result that defendants that may have previously settled for reasonable amounts may find themselves paying much higher amounts if the claim interpretation goes poorly. On a different front, the amounts NPEs and others are willing to pay for patents may be reduced because of the greater risks and costs involved in enforcement. This could reduce the market for patents that provide additional sources of revenue for many patent owners. This in turn could reduce the overall value of patents, the amount companies are willing to spend on patenting and result in an overall chilling effect on research and development and ultimately innovation. As the Innovation Act evolves through the legislative process, some or all of the points above may vary, but the clear direction of the Act, the limitation of patent litigation by NPEs, will remain.

Article by:

Sean S. Wooden

Of:

Andrews Kurth LLP

Supreme Court to Consider Case on Patent Eligibility of Computer-Implemented Inventions

Michael Best Logo

On December 6, 2013, the Supreme Court agreed to consider Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, a case concerning the patent eligibility of computer-implemented inventions. The Court will review a split decision issued by the en banc Federal Circuit in May 2013. In that decision, seven of 10 judges concluded Alice Corporation’s claims to computer-based methods for minimizing settlement risk in financial transactions, as well as claims to computer-readable media containing program code for performing such methods, constituted patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101. The judges split evenly, however, regarding the patent eligibility of Alice’s remaining claims to computerized systems for performing such transactions. Given the stark differences of opinion expressed by members of the Federal Circuit, it was widely predicted that the Supreme Court would step in to settle the dispute. The Court’s decision could have significant implications for the computer hardware and software industries, as well as for patent eligibility standards in general.

The Supreme Court is expected to hear arguments in early 2014, and a decision is expected by the end of the term in June 2014. The case number is 13-298.

Article by:

Of:

Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

 

How Monsanto Applies to Nonagricultural Biotechnology

Womble Carlyle

The facts behind the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Monsanto v. Bowman are simple enough. Farmers are able to buy soybeans containing Monsanto’s patented glyphosate resistance technology under a license that permits them to plant and grow one generation of crops. Vernon Bowman skirted this program, however, by purchasing commodity soybeans from a grain elevator knowing that the seeds would nonetheless likely contain the very same Monsanto technology. He then planted the seeds, raised crops, and saved seeds from these crops to plant new crops. The Supreme Court held that Bowman’s actions infringed Monsanto’s patents because unlicensed growth of the seeds was a new making of the patented invention. Consequently, the doctrine of patent exhaustion did not provide any defense as to these new seeds.

This was not a surprising result for the biotechnology industry. The idea that patent rights in seed progeny are not exhausted by the original sale of their “parents” was well established in the United States, and is even codified in the European Biotechnology Directive.

The Court left us with a relatively clear answer regarding the scope of patent exhaustion related to seeds. The use of the purchased, licensed seeds for consumption and/or processing cannot be interfered with by the original seller, as the patent rights on those individual (sold) seeds have been exhausted. The planting and cultivation (i.e., replication) of those seeds, however, can only be done under a license from the patentee. In other words, even though someone sells you a bag of seed, you have no right to plant and grow that seed without a license (although there may be a good argument that the license should be implied in appropriate cases).

So, where does Bowman leave us when it comes to determining the infringement or enforceability of self-replication biotechnology patents outside of the agricultural context? For other patented self-replicating (or easily replicable) technologies, the circumstances may present more complicated questions.

Biotechnology inventions such as cell lines, bacteria, and other living material often must exist in a condition of continuous self-replication simply to be maintained for any use. Vectors, plasmids, etc., replicate within cells, and from generation to generation within host cells, allowing for production of vastly more nucleic acid copies than initially used for transfection. Even small linear nucleic acids such as those used for primers and probes may be “replicated” to generate large quantities relatively easily using PCR or other methods in molecular biology. In each case, (cells, viruses, vectors, probes), something analogous to planting, watering, cultivating, is required. In view of the Bowman decision, the question persists as to whether such replication will be permitted or considered an unlicensed “remanufacture” or new making of the original, patented item.

In this regard, we note that Justice Kagan left open the possibility that the replication might be “a necessary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose.”[1] Certainly, the replication contemplated in this part of the opinion is that which must necessarily occur in connection with some authorized practice of the invention. Maintenance of culture cells, for example, where the cells are necessarily replicating only for the purpose of maintaining the culture during its authorized use or in preparation for such use is one example that seems to fit comfortably within this aspect of the Court’s opinion.  In other words, a license for multigenerational use of a cell line may be implied in these circumstances, even if it is not given expressly.

Other technologies may not present quite so simple an analysis. DNA vectors can be used for a variety of purposes, not all of which require replication. For example, vectors can be used as probes or markers, they can be used to transport sequences of interest for further manipulation, or they can be used as immunizing agents. None of these uses require or specifically contemplate replication. Of course, some vectors are used in contexts where replication is likely or assumed (e.g., transfection of cells or bacteria, generation of transgenic tissues or organisms). The consideration of vectors under Bowman will, therefore, likely depend more heavily on context, including the sales and licensing practices of the patentee.

Some commentators have characterized the Bowman holding as “limited to the facts,” pointing to the Court’s comment that “[o]ur holding today is limited – addressing the situation before us, rather than every one involving a self-replicating technology.”[2] Attempts to limit Bowman to its specific facts should be taken carefully. Indeed, the Court cut through much of the surrounding facts to reach its core holding – that replication is a new making of the patented invention and an infringement in the absences of a license. Accordingly, it does appear that the holding may address the most important “situation” for all self-replicating technologies, even if it does not address all of the context-dependent permutations of the facts involving self-replication technologies.

Consequently, assertions of “self-replicating” material turning otherwise innocent parties into patent infringers are simply not credible. To paraphrase the Court in Bowman, the soybeans Bowman took home from the grain elevator didn’t plant themselves, didn’t spray themselves with glyphosate, and didn’t otherwise cultivate themselves to produce the unauthorized crop. Similarly, in biotechnology, it is likely that unauthorized and infringing activity will quite clearly fit the Monsanto “situation” and be easily recognizable as infringement. For example, maintaining an initial cell culture in the hands of the licensee-purchaser, although it also involves replication, should be easily distinguished from distribution of the culture (or vectors, or phage, etc.) to unauthorized third parties.

Nonetheless, given the potential for unnecessarily complex analysis and possible confusion of courts, patent holders should carefully consider how their license provisions may be used to clarify not only express grant and restriction provisions, but also how the license may shape an understanding of how the invention works and its intended use. The dividing line between authorized and infringing activity will be influenced by context, and parties are well advised to define that context by the licensing contract and not rely on the bare contours of the doctrine of patent exhaustion. The license is the place where the parties involved, the patent holder and the licensee, have a chance to agree on what is authorized and what is not. It is also the place where the patent holder has an opportunity to shape future interpretations of what the practice of the invention encompasses and what it does not. An effort to be as comprehensive as possible in the positive, express grant of the license may be as important as the restrictions that are expressly stated. If, as is quite possible, the restrictions fail to contemplate the full scope of intended unauthorized activities, a grant of authorization that is more specific may allow a court to more accurately determine what is “necessary but incidental” to the authorized practice of the invention and what is not.

The Bowman decision provides the biotech community some much needed clarity regarding self-replicating inventions. Perhaps equally important, the Court displayed a keen sensitivity to the negative implications of an overly broad exhaustion doctrine. While there will undoubtedly be further development of the law as it is applied to different technologies, the fundamental ability to control self-replicating inventions at each generation through the grant or withholding of a license places authority where it belongs – with the patentee. And, by reducing the need for complex work-arounds, the clarified authority and more calibrated level of control provided by theBowman decision should facilitate licensing negotiations to the benefit of both parties.

This article was written by guest bloggers Christopher Jeffers, Ph.D., Carl Massey, Jr., Thomas F. Poché, Ph.D.

[1]Although the Court referenced the copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1), in conjunction with this “necessary but incidental” fact pattern, the statute actually considers only computer programs and states there is no infringement if “a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer programin conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner.” From this, better language in the Bowmanopinion might have been “necessary and essential” or even “necessary and incidental.” 

[2] Bowman Op. at 10.

Article By:

 of

America Invents Act (AIA) Reform: An Interview with a Former Patent Judge of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

gears, innovation in thought bubble

With its recent overhaul to the patent system, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), enacted by Congress on September 16, 2011, makes significant changes to the way patent infringement claims are brought and adjudicated. However, whether these changes actually revolutionize the system or fall short and lack luster is a contentious topic best left to the experts, such as James T. Carmichael. Mr. Carmichael has previously served as Administrative Patent Judge on the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (“PTAB”), formerly known as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, and prior to that as Associate Solicitor of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), and currently represents inventors and patent challengers before the USPTO in private practice with Miles & Stockbridge. He has definite opinions on the overall strength and benefits of the Act. These include the potential reduction of litigation expenses by 90% and the ability for a patent to be cancelled more quickly and easily.

Patent Infringement Nuisance Lawsuits

The most significant way that the AIA revamps the patent system is by way of reducing the nuisance value of a lawsuit. Lawsuits brought by non-practicing entities (“NPE”) consist of a business or individual who is not producing or marketing the patent but nonetheless enforces the patent against alleged infringers. The average legal cost for defending patent infringement remains about $3 million. As such, defendants tend to settle rather than pay the high attorneys’ fees, even if the lawsuit is frivolous or weak. Mr. Carmichael opined that the AIA helps decrease this practice because it can cut the legal costs to $300,000. This in turn will help drive the settlement value down, providing NPEs with less incentive to pursue nuisance settlement amounts in the hundreds of thousands or more.

Critics of the AIA point out that even though plaintiff NPEs recover significantly less under the new provision, they make up for the difference in settlement amounts by simply suing a higher number of alleged infringers. As such, NPEs are developing a new business model in response to the AIA that has the “effect of spreading the pain.” Moreover, small businesses are still adversely affected by even the smaller settlement amount and may opt to settle rather than pursue litigation, thus continuing the practice of nuisance value suits before the AIA.

Mr. Carmichael concedes that the new legislation reduces the cost of litigation but not necessarily the number of suits filed. However, he insists that the AIA is a “big step in the right direction” and succeeds generally in bringing the nuisance value down. According to him, industry largely supports the AIA because it reacts and provides a solution to the high cost of striking down an invalid patent before the AIA revisions. In addition, not every patent claim is from a NPE with a nonmeritorious case and many patent claims are legitimate and should be asserted, given the value of patent rights.

Patent Post-Grant Process Under PTAB

The AIA reduces the cost of striking an invalid patent by providing for post-grant opposition which provides an alternative to litigation. Under the newly-implemented inter partes review (IPR), an entity or business may challenge the validity of the patent at the PTAB. IPR will be decided by a PTAB three-judge panel, whereas under the previous system of reexamination, patent examiners from the Central Reexamination Unit (CRU) determined the patent claim rights. According to Mr. Carmichael, the benefit of adjudication under PTAB is that it is easier for PTAB to cancel a patent then for a jury to invalidate a patent. Under the AIA, there is no presumption of validity applied in the patent review process so deference is not given to the patent examiner. Further, a patent challenger can go directly to the administrative judges to challenge the patent with more technical and nuanced arguments that cannot adequately be made to a jury. The new procedures “grant effective ways to determine if a challenge is valid,” according to Mr. Carmichael. Ultimately, striking an invalid patent is “faster and easier than before, mainly because these proceedings are conducted by PTAB, not [CRU patent] examiners or courts.”

In addition, under the AIA, patent review is provided the maximum time limit of one year, whereas under reexamination, no such time limit existed and the correction of patents was a time-consuming process. Parties could potentially add new arguments under reexamination but the new patent post-grant opposition process will be more efficient. Prior legislation did not have this time limit, which is one reason why Mr. Carmichael deemed it as ineffectual as compared to the AIA.  Courts are now likely to stay patent infringement proceedings in view of the speedier PTAB processes.

A Successful Verdict for the AIA’s Patent Reform Provisions

Ultimately, Mr. Carmichael views the AIA legislation as the “first in history” to successfully accomplish diminishing the nuisance value of a patent infringement suit and provide effective avenues of opposition to patent challengers with meritorious claims. Mr. Carmichael dismisses complaints from critics of the legislation, stating “I think it did enough for what it was trying to accomplish.” According to Mr. Carmichael, the AIA will serve as the “most powerful tool in history to challenge [patent] validity.” The final enactment of the legislation occurred recently on March 16, 2013, and only time will tell whether the rest of the legal community agrees with him or not.

Article By:

 of

Patent Exhaustion Rejected: Patented Seed Purchaser Has No Right to Make Copies

McDermottLogo_2c_rgb

The Supreme Court in Bowman v. Monsanto Co. ruled unanimously that a farmer’s replanting of harvested seeds constituted making new infringing articles.  While the case is important for agricultural industries, the Supreme Court cautioned that its decision is limited to the facts of the Bowman case and is not a pronouncement regarding all self-replicating products.

In a narrow ruling that reaffirms the scope of patent protection over seeds, and possibly over other self-replicating technologies, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a purchaser of patented seeds may not reproduce them through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission.  Bowman v. Monsanto Co., Case No. 11-796 (Supreme Court May 13, 2013).

In this case, Monsanto had asserted two of its patents that cover genetically modified soybean seeds that are resistant to herbicide (Roundup Ready® seeds).  Monsanto broadly licenses its Roundup Ready® soybean seeds under agreements that specify that the farmer “may not save any of the harvested seeds for replanting, nor may he supply them to anyone else for that purpose.”  Vernon Hugh Bowman is a farmer who purchased soybean seeds from a grain elevator.  Bowman replanted Roundup Ready® seeds in multiple years without Monsanto’s permission.  The district court granted summary judgment of patent infringement against Bowman, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.  Bowman appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.

On appeal, Bowman heavily relied on the “patent exhaustion” doctrine, which provides that the authorized sale of a patented article gives the purchaser or any subsequent owner a right to use or resell that article.  Bowman argued that the authorized sale of the Roundup Ready® seeds exhausted Monsanto’s patent rights in the seeds, because “right to use” in the context of seeds includes planting the seeds and reproducing new seeds.

Patent Implications

Speaking through Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision that Bowman’s activities amounted to making new infringing articles.  The Supreme Court held that “the exhaustion doctrine does not enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s permission.”  Specifically, the exhaustion doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights only as to the particular article sold, but “leaves untouched the patentee’s ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patented item.”  The Supreme Court noted that if Bowman’s replanting activities were exempted under the exhaustion doctrine, Monsanto’s patent would provide scant benefit.  After Monsanto sold its first seed, other seed companies could produce the patented seed to compete with Monsanto, and farmers would need to buy seed only once.

In rebuffing Bowman’s argument that he was using the seed he purchased in the manner it was intended to be used, and that therefore exhaustion should apply, the Supreme Court explained that its ruling would not prevent farmers from making appropriate use of the seed they purchase—i.e., to grow a crop of soybeans consistent with the license to do so granted by Monsanto.  However, as the Supreme Court explained “[A]pplying our usual rule in this context . . . will allow farmers to benefit from Roundup Ready, even as it rewards Monsanto for its innovation.”

Tying the Supreme Court’s decision in this case narrowly to seed (as opposed to other self-replicating technologies), Justice Kagan noted that the decision is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., in which the Supreme Court concluded that seeds (as well as plants) may simultaneously be subject to patent protection and to the narrower protection available under the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA).  PVPA protection permits farmers who legally purchase protected seed to save harvested seed for replanting.  However, reconciling the two forms of protection, Justice Kagan explained, “[I]f a sale [i.e., of a patented seed] cut off the right to control a patented seed’s progeny, then (contrary to J.E.M.) the patentee could not prevent the buyer from saving harvested seed.”

Other Self-Replicating Technologies

The Supreme Court’s decision in Monsanto is, of course, important for agricultural industries.  If extended to other self-replicating technologies, it may also prove important for biotechnology companies and others  that rely on self-replicating technologies, including, for example, companies that own patent rights over viral strains, cell lines, and self-replicating DNA or RNA molecules.  If subsequent cases extend the “no exhaustion” holding of Monsanto to these technologies, patent protection would extend to copies made from the “first generation” product that is obtained through an authorized sale.

However, the Supreme Court cautioned that its decision is limited to “the situation before us” and is not an overarching pronouncement regarding all self-replicating products.  The Supreme Court suggested that its “no exhaustion” ruling might not apply where an article’s self-replication “occur[s] outside the purchaser’s control” or is “a necessary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose,” citing computer software (and a provision of the Copyright Act) as a possible example.  As explained by Justice Kagan, “We need not address here whether or how the doctrine of patent exhaustion would apply in such circumstances.”  In this regard, the Supreme Court particularly noted that “Bowman was not a passive observer of his soybeans’ multiplication.”  Instead, Bowman “controlled the reproduction” of seeds by repeated planting and harvesting.  Thus, the Supreme Court suggests that a purchaser’s “control” over the reproduction process likely will be a key inquiry in considering the patent exhaustion doctrine as it relates to other self-replicating technologies.  Of course, it remains to be seen how broadly lower courts will interpret the Supreme Court’s ruling.

Antitrust Implications

By holding that Monsanto’s restriction on replanting was within the scope of its patent rights, the Supreme Court effectively immunized that restriction from antitrust scrutiny.  Other court decisions have called into question other license restrictions viewed as going beyond the scope of patent protection as being potentially susceptible to an antitrust or patent misuse challenge.

The Supreme Court highlighted its application of the exhaustion doctrine last addressed in Quanta, which held that “the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights in that article.”  This boundary line conventionally demarcated the end of a patent’s protection and the beginning of a potential antitrust minefield.  Some commentators may interpret the Monsanto decision to push that line further out.  Importantly, however, the Supreme Court deemed the seeds at issue to be a “new product.”  So construed, Monsanto’s restriction on replanting did not affect the product’s use, as in Quanta and Univis Lens, but rather came within the well-settled principle that “the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right to ‘make’ a new product.”

The Supreme Court not only was doctrinally conservative in its Monsanto decision, it was also careful to explain that its holding is a narrow one.  Monsanto never exhausted its patent rights in the “new” seeds; indeed, it never truly “sold” them.  Rather, Bowman created new seed from seeds that Monsanto had sold.  The decision therefore may not portend a more general inclination to construe the scope of patent protection more broadly.  In fact, the Supreme Court went so far as to clarify that it could reach a different outcome were it presented with a different technology.

Article By:

Almost All Applications Filed On or After September 16, 2012 Will Require a New Inventor’s Declaration

On Tuesday, August 14, 2012, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published a final rule entitled “Changes to Implement the Inventor’s Oath or Declaration Provisions of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act.” Among other things, this rulemaking implements 35 USC 115, which changed the requirements for the inventor’s oath or declaration. Amended 35 USC 115(b) provides that the oath or declaration must contain two statements: (1) that the application was made or was authorized to be made by the affiant or declarant, and (2) that the individual believes himself or herself to be the original inventor or an original joint inventor of a claimed invention in the application. All oaths or declarations submitted in an application filed on or after September 16, 2012 must meet the requirements of 35 USC 115 as amended by the AIA.

The phrase “or was authorized to be made” is new and does not appear in the current version of the inventor’s declaration. As a result, oaths or declarations submitted in applications filed before September 16, 2012 will not satisfy the statutory requirements for an oath or declaration for an application filed on or after September 16, 2012.

This is especially significant for continuing applications: continuations, divisionals, and continuation-in-part applications. Previously, applicants could submit a copy of the inventor’s oath or declaration from a parent application for a continuation or divisional application of that parent application. However, according to this final rule, starting September 16, 2012, this will no longer be possible if the current oath or declaration does not contain the new statements as above. The oath or declaration that is submitted for a continuing application that was filed on or after September 16, 2012, must satisfy the amended AIA statute. As a result most applications will need a new oath or declaration.

Adding to the problem, the USPTO will no longer review an oath or declaration in an application for compliance with the rules during the examination process. The USPTO will review applications to determine whether the application includes an oath or declaration when the application is in condition for allowance. Therefore it could be many years before the applicant learns that the oath or declaration is defective.

RECOMMENDATION: File continuing applications, continuations, divisionals, and continuation-in-part applications prior to September 16, 2012, if obtaining a new oath or declaration with the signature of the inventors may be a problem. Contact your attorney for other options.

© 2012 Sterne Kessler

USPTO Preliminary Guidelines Spread Mayo on Patent-Eligibility

The National Law Review recently published an article by Christopher L. Drymalla, Jeffrey B. Swartz, Jeffrey S. Whittle and Michael R. Samardzija, Ph.D. of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP regarding Patent-Eligibilty:

A day after the United States Supreme Court delivered its decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,1 the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued preliminary guidance2 instructing examiners to reject process claims that invoke laws of nature and only add steps which constitute “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” that is described in the most general of terms regardless of whether there is a transformation involved.

According to the Patent Office, although the “machine or transformation test” remains an “important and useful clue,” it is not to be considered “the sole or a determinative test” for eligibility as it does not “trump the ‘law of nature’ exclusion.” Moreover, the Mayo decision reinforces the need for a patent applicant whose claims include a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea to ensure the “claimed product or process amounts to significantly more than a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea with conventional steps specified at a high level of generality appended thereto.” (emphasis in original). Although the guidelines put special importance on process claims as were at stake in Mayo, the guidelines appear to indicate this analysis may apply to all claims related to laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.

Neither the guidelines nor Mayo provide specific guidance for what would make a product or process significantly more than a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea. Nevertheless, the Patent Office sees the claim at issue inMayo as a prime example of one which merely includes a highly general and conventional step of which patent examiners are expected to be more cautious.  As explained in the guidelines, the claims in Mayo emphasize the “law of nature” correlation between the concentration of the drug and its threshold limits for therapeutic effects and harmful side effects.

Simply adding the well-understood, routine, conventional actions of administering the drug and checking its blood concentration in the most general of terms, however, does not confer patent eligibility as the claims themselves are “effectively directed to the [law of nature] exception itself.” Based on the new guidelines, an examiner confronting a similar claim set is directed to reject the claim as non-statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (utility or patent-eligibility requirement section). The guidelines do specifically note that the applicant in such a case will then have the opportunity to defend the claim and show why it is not drawn to the patentability exception itself. The applicant will have to rely on other claim limitations to support the argument.

The Patent Office’s guidelines suggest that the Mayo decision should be viewed as a cautionary tale for applicants who intend to direct claims to inventions which arguably incorporate the use of laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.

Should you have any questions, please contact your Bracewell & Giuliani LLP patent attorneys. We will, of course, keep you advised as to any new developments in this area.

_______________________________________

1No. 10-1150, 566 U.S. ___, 2012 WL 912952 (S. Ct. Mar. 20, 2012) (for a more thorough discussion of Mayo and the particular facts and determinations involved,see Update: Can’t Touch This – Supreme Court Finds Personalized Medicine Patent Claims Invalid, Bracewell & Giuliani LLP (Mar. 20, 2012).

2See Memorandum: Supreme Court Decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (Mar. 21, 2012).

© 2012 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP