Aglets, Who Knew?

SneakRTech Corp. wants you to defend their patent and challenge BadGuys, Incorporated’s patent at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The subject matter: aglets.

You run to the internet and find that “aglets” are the metal or plastic component on the end of a shoelace. Even more, you are surprised to find that the science of aglets is varied and deep. There is technology behind the manufacturing of the aglets themselves, the assembly of the aglets to the laces, and the design of the aglets such that they easily insert into the eyelets of the shoe. Chemistry and material science play a role in the technology related to aglets – both metallurgy and polymer science. Some of these disciplines are relatively old (e.g., at least 15 years ago they were well developed), while some disciplines are rapidly evolving (e.g., nanocoatings to provide a color-change depending on the temperature of the environment).

To complicate things further, the patents being defended and challenged have very different applications—one is an aglet for a desert rock climbing shoe, known to be exposed to high heat, low humidity, and abrasive conditions. The other is directed to a snowboarding boot aglet.

So now you face important questions. Do you need two experts? And how do you choose an expert? There are a least four considerations associated with finding the right expert. 

1. Make a wish-list

The first step in selecting an expert is simple – make a wish-list of the ideal traits you want in your expert. This requires answering, or at least thinking about, several questions.

What, and how many, technology spaces are claimed? Consider whether you need multiple experts, based on the variation in technology, including between claims of the same patent. Although Daubert seems to come up less at the PTAB, consider how to position yourself so that any expert you choose will survive a Daubert challenge.

For our example, think about desired attributes of the eventual selected expert. Are we looking for an expert in aglet design, or perhaps manufacturing processes related to attaching the aglets to the lace themselves? Are we looking for industry or academic expertise, or both? Are we looking for a focused specialist in aglets or a broader expertise in understanding the chemistry, material science, and nanotechnology of aglets. Where is the eyelet going to be (e.g., dress shoe, trail runner, hockey skates, etc.)? Does it matter?

What level of education is required to helpfully explain the technology, and relatedly, how are we planning to define the person-of-ordinary-skill-in-the-art? If the technology is relatively developed, how will our expert opine on the state-of-the-art at a time where she may not have even been out of undergraduate school?

Do you need an experienced expert with deposition and court appearances, or will a more novice expert work?

2. Identify potential expert types and sources

Once you have a wish-list of what you want in an expert, you need to determine where to look to find it. A good start can be to research publications, patents, and industry groups in the claimed technology space.

For example, one aglet patent may relate to electroplating processes of aglets specifically designed to be applied after the aglet is attached to the lace, involving complex chemistry and manufacturing concerns. The other aglet patent could be focused on shape design for ease of entry into an eyelet on a shoe.

For the first aglet, the complex chemistry may require a high level of education. The latter aglet may be better suited to a manufacturing engineer having hands on experience in a final assembly plant, or an industrial designer focused on customer experience. These experts may travel in vastly different circles, and may lend themselves to different types of searching. Additionally, consider whether you’re looking for a generalist or a specialist. For specialist experts, several databases are available to search theses/dissertations. This may provide a list of potential experts to consider that have studied your issue deeply.

3. Consider using an expert service – or two

A helpful shortcut to finding your expert and getting them retained early can be utilizing an expert search service. As a practical matter, it can be helpful to use such a service to ensure quick turnaround, especially if you have a good relationship with the headhunter. You can take steps to make the search consultant’s job easier, which will net better results. This includes providing them a list of experts already disqualified, for example based on conflicts, co-counsel or client preference, etc. Coordination with the client and co-counsel is key, and evaluating potential experts and developing the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art can quickly narrow the list of available experts.

Additionally, provide the expert service your anticipated timeline—it is critical that the expert is available when you need them (e.g., to prepare a declaration, at deposition(s), etc.).

4. Nail the expert interview – gain knowledge and assess quickly

The interview phase needs to include at least three considerations: experience as an expert, substantive background in the technology, and availability now and throughout trial. If an expert has never been deposed before, try to determine whether they have the soft skills needed to be effectively cross-examined. Push them to see how they react to hard questions both substantively and temperamentally. Ask them for some strategy advice for your case to see how they think. Research them – look for skeletons before hiring them. Ask for references.

You now have two experts: Ms. Boot and Dr. Slipper, PhD., to assist on two separate aglet patent cases.

This post was written by Jason D. Eisenberg of  Sterne Kessler., © 2017
For more Intellectual Property legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Brewers & Blades: Avoiding Exhaustion in Products with Consumable Parts

A product with consumable or replaceable parts can be complicated to patent. These kinds of products have a reusable base component and replaceable widgets that work with it. Think razor handles with disposable razor blades, coffee brewers with coffee pods, or table saws with replaceable blades. Sales of the widgets may create a substantial revenue stream, but what’s to stop an interloper from copying the widgets and undercutting these continuing sales? Patents! Right? Maybe; as long as you’ve been careful to patent the right aspects of your products and to avoid running afoul of the patent exhaustion doctrine. This doctrine “exhausts” a patentee’s patent rights in a product after it has been sold. The exhaustion is expansive. Courts have held a method claim automatically exhausted by the exhaustion of an apparatus claim in the same patent.[1] Very recently, the Supreme Court may have expanded the doctrine about as far as it can go: now all patent rights are exhausted regardless of any attempt at post-sale restriction, and regardless of the location of the sale.[2] In other words any sale, anywhere, exhausts all patent rights in the sold product.

Suppose you run a prolific company that makes coffee brewers that use single-serve disposable pods and also makes table saws with replaceable blades. For each product your business model might depend on controlling the pods or blades used with your product. For instance, if you take a loss on your coffee brewer intending to make up for it in sales of coffee pods, a patent covering the pods may be more valuable than one covering the brewer. If you intend to develop a licensing program for third-party saw blades, a patent covering a saw blade’s interface with your table saw may be crucial. So how might one breathe more easily despite the patent exhaustion doctrine to keep infringement claims viable? Here are some suggestions.

Patent your widgets separately. If patented together with the base component you may not be able to escape exhaustion of your patent claim, since your sale of the base component may “exhaust” your rights in the claim with respect to that sale. By patenting the widget separately—and in a separate patent—there is less chance of its claims being exhausted by sale of the base component. Keeping your widgets separate also minimizes your exposure to other pitfalls, such as being limited to contributory infringement claims.

Patent with your design strategy in mind. A robust design patent strategy can be a great tool to prevent knock-off widgets from cutting into market share. Strategic claim drafting in a design patent can in many cases provide claim scope broad enough to cover unauthorized widgets of varying configurations that may work with the base component. This is accomplished through the creative use of solid and broken lines in the drawings to claim particular aspects of the widget design, so long as the design of these aspects is not dictated by their function. This strategy can be especially helpful where it may be difficult or time-consuming to get a utility patent claim broad enough to stop knockoff widgets. And because your design patents will be directed to the widgets themselves, they are unlikely to fall victim to exhaustion due to sale of the base component.

Design with your patent strategy in mind. Designers may find it useful to over-design the parts of the base component and the widget that interact, with two additional goals in mind: (1) at least the widget side of the interaction should include a standalone novel feature, whether functional, ornamental, or both; (2) the interaction should only properly work with a widget including the novel feature. This may provide the opportunity for strong and specific utility or design patent claims directed to the widget that can be used to prevent unauthorized knockoff widgets.

Make your widgets disappear. Now that the Supreme Court has in some ways sanctioned unauthorized re-use of spent widgets, patents may not stop a competitor from re-filling and re-selling them. But what if there’s nothing left to re-fill? If possible, consider making your entire widget consumable by the base component or making it only survive a single use intact, so that it is not re-fillable and a customer will be left to simply recycle the remainder.

These suggestions can augment a careful patenting strategy to help combat crafty interlopers and circumvent courts’ hostile stance toward downstream control of products after their sale. A strategic combination of product design and intellectual property law can be a key tool in protecting investments in developing such products. A bold, full-bodied patent prosecution strategy can help cut through the unique difficulties in protecting investment in products that use consumable parts. Involving your patent counsel in the early stages of product design can be the difference between a sale that exhausts your patent rights, and one that leaves the company buzzing with viable patent protection that rips through the competition.


[1] See Keurig Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

[2] See Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 15-1189 (May 30, 2017).

This post was written by Daniel A. Gajewski and Mark W. Rygiel of Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.

More legal analysis is available at The National Law Review.

Stanford University’s Loss in Interferences of Three Patents Covering Testing Methods for Fetal Aneuploidies for Lack of Written Description is Vacated

The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Jun. 27, 2017, Before O’Malley, Reyna, and Chen.

Takeaway:

  • The Federal Circuit declined to reconsider its decision in Biogen MA, Inc. v. Japanese Found. for Cancer Research, 785 F.3d 648 (Fed. Cir. 2015) that parties cannot bring civil actions in district court under 35 U.S.C. § 146 for review of the PTAB’s decisions in interferences declared on or after September 16, 2012.

  • In evaluating whether a claim satisfies the written description requirement, the fact finder may consider what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand from a description of a product or technique in the specification as of the filing date of the application. Post-filing date publications may only be used as evidence of the state of the art existing on the filing date.

Procedural Posture:

Stanford University (“Stanford”) appealed from orders of the PTAB in three interference proceedings between Stanford and Chinese University of Hong Kong (“CUHK”), which found the claims of three Stanford patents directed to testing methods for fetal aneuploidies unpatenable for lack of written description.  The appeal was initially filed pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 146 in the District Court for the Northern District of California, and the parties engaged in discovery there.  On May 7, 2015, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision in Biogen MA, Inc. v. Japanese Found. for Cancer Research, 785 F.3d 648 (Fed. Cir. 2015), holding that under the AIA, for interferences declared after September 15, 2012, an appeal from an interference decision has to be made to the Federal Circuit.  The parties then jointly requested transfer from the Northern District of California to the Federal Circuit, which was granted.  The Federal Circuit considered the case on the merits, vacated and remanded.

Interference:

  • The Federal Circuit declined to revisit its holding in Biogen, noting that although Stanford briefed this issue in its opening brief, Stanford did not raise this issue again in its reply brief or in oral argument. Rehearing en banc and a petition for certiorari in the Biogen case were denied; thus, in the Federal Circuit’s view, “Biogen is the law in this circuit and we, as a panel, will not revisit it.”

  • The Federal Circuit declined to consider the record developed during discovery in the district court. Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the interference decisions, the Federal Circuit agreed with CUHK’s position that the activities in the district court were a nullity and should not be considered by the Federal Circuit or remanded to the Board for consideration.

Written Description:

  • Sufficiency of written description is evaluated from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, “by examining the record evidence as to pre-filing date art-related facts.” The post-filing date publications may be considered to the extent they “contain art-related facts … existing on the filing date,” but may not be used as a source for the knowledge about art-related facts that did not exist on the filing date.

  • The Board awarded patents in interferences to CUHK because it found that the Stanford patents’ specification disclosed “targeted” rather than “random” sequencing, and the specification would not have indicated to one of ordinary skill in the art that Stanford’s inventor Dr. Quake was in possession of the claimed random massively parallel sequencing (“MPS”) method. The Federal Circuit held that the PTAB erred because it did not adequately explain why the Illumina platform for sequencing DNA, referenced and described in Stanford’s original application, did not provide sufficient written description support for random sequencing.  The Board improperly relied on the testimony of CUHK’s expert, who only described that an earlier sequencing technique, Roche 454, was used for targeted sequencing, and “failed to cite to the Roche 454 references with specificity.”  The Board also erred in finding that, because Stanford’s application did not preclude targeted MPS sequencing, it did not disclose to a person of ordinary skill in the art random MPS sequencing.

This post was written by Georg C. Reitboeck  Ksenia Takhistova Christopher Gresalfi of Andrews Kurth Kenyon.

USPTO Freedom Of Information Act Inquiry

Whats Next, Question Marks, Freedom of Information Act, FOIAThe Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) can be a very powerful tool. It provides unqualified right to access certain public records. Patent attorney Gary Shuster used it to file a FOIA request (Request No. F-17-00099) with the USPTO on January 26, 2017, seeking the following:

1. Any document written by or on behalf of Michelle Lee constituting a resignation from office, a request to withdraw a resignation from office, or a request to refrain from her position.

2. The most current document identifying the Director of the USPTO or, if there is no director, the acting director of the USPTO.

3. Any written instructions received between January 20, 2017 and the date of this request regarding deletion of any data from web sites operated by or on behalf of the USPTO, including USPTO.com.

To spare the USPTO having to compile and produce all documents responsive to this request, Shuster offered: “In the alternative, you may satisfy this request by simply answering the following question: Who is the current director or acting director of the USPTO?”

On February 24, 2017, USPTO FOIA specialist Karon Seldon sent Shuster a letter stating that the agency was extending the time limit, citing FOIA provisions allowing extensions in “unusual circumstances.” This is a FOIA provision which provides an extension may be claimed in usual circumstances where there is a “need for consultation … with another Federal Agency having a substantial interest in the determination of the request.” This is likely to give a bit of breathing room to determine how the Trump administration will affect the decision.

The new deadline for response is March 10, 2017. Although it’s currently a bit of a mystery, we’ll see tomorrow who will be named to the Director role.

© Copyright 2002-2017 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

Intellectual Property Cases to Watch in 2017

The New Year brings excitement and anticipation of changes for the best.  Some of the pending patent cases provide us with ample opportunity to expect something new and, if not always very desirable to everybody, at least different.  In this post, we highlight several cases that present interesting issues and that we anticipate may provide for new and important developments in the patent law this year.

Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc.

2017 IP cases intellectual propertyThis highly-publicized case, now on remand from the Supreme Court, concerns damages for design patent infringement.

Apple sued Samsung in 2011 for infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. D618,677 (claiming an electronic device having black rectangular front face with rounded corners), D593,087 (claiming an electronic device having a rectangular front face with rounded corners and a raised rim) and D604,305 (claiming a grid of 16 colorful icons on a black screen of an electronic device).  As we reported earlier, a jury found that several Samsung smartphones resembling the iPhone infringe those patents and awarded $399 million in damages to Apple, the entirety of Samsung’s profit from sale of the infringing smartphones.

The Federal Circuit upheld the award. The decision centered on 35 U.S.C. § 289, which provides that an accused infringer manufacturing or using a patented “article of manufacture” is liable to the patent owner “to the extent of his total profit.”  The Federal Circuit rejected Samsung’s argument that damages should not be determined based on the entire smartphone but rather should be limited to individual components covered by the patents, such as a front face or a screen.  The smartphone as a whole was deemed to be an “article of manufacture” in the context of Section 289.  The Supreme Court, in an unanimous (but short) decision, however agreed with Samsung and remanded, stating that an “article of manufacture” is “simply a thing made by hand or machine,” and is broad enough to include both a multicomponent product sold to a consumer and individual components of that product, “whether sold separately or not.”  No test however was provided on how to identify an “article of manufacture” relevant to damages.

On remand, the Federal Circuit will determine whether “the relevant article of manufacture for each design patent … is the smartphone or a particular smartphone component.”  A test for determining what exactly constitutes an “article of manufacture” for the purpose of determining damages in design patent cases is highly anticipated.

TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC

This case concerns a choice of venue in patent cases, and a decision by the Supreme Court is expected around June, 2017.

Kraft Foods sued TC Heartland in the District of Delaware, alleging that Heartland’s liquid water enhancer products infringed three of Kraft Foods’ patents.  Heartland moved to either dismiss the action or transfer venue to the Southern District of Indiana, where it is headquartered and incorporated.  In support, Heartland stated that it is not registered to do business and has no presence in Delaware.  After the district court denied its motion, Heartland appealed.  The Federal Circuit affirmed and stated that patent suits may be filed in any judicial district in which the defendant sells an allegedly infringing product (Heartland ships accused products to Delaware, which amounts though to only about 2% of its total sales).  The Federal Circuit has consistently applied this interpretation of the patent venue statute since its 1990 decision in VE Holding, which has since allowed patent holders to file suits in favorable courts that are perceived to be more plaintiff-friendly, such as the Eastern District of Texas. Opponents of this doctrine refer to it as a “forum shopping.”

As we reported before, on December 14, 2016, the Supreme Court agreed to review the Federal Circuit’s decision.  A decision in favor of Heartland would fundamentally change where patent cases can be litigated.  In particular, many patent holders may effectively be barred from bringing suits in the Eastern District of Texas.

Lexmark International v. Impression Products

On December 2, 2016, the Supreme Court granted Impression Products’ petition to hear a case concerning whether patent exhaustion arises from foreign sales.

Lexmark, a manufacturer of printers and cartridges for those printers, sold the cartridges covered by Lexmark’s U.S. patents in the U.S. and abroad.  Some of the cartridges were sold at a reduced price and, according to a “Return program,” were subject to a single-use/no-resale restriction set forth in the user agreement.  With the goal of protecting quality and reputation of its products, and for other reasons, Lexmark required that customers who bought Return program cartridges return the empty cartridges only to Lexmark for remanufacturing or recycling.  Impression, among others, acquired and re-purposed (which included modifying the original chip) both the foreign- and domestically-sold cartridges, and sold the modified cartridges in the U.S.  When Lexmark took legal actions and other defendants agreed to settlements, Impression however argued that the first sale of the cartridges, either in the U.S. or abroad, exhausted Lexmark’s U.S. rights to exclude.

The district court partially sided with Impression, ruling that Lexmark’s sale in the U.S. exhausted its patent rights, despite the express single-use/no-resale restrictions under the Return Program, but concluded that foreign sales did not exhaust Lexmark’s patent rights.  As we said earlier, on February 12, 2016, the en banc Federal Circuit agreed with Lexmark and confirmed two important aspects of the patent exhaustion doctrine, namely that (1) a patentee can “sell[] a patented article subject to a single-use/no-resale restriction that is lawful and clearly communicated to the purchaser” without exhausting the patentee’s rights to that item; and (2) because foreign sales do not permit “the buyer to import the article and sell and use it in the United States,” an authorized foreign sale of a product does not exhaust a patentee’s U.S. patent rights to exclude associated with that product.

In re Aqua Products

This is a pending en banc case before the Federal Circuit regarding whether it is the patent owner who bears the burden of proving patentability of its amended claims in inter partes reviews before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.

Aqua Products, Inc., as a patent owner, faced a claim amendment issue.  In particular, after an inter partes review (IPR) of Aqua’s patent on a robotic swimming pool cleaners was initiated, Aqua moved to substitute several of the challenged claims with limitations from the claims that were not challenged, effectively amending the claims.  The America Invents Act (AIA) permits patent owners to move to amend claims of a patent, and 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) states that “the patent owner may file one motion to amend the patent,” with additional motions to amend allowed in limited circumstances.

Applying its rule making authority, the PTO ruled that Aqua failed to demonstrate that its amendments would make the claims-at-issue patentable over the known prior art.  On August 12, 2016, the Federal Circuit granted Aqua’s motion for an en banc hearing and asked Aqua and the USPTO to brief whether the USPTO may require that a patent owner bear the burden of persuasion regarding patentability of the amended claims, even though the AIA assigns the burden of proving unpatentability of the proposed claim amendments to an IPR petitioner.  See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)).

Argument was heard on December 9, 2016, and a blog post on the upcoming decision will appear in due course.

Supreme Court Punts Design Patent Damages Back to Federal Circuit

design patent damagesThe Supreme Court issued a rare decision on the issue of damages for design patent infringement in the Apple v. Samsung smartphone case. The result could mean significant changes in the calculation of damages for infringement of design patents.

The decision is one more step in the ongoing battle between Apple and Samsung that originally included claims of patent infringement, design patent infringement and trade dress infringement. Samsung’s phones were found to infringe the ornamental designs in each of the three design patents shown below and Apple was awarded Samsung’s entire profit from the sale of its infringing smartphones, which amounted to nearly $400 million. The only issue on appeal was the basis for the damages award.

Generally, a design patent holder may seek damages under the standard patent damages statute 35 U.S.C. §284 that sets a floor for damages as “a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.” As an alternative, the patentee can collect damages under the design-patent-damages provision in 35 U.S.C. §289. Section 289 provides for the significant remedy of profit disgorgement based upon a defendant’s use of the patented “article of manufacture.” The infringer “shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit.”

The Federal Circuit affirmed the damages award, rejecting Samsung’s argument that damages should be limited because the relevant articles of manufacture on which damages are based were the front face or screen as opposed to the entire smartphone. The Federal Circuit’s reasoning was that such a limit was not required because the components of Samsung’s smartphones were not distinct articles of manufacture.

The Supreme Court held unanimously that the Federal Circuit incorrectly interpreted §289 in holding that the “article of manufacture” for the purpose of calculating damages must be the entire smartphone and remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit for additional briefing on what constitutes an “article of manufacture” in the context of the design patents at issue.

Although the Supreme Court did not completely resolve the issue, this decision will be significant in future design patent cases when the design patent protection is directed solely to a component or element of a product as compared to the entirety of the product.

©2016 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

U.S Supreme Court Revisits Design Patent Damages

design patent appleOn December 6, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. ____ (2016), unanimously ruled that in multicomponent products, the “article of manufacture” subject to an award of damages under 35 U.S.C. §289 is not required to be the end product sold to consumers but may only be a component of the product.

In 2007, when Apple launched the iPhone, it had secured several design patents in connection with the launch. When Samsung released a series of smartphones resembling the iPhone, Apple sued Samsung, alleging that the various Samsung smartphones infringed Apple’s design patents. A jury found that several Samsung smartphones did infringe those patents. Apple was awarded $399 million in damages for Samsung’s design patent infringement, the entire profit Samsung made from its sales of the infringing smartphones. The Federal Circuit affirmed the damages award, rejecting Samsung’s argument that damages should be limited because the relevant articles of manufacture were the front face or screen rather than the entire smartphone.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit. In its unanimous opinion, the Court reasoned that for purposes of a multicomponent product, the relevant “article of manufacture” for arriving at a damages award (based on 35 U.S.C. §289) need not be the end/finished product sold to the consumer but may be only a component of that product. The Court determined that “The Federal Circuit’s narrower reading of the ‘article of manufacture,'” limiting it to the end product, “cannot be squared with the text of §289.” How to arrive at §289 damages? According to the Supreme Court, “Arriving at a damages award under §289 thus involves two steps. First, identify the ‘article of manufacture’ to which the infringed design has been applied. Second, calculate the infringer’s total profit made on that article of manufacture.”

This decision could have potential impact on future design patent infringement cases, especially when calculating infringement damages. It remains to be seen, what kind of guidance the Federal Circuit will provide in addressing the scope of the “article of manufacture” for multicomponent products.

ARTICLE BY Sudip K. Mitra of Vedder Price

© 2016 Vedder Price

Supreme Court Reinvigorates Effectiveness of Obtaining an Opinion of Counsel to Defend against Potential Enhanced Damages for Willful Infringement in Halo Electronics

Supreme Court Willful Patent InfringementOn June 13, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court again reversed a decision of the Federal Circuit—the Circuit specially designated to hear all patent appeals—this time, in articulating the test for determining whether to award enhanced damages for willful patent infringement in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.1  This is the third time in two years that the Court has reversed the Federal Circuit on remedies in high-stakes patent litigation.2  In an opinion that harkens, in part, back to 1980’s patent law, Chief Justice Roberts and a unanimous Supreme Court held that parties who have actual knowledge that their activities may infringe another’s patent must subjectively believe that their actions are legal, and no longer can rely on theories of objective reasonableness first developed at the time of trial to avoid enhanced damages.

I. Opinions of Counsel at The Federal Circuit

The Halo Electronics decision expressly overruled a 2007 Federal Circuit case, In re Seagate Technologies, which had used a two-part test to determine whether the defendant willfully infringed. Under Seagate, courts first had to find that the actions taken by the alleged infringer were objectively reckless.3  Second, the Court had to find that the defendant acted in a subjectively reckless manner: that they actually acted in bad faith to infringe the plaintiff’s patent.4

The Seagate test created a situation where defense counsel could place the weight of their strategy on showing that the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable after the fact at trial. Under this test, it was sufficient to show just one scenario where it would have been reasonable to believe that the defendant’s conduct would not have fallen under the plaintiff’s patent, or that the patent would be invalid.5  This emphasis on what the defendant could have thought, rather than what it actually had thought, resulted in the prospect of enhanced damages becoming very difficult to obtain.6

Seagate itself represented a shift away from the Federal Circuit’s earlier test, established by Underwater Devices in 1983, which placed an “affirmative duty” on the defendant to obtain a competent opinion of counsel to avoid the threat of treble damages.7  Such an opinion of counsel represented the documented legal understanding of the defendant as to whether it believed the plaintiff’s patent was valid, and/or covered the defendant’s activities. A defendant relied upon the opinion of counsel to avoid a finding of willfulness if its actions were later deemed infringing.

To be competent, an opinion of counsel had to investigate the file histories of the patents to determine both their validity and their applicability to the defendant’s actions.8  Additionally, whether the opinion came from a licensed patent attorney, and the extent to which the attorney was affiliated with the defendant, also were considered in determining the competency of the opinion.9  The Federal Circuit made it clear that conclusory opinions made by affiliated in-house counsel, lacking in patent training and expertise, would not be deemed competent.10

The Federal Circuit’s shift away from Underwater Devices came with industrywide changes in the field of patent litigation.11  With the rise in lawsuits pursued by non-practicing entities, the Federal Circuit recognized that many defendants lacked the resources to obtain a competent opinion of counsel every time they received a cease-and-desist letter from a patent holder. In this regard, the Halo Supreme Court also agreed with the Federal Circuit that the “affirmative duty” standard of Underwater Devices was inappropriate.

II. What Halo Electronics Means for Patent Defendants

The Supreme Court, in overruling Seagate, held that a showing of subjective recklessness nonetheless would be required for Courts to consider awarding enhanced damages.12  By removing Seagate’s “objectively reasonable standard” prong, Halo Electronics has the effect of shifting the timeline in which the defendant must establish the reasonableness of its actions. Rather than permitting an after-the-fact showing of objective reasonableness through theories devised for trial, Halo Electronics places an onus on defendant to prove that it believed, at the time of its actions, that it did not infringe another’s patent, or that the patent was invalid.

The Court seemed most troubled by the idea that a truly malicious infringer could avoid treble damages under the Seagate test solely as a result of its trial lawyer’s creative trial presentation of what the defendant could have thought.13  Rather than provide defendants with beforehand and after-the-fact defenses, the Halo Electronics decision encourages defendants to be proactive. Although Halo Electronics reduces the number of options available to a defendant, the options that remain include a clear and safe path around the threat of potential enhanced damages by way of an opinion.

III. Halo Electronics Shields Patent Defendants Who Proactively Obtain an Opinion of Counsel

In some ways, Halo Electronics represents a shift back to the Underwater Devices era, with at least one critical difference. Underwater Devices made obtaining a competent opinion of counsel an affirmative duty for defendants in order to avoid enhanced damages. In contrast, the Halo Electronics decision rejected the notion of an “affirmative duty” as in Underwater Devices.

As Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence, Halo Electronics does not create any rigid affirmative duties akin to those in Underwater Devices.14  Instead, it implicitly holds that a competent opinion of counsel, though not necessary to avoid treble damages, nearly always would be sufficient to avoid them. By acting in honest reliance on documented, independent legal advice stating that the patents are either invalid or do not cover the conduct at issue, the defendant cannot act with the bad faith the Court requires. Thus, proactively obtaining a competent opinion of counsel can be a highly effective way to shield potential infringers from the threat of enhanced damages.

On a practical level, the up-front cost of obtaining an opinion of counsel pales in comparison to the cost of protracted litigation to determine the willfulness of the defendant’s actions. Ultimately, by relying on a competent opinion of counsel, a defendant can protect itself against the threat of enhanced damages well before trial at the pleadings or summary judgment stages. Moreover, the removal of enhanced damages also disarms a critical weapon plaintiffs could wield in settlement negotiations.

IV. Opinions of Counsel at Cadwalader

One area of practice of the Intellectual Property Group at Cadwalader specializes in advising clients regarding potential patent infringements and developing defenses once a client becomes aware of a potentially problematic patent. The IP Group has prepared hundreds of opinions of counsel in a diverse array of technologies, from electronics to pharmaceuticals and mechanical devices.


1 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. ___ (2016).

2 See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); see generally Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Where have I read this before? Justices tread familiar path limiting Federal Circuit control over remedies in patent cases, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 16, 2016, 8:04 AM), http://goo.gl/DzNlIC.

3 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

4  “[Defendant’s] subjective beliefs may become relevant only if [plaintiff] successfully makes this showing of objective unreasonableness.” Id. Accord Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 61 (1993) (describing similar objective, then subjective, two‑part test determining when litigation is a “sham” for antitrust purposes); Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1751-52 (refusing to further extend Prof’l Real Estate’s definition of “sham” litigation in context of patent litigation).

5 “Under that standard, someone who plunders a patent—infringing it without any reason to suppose his conduct is arguably defensible—can nevertheless escape any comeuppance under § 284 solely on the strength of his attorney’s ingenuity.”  Halo Elecs., 579 U.S. at ___ (slip op. at 10).

6 Id.

7 Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

8 Id. at 1390.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 “Seagate, it would seem . . . would reflect the Federal Circuit’s directed response to patent trolls. . . .” Dov Greenbaum, In re Seagate: Did It Really Fix the Waiver Issue? A Short Review and Analysis of Waiver Resulting from the Use of A Counsel’s Opinion Letter As A Defense to Willful Infringement, 12 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 155, 183 (2008).

12 Halo Elecs., 579 U.S. at ___ (slip op. at 10).

13 Id. at ___ (slip op. at 9).

14 “[C]onsulting counsel may help draw the line between infringing and noninfringing uses,” but it is not required. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 3) (Breyer, J., concurring).

Supreme Court Defers Certiorari Decision In Amgen Sandoz

Amgen Sandoz Supreme Court Biosimilar PatentOn June 20, 2016, instead of deciding whether to grant certiorari in the biosimilar patent dance dispute between Amgen and Sandoz, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General “to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.” While this will delay any Supreme Court review of the Federal Circuit’s first decision interpreting the patent dance provisions of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), it could give the Court an opportunity to consolidate its consideration of the biosimilar statute with other biosimilar cases making their way through the courts.

These articles discuss some of the issues raised to date in biosimilar patent disputes surrounding Neupogen®, Nuelasta® and Remicade®:

© 2016 Foley & Lardner LLP

Patent Prosecution: “Unclean Hands” Doctrine Erases Merck’s Damage Award

unclean hands doctrine patent prosecutionIn my last post on the district court’s ruling in Gilead v. Merck, I implied that Gilead had convinced the Judge that Merck had employed inequitable conduct (“IC”) in conducting its negotiations with Pharmasset, the company Gilead later purchased to obtain the rights to the HCV drug, sofosuvir or Solvaldi®. However, I was reading and writing at an usually high speed and missed the fact that the judge’s finding was based on the pre-IC, unclean hands defense.

I skipped over the section on Therasense, a 2011 Fed. Cir. decision that redefined the IC doctrine, and missed the Judge’s comments distinguishing the two doctrines. In both opinions, it was noted that the unclean hands defense originated with three early S. Ct. decisions in which the “guilty parties” employed egregious misconduct to obtain their patents. The remedy in each case was to bar the wrongdoers ability to sue for infringement of the patents.

Gilead probably chose this defense because the IC doctrine has been applied in modern decisions to render patents or entire patent families unenforceable for failure of the patentee to submit relevant prior art to the PTO during prosecution. There is a specific intent requirement and a “hard but for” materiality requirement for unsubmitted art that is difficult for defendants to plead and to meet. Here is the district court’s analysis of the doctrines:

“Therasense addressed the separate defense of IC — a defense that Gilead does not assert in this case — but the Fed. Cir.’s discussions of the differences between IC and unclean hands confirmed that unclean hands remains a viable defense to patent infringement. [649 F.3d at 1285-89]. As the Fed. Cir. explained, the doctrine of IC grew from the older doctrine of unclean hands. Id. at 1287. Whereas unclean hands can involve improper conduct before either the Patent Office or the courts, IC relates solely to conduct before the Patent Office. Id. Additionally, where unclean hands can involve improper conduct before either the Patent Office or the courts, IC relates solely to conduct before the Patent Office.”

Well, not exactly. Therasense does not have a lot to say about the unclean hands doctrine, since the facts in Therasense involved a failure to disclose documentary evidence to the Patent Office, but it is clear that the Fed. Cir. did not intend to supplant the unclean hands defense promulgated by the S. Ct. to punish egregious misconduct. In fact, the Fed. Cir. added egregious misconduct to the current IC doctrine, to cover fact situations not involving withholding prior art. How this version of egregious conduct varies from the older unclean hands doctrine is not clear.

The district court judge seems to have erred when she wrote that IC is applicable only to patent prosecution. As set forth in Therasense:

“As the IC doctrine evolved from these unclean hands cases, it came to embrace a broader scope of misconduct, including not only egregious affirmative acts of misconduct intended to deceive both the PTO and the courts but also the mere nondisclosure of information to the PTO. IC also diverged from the doctrine of unclean hands by adopting a different and more potent remedy – unenforceability of the entire patent rather than mere dismissal of the instant suit.”[emphasis added]

As the dissenters wrote in Therasense: “[N]othing in this opinion rejects the application of the doctrine of IC (or “unclean hands”) as applied to other forms of misconduct, in litigation or otherwise.”[emphasis added]

So while Gilead’s “unclean hands” arguments prevailed, it appears that Gilead could have pled either doctrine and prevailed, especially since the Court found a specific intent to deceive.  It is my guess that since the Gilead decision did not involve the PTO, Gilead chose to go with unclean hands, but this decision may foreshadow a revival of this defense, particularly when most of the wrong-doing involves the litigation work and not the prosecution. Stay tuned.

© 2016 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.