Tag: patent

China’s Supreme People’s Court Rules No Accounting for Profit for Joint Patent Ownership

In decision no. （2020）最高法知民终954号 dated November 25, 2021, China’s Supreme People’s Court ruled that if the co-owners of a patent or patent application right do not make an agreement on the exercise of the right and one of the co-owners independently practices the patent,  the other co-owner cannot claim the distribution of the proceeds from the separate practicing of the patent on the grounds of co-ownership of the patent right.

 

 

 

 

 

The appellant, the First Affiliated Hospital of Wenzhou Medical University 温州医科大学附属第一医院 (hereinafter referred to as Wenzhou Hospital) and the appellee Shenzhen Huilistong Information Technology Co., Ltd. 深圳市汇利斯通信息技术有限公司 (hereinafter referred to as Huilistong Company) were involved in a patent infringement litigation for CN Patent No. ZL 201210235924.0 entitled “a self-service terminal used in the lobby of a hospital.”

Wenzhou Hospital asserted that it co-owns the involved patent with Huilistong. Without its permission, Huilistong Company violated the rights of Wenzhou Hospital by practicing the patent involved in the case, and requested an order for Huilistong Company to stop the infringement and destroy inventory of infringing products and compensate Wenzhou Hospital for economic losses of 2.5098 million RMB and reasonable expenses for rights protection of 116,400 RMB.

The Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court of Guangdong Province held that Huilistong Company could independently practice the patent involved in the case in accordance with the law, which does not constitute an infringement of the patent right of Wenzhou Hospital.

Wenzhou Hospital appealed to the Supreme People’s Court. The Supreme People’s Court made a determination on the issue of “allocation of royalties,” and on September 24, 2020, it rejected the appeal and upheld the original judgment.

The Supreme People’s Court explained that Article 15 of the Patent Law stipulates that if the co-owners of the patent right have an agreement on the exercise of the right, such agreement shall prevail. If there is no agreement, the co-owners may practice the patent alone or permit others to implement the patent by way of ordinary licensing; if the patent is permitted to be practiced by others, the royalties collected shall be distributed among the co-owners.

Except for the circumstances specified in the preceding paragraph, the exercise of joint patent application rights or patent rights shall obtain the consent of all co-owners.

Therefore, without the consent of the co-owner of the patent, the co-owner of a patent may directly obtain economic benefits through the co-owned patent in two ways: first, to separately practice the co-owned patent, and second, to license others to exploit the patent in the way of ordinary license, and only in the latter circumstance may there be a requirement for distributing the profits to the co-owners, but under the circumstance of independent exploitation, there is no such requirement.

In this case, Wenzhou Hospital claimed that some of the self-service registration integrated machines involved in this case were marked with such words as the joint research and development by Huilistong Company and the hospital involved in this case. However, this does not prove that Huilistong Company licensed the hospital involved in this case to use the patent involved, and there was no evidence in this case that the hospital involved in this case paid any patent licensing fee to Huilistong Company.

Therefore, the claim of Wenzhou Hospital for sharing the economic proceeds obtained by Huilistong Company from the exploitation of the patent at issue was not valid.

Wenzhou Hospital separately claimed that, according to the provisions of the civil law on the sharing of proceeds by the co-owners with respect to the co-owned property, Wenzhou Hospital also had the right to share the economic proceeds obtained by Huillistong Company from the implementation of the patent in question.

In response, the Supreme People’s Court held that, although Article 78 (2) of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China provides that “a co-owner enjoys the rights and assumes the obligations over the co-owned property,” this provision is a general provision on the co-owned property, and the aforesaid provision of the Patent Law falls under the special provisions on the distribution mechanism of the rights and interests of all co-owners under the circumstance of co-ownership of patents, and the special provisions of the Patent Law shall prevail.

Therefore, the Supreme People’s Court ruled for Huilistong Company.

The full text of the decision is available here (Chinese only).

© 2021 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

CosmoKey Gets a Duo-Over – Federal Circuit Panel Reverses Finding of Ineligibility

In CosmoKey Solutions GMBH & Co. KG v. Duo Security LLC, No. 2020-2043 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2021), the Federal Circuit reversed a finding of ineligibility for claims directed to a computer authentication method.

CosmoKey’s patent is directed to an authentication method that requires a user to activate a timed authentication function on a mobile device to log into a computer. Duo Security moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court found the claims ineligible under § 101, specifically finding that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of “authentication” at step one of Alice, and that the remaining elements were generic computer functionality at step two.

The Federal Circuit reversed. The majority first stated it was “not convinced” the claims were broadly “directed to” authentication, instead noting the focus of the claims and the specification on the activation of a timed authentication function. Nonetheless, according to the majority, answering this question at step one was “unnecessary” because the claims were eligible at step two for reciting a specific improvement to authentication that “increases security, prevents unauthorized access by a third party, is easily implemented, and can advantageously be carried out with mobile devices of low complexity.”

Judge Reyna concurred in the judgment, but did so by resolving the inquiry at step one, finding the claims directed to a “specific improvement to authentication.” He viewed the majority’s decision to skip step one and resolve the inquiry at step two as “turn[ing] the Alice inquiry on its head.” He noted that, without the step one analysis, it is difficult to determine whether “additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application” of an abstract idea.

© 2021 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP
For more patent litigation, visit the NLR Intellectual Property Law section.

Reading the Supreme Court Tea Leaves in Dex Media Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP

On June 24, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in Dex Media Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP. Next term, the Court will determine whether 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) permits appeal of the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute inter partes review upon finding that 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)’s time bar did not apply.

The Dex Media case has traveled a long and tortuous path. Its journey began with the service of a complaint in 2001 which was dismissed without prejudice in 2003, and the filing of a new complaint in 2012. The petition for inter partes review was filed in May 2013, and a final written decision of the Board issued in October 2014 finding that the asserted claims are invalid. From there, the case visited the Federal Circuit twice, the Supreme Court once and is now on its way back for a second time. On appeal, the dispute has focused on whether the petition for inter partes review was time barred by § 315(b), and whether the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to hear the appeal of that issue.

Facts of the Case

In 2001, Inforocket.com, Inc., an exclusive licensee to the patent-in-suit, filed a district court action against Keen, Inc. The complaint asserting infringement was served on September 14, 2001. While the case was pending, Keen acquired Inforocket as its wholly owned subsidiary and stipulated to a voluntary dismissal of the district court action without prejudice in 2003. Keen later changed its name to Ingenio. Click-to-Call subsequently acquired the patent-in-suit, and on May 29, 2012, filed patent infringement lawsuits against multiple parties, one of which was Ingenio.

On May 28, 2012, just under one year after being served with the complaint in the Click-to-Call action, Ingenio and two other defendants filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) of the patent-in-suit. In its preliminary response, Click-to-Call contended, among other things, that § 315(b) statutorily barred institution of the IPR proceedings, noting that Ingenio’s predecessor-in-interest was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent-in-suit in 2001. Section 315(b) states, “An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real part in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”

The Board instituted the proceeding, and based on Federal Circuit precedent found that dismissal of an infringement suit without prejudice nullifies the effect of the service of the original complaint against Keen. Therefore, service of the 2001 complaint did not bar the petition. Click-to-Call again argued that the petition was time-barred in its patent owner response; and in its final written decision, the Board reaffirmed its earlier conclusion on that point and found that the challenged claims were invalid.

In the case being reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit first had to decide whether it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the § 315(b) time bar in light of § 314(d), which states, “No Appeal. – The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and unappealable.” The Federal Circuit, relying upon its en banc ruling in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018), held that time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable.

In Wi-Fi One, the Federal Circuit based its finding on the rationale that the time-bar determination “is not akin to either the non-initiation or preliminary-only merits determinations for which unreviewability is common in the law,” and the fact that the time bar “sets limits on the Director’s statutory authority to institute.” Id. at 1373-74. Having decided the question of appealability, the Click-to-Call court then held en banc that the time-bar decision applies to bar institution of an IPR when a petitioner was served with a complaint for patent infringement more than one year before filing its petition, but the action was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

Predictions for the Supreme Court

Often, even without the presence of a circuit court split, the Supreme Court takes cases on appeal from the Federal Circuit to reign in and overrule the Appellate Court. In fact, the Supreme Court has reversed 70 percent of the Federal Circuit cases it has heard since 2007. There are two important factors to suggest that the Supreme Court will for a second time reverse the Federal Circuit in this case.

  • First, in a prior appeal of this case to the Federal Circuit in 2015, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on its prior precedent in Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc., which was subsequently overruled by Wi-Fi One. Click-to-Call petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and in June 2016, the Supreme Court granted cert, and vacated and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit to consider in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee. This suggests that, at the time, the Supreme Court thought there was a clear path for the Federal Circuit to hold that § 315(b) rulings are appealable, as the Federal Circuit did in both Wi-Fi One and its ruling that is currently under review. Since then, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed, with Justice Kennedy’s retirement and the confirmation of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. It seems now that at least four of the justices of the newly constituted Court may believe that the Federal Circuit’s decision is not consistent with § 314(d).
  • This contention also is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court declined to review both of the questions presented by the petition for cert. Dex Media, Inc., the successor-in-interest to Ingenio, also requested that the Supreme Court decide whether § 315(b) bars institution of an inter partes review when the previously served patent infringement complaint, filed more than one year before the IPR petition, had been dismissed without prejudice. The Supreme Court declined to hear that issue. One might suppose that if the Supreme Court believes the time-bar question is appealable, the Court also would want to rule on whether a dismissal without prejudice negates the effect of service of the complaint under the time bar statute. It is entirely possible that the Court declined to make that determination because the question will be moot once the Court determines there is no appellate jurisdiction over the time-bar issue.

Implications of the Ruling

If the Supreme Court affirms the Federal Circuit’s ruling and finds that § 315(b) questions are appealable, the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence regarding when the one-year period begins will remain binding, at least until the Supreme Court decides to hear that issue anew. This means that entities looking to file IPR petitions must be alert to the fact that a predecessor-in-interest may have been served with a complaint triggering the one-year time limit as well as whether to file a petition with other entities who (directly or through a predecessor-in-interest) may have been served with complaints that could bar the entire petition.

In contrast, what will happen if the Supreme Court reverses the Federal Circuit’s ruling and Orders dismissal of the appeal on the grounds that § 314(d) prohibits appeal of the time bar issue? Prior to the Federal Circuit’s ruling, the Board had consistently found, as they did in this case, that dismissal of a complaint without prejudice constituted a nullity in terms of the time-bar statute. If the Federal Circuit’s opinion in this case is overruled, its opinion would not be precedential and the Board could either interpret the statute as they had previously or alter the interpretation in view of the Federal Circuit’s opinion, though they would be under no obligation to do so. It also is possible that this becomes one of the many issues that are panel-dependent, forcing petitioners who were served with complaints that have been dismissed without prejudice to “roll the dice” on the issue.

PTAB practitioners should be watching the outcome of this case closely and consider all of the implications of the ruling before filing a petition for inter partes review. As the facts of this case highlight, they also should perform a thorough due diligence review of all “real parties in interest” related to the contemplated petitioner.

©2019 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

Ericsson Offers FRAND – District Court Endorses Comparable Licenses, Rejects SSPPU Royalty Rate

On May 23, 2019, the court issued a declaratory judgment in the case of HTC v. Ericsson, No. 18-cv-00243, pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (Judge Gilstrap). That judgment confirmed that Ericsson’s 4G standard-essential patents (“SEPs”) convey significant value to mobile handsets and held that Ericsson made an offer to HTC that complied with Ericsson’s obligations to license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. The decision, published on the heels of Judge Koh’s recent opinion in FTC v. Qualcomm, provides much-needed clarity to SEP owners by definitively rejecting the smallest-saleable patent practicing unit (“SSPPU”) royalty theory in favor of a real-world, market-based approach.

The Dispute

Ericsson owns a large portfolio of cellular patents essential to the 2G, 3G, and 4G standards that it licenses to handset makers worldwide. As a member of the ETSI standard setting organization, Ericsson agreed to license these patents on FRAND terms. Ericsson offered a license to HTC at a rate of $2.50 per 4G device, or 1% of the net device price with a $1 floor and $4 cap. HTC countered with a rate of $0.10 per 4G device. HTC sued Ericsson, claiming that Ericsson’s offered royalty rate was too high, and that Ericsson breached its FRAND commitment.

A jury trial was held in February 2019. HTC argued that a royalty base must be calculated based on the profit margin of the baseband processor (which HTC argued was the SSPPU) rather than the price of the device as a whole. Ericsson argued that HTC’s SSPPU approach dramatically undervalued 4G cellular technology and that Ericsson’s patents in particular were worth far more. After a five-day trial, the jury found that Ericsson’s offers did not breach Ericsson’s commitment to license on FRAND terms and conditions.

The Decision

Following the verdict, the district court also issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with ruling on Ericsson’s request for a declaratory judgment that it had complied with FRAND. This declaration reaffirmed the jury’s findings, while also addressing more fully some key questions.

First, the court stated unequivocally that the ETSI FRAND commitment does not require a company to license its SEPs based on the profit or cost of the baseband processor or SSPPU.The district court’s decision is consistent with Federal Circuit precedent, such as Ericsson v. D-Link, which holds that “courts must consider the facts of record when instructing the jury and should avoid rote reference to any particular damages formula.”

Second, the order went further to conclude that Ericsson’s 4G portfolio is worth significantly more than a royalty rate based on the profit margin or cost of the baseband processor in HTC’s phones (HTC’s “SSPPU”). Looking to industry-wide evidence, the court held that the value of cellular technology far exceeded a valuation based on the price or profit of a baseband processor. The court found that “Ericsson established, and HTC’s own experts conceded, that there are no examples in the industry of licenses that have been negotiated based on the profit margin, or even the cost, of a baseband processor” and that credible evidence supported a finding that “the profit margin, or even the cost, of the baseband processor is not reflective of the value conferred by Ericsson cellular essential patents.”

Third, the court determined that both of Ericsson’s offers to HTC—(1) $2.50 per 4G device or (2) 1% with a $1 floor and $4 cap—were fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. The court found that Ericsson’s “comparable licenses provide the best market-based evidence of the value of Ericsson’s SEPs and that Ericsson’s reliance on comparable licenses is a reliable method of establishing fair and reasonable royalty rates that is consistent with its FRAND commitment.” At trial, evidence was presented regarding Ericsson’s licenses with Apple, BLU, Coolpad, Doro, Fujitsu, Huawei, Kyocera, LG, Panasonic, Samsung, Sharp, Sony, and ZTE. The court noted that several of Ericsson’s licenses contained express terms that were “similar or substantially similar” to Ericsson’s offers to HTC and rejected the argument that Ericsson’s offers to HTC were discriminatory.

Why It Matters

Judge Gilstrap’s declaration represents an important development in FRAND case law that looks to industry practice and market evidence rather than untested licensing theories. It affirms that basing a rate on comparable licenses is an acceptable FRAND methodology.

The decision also rejects the SSPPU royalty theory. Some have read the recent FTC v. Qualcommopinion to suggest that a FRAND royalty must be structured as a percentage rate on a baseband processor. Judge Gilstrap’s declaration demonstrates why such a reading is incorrect.  First, the declaration explains that the ETSI FRAND commitment simply does not require a SSPPU royalty base. Second, even if one were to indulge the SSPPU approach, the SSPPU for many standard-essential patents is not limited to a baseband processor. Third, a wealth of market evidence shows that Ericsson’s patents (and standard-essential patents generally) are far more valuable than a baseband processor-based royalty would reflect.

© McKool Smith
This article was written by Nicholas Mathews from McKool Smith.

State Sovereignty 101: State Universities Not Immune to IPR Proceedings

School may be out for the summer, but public colleges and universities would do well to spend their break shoring up strategies and defenses against potential inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings. Last week the Federal Circuit ruled that states and state agencies (including state affiliated colleges and universities) may not rely on a sovereign immunity defense in a patent IPR proceeding. This decision means that challenges against University of Minnesota patents will proceed at the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (“PTAB”), and that other state affiliated educational institutions also may be subject to such proceedings.

The June 14 decision could open the floodgates to other IPR challenges against patents held by public colleges, universities, and other state entities. State colleges and universities should plan on adjusting various intellectual property clauses of licenses, sponsored research, and other technology transfer and funding agreements in efforts to mitigate the risks associated with an IPR challenge. These institutions also should carefully evaluate and plan for this risk in any assertion or even licensing efforts where a risk of an IPR may arise. Further, public colleges and universities should develop internal strategic plans to reduce the risk of an IPR occurring and to have various strategic approaches to IPR situations should an IPR challenge, or even a threat of an IPR challenge, occur in the future.

In the dispute, Ericsson challenged multiple patents held by the University of Minnesota relating to wireless technologies. The University of Minnesota also faces separate patent challenges to a computer hardware patent and a university patent related to hepatitis C medication.

The Federal Circuit held that for purposes of IPRs, state sovereign immunity is essentially the same as tribal sovereign immunity held by Native American tribes. In 2018, the Federal Circuit ruled that Saint Regis Mohawk could not employ tribal sovereign immunity in a dispute before the PTAB.

“[An] IPR represents the sovereign’s reconsideration of the initial patent grant, and the differences between state and tribal sovereign immunity do not warrant a different result than Saint Regis. We therefore conclude that state sovereign immunity does not apply to IPR proceedings,” the Court wrote in the June 14 ruling. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. V. LSI Corp., No. 2018-1559, 27 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 14, 2019).

The Federal Circuit also wrote that IPR proceedings differ substantively from typical civil litigation, to which sovereign immunity would normally apply unless waived. Instead, the Court writes that IPR proceedings “are essentially agency reconsideration of a prior patent grant.”

In other words, IPRs are more akin to a government agency enforcement action than a civil suit. The PTAB’s primary focus is determining whether a previous patent grant was made in error, rather than resolving a dispute between two adversarial parties. The PTAB may issue a ruling even if the petitioner or patent owner decides not to participate, unlike in civil litigation.

A petition for certiorari was filed in Saint Regis but was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court, which effectively allowed the Federal Circuit decision to stand. It remains to be seen if the University of Minnesota will appeal this ruling or if certiorari would be granted, but if allowed to stand, it is fair to anticipate a significant increase in patent IPR challenges to public colleges and universities as well as to other state agencies.

Click here to read the full opinion from the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Copyright © 2019 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.
Read more about patent inter partes review proceedings on the National Law Review Intellectual Property page.

SAS Indirectly Strengthens the Impact of Estoppel

The Supreme Court decision in SAS Institute v. Iancu[i]will likely strengthen a patent owner’s ability to argue in favor of estoppel and keep a petitioner from getting multiple bites at the invalidity apple in parallel PTAB and district court proceedings. At first glance the Supreme Court’s recent decision appears to be another setback to patent owners. Instead of quickly defeating post grant challenges to at least some challenged claims pursuant to a denial of institution, patent owners will now have to fight petitions even if the Board finds merit with only a single ground challenging patentability. Upon closer examination, however, SAS’s implications for estoppel are favorable and may even resolve a split concerning the scope of estoppel.

The Supreme Court Directive in SAS

SAS addressed the PTAB’s “partial institution” policy, under which the PTAB claimed the power to institute an IPR with respect to only some of the claims challenged in a petition. In SAS, the Supreme Court rejected that policy. The Court explained that if the PTAB decides to institute an IPR, 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) provides that PTAB “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.” Emphasizing the statute’s use of the phrase “any patent claim,” the Court held that PTAB cannot pick and choose which claims to address, but must instead take the petition as it finds it.[ii] The Court found further support for its interpretation in the structure of the inter partes review process “in which it’s the petitioner, not the Director, who gets to define the contours of the proceeding.”[iii]

The Split on Estoppel

The partial institution policy that SAS rejected has created a split in the interpretation of estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). Section 315(e)(2) provides that “[t]he petitioner in an inter partes review . . . that results in a final written decision under section 318(a) . . . may not assert . . . in a civil action . . . that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.” Congress intended this provision to preclude the same party from re-litigating invalidity in the district court once it had chosen to do so through an IPR. As then-Director of the PTO David Kappos testified, the “estoppel provisions mean that your patent is largely unchallengeable by the same party.”[iv] Similarly, Senator Grassley stated that IPR review “will completely substitute for at least the patents-and-printed-publications portion of the civil litigation.”[v]

Notwithstanding the apparently broad estoppel envisioned by Congress, some courts have interpreted § 315(e) more narrowly. For example, in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit explained that where PTAB partially instituted an IPR, the petitioner was not estopped from raising a ground in district court that it had included in its IPR petition but on which PTAB did not institute. The court reasoned that the non-instituted ground was not raised “during th[e] inter partes review.”[vi] Similarly, in HP Inc. v. MPHJ Technology Investment, LLC, the Federal Circuit explained that “noninstituted grounds do not become a part of the IPR,” and “[a]ccordingly, the noninstituted grounds were not raised and, as review was denied, could not be raised in the IPR.” The court therefore held that “the estoppel provisions of § 315(e)(1) do not apply.”[vii] Other courts have followed suit and even extended that holding.[viii]

A broader interpretation of estoppel tracks what many believe to be the statutory intent, however, as a party should not get two bites at the apple and be able to seek review at both the PTAB and in the district court. Adopting this view, the court in Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. cabined Shaw and HP to their facts, holding that they “exempt an IPR petitioner from § 315(e)’s estoppel provision only if the PTAB precludes the petitioner from raising a ground during the IPR proceeding for purely procedural reasons.”[ix] Thus, the court held that § 315(e) estopped the petitioner from asserting any ground that (1) was included in PTAB’s final written decision, (2) was not instituted for non-procedural reasons, or (3) was not included in the petition.[x] Any other decision would result in needlessly protracted litigation as petitioners would re-litigate arguments similar to those that it had already lost or strategically chose not to include in a petition.[xi] The court in Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Products LLCtook a similar view with respect to non-petitioned grounds, holding that estoppel applies “to grounds not asserted in the IPR petition, so long as they are based on prior art that could have been found by a skilled searcher’s diligent search.”[xii]

SAS Strengthens Patent Owners’ Estoppel Arguments Because a Petitioner is Deemed to be the “Master of its Complaint”

While SAS had nothing to do with estoppel on its face, much of the disagreement regarding the scope of estoppel arose out of the PTAB’s partial institution policy and the effect of estoppel on non-instituted claims. Because the PTAB no longer has discretion as to partial institution, courts will no longer have to struggle with whether a petitioner is estopped from raising non-instituted grounds for unpatentability in a subsequent or parallel district court proceeding. While a few open issues remain, the patent owner will still be able to argue that SAS supports the idea that petitioners should only get one opportunity to challenge patentability—either at the PTAB or before a jury. The Supreme Court directive from SAS, coupled with recent guidance from the PTAB, suggests that the divide between the broad (Biscotti and Douglas Dynamics) and narrow (Shaw and HP) interpretations of estoppel—at least with respect to pre-institution decisions from the PTAB—may be merging.

Moreover, while SAS does not explicitly resolve whether a petitioner is estopped from arguing non-petitionedclaims in a parallel district court case, the premise behind the Supreme Court’s decision—that the petitioner is the master of its own petition—suggests that estoppel should apply. Some commentators have predicted that because PTAB must now choose between full institution and full denial, “petitioners [will] have an incentive to focus their petitions even further—when choosing claims to challenge, grounds to assert, and prior art to cite—in order to ensure that the likelihood of full institution is greater than the likelihood of full denial.”[xiii] But filing a targeted (and therefore stronger) petition may run the risk of estoppel on any non-petitioned claim. As Biscotti and Douglas Dynamics indicate, petitioners should not be permitted to hold arguments in reserve in case of an unfavorable result at the PTAB. Moreover, SAS supports Biscotti’s and Douglas Dynamic’s interpretation of the meaning of “during” the IPR. While Shaw characterized an IPR as not beginning until institution,[xiv]SAS depicts post grant review as a single process that begins with petitioner defining the scope of the proceeding in its petition.[xv]Applying estoppel to non-petitioned claims would not be inconsistent with a courts’ concern “that estoppel applies only to those arguments, or potential arguments, that received (or reasonably could have received) proper judicial attention.”[xvi]

 Further, SAS will still enable patent owners to rely on the same line of cases to argue for procedural estoppel. Before SAS, the PTAB frequently denied institution in view of procedural deficiencies.[xvii] Now, however, the PTAB will be faced with either denying institution for failure to comply with PTAB rules or allowing institution on all grounds even where some of the challenges are procedurally improper. For example, petitioners could present a single procedurally proper argument to open the door to review and evade page limit requirements by packing the remainder of the petition with grounds that must also be instituted under SAS but that are supported only by improper incorporations by reference.[xviii] While denying institution because of procedural failings could preclude the petitioner from filing another (procedurally proper) petition making the same arguments,[xix] the petitioner, as “master of its complaint,” could have drafted its petition correctly from the start.[xx] In short, the petitioner’s failure to follow the rules should not justify a second bite at the validity apple.

 Finally, pending petitions subject to partial institution could have the same consequences depending on the action of the petitioner post-SAS. PTAB guidance indicates that in such cases, “the panel may issue an order supplementing the institution decision to institute on all challenges raised in the petition.”[xxi] If a petitioner fails to seek supplemental institution or fails to appeal the PTAB’s refusal to supplement, estoppel could apply. While some courts might continue following Shaw and HP by holding that non-instituted claims were not raised “during” the IPR, petitioner “could have raised” those claims and arguments “during” the IPR—even under Shaw’s interpretation—given SAS’s holding because the petitioner should have sought to remedy the non-institution.

The Takeaway

While not obvious at first glance, SAS follows recent decisions like General Plastics that tend to protect patent owners’ rights. While the focus of SAS was on institution and the scope of institution, the Court has armed patent owners with another weapon with which they can challenge serial review of the same patent on the same grounds in multiple petitions and district court proceedings.

[i] No. 16-969 (Apr. 24, 2018).

[ii] Id., slip op. at 1, 4-5.

[iii] Id., slip op. at 12.

[iv] Hr’g on H.R. 1249 Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., Competition and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of David Kappos, Dir., USPTO) (“Those estoppel provisions mean that your patent is largely unchallengeable by the same party.”)

[v] 157 Cong. Rec. S1360-94 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (claiming that the estoppel provision “ensures that if aninter partes review is instituted while litigation is pending, that review will completely substitute for at least the patents-and-printed-publications portion of the civil litigation”).

[vi] 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2)).

[vii] 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

[ See, e.g., Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7728, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017); Illumina, Inc. v. Qiagen N.V., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2016).viii]

[ix] 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144164, at *21-22 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017).

[x] Id. at *22.

[xi] Id. at *17-18, *20-21.

[xii] 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58773, at *15.

[xiii] Saurabh Vishnubhakat, First Steps After SAS Institute, Patently-O (Apr. 27, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/04/first-steps-institute.html

[xiv] 817 F.3d at 1300.

[xv] Slip op. at 6, 9.

[xvi] Verinata, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7728, at *10.

[xvii] See, e.g., Shenzhen Huiding Technology Co., Ltd. v. Synaptics Incorporated, IPR2015-01741, Paper 8 at 29-31 (PTAB Aug. 7, 2015) (partially denying institution due to improper incorporation by reference); Bomtech Elec., Co. Ltd. v. Medium-Tech Medizingeräte GmbH, Case No. IPR2014-00138, Paper No. 8 at 32-33 (PTAB Apr. 22, 2014) (same).

[xviii] See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3).

[xix] General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017).

[xx] Id.

[xxi] Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings (Apr. 26, 2018) (emphasis added). 

 

© McKool Smith
This post was written by Scott W. Hejny and Chelsea Priest of McKool Smith.

PTO Releases Revised Guidance on Compliance with Mayo/Alice Rule

On April 19, the USPTO released a Memorandum from Robert Bahr, The Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, that summarized the support required for a finding if a claim directed to a judicial exception to s. 101 eligibility under Step 2A of the Mayo/Alice analysis chart of MPEP 2106 – a natural phenomenon, an abstract idea or a product of nature [ ed. note “PAIN’]– contains an additional inventive concept that, taken alone or in combination, would not represent well-understood, routine, or conventional [“WRC”] activity. The Memorandum was prompted by the recent decision in Berkheimer v. HP, 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

At virtually the same time, Director Iancu released a Request for Comments on Determining Whether a claim element is [WRC] for the Purposes of Subject Matter Eligibility, and it pretty much repeats the factors listed in the Bahr Memorandum. For a detailed summary of the factual underpinnings that an examiner must make in order to support a rejection on the basis that a claim directed to a PAIN does not meet the inventive concept requirement because it is WRC, please refer to my post of April 20th.

I criticized the four factors outlined in the Memorandum/Request for using the s. 112 standard that that which is known to the art need not be set forth fully in the specification, as a blaze mark to guide examiners in determining whether the additional elements(s) in the claim are WRC. In other words, if the specification does not give the details of how to measure a biomarker, the examiner can use such facts to support a WRC finding. This relying on material not present in the specification is repeated in Factors 1, 3 and 4. I also criticized Factor 2 as permitting examiners to simply cite to “one or more court decisions discussed in MPEP 2106(5)(d)(2)” as noting the WRC nature of the additional element(s) in the claim, primarily due to the breadth of the summaries of the cases in this section of the MPEP.

The Revised Guidance in the May 8th Presentation (which is available as a slideshow from the PTO) takes these two criticisms to heart. It drops the reference to the value of a s. 112 analysis in Factors relating to the evidence of WRC provided by the specification, the disclosures in the prior art and the ability of the examiner to take official notice of the WRC, which usually will be based upon disclosures in the prior art.

The Revised Guidelines start out by stating that the examiner should conclude that a claim element(s) represents only WRC activity only if he/she can conclude that the element(s) is “widely prevalent or in common use in the relevant industry,” a conclusion that must be supported by factual determinations. Here is a quick run-down of the four “Options” that the examiner can use to demonstrate that a claim directed to PAIN does not contain more than elements that are WRC (These are mostly my words):

  1. Applicant makes a “statement against interest” in the specification or during prosecution that a claim element(s) is conventional, widely prevalent or in common use, or is a commercially available product.

  2. The examiner can cite to one or more court decisions as noting the WRC nature of the additional elements, as reported in MPEP 2106(d)(II). I criticized this as overly broad, especially in view of the fact that there is almost no case law involving diagnostic testing or methods of medical treatment. Interestingly, in Vanda v. West-Ward, the Fed. Cir. stated that the Mayo claims were diagnostic claims. This is a stretch – What condition did they diagnose? The recited patient had been treated with the drug before any sample testing was carried out. However, the revised guidelines make it clear that the additional element in the claim must be the same as the element addressed in the court case, as well as the fact that the case must be on the MPEP list. Vanda v. West-Ward should be added to this list.

  3. The examiner finds prior art publication(s) that demonstrate that the element(s) in questions are WRC, not just in existence at some point in the past. This should come from the prior art located in the search done by the Examiner or disclosed by Applicant.

  4. The examiner is permitted to take official notice of the WRC of the additional element(s) but only to be used when the examiner is certain thereof based upon his/her personal knowledge. For all but the most indisputable WRC, the examiner may be required to provide a declaration under 37 CFR 1.104(d)(2).

If more than one element is present, the examiner must show that the combination of the elements is WRC in the pertinent art. If the examiner cited to a publication not previously of record in response to an argument by applicant, the office action should not be made final.

Comments must be received by Aug. 20, 2018 by submitting them to Eligibilty2018@USPTO.gov.

 

© 2018 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.
Read more updates on Mayo/Alice on the National Law Review’s Intellectual Property Page.

Getting Closer to put the UPC into Force

April 26, 2018 is a remarkable date: first it’s World IP Day celebrating IP around the world. Second, and this is unique, the British IP Minister Sam Gyimah MP announced that the UK ratified the Unified Patent Court Agreement (UPC Agreement). By doing so the UK agreed to be bound to both the UPC agreement and the UPC’s Protocol on Privileges and Immunities (PPI). The UPC will be a court common to the contracting member states within the EU having exclusive competence in respect of European Patents and European Patents with unitary effect.

In addition to Paris and Munich, London hosts a section of the Court’s central Division dealing with patents in the field of life sciences and pharmaceuticals. The way is now open for discussion about UK’s future within the UPC system after-Brexit. As of today, the UPC Agreement is ratified by 16 countries of the European Union.

To bring the Agreement into force, UK, France and Germany have to ratify the UPC Agreement and the PPI, now everyone is waiting for Germany, as France has already ratified.

Germany’s completion is currently on hold due to a constitutional complaint pending before the German Federal Constitutional Court.  According to rumours abound in the German IP community this complaint might be dismissed and the ratification will be finished during this year.

It’s time to get ready for playing with the new system!

 

Copyright 2018 K & L Gates.
This post was written by Christiane Schweizer of K & L Gates.
Read more on intellectual property on the National Law Review’s Intellectual Property Page.

Are Foreign Lost Profits Really Lost?

On January 12, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Federal Circuit’s lost profits decision in WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015), marking the first step toward defining the scope of recovery for damages in the form of lost foreign sales. Under the Patent Act, damages are governed by § 284, which provides:

Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.

While § 284 allows patent owners to recover lost profits and reasonable royalties, the statute is silent as to whether these damages should encompass overseas losses (i.e., from foreign sales or contracts), which could play an important and substantial role in elevating damages – especially for patent holders with international contracts and services.

Background

WesternGeco LLC (“WesternGeco”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Schlumberger Limited, a worldwide provider of reservoir drilling and processing technology in the oil and gas industry. Relevant to this case, WesternGeco LLC provides reservoir monitoring and imaging services to help perform seismic surveys. ION Geophysical Corp. (“ION”) offers similar services as WesternGeco and is a competitor.

In 2009, WesternGeco sued ION for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)-(2). Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) provides:

  1. Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention . . . in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent . . . shall be liable as an infringer.
  2. Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use . . . knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States . . . shall be liable as an infringer.

The district court found for WesternGeco, awarding it $93,400,000 in lost profits and $12,500,000 in reasonable royalties as damages. On appeal, however, the panel majority reversed the district court’s award of lost profits, observing that the “presumption against extraterritoriality is well-established and undisputed.” Moreover, the Federal Circuit previously stated in Power Integrations v. Fairchild Semiconductor, “[Our patent laws] do not thereby provide compensation for a defendant’s foreign exploitation of a patented invention, which is not infringement at all.” In effect, the majority held that “[u]nder Power Integrations, WesternGeco cannot recover lost profits resulting from its failure to win foreign service contracts.”

WesternGeco’s Petition

WesternGeco filed two petitions for certiorari. Based on the first petition, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s opinion in light of Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). On remand, however, the Federal Circuit reinstated its opinion and judgment as to lost profits. As a result, WesternGeco filed a second petition for certiorari on February 17, 2017, which presented the following question:

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that lost profits arising from prohibited combinations occurring outside of the United States are categorically unavailable in cases where patent infringement is proven under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).

In its petition, WesternGeco argued that the majority panel “applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in such a duplicative manner [that] defeat[ed] Congress’ intent in enacting § 271(f).” Therefore, the decision “effectively eliminate[d] lost profit damages where infringement is found under § 271(f), limiting patent owners only to a reasonable royalty.” WesternGeco also distinguished its case from Power Integrations, by arguing that “Power Integrations dealt with infringement under § 271(a)” and therefore “reflects no comparable congressional judgment to target certain extraterritorial conduct.”

In an amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of the United States, the Solicitor General urged the Court to hear this case, stating that the Federal Circuit’s “approach systematically undercompensates prevailing patentees like petitioner, whose transnational business suffered when respondent infringed petitioner’s patents within the United States.”

In addition, WesternGeco argued that allowing patentees to recover lost profits from international sales would be consistent with copyright law, which has been found by several circuits to permit parties to recover foreign damages so long as those damages are directly linked to a domestic predicate act of infringement.

Implications

Although the Supreme Court, in its 2007 opinion in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., previously “[r]ecogniz[ed] [that] § 271(f) is an exception to the general rule that [U.S.] patent law does not apply extraterritorially,” the Court ultimately “resist[ed] giving the language . . . an expansive interpretation.”

Patent holders should be aware that the Supreme Court’s decision in WesternGeco may present an opportunity to expand the scope of damages claims to encompass international losses caused by infringement in the United States.

 

© Copyright 2018 Brinks, Gilson & LioneBrinks, Gilson & Lione.
This post was written by Jeffrey J. Catalono and Judy K. He of Brinks, Gilson & Lione.
Read more Intellectual Property News at the Intellectual Property Page.

Have you ever used a one-click ordering process online? Then you indirectly paid Amazon.

If you purchased anything from a website using a one-click purchase button, you indirectly paid Amazon for that ability, at least up until September 11, 2017 when Amazon’s patent to this technology expired. As a result, one-click purchasing might become the new norm.

In 1997, Amazon filed for a business method patent to one-click purchasing, which allows return shoppers to purchase items with just a single click of a button instead of having to proceed through a prolonged checkout process. The patent issued in 1999, at which point Amazon sued Barnes & Noble for patent infringement based on a similar technology used during Barnes & Noble’s checkout process. After extended litigation, the two companies settled in 2002. Not wanting to face similar litigation, Apple licensed the patent in 2000 to simplify ordering from the Apple Store.

The patent was extremely contentious, causing multiple calls to tighten patent laws or eliminate business method patents entirely. In response to the numerous attacks on the patent, Jeff Bezos called on the US Patent and Trademark Office to reduce the lifespan of patents to only 3 to 5 years, which prompted the US Patent and Trademark Office to issue an action plan to work with e-commerce companies to strengthen issued business method patents. But despite facing numerous challenges over the years, the patent survived. Thus if you have ordered anything online using a one-click purchase process, that company likely paid a licensing fee to Amazon to be able to provide that option.

Since the patent is now expired, one-click purchasing is now open to every online retailer. Large technology companies, such as Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft, are developing standardized one-click checkout procedures that can be applied internet-wide and that follow you from website to website. Google is likewise developing technology to incorporate one-click purchasing into its internet browser, Chrome.

 

©1994-2018 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.