Tag: OIG

FCA Enforcement & Compliance Digest — Fall 2024 False Claims Act Newsletter

Welcome to the Fall 2024 issue of “FCA Enforcement & Compliance Digest,” our quarterly newsletter in which we compile essential updates on False Claims Act (FCA) enforcement trends, litigation, agency guidance, and compliance tips. We bring you the most recent and significant insights in an accessible format, concluding with our main takeaways — aka “And the Fox Says…” — on what you need to know.

In this Fall 2024 edition, we cover:

  1. Enforcement Trends: Manufacturers challenge AKS intent requirement as reflected in recent denials of OIG Advisory Opinion requests.
  2. Litigation Developments: Implications of Florida judge’s ruling that the FCA qui tam provision is unconstitutional.
  3. Compliance Corner: What health care companies need to know about AI.
  4. ICYMI: Federal Court Permits Investors to Resume Kickback Suit Against Teva

1. Enforcement Trends

Do Violations of the AKS Require a ‘Corrupt’ Intent? Manufacturers Challenge the OIG’s Interpretation of the Statute

In a series of recent lawsuits filed by the pharmaceutical industry against the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), manufactures are challenging the OIG’s interpretation of the Anti-Kickback Statue (AKS), arguing that violations of the statute require a corrupt intent. While courts have so far ruled in OIG’s favor, should a court accept this argument, the AKS regulatory landscape could be upended, providing health care providers and suppliers the opportunity to develop and implement arrangements that have historically been prohibited by the OIG.

The challenges to OIG’s interpretation of the AKS come in the context of OIG Advisory Opinion requests submitted by the manufacturers (or a related charity) proposing various forms of patient assistance programs under which the manufacturers or their related charities offer financial assistance to patients on the manufacturers’ products. The OIG denied each of the Advisory Opinion requests, finding that the proposed forms of patient assistance would constitute remuneration intended to induce patients to purchase the manufacturers’ drugs in violation of the AKS.

The OIG has consistently reiterated its opposition to manufacturer-operated patient assistance programs, with both the OIG’s 2005 Special Advisory Bulletin: Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees and the 2014 Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin: Independent Charity Patient Assistance Programs noting that manufacturers cannot provide co-pay assistance to federal health care program beneficiaries, as doing so would constitute a kickback. However, the guidance also described the parameters under which independent charities can provide co-pay assistance, including assistance to federal health care program beneficiaries (i.e., Medicare beneficiaries). One of the key factors with respect to the operation of charitable patient assistance programs, is the independence of the charities operating the programs. While the independent charities are primarily funded by manufacturers, to be considered independent for OIG’s purposes, the charities must retain independence from donors. This means the donors cannot influence the design or operation of the patient assistance programs, and the programs cannot favor patients on the donor’s drug (e.g., assistance cannot be contingent upon the patient being prescribed a donor’s drug).

In three separate litigations, Pfizer Inc. v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, Vertex Pharmaceuticals Incorporated v. United States Department of Health and Human Services et al., and Pharmaceutical Coalition for Patient Access v. United States of America et al., manufacturers are challenging OIG’s long-held position that manufacturers cannot provide patient assistance, including co-pay assistance, to federal health care program beneficiaries. In doing so, the goal of the manufacturers is to provide assistance to patients, including co-pay support, either directly or through a charity that is not considered independent by OIG’s standards due to the relationship of the proposed charities to the manufactures and the level of influence by the manufacturers over the proposed charities. In each litigation, the manufacturer or, in the case of the Pharmaceutical Coalition for Patient Access (PCPA), the charity controlled by the manufacturers, is challenging an unfavorable Advisory Opinion issued by OIG concluding that the proposed patient assistance programs would constitute remuneration intended to induce patients to use a particular manufacturer’s products.

Under the arrangements proposed by Pfizer and PCPA, the proposed charities would be funded exclusively by manufacturers and would only provide support to patients on those funders’ drugs. In Pfizer’s Advisory Opinion request, the company proposed two potential co-pay assistance programs: (1) a direct co-pay assistance program and (2) a Pfizer-supported charity co-pay assistance program. Similar to the proposed Pfizer-supported charity co-pay assistance program, PCPA, an organization funded by manufacturers of Part-D-covered oncology drugs, proposed to create its own patient assistance program that would provide co-pay assistance to patients who meet certain qualifying criteria and then invoice each participating manufacturer for “the total amount of cost-sharing subsidies provided to eligible Part D enrollees.”

Vertex’s Advisory Opinion request focused on a proposed “Fertility Preservation Program” under which Vertex would pay fertility providers through a third-party vendor for the treatments provided to patients enrolled in the program. While this proposed program involved coverage of related treatment costs (i.e., the costs of the fertility treatments) rather than coverage of the co-pay costs associated with the Vertex drug itself, OIG nonetheless applied the same reasoning as in the Pfizer and PCPA opinions, concluding that the program would constitute remuneration to the patients in violation of the AKS.

In each litigation, the manufacturer (or, in the case of PCPA, the manufacturer-related charity) is challenging OIG’s position that the manufacturer’s subsidies constitute “remuneration” meant “to induce” patients to purchase manufactures’ products. The manufacturers argue that the AKS criminalizes conduct that “leads or tempts to the commission of crime” through “remuneration” that corrupts medical decision-making, as part of a quid pro quo transaction. In other words, according to the manufacturers, “to induce” requires a corrupt intent. Therefore, because the manufactures’ efforts to assist patients with meeting Medicare co-pay obligations or gaining access to Medicare-covered treatments (or treatments otherwise covered by the federal health care programs) are not done with malice or corrupt intent, such programs would not violate the AKS.

To date, no court has agreed with the manufacturers’ position. While Vertex is still pending trial in the District Court for the District of Columbia, the District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled against Pfizer, noting that “the law is clear that absent an express carve-out, the Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits any remuneration intended to induce someone to purchase or receive a drug or medical service.” Similarly, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled against PCPA, concluding that HHS OIG’s “interpretation of the AKS adheres faithfully [to] the statute’s plain text, comports with its context, and does not offend its history.” On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision in Pfizer, finding that an AKS violation does not require “corrupt intent.” Pfizer then appealed to the US Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. PCPA’s case is currently on appeal with the Fourth Circuit.

Should the Vertex court or a court of appeals agree that the statutory terms “induce” and “remuneration” should be construed more narrowly and require a corrupt intent to violate the AKS, AKS regulatory interpretation and much of OIG’s guidance could be called into question. Arrangements that have historically been viewed as suspect by the OIG could be considered compliant to the extent the parties lacked a corrupt intent to violate the law.

And the Fox Says… Ongoing efforts challenging OIG’s statutory interpretation of the AKS demonstrate manufacturers’ interests in narrowing the scope of prohibited activities under the law. Providers and suppliers should continue monitoring the ongoing litigation and any future efforts to challenge OIG’s interpretation of the AKS, as any judicial narrowing of the interpretation could provide opportunities to develop innovative arrangements that may be beneficial to patients. Regardless, developing compliant arrangements to benefit patients can be complicated, and legal counsel can help to ensure you remain apprised of all relevant developments and assist in structuring compliant arrangements.

2. Litigation Developments

What Is the FCA Without Its Qui Player? A Look Into Zafirov’s Future Implications and the Enforceability of the FCA Without a Qui Tam Device

As we previously discussed, a Florida federal district court recently held in Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates LLC that the FCA qui tam provision is unconstitutional. The court reasoned that a relator who litigates an FCA lawsuit on behalf of the United States is not a properly appointed “officer” under Article II of the US Constitution and, thus, does not have the authority to serve in that position. This article examines several questions: What does FCA enforcement look like without a qui tam device? What questions did Zafirov leave unresolved? And what should one expect in the coming years as this issue is litigated on appeal and among other courts?

Can the government successfully enforce the FCA without a qui tam device? If, in the end, the qui tam provision is voided, that does not spell doom for the FCA. This is because the government still has the authority to file FCA actions itself and could hire many more attorneys to investigate and prosecute them. The government also has other mechanisms to entice whistleblowers to come out of the woodwork and inform it of wrongdoing. For example, recently, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the “Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program.” This enforcement program compensates whistleblowers who inform the DOJ of original and truthful information concerning corporate misconduct. If the information leads to a successful forfeiture of over $1 million, the whistleblower is compensated. Currently, however, the program does not cover FCA claims. But the DOJ or US Congress could theoretically expand this program, or create a new one, to attract whistleblowers who have information concerning FCA violations. Under such a program, the government’s litigation of FCA claims would not be all that different from what happens currently. Rather than intervene in a meritorious FCA case brought by a relator, the government would file its own case based on information provided by a whistleblower. This would avoid the constitutional pitfalls identified in Zafirov. A post-qui tam landscape will certainly see fewer FCA claims being filed overall, but the government would likely file more FCA claims than it does now.

Still, many questions remain unresolved under Zafirov concerning the extent to which relator suits are constitutionally permissible. In Zafirov, the relator was litigating an FCA suit in which the United States declined to intervene. But what happens if the United States does intervene and takes over the case? Are those suits permissible? Does the relator act as an “officer” if her role is just limited to filing a lawsuit? Could the government get around Zafirov by intervening in more cases? Or are all FCA lawsuits filed by a relator invalid ab initio even if the government intervenes? If so, would Congress have to create a mechanism to appoint a relator as an officer for FCA purposes? In short, it is unclear how broadly Zafirov will be read. On one hand, it could be read to only apply to non-intervened cases. On the other hand, the very act of filing a complaint on behalf of the United States may require a constitutional appointment, and the government’s intervention would not cure that taint. These questions will remain unresolved until they are addressed by the Supreme Court.

Only time will tell what will happen as this issue percolates in the courts. Already, several circuit courts have upheld the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions. In the district courts located in circuits that have not yet addressed this issue, defendants are filing dispositive motions arguing that the relator’s appointment is unconstitutional. Though the decision in Zafirov is currently an outlier, it soon may not be as more courts consider arguments that rely on Zafirov’s reasoning.

And the Fox Says… Zafirov is significant because it may be the first blow to a significant enforcement mechanism on which the government heavily relies. But the qui tam provision’s fate is not set in stone. The relator in Zafirov will almost certainly appeal the decision to the Atlanta-based Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. That court’s decision may then be appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeals process for Zafirov may take years before the Supreme Court grants certiorari on the issue (if it does at all). In the meantime, the issue is not going away, and Zafirov is unlikely to be a one-off case. Those who are in the throes of an FCA investigation or litigation should raise this issue as a possible litigation risk or as an affirmative defense. The best possible time to raise this issue amid litigation is on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Even if a case is past this point, Zafirov supports the position that such an argument is not waived, given that the issue goes to the relator’s very authority to bring the suit. So, defendants litigating a case brought by a relator should raise this issue as soon as possible. We at ArentFox Schiff will continue to monitor developments to help our clients navigate this ever-changing legal landscape.

3. Compliance Corner

AI Under the DOJ Microscope: How Health Care Companies Should Respond

Many companies, including health care companies, have incorporated artificial intelligence (AI) into their business practices. While historically, AI has largely been unregulated, that is starting to change. Recently, state governments have begun regulating the use of AI in the health care setting, as our colleagues summarized here regarding recently passed California legislation requiring health care facilities, clinics, and physician practices in the state to disclose the use of AI in communications regarding patient clinical information. Now, AI has the attention of the DOJ.

This past March, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco indicated the DOJ’s interest in AI, stating at the American Bar Association’s 39th National Institute on White Collar Crime that “fraud using AI is still fraud.” Following Monaco’s statement, in September, the Criminal Division of the DOJ updated its Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) guidelines to require DOJ prosecutors to consider whether a company’s compliance program safeguards against misuse of AI or other emerging technologies. As a brief primer, the ECCP is a DOJ document that prosecutors use to evaluate the effectiveness of a corporate compliance program in determining whether to criminally charge a company. The document is published publicly and provides helpful insight into the DOJ’s expectations for companies as they build and implement their corporate compliance programs.

Under the updated guidance, the DOJ emphasizes that companies need to assess AI-related risks as part of their overall enterprise risk management systems. Specifically, a corporate compliance program must consider whether it has specific policies and procedures to prevent “any potential negative or unintended consequences” resulting from the use of AI in its business practices and compliance program. Additionally, a company should proactively conduct risk analyses of its use of AI and mitigate the potential for “deliberate or reckless misuse of technologies” by company insiders. Other key considerations are whether the company trains its employees on the use of AI, whether there is a baseline of human decision-making used to assess AI-generated content, and how the company implements accountability over the use of AI.

In its September update, the DOJ also revised a section of the ECCP, asking whether compliance personnel have access to relevant data sources to allow for “timely and effective monitoring and/or testing” of policies, controls, and transactions. A key consideration is whether the assets, resources, and technology available to compliance programs are comparable to those available elsewhere in the company. An imbalance in access to technology and resources may indicate a compliance program’s inability to detect and mitigate risks, particularly if a business unit is given unfettered access to AI tools while compliance lags behind.

Compliance officers at health care companies should take steps now to ensure that the implementation and use of AI within their organizations do not raise any compliance red flags. Consider the recent Texas Attorney General settlement with Pieces Technologies, a company that markets generative AI products, which resolved allegations that the company made misleading statements regarding the accuracy of its products. As part of the settlement, Pieces agreed to provide more explicit disclosures to customers related to how the company’s products should be used and the potential harm that could result from the products.

Providers using such technologies may encounter data privacy and security risks, including cybersecurity risks such as ransomware and malware attacks, bias and fairness concerns with respect to the training of the AI systems that may result in preference for a particular drug or treatment, and reliability and accountability concerns affecting a health care professional’s ability to provide patient care. With that being said, the DOJ could conduct investigations similar to the Pieces investigation against health care providers that use AI without considering these risks.

To help mitigate the risks associated with AI, including in the event of a DOJ investigation, compliance officers should be involved during all stages of discussions around AI initiatives, including through implementation and use. Compliance officers should ensure their companies have appropriate policies and procedures governing the use of AI once it is introduced to their organizations and provide training to employees both on the AI technology and on the policies governing its use. Finally, compliance officers should ensure they have the necessary access to AI systems to conduct compliance oversight measures. Such oversight measures may include assessing AI-related risks as part of their organization’s annual risk assessment, conducting AI-related auditing, and monitoring to help identify potential issues with the technology as they arise.

And the Fox Says… The DOJ’s AI-focused compliance guidance is a call to action for companies to proactively address the legal and regulatory implications of AI technologies, reminding them that the age of AI requires more than just innovation — it demands robust compliance strategies. Companies that conduct regular risk assessments of their practices must consider the use of AI, update policies and procedures to address its use, provide compliance teams with equal data access, and regularly update training on the lawful use of these technologies. Empowering compliance personnel and working with outside compliance experts to make these regular updates will put a company in a good position to meet these new standards. By embracing these guidelines, companies can mitigate legal and regulatory risks while leveraging the capabilities of AI technologies.

4. In Case You Missed It

Our most popular blog post from the last quarter: Federal Court Permits Investors to Resume Kickback Suit Against Teva.

© 2024 ArentFox Schiff LLP
For more on the FCA, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section

Telehealth Update: DEA/HHS Temporary Rule, Medicare Coverage of Telehealth Services, Potential for Increased Oversight, and What to Watch For in 2025

Telehealth companies and other industry stakeholders have had a watchful eye towards the end of 2024 and the impending “telehealth cliff” as COVID-era Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) flexibilities and Medicare expanded telehealth coverage are set to expire. Although a recent temporary joint rule from the DEA and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) along with the 2025 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule final rule has provided some hope, questions regarding telehealth access in 2025 and under a new Administration remain unclear. Further, calls continue for increased oversight of telehealth services. Below, we breakdown recent updates for the telehealth industry.

DEA Telehealth Flexibilities

Providing some good news, late last month the DEA and HHS jointly issued a temporary rule (the Temporary Rule) extending the COVID-era flexibilities for prescribing controlled substances via telehealth through the end of 2025. The flexibilities, which previously were twice extended and set to expire December 31, 2024, temporarily waive the in-person requirements for prescribing under the Controlled Substances Act.

The DEA and HHS issued the Temporary Rule to ensure that providers and patients who have come to rely on telehealth services are able to smoothly transition to the new requirements, which as previously covered, are likely to significantly limit providers’ ability to prescribe controlled substances without an in-person interaction. The Temporary Rule also acknowledges that the DEA and HHS continue to work with relevant stakeholders and will use the additional time to promulgate proposed and final regulations that “effectively expand access to telemedicine” in a manner that is consistent with public health and safety, while mitigating the risk of diversion. The agencies also note that the limited time period of the extension is aimed at avoiding investment in new telemedicine companies that may encourage or enable problematic prescribing practices.

The Temporary Rule effectively allows all DEA-registered providers to prescribe Schedule II-V controlled substances via telehealth through the end of 2025, regardless of when the provider-patient relationship was formed. Consistent with the prior temporary rules, the following requirements continue to apply:

  • The prescription must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by a practitioner acting in the usual course of professional practice.
  • The prescription must be issued pursuant to a telehealth interaction using two-way, real-time audio-visual technology, or for prescriptions to treat a mental health disorder, a two-way, real-time audio-only communication if the patient is not capable of, or does not consent to, the use of video technology.
  • The practitioner must be authorized under their DEA registration to prescribe the basic class of controlled medication specified on the prescription or be exempt from obtaining a registration to dispense controlled substances.
  • The prescription must meet all other requirements of the DEA regulations.

Providers should also be cognizant of applicable state laws that may place additional restrictions on the ability to prescribe certain medications or otherwise provide treatment via telehealth.

Medicare Coverage of Telehealth Services 

Unlike the DEA flexibilities, many of the COVID-era flexibilities for traditional Medicare coverage of telehealth services will end on December 31, 2024. Despite bipartisan support, congressional action is required to extend broad coverage for certain telehealth services existing since March 2020. Most notably, unless Congress acts, beginning January 1, 2025 expiring flexibilities include waiving the originating site requirements to allow beneficiaries to receive services in their homes and expanding the list of Medicare-enrolled providers who can furnish telehealth services.

Further, beginning January 1, 2025, Medicare coverage of telehealth services for beneficiaries outside of rural health care settings will be limited to:

  • Monthly End-Stage Renal Disease visits for home dialysis;
  • Services for diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of symptoms of an acute stroke;
  • Treatment of substance use disorder or a co-occurring mental health disorder, or for the diagnosis, evaluation or treatment of a mental health disorder;
  • Behavioral health services;
  • Diabetes self-management training; and
  • Nutrition therapy.

For its part, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) recently issued its 2025 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule Final Rule (the MPFS Final Rule) extending and making permanent certain telehealth flexibilities within its authority. In particular, through December 31, 2025, practitioners may continue to utilize live video to meet certain Medicare direct supervision requirements and reference their currently enrolled practice when providing telehealth services from their home. The MPFS Final Rule continues to remove frequency limitations for certain hospital inpatient/observation care, skilled nursing facility visits, and critical care consultation services furnished via telehealth. Additionally, the MPFS Final Rule makes permanent the utilization of audio-only telehealth for any Medicare-covered telehealth service.

Increased Telehealth Oversight 

Recent months also have seen renewed calls for increased oversight of telehealth services. In September, the HHS Office for Inspector General (OIG) issued a report (the OIG Report) recommending increased oversight of Medicare coverage of remote patient monitoring. As a basis for its findings, the OIG Report cites the dramatic increased utilization of and payments for remote patient monitoring from 2019 to 2022, the fact that over 40% of Medicare beneficiaries receiving remote patient monitoring did not receive all three components of the service (i.e., education and setup, device supply, and treatment management), and the observation that Medicare lacks key information regarding the data being collected and the types of monitoring devices utilized. Notably, OIG conducted its review in part because of the potential for significant expansion of remote patient monitoring in the Medicare population.

Given these factors, the OIG Report recommends that CMS:

  1. Implement additional safeguards to ensure that remote patient monitoring is used and billed appropriately in Medicare.
  2. Require that remote patient monitoring be ordered and that information about the ordering provider be included on claims and encounter data for remote patient monitoring.
  3. Develop methods to identify what health data are being monitored.
  4. Conduct provider education about billing of remote patient monitoring.
  5. Identify and monitor companies that bill for remote patient monitoring.

Separately, concerns also have been raised regarding the recent emergence of direct-to-consumer telehealth platforms sponsored by pharmaceutical companies. In this model, patients seeking specific medications are linked to a health care provider who can virtually prescribe the requested medication. In October, U.S. Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), joined by Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Peter Welch (D-VT), and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) sent letters to several pharmaceutical companies requesting written response to questions regarding these platforms including the cost of direct-to-consumer advertising, the arrangements between the telehealth providers and the pharmaceutical companies, and whether the virtual consultation comply with the standard of care.

Conclusion

Despite attempts to preserve and expand telehealth access and affordability, effective January 1, 2025, many Medicare beneficiaries will be cut off from certain telehealth services unless one of the bills currently pending in Congress is passed. Crucially, bipartisan support for increased access to telehealth services is likely to continue in both chambers of Congress. Although the incoming Administration has not detailed its plans regarding telehealth access on a permanent, or even temporary basis, telehealth will continue to play an important role in the United States health care system through 2025 and beyond. As telehealth continues to play an important role in increasing access to care, increased oversight and enforcement is almost certain, even if future oversight priorities are unclear. As always, we will continue to monitor and report on important telehealth developments.

©1994-2024 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
For more on Telehealth, visit the NLR Health Law Managed Care section

No More Fraud Vampires: Whistleblowers Put a Stake in Phlebotomy Unlawful Kickback Scheme

31 October 2024. Two whistleblowers “stopped the bleeding” caused by an alleged kickback scheme perpetrated by a mobile phlebotomy service based in California. Veni-Express, Inc. and its owners have agreed to pay $135,000 to settle allegations of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute and False Claims Act. While the award for the two whistleblowers has not yet been determined, False Claims Act qui tam whistleblowers may be rewarded between 15-25% of the settlement.

Overview of the Case

According to the allegations, from 2015 to 2019, Veni-Express allegedly submitted false claims to federal health care programs for services that were not actually performed. These services included venipuncture procedures during homebound patient visits and non-reimbursable travel mileage claims for the visits. The fraudulent activities were reportedly conducted with the oversight of the company’s owners, Myrna and Sonny Steinbaum.

Additionally, between July 2014 and June 2015, Veni-Express allegedly paid unlawful kickbacks to Altera Laboratories, also known as Med2U Healthcare LLC, to market their services. These kickbacks were disguised as a percentage of company revenue.

Unlawful Kickbacks and Phantom Billing

The Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) is a federal law that prohibits healthcare providers from offering, soliciting, or receiving anything of value to induce or reward referrals for services covered by federally funded healthcare programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid. When providers violate the AKS, they compromise patient care by prioritizing financial gain over medical necessity, which can lead to unnecessary, costly, or substandard treatments. Phantom billing, which involves charging Medicare and Medicaid for services never provided, drains funds that could otherwise be used for essential care for beneficiaries. It leads to increased healthcare costs, putting a strain on federally funded healthcare programs and potentially causing cuts or restrictions in services. This fraudulent practice also erodes trust in the healthcare system, which can prevent beneficiaries from seeking the care they need. As the Special Agent in Charge for the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General said about the case, “Improper incentives and billing Medicare for services never actually provided divert taxpayer funding meant to pay for medically necessary services for Medicare enrollees.”

Settlement Details

The settlement agreement is based upon the parties’ ability to pay, requiring Veni-Express to pay $100,000, with additional payments contingent upon the sale of company property. Myrna Steinbaum will pay $25,000, while Sonny Steinbaum will contribute $10,000.

Whistleblower Involvement

The whistleblowers in the qui tam actions were a former phlebotomist and a laboratory technical director. The qui tam provision in the False Claims Act allows private citizens with knowledge of fraud to report fraud schemes to the government and share in the government’s recovery.

Implications for Healthcare Professionals

This whistleblower settlement serves as a cautionary tale for healthcare professionals, emphasizing the need for strict adherence to regulatory standards. It underscores the power industry insiders have to speak up and put an end to fraud schemes that taint the healthcare profession.

© 2024 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section.

Medicare Advantage: OIG Report Finds Improper Denials

On April 27,2022, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (OIG), Office of Evaluations and Inspections, issued a report on the performance of Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs) in approving care and payment consistently with Medicare coverage rules. In its review, OIG found that 13% of MAO denials of prior authorization requests should have been approved and that 18% of payment requests from providers were improperly denied. OIG also made a number of recommendations to the Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) with respect to its oversight of MAOs.

Purpose and Method of the Study

OIG undertook the study to assess whether MAOs are appropriately providing access to medically necessary services and making payment to providers consistently with Medicare coverage rules. Since CMS pays MAOs principally by capitation, MAOs have a potential incentive to increase their profits by denying access to care of beneficiaries or by denying payments to providers. CMS’s annual audits of MAOs have indicated some persistent problems related to inappropriate denials of service and payment. As enrollment in Medicare Advantage continues to grow, OIG viewed it as important to ensure that medically necessary care is provided and that providers are paid appropriately.

OIG conducted the review by randomly selecting 250 denials of prior authorization requests and 250 payment request denials by 15 of the largest MAOs during a week in June of 2019. OIG had coding experts review the cases and had physician reviewers examine the medical records. Based on these reviews, OIG estimated the rates at which MAOs issued denials of services or payment that met Medicare coverage rules and MAO billing rules. OIG also examined the reasons for the inappropriate denials and the types of services involved.

Standards

MAOs must cover items and services included in fee-for-service Medicare, and may also elect to include additional items and services. MAOs are required to follow Medicare coverage rules that define what items and services are covered and under what circumstances. As the OIG states in the Report, MAOs “may not impose limitations – such as waiting periods or exclusions from coverage due to pre-existing conditions — that are not present in original Medicare.” In following Medicare coverage rules, MAOs are permitted to use additional denial criteria that were not developed by Medicare when they are deciding to authorize or pay for a service, provided the clinical criteria are “no more restrictive than original Medicare national and local coverage policies.” MAOs may also have their own billing and payment procedures, provided all providers are paid accurately, timely, and with an audit trial.

MAOs utilize prior authorization requests before care is furnished to manage care and payment requests from providers to approve payment for services provided. Beneficiaries and providers may appeal such decisions, and beneficiaries and providers are successful in many of the appeals (for a one-time period, as many as 75% of the appeals were granted).

Findings

Prior Authorization Denials

In the study, OIG found that 13% of prior authorization denials were for services that met Medicare coverage rules, thus delaying or denying care that likely should have been approved. MAOs made many of the denials by applying MAO clinical criteria that are not part of Medicare coverage rules. As an example, a follow-up MRI was denied for a beneficiary who had an adrenal lesion that was 1.5 cm in size, because the MAO required the beneficiary to wait one year for such lesions that are under 2 cm in size. OIG’s experts found such a requirement was not contained in Medicare coverage rules and was therefore inappropriate. Rather, the MRI was medically necessary to determine if the lesion was malignant.

OIG also found instances where MAOs requested further documentation that led to a denial of care when it was not furnished, as such additional documentation was not required to determine medical necessity. OIG’s reviewers found that either sufficient clinical information was in the medical record to authorize the care or the documentation requested was already contained in the medical record.

Payment Denials

OIG found in the study that 18% of payment denials fully met Medicare coverage rules and MAO payment policies. As a result of these denials, payment was delayed or precluded for services that should have been paid.

OIG found that common reasons for these inappropriate payment denials were human error in conducting manual reviews (for example, the reviewer not recognizing that a skilled nursing facility (SNF) was an in-network provider), and inaccurate programming.

OIG also found that advanced imaging services (including MRIs and CT scans), stays in post-acute facilities (including SNFs and inpatient rehabilitation facilities), and injections were the services that were most prominent in the inappropriate denials that should have been authorized for care and payment in accordance with Medicare coverage rules.

OIG Recommendations

Based on the study, OIG recommended that:

  • CMS should issue new guidance on both the appropriate and inappropriate use of MAO clinical criteria that are not contained in Medicare coverage rules. In particular, OIG recommended that CMS should more clearly define what it means when it states that MAO clinical criteria may not be “more restrictive” than Medicare coverage rules.

  • CMS should update its audit protocols to address issues identified in the report such as MAO use of clinical criteria and/or examine particular service types that led to more denials. OIG suggests CMS should consider enforcement actions for MAOs that demonstrate a pattern of inappropriate payment denials.

  • CMS should direct MAOs to identify and address the reasons that led to human errors.

CMS reviewed the OIG report and concurred with each of OIG’s recommendations. Those recommendations can affect future coverage decisions as well as utilization of prior authorization tools. AHIP, a national association of health care insurers, challenged the OIG’s sample size as inappropriate to support the agency’s conclusions, and defended prior authorization tools.

Takeaways

Given CMS’s concurrence with the report’s findings, we recommend that MAOs track these issues over the next several months in advance of CMS’s Final Rate Announcement for CY 2024.

MAOs should also be aware of potential False Claims Act (FCA) exposure in this area. FCA exposure can arise when a company seeks and receives payments despite being out of compliance with the basic terms for its participation. If an MAO knew it was denying claims that should be paid because they would be covered under traditional Medicare, but the MAO was still collecting full capitation, it is possible that a whistleblower or the government may pursue FCA liability. This risk warrants attention because whistleblowers can bring qui tam suits under the FCA, with resulting high costs for defense and potentially high penalties if a violation is proven (or settled to avoid further litigation). That said, an FCA suit based on this theory would raise serious questions, including whether any non-payment actually met the FCA’s “knowingly” standard (which includes reckless disregard), or whether any non-payment met the materiality threshold necessary to demonstrate a violation of the FCA.

Article By Alexis Finkelberg Bortniker, C. Frederick Geilfuss II, Matthew D. Krueger, Maureen F. Kwiecinski, and Kinal M. Patel at Foley & Lardner LLP

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COVID-19 Healthcare Enforcement Actions to Increase in 2022 and Beyond

“The Department remains committed to using every available federal tool—including criminal, civil, and administrative actions—to combat and prevent COVID-19 related fraud. We will continue to hold accountable those who seek to exploit the pandemic for personal gain, to protect vulnerable populations, and to safeguard the integrity of taxpayer-funded programs”

US Attorney General Merrick Garland – March 10, 2022, Remarks

The Biden Administration, US Department of Justice (DOJ), US Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG), and other federal agencies have prioritized prosecuting COVID-19-related fraud since the pandemic began. Although the United States appears to be finally emerging from the pandemic, the government’s pandemic-related enforcement actions are here to stay for the foreseeable future. DOJ has made clear that the government’s COVID-19 enforcement efforts will accelerate, with a more significant focus on complex healthcare fraud cases and civil actions under the False Claims Act (FCA). As the federal government continues to devote additional resources towards its pandemic-related enforcement efforts, healthcare companies, hospital systems and providers should prepare for increased scrutiny.

Additional Resources Devoted to COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Efforts

DOJ and other federal agencies have already devoted an unprecedented amount of resources to investigating and prosecuting pandemic-related fraud cases. These extensive efforts have led to immediate results. To date, DOJ has brought pandemic-related criminal charges against more than 1,000 individuals with the total alleged fraud losses exceeding $1 billion, and has seized more than $1.2 billion in fraudulently obtained relief funds.

DOJ’s pandemic-enforcement efforts show no sign of slowing down anytime soon. Less than a year after US Attorney General (AG) Merrick Garland established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force, the Biden administration announced that DOJ would appoint a chief prosecutor to expand on the Task Force’s “already robust efforts,” to focus on “most egregious forms of pandemic fraud” and to target particularly complex fraud schemes.

On March 10, 2022, DOJ announced that Kevin Chambers has been appointed as DOJ’s director for COVID-19 fraud enforcement. During his introductory remarks, Chambers said that DOJ would be “redoubling [its] efforts to identify pandemic fraud, to charge and prosecute those individuals responsible for it and whenever possible, to recover funds stolen from the American people.” He also indicated that DOJ would use “new tools” it has developed since the start of the pandemic to investigate such fraud.

In a March 2, 2022, speech before the American Bar Association’s Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime, AG Garland also announced that the Biden Administration will seek an additional $36.5 million in the 2022 budget for DOJ to “bolster efforts to combat pandemic-related fraud.” As evidence of this point, DOJ plans to hire 120 new prosecutors and 900 new Federal Bureau of Investigation agents who will focus on white-collar crime.

DOJ and HHS-OIG to Increasingly Focus on FCA Cases

For the past two years, officials from DOJ and HHS-OIG have identified civil and criminal healthcare fraud relating to COVID-19 as a high priority. As the effects of the pandemic subside, COVID-19-related civil enforcement actions targeting healthcare providers and healthcare companies seem set to increase.

During remarks at the Federal Bar Association’s annual Qui Tam Conference in February 2022, Gregory Demske, chief counsel to the inspector general for HHS-OIG, emphasized that COVID-19 remains a key enforcement priority. Demske indicated that HHS-OIG is focused on the use of COVID-19 to bill for medically unnecessary services, and fraud in connection with HHS’s Provider Relief Fund (PRF) and Uninsured Relief Fund. Demske also confirmed that HHS-OIG remains intensely focused on fraud in connection with telehealth services, the use of which increased exponentially during the pandemic. And, in March 2022, AG Garland reiterated that DOJ will use “every available federal tool—including criminal, civil, and administrative actions—to combat and prevent COVID-19 related fraud.”

The majority of pandemic-related healthcare enforcement actions to date have been criminal prosecutions involving truly blatant instances of fraud and abuse. Going forward, civil and administrative actions likely will be used to pursue cases that turn on lower mens rea requirements or involve more complex regulatory issues. These civil actions will include qui tam actions filed by whistleblowers, as well as FCA cases initiated directly by the DOJ.

In 2021, DOJ recovered more than $5 billion in connection with FCA cases involving the healthcare industry. Given the unprecedented amount of government funds expended to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, DOJ and HHS-OIG will undoubtedly rely on the FCA to maximize the government’s financial recovery. DOJ has already reached FCA settlements in several Paycheck Protection Program cases. It is only a matter of time before we see similar FCA investigations, complaints and settlements focused on relief funding to healthcare providers.

Pandemic-Related Healthcare Priorities

HHS’s PRF

The PRF was created as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act to provide direct payments to “eligible health care providers for health care-related expenses [and] lost revenues that are attributable to coronavirus.” More than $140 billion has been disbursed to hospitals and healthcare providers under the PRF, which is administered by the Health Resources & Services Administration (HRSA).

Payments under the PRF are subject to specific terms and conditions. To retain PRF disbursements, providers must attest to “ongoing compliance” with these requirements and acknowledge that their “full compliance with all Terms and Conditions is material to the Secretary’s decision to disburse funds.” Notwithstanding ongoing concerns and confusion regarding the PRF program requirements, any noncompliance with the terms and conditions could result in criminal, civil and administrative enforcement actions. As recently as March 3, 2022, AG Garland identified fraud in connection with the PRF as a key DOJ enforcement priority.

To date, the Healthcare Fraud Unit of DOJ’s Criminal Division has already brought criminal charges against nine individuals for fraud relating to the PRF. These criminal cases, however, have almost exclusively focused on egregious allegations of fraud and abuses, such as misappropriating PRF disbursements and using the money for personal expenses. For example, in September 2021, DOJ charged five individuals with using PRF payments to gamble at Las Vegas casinos and purchase luxury cars.

DOJ, however, has long indicated that the FCA will also play a “significant role” in DOJ’s PRF enforcement efforts. It is now just a matter of time before such civil investigations and settlements emerge.

HRSA’s stated oversight plan includes post-payment analysis and review to determine whether HHS distributed PRF payments to eligible providers in the correct amounts; audits to assess whether recipients used the funds in accordance with laws, guidance, and terms and conditions; and the recovery of overpayments and unused or improperly used payments. Among other things, HRSA and HHS-OIG likely will evaluate ownership changes, double counting reimbursed expenses and losses, and compliance with the balanced billing requirements.

PRF oversight and enforcement actions have been delayed partly because of program complexities and extended reporting timelines. For example, the first report from PRF recipients on use of funds was not due until the end of 2021. Depending on the date funds were received, PRF recipients may have no reporting obligations through 2023. Entities that expended more than $750,000 in federal awards, including PRF payments, also must obtain an independent audit examining their financial statements; internal controls; and compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and program requirements. These independent audits of PRF payments must be submitted to the Federal Audit Clearinghouse, for nonprofit organizations, or the HRSA Division of Financial Integrity, for for-profit “commercial” organizations. Recipients also may be subject to separate audits by HHS, HHS-OIG or the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee to review copies of records and cost documentation and to ensure compliance with the applicable terms and conditions.

Finally, DOJ and HHS-OIG have increasingly relied on sophisticated data analytics to drive their healthcare enforcement efforts generally. Now that the first round of reports containing specific PRF data certifications are available to HRSA and HHS-OIG, we expect to see the use of such analytics, in conjunction with all the other available information, in connection with PRF enforcement.

Telehealth

Telehealth use expanded exponentially during the pandemic. A March 2022 HHS-OIG report showed that during the first year of the pandemic, more than 28 million Medicare beneficiaries (approximately 43% of all Medicare beneficiaries) used telehealth services—a “dramatic increase from the prior year” in which only 341,000 beneficiaries used telehealth. This increase was largely the result of HHS temporarily waiving statutory and regulatory requirements related to telehealth to allow Medicare beneficiaries to obtain expanded telehealth services.

Telehealth has been at the forefront of DOJ’s healthcare enforcement efforts for years now. For example, DOJ’s 2021 nationwide healthcare enforcement action included criminal charges against dozens of individuals for telehealth fraud schemes involving more than $1.1 billion in alleged loses. The majority of these telehealth enforcement actions to date have involved the use of telehealth to engage in traditional fraud healthcare schemes, such as illegal kickbacks and billing for medically unnecessary services and equipment.

DOJ, however, has increasingly pursued criminal enforcement actions directly related to the telehealth waivers HHS issued in response to the pandemic. For example, in November 2021, a defendant was sentenced to 82 months in prison for participating in a $73 million telehealth fraud scheme. The defendant owned laboratories that provided genetic testing and had paid his coconspirators to arrange for telehealth providers to order medically unnecessary genetic tests. The telehealth providers were not actually treating the beneficiaries, did not use the test results and often never even conducted the telemedicine consultation. Although this was primarily a traditional Anti-Kickback Statute/medical necessity case, DOJ also charged the defendant with using the COVID-19-related telehealth waivers to submit more than $1 million in false claims for sham telemedicine visits.

Similar criminal prosecutions and civil actions relating to the expanded telehealth waivers and sham telehealth encounters can be expected in the future. DOJ and HHS-OIG will likely focus on telehealth visits that resulted in claims for services and equipment with particularly high reimbursement rates, such as genetic testing and durable medical equipment. DOJ and HHS-OIG likely will use data analytics to focus on instances in which telehealth services were billed by providers with whom the beneficiary did not previously have a relationship.

Improper Billing Schemes

DOJ has also pursued criminal cases involving traditional healthcare fraud schemes that sought to take advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in May 2021, DOJ announced criminal charges against numerous individuals who were improperly bundling COVID-19 tests with other more expensive laboratory tests, such as genetic testing, allergy testing and respiratory pathogen panel testing. DOJ has likewise pursued criminal cases in which defendants improperly used COVID-19 “emergency override” billing codes to circumvent preauthorization requirements and bill Medicare for expensive medications and treatments. Any improper billing schemes that relate to the pandemic will continue to be a focus of criminal and civil enforcement efforts going forward.

Key Takeaways and Recommendations

DOJ, HHS-OIG and other federal agencies remain focused on pursuing healthcare fraud relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. The best way for hospitals, health systems and other healthcare companies and providers to prepare for this increased enforcement activity and scrutiny is to ensure that they have a robust compliance program in place.

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to compliance, but companies can take several proactive and practical steps to minimize their enforcement risk:

  • Monitor federal and state regulatory and statutory changes. The rules, regulations and guidance relating to the COVID-19 pandemic, including for the PRF and expanded telehealth waivers, have repeatedly changed over the past two years and continue to evolve. Monitoring such changes will not only help prevent enforcement actions, but a company’s reasonable and good faith efforts to interpret and follow such rules and regulations can be a powerful defense should an investigation arise, as discussed in connection with the Allergan case, above. Further to that point, where regulatory requirements and associated guidance is ambiguous, a good documentary record of the basis for your entity’s interpretation of the rules is critical.
  • Incorporate data analytics into your compliance program. DOJ and HHS-OIG continue to rely heavily on sophisticated data analytics, including artificial intelligence, to identify and prosecute fraud. In March 2022, AG Garland emphasized DOJ’s use of “big data” to identify payment anomalies that are indicative of fraud. Healthcare companies already have access to vast amounts of data that they can and should use to proactively identify errors, monitor risk areas and address any potential misconduct.
  • Adapt your compliance program and internal controls, as appropriate, to support PRF compliance, reports and audits. Recipients should continue to practice good compliance hygiene and maintain contemporaneous records regarding the receipt and spending of federal funds. Doing so may involve implementing additional systems to track spending, recovery and relief to avoid overlapping use of funds among relief programs, or consulting with grant accounting and compliance advisors to augment existing infrastructure. Recipients also should periodically review policies, procedures and controls, particularly following major updates to program requirements and interpretations.
  • Ensure the accuracy of required PRF reports, certifications and submissions. Particularly in light of ongoing political pressure, HRSA and HHS-OIG likely will conduct extensive oversight of the PRF to identify potential errors, overpayments and improper use of funds. Recipients should carefully review guidance and instructions to avoid inadvertent errors and misstatements on all submissions. Recipients may consider revisiting prior submissions underlying significant disbursements to identify interpretative issues or compliance concerns that warrant additional supporting documentation or disclosure.
  • Carefully consider the implications before entering into arrangements with other parties. The biggest risk to healthcare companies often comes from those with whom they do business. Compliance programs should focus heavily on reducing the risk of entanglement with bad actors.
  • Be diligent in the design and oversight of marketing strategies. Healthcare companies and providers should regularly review their marketing strategies to ensure total transparency and compliance (both historic and prospective) with applicable state and federal anti-kickback statutes. Companies should confirm that patients are reached through appropriate channels. Although issues relating to COVID-19 may be the impetus for a government investigation, violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute frequently result in larger recoveries for the government.
  • Proactively examine coding and billing practices. Providers should immediately review and revisit their coding and billing practices to determine if their practices involved bundling COVID-19 testing with other claims, the use emergency override billing codes or billing for other COVID-19 related services with high reimbursement rates. There is a strong likelihood that the DOJ will review the claims data for any providers with statistically significant use of these billing and coding practices, particularly when the providers are located in geographical areas where the DOJ’s Healthcare Fraud Strike Force and HHS-OIG’s Medicare Fraud Strike Force operate.

Article By Julian L. André, Benton Curtis, and Dawn R. Helak of McDermott Will & Emery

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

HHS OIG Signs Off on Substance Use Recovery Incentive Program

On March 2, 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Office of the Inspector General (the “OIG”) issued a new advisory opinion (“AO 22-04”) related to a program through which the Requestor would provide certain individuals access to digital contingency management (“CM”) and related tools to treat substance use disorders (“Program”).  The OIG advised that it would not impose administrative sanctions under the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”) or the Beneficiary Inducements Civil Monetary Penalty Law (“CMPL”).

The Requestor, a digital health company, offers a Program that uses smartphone and smart debit card technology to implement CM for individuals with substance use disorders, addressing aspects of these disorders “in ways that conventional counseling and medications often cannot.” The Requestor makes this technology available to individuals who meet certain requirements through contracts with a variety of entities, such as health plans, addiction treatment providers, employee assistance programs, research institutions, and other treatment providers (“Customers”).

Individuals (‘Members”) are Customer- or self-referred, and are subject to a structured interview using the American Society of Addiction Medicine Continuum Triage tool before participation in the Program. The Requestor’s enrollment specialist, under the guidance of a licensed clinical supervisor, determines the type of services and frequency of recovery coaching using an evidence-based, automated algorithm. The Program technology establishes the schedule of expected target behavioral health events, objectively validates whether each expected event has occurred, and, if it has, promptly disburses the exact, protocol-specified incentive to the Member, using (where appropriate) a progressive reinforcement schedule.

The Program is not limited to treatments or federally reimbursable services; it also includes, among other features, support groups, medication reminders, and appointment attendance verification. For those that do include federally reimbursable services, the Requestor advised that such services may be furnished by a Customer. Incentives from the Program are provided to Members via a “smart debit card.” The card includes “abuse and anti-relapse protections (e.g., it cannot be used at bars, liquor stores, casinos, or certain other locations nor can it be used to convert credit to cash at ATMs or gas stations)”, and allows the Requestor to monitor use. Incentives are capped at $200/month and $599/year; individual incentives are typically relatively small, at $1-$3.

The Requestor receives fees from Customers on either a flat monthly basis, per eligible, active Member, or a pay-for-performance model, in which Requestor is paid upon a Member achieving certain agreed-upon targets for abstinence. The Requestor certified that the aggregate fees are consistent with fair market value and do not vary based on the volume or value of business generated under federal health care programs. Instead, fees are based on the service configurations being purchased and the intensity of behavioral targets that are planned for each Member, as well as whether a member is low- or high-risk, and in or out of treatment.

OIG concluded that two stream of remuneration potentially implicate the AKS and CMPL.  First, Customers pay Requestor a fee to provide services, some of which could incentivize a Member to receive a federally billable service. Second, some of the fees Customers pay to Requestor get passed on to Members as CM Incentives for achieving certain behavioral health goals, some of which may involve services that could be billable to Federal health care programs (e.g., a counseling session) by a particular provider or supplier, which could be a Customer. OIG noted its longstanding concerns relating to the offer of incentives intended to induce beneficiaries to obtain federally reimbursable items and services, as such incentives could present significant risks of fraud and abuse.

The OIG concluded that the Program presents a minimal risk of fraud and abuse and declined to impose sanctions, providing four justifications –

  1. The Requestor certified that the Program is based in research, and provided evidence that CM is a “highly effective, cost-efficient treatment for individuals with substance use disorders.” Therefore, the OIG decided that, taken together with the other safeguards present in the Arrangement, the incentives in the Requestor’s Program serve as “part of a protocol-driven, evidence-based treatment program rather than an inducement to seek, or a reward for having sought, a particular federally reimbursable treatment.”
  2. The incentives offered through the Program have a relatively low value and a cap, and largely are unrelated to any federally payable services, especially as the Requestor is not enrolled in and does not bill to federal health care programs for Program services. Therefore, the OIG determined that the risk of the incentives “encouraging overutilization of federally reimbursable services is low.”
  3. The Requestor’s Customer base is not limited to entities that have an incentive to induce receipt of federally reimbursable services. While the OIG acknowledged that there may be instances where an incentive may be given for receiving a federally billable service, the fees do not vary based on volume or value of any federally reimbursable services, and the Customers do not have control of the Program. Therefore, the OIG determined that the risk is low an entity would become a Customer to “generate business or reward referrals.”
  4. Although the incentives loaded onto a smart debit card function as cash equivalents, the OIG found the safeguards included in the Arrangement sufficient to mitigate fraud and abuse concerns. The Requestor, which does not bill federal health care programs or have an incentive to induce overutilization, determines what services an individual needs and what incentives are attached. Additionally, the smart debit card has “anti-relapse protections”, which can signal possible need for intervention. Therefore, the OIG concluded that the remuneration in the form the smart debit card is sufficiently low risk.

AO 22-04 reflects HHS’s continued aims to increase flexibility around substance use disorder treatments.  Just two weeks before, HHS announced two grant programs, totaling $25.6 million, to expand access to medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder and prevent the misuse of prescription drugs. In a press release, HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra is quoted as saying, “At HHS we are committed to addressing the overdose crisis, and one of the ways we’re doing this is by expanding access to medication-assisted treatment and other effective, evidenced-based prevention and intervention strategies.” HHS’ “National Tour to Strengthen Mental Health” is intended to “hear directly from Americans across the country about the challenges they’re facing, and engage with local leaders to strength the mental health and crisis care in our communities”, focused on three aspects: mental health, suicide, and substance use. Further flexibilities should be anticipated in these areas as the Tour continues.

Anyone seeking treatment options for substance misuse should call SAMHSA’s National Helpline at 800-662-HELP (4357) or visit findtreatment.gov. If you or anyone you know is struggling with thoughts of suicide, please call the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline at 800-273-TALK (8255), or text the Crisis Text Line (text HELLO to 741741).

Article By Christine M. Clements and Theresa E. Thompson of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

OIG: Telehealth “Critical” to Maintaining Access to Care Amidst COVID-19

The federal Office of Inspector General (OIG) recently published a report (OIG Report) as part of a series of analyses of the expansion and utilization of telehealth in response to the COVID-19 public health emergency.  In its report, the OIG concludes that telehealth was “critical for providing services to Medicare beneficiaries during the first year of the pandemic” and that the utilization of telehealth “demonstrates the long-term potential of telehealth to increase access to health care for beneficiaries.” The OIG’s conclusions are notable because they come at a time when policymakers and health care stakeholders are determining whether and how to make permanent certain expansions of telehealth for patients nationwide.

The OIG Report is based on Medicare claims and encounter data from the “first” year of the pandemic (March 1, 2020 through February 28, 2021) as compared to data for the immediately preceding year (March 1, 2019 through February 29, 2020). Per the OIG Report, the OIG observed that approximately 43% of Medicare beneficiaries used telehealth during the first year of the pandemic, and that office visits were the most common telehealth encounter for those patients. The telehealth utilization data showed an 88-fold increase over the utilization of telehealth services for the prior year, which in part reflects the significant limitations on telehealth reimbursement under Medicare prior to COVID-19, in addition to the significant regulatory expansion of telehealth at the federal and state levels in response to COVID-19.

Interestingly, the OIG Report states that beneficiaries enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan “were more likely to use telehealth” than Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries, and that “CMS’s temporary policy changes enabled the monumental growth in the use of telehealth in multiple ways,” including by expanding the permissible patient locations, and the types of services that could be provided via telehealth. In addition, the OIG indicated that the use of telehealth for behavioral health services by beneficiaries “stands out” because of the higher incidence of beneficiaries accessing those services via telehealth, which may in turn influence policymaking and increase access to critical behavioral health care services.

Finally, the OIG Report notably includes a footnote which indicates that a separate report on “Program Integrity Risks” is forthcoming, which may shed light on corresponding compliance concerns that have arisen in connection with the significant expansion of telehealth in response to COVID-19.

Article By Conor O. Duffy of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

Gear Up for Increased CMS Scrutiny of Hospice Services for Assisted Living Facility Residents

Poyner Spruill LLP Attorneys at Law, a North Carolina Law Firm

A recent study issued by the evaluation and policy division of the U.S. DHHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) indicates that hospices can expect increased scrutiny regarding the services they provide to assisted living facility residents. The study, dated January 13, 2015, was based upon an evaluation of all Medicare hospice claims from 2007 through 2012. Key observations made by OIG included the following:

  • Hospices provided care significantly longer for individuals in the assisted living facility setting as compared with other settings such as private homes and skilled nursing facilities.

  • For-profit hospices received much higher Medicare reimbursement per beneficiary than did nonprofit hospices.

  • Residents of assisted living facilities often had medical diagnoses that required less complex care.

  • Hospices often furnished fewer than five hours of visits for routine home care patients in assisted living facilities.

The OIG study does not speak to the important reality that residents of assisted living facilities typically are healthier than residents of skilled nursing facilities, which would tend to support a higher median number of hospice days in the assisted living setting.

OIG recommends to CMS that, as part of its ongoing hospice payment reform efforts, it should reduce incentives for hospices to target assisted living facility residents with certain diagnoses and those likely to have extended periods of care. Of course, this follows a similar recommendation by MedPac. OIG’s study recommends that CMS “target certain hospices for review.” These include hospices with a high percentage of CMS payments for patients in assisted living facilities, and hospices with a high percentage of  patients receiving care over 180 days or patients with certain diagnoses. In the wake of this critical study, hospices, especially for-profit hospices, can expect increased scrutiny of the services they provide to assisted living facility residents.

Hospice providers whose patients include a high number of assisted living facility residents should expect to be subject to increased Medicare review. Hospices should consider taking preemptive defensive steps now, such as:

  • Evaluating their data on assisted living facility residents in order to identify any outliers or potentially unsupported distinctions from services provided in other settings; and

  • Conducting internal compliance reviews regarding the services provided to assisted living facility residents.

This is especially true of for-profit hospices that fall in or near the category of high service to assisted living facility residents.

ARTICLE BY

Pamela A. Scott
OF
Poyner Spruill LLP

Office of Inspector General Issues Special Fraud Alert Concerning Laboratory Payments to Referring Physicians

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On June 26th, the OIG issued a Special Fraud Alert concerning laboratory payments to referring physicians.  The OIG identified 2 different types of payment arrangements that may be viewed as problematic under the Anti-Kickback law: blood specimen collection, processing and packaging arrangements and registry payments.

The OIG described specimen processing arrangements as payments from laboratories to physicians for certain specified duties, which may include blood specimen collection and centrifuging, maintaining the specimens at a particular temperature, and packaging the specimens so that they are not damaged in transport. The OIG indicated that payments are typically made to referring physicians on a per-specimen or per-patient-encounter basis, and often are associated with expensive or specialized tests.  The concern raised by the OIG is that since Medicare (and other third party payors) allow nominal payments in certain circumstances for specimen collection and for processing and packaging specimens for transport to a laboratory, payment by the laboratory to the physician amounts to unlawful remuneration because the physician is effectively being paid twice for the same work.  The OIG also raised concerns that such payments may be made in amounts which exceed fair market value, although the OIG cautioned that such payments may be suspect if one purpose of the arrangement is to induce or reward referrals of Federal health care program business “regardless of whether the payment is fair market value for services rendered.”

The OIG identified the following characteristics specimen processing arrangements that may be suspect:

  • Payment exceeds fair market value for services actually rendered by the party receiving the payment.
  • The payment is for services for which payment is also made by a third party, such as Medicare.
  • Payment is made directly to the ordering physician rather than to the ordering physician’s group practice, which may bear the cost of collecting and processing the specimen.
  • Payment is made on a per-specimen basis for more than one specimen collected during a single patient encounter or on a per-test, per-patient, or other basis that takes into account the volume or value of referrals.
  • Payment is offered on the condition that the physician order either a specified volume or type of tests or test panel, especially if the panel includes duplicative tests (e.g., two or more tests performed using different methodologies that are intended to provide the same clinical information), or tests that otherwise are not reasonable and necessary or reimbursable.
  • Payment is made to the physician or the physician’s group practice, despite the fact that the specimen processing is actually being performed by a phlebotomist placed in the physician’s office by the laboratory or a third party.

The OIG also noted that payment arrangements can be problematic even if they are structured to carve out work performed on specimens from non-Federal health care program beneficiaries.

The OIG also raised concerns about payments for registry maintenance and observational outcomes databases.  Under these arrangements, which often involve patients presenting with specific disease profiles, laboratories pay a physician for certain specified duties, including submitting patient data to be incorporated into the registry, answering patient questions about the registry, and reviewing registry reports. While the OIG found that such payments may be appropriate in certain limited circumstances, such payments may induce physicians to order medically unnecessary or duplicative tests, including duplicative tests performed for the purpose of obtaining comparative data, and to order those tests from laboratories that offer registry arrangements in lieu of other, potentially clinically superior, laboratories.

The OIG identified the following as being characteristics of potentially suspect registry arrangements:

  • The laboratory requires, encourages, or recommends that physicians who enter into registry arrangements to perform the tests with a stated frequency (e.g., four times per year) to be eligible to receive, or to not receive a reduction in, compensation.
  • The laboratory collects comparative data for the registry from, and bills for, multiple tests that may be duplicative (e.g., two or more tests performed using different methodologies that are intended to provide the same clinical information) or that otherwise are not reasonable and necessary.
  • Compensation paid to physicians pursuant to registry arrangements is on a per patient or other basis that takes into account the value or volume of referrals.
  • Compensation paid to physicians pursuant to registry arrangements is not fair market value for the physicians’ efforts in collecting and reporting patient data.
  • Compensation paid to physicians pursuant to registry arrangements is not supported by documentation, submitted by the physicians in a timely manner, memorializing the physicians’ efforts.
  • The laboratory offers registry arrangements only for tests (or disease states associated with tests) for which it has obtained patents or that it exclusively performs.
  • When a test is performed by multiple laboratories, the laboratory collects data only from the tests it performs.
  • The tests associated with the registry arrangement are presented on the offering laboratory’s requisition in a manner that makes it more difficult for the ordering physician to make an independent medical necessity decision with regard to each test for which the laboratory will bill (e.g., disease-related panels).

The OIG found that concerns also arise when a physician is selected to collect data for a registry on the basis of their prior or anticipated referrals, rather than their specialty, sub-specialty or other relevant attribute.  The OIG also noted that “Even legitimate actions taken to substantiate such claims, including, for example, retaining an independent Institutional Review Board to develop study protocols and participation guidelines, will not protect a registry arrangement if one purpose of the arrangement is to induce or reward referrals.”

The laboratory market is a very competitive one.  The issuance of the referenced Special Fraud Alert, as well as recent large scale investigations and criminal indictments involving laboratory and physician relationships (including the Biodiagnostic Laboratory Services LLC investigation here in New Jersey: https://tinyurl.com/cf5djfw) demonstrates that the OIG has turned an increased focus on relationships between laboratories and physicians.

Article By:

Beth Christian
Of:
Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C.