Top Risks for Businesses in 2024

Just weeks into 2024, it is already clear that uncertainty will be the watchword. Will the economic soft landing of 2023 persist into 2024? Will labor unrest, strong in 2023, settle down as inflation cools? Will inflation remain tamed? Will the U.S. elections bring continuity or a new administration with very different views on the role of the U.S. in the world and in regulating business?

Uncertainty is also fueling a complex risk environment that will require monitoring global developments more so than in the past. As outlined below, geopolitical risks are present, multiple, interconnected and high impact. International relations have traditionally fallen outside the mandate of most C-Suites, but how the U.S. government responds to geopolitical challenges will impact business operations. Beyond additional disruptions to global trade, businesses in 2024 will face risks associated with expanding protectionist economic policies, climate change impacts, and AI-driven disruptors.

Geopolitical Tensions Disrupting Global Trade

The guardrails are coming off the international system that enshrines the ideals of preserving peace and security through diplomatic engagement, respecting international borders (not changing them through military might) and ensuring the free flow of global trade. In 2022, the world was shocked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it has taken time for the full impact to reverberate through the international system. While political analysts write on a “spillover of conflict,” the more insidious impact is that more leaders of countries and non-state groups are acting outside the guardrails because they are no longer deterred from using military force to achieve political goals, making 2024 ripe for new military conflicts disrupting global trade beyond the ongoing war in Europe.

In October 2023, Hamas launched a war from Gaza against Israel. Thus far, fighting has spread to the West Bank, between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in the north, and to the Red Sea, with Iranian-backed Houthis attacking shipping through the strategic Bab al Mandab strait. Container ships and oil tankers, to avoid the risks, are re-routing to the Cape of Good Hope, adding two weeks of extra sailing time, with the associated costs. Insurance premiums for cargo ships sailing in the eastern Mediterranean have skyrocketed, with some no longer servicing Israeli ports. Companies and retailers with tight delivery schedules are switching to airfreight, which is expected to drive up airfreight rates.

Iran, emboldened by its blossoming relationship with Russia as one of Moscow’s new arms suppliers, is activating its proxy armies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to attack Western targets. In a two-day period in January 2024, the Iran Revolutionary Guards directly launched strikes in Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Nuclear-armed Pakistan retaliated with a cross border strike in Iran. While there are many nuances to these incidents, it is evident that deterrence against cross-border military conflict is eroding in a region with deep, festering grievances among neighbors. Iran is in an escalatory mode and could resume harassing shipping in the Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where about a fifth of the volume of the world’s total oil consumption passes through on a daily basis.

In East Asia, North Korea is also emboldened by the changing geopolitical environment. Pyongyang, too, has become a major supplier of weaponry to Moscow for use in Ukraine. While Russia (and China) in the past have constructively contained North Korean predilection for aggression against its neighbors, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un may believe the time is ripe to change the status quo. Ominously, in a Jan. 15 speech before the Supreme People’s Assembly (North Korea’s parliament), Kim rejected the policy of reunification with South Korea and proposed incorporating the country into North Korea “in the event of war.” While North Korean leaders frequently revert to brinksmanship and aggressive language, Kim’s speech reflects confidence of a nuclear power, aligned with Russia against a shared adversary – South Korea, which is firmly aligned with the G7 consensus on Russia. A war in the Korean peninsula would be felt around the world because East Asia is central to global shipping and manufacturing, disrupting supply chains, as well as the regional economy.

China is also waiting for the right moment to “unite” Taiwan with the mainland. Beijing has seen the impact of Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine and has been deterred from aiding the Russian war effort. In many ways, China has benefited from these sanctions and the reorientation of global trade. Also, Russia, with its far weaker economy, has proven surprisingly resilient to sanctions, another lesson for China. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese people voted in January and returned for a third time the ruling party that strongly rejects Chinese territorial claims. Tensions are high, with the Chinese military once again harassing Taiwanese defenses. For Beijing, the “right moment” could fall this year should conflict break out on the Korean peninsula, which would tie the U.S. down because of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The uncertainty here is not that there are global tensions, but how the U.S. will respond as they develop and how U.S. businesses can navigate external shocks. Will the U.S. be drawn into a new war in the Middle East? Can the U.S. manage multiple conflicts, already deeply involved in supporting Ukraine? Is the U.S. economy resilient enough to withstand trade disruptions? How can businesses strengthen their own resiliency?

Economic Protectionism Increasing Costs and Risks

Geopolitical tensions, the global pandemic and the unequal benefits of globalization are impacting economic policies of the U.S. and the political discourse around the merits of unrestrained free trade. Protectionist economic policies are creeping in, under the nomenclature of “secure supply chains,” “friend-shoring” and “home-shoring.” The U.S. has imposed tariffs on countries (even allies) accused of unfair trade practices and has foreclosed access to certain technologies by unfriendly countries, namely China.

While the response to some of these trade restrictions are new trade agreements with “friends” to regulate access under preferred terms, in essence creating multiple “friends” trade blocs for specific sectors, other responses are retaliatory, including counter tariffs and export restrictions or outright bans. In 2024, the U.S. economy will see the impact of these trade fragmentation policies in acute ways, with upside risks of new business opportunities and downside risks of supply chain disruptions, critical resource competition, increased input costs, compliance risks and increased reputational risks.

Trade with China, which remains significant and important to the stability of the U.S. economy, will pose new risks in 2024. While Washington and Beijing have agreed to some political and security guardrails to manage the relationship, economic competition is unrestrained and stability in the bilateral relations is not guaranteed. The December 2023 bipartisan report by the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, with its 150 recommendations on fundamentally resetting economic and technological competition with China, if even partially adopted, risks reigniting the trade war.

2024 is a presidential election year for the U.S. A change of control of the executive branch could result in many economic and regulatory policy reversals. The definition of “friend” could shift or narrow. Restrictions on trade with China could accelerate.

Impacts of Climate Change and Sustainability Policies

2023 was the hottest year on record, and El Niño conditions are expected to further boost the warming trend. Many regions experienced record-breaking wildfire activity in 2023, including Canada where 18 million hectares of land burned. Extreme storms caused life-threatening flooding in Europe, Asia and the Americas. 2024 is expected to bring even more climate hazards. The impacts will be physical and financial, including growing insurance losses and adverse impacts on operations and value chain. Analysts expect that in 2024, the economic and financial costs of adverse health impacts from climate change will increase, with risks related to the spread of infectious disease, insufficient access to clean water, and physical harm to the elderly and vulnerable. The direct economic effect will be on health systems, but also loss of productivity due to extreme weather incidents and effects of epidemics.

Energy transition to low-carbon emissions is underway in the U.S., but it is uneven and still uncertain. The financial market is investing in an impressive number of startups and large-scale projects revolving around cleantech. Still, there is hesitancy on the opportunity and risks of sustainability. Thus far, progress towards sustainability goals has been private sector-led and government-enabled. There is a risk that government incentive programs encouraging the transition to low-carbon energy could be reversed or curtailed under a new administration.

In 2024, some companies will face more climate disclosure compliance requirements. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is expected to release its final rule on climate change disclosures. The final action has been delayed several times because of pushback by public companies on some of the requirements, including Scope 3 greenhouse gas emission disclosures (those linked to supply chains and end users). California has not waited for the SEC’s final rule: In October 2023, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed into law legislation that will require large companies to disclose greenhouse gas emissions. The California climate laws go into effect in 2026, but companies will need to start much earlier to build the capabilities to plan, track and report their carbon footprint. For U.S. companies doing business in the European Union, they will need to comply with the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, with the rules coming into force mid-2024.

Disruptive Technology

In 2023, generative AI was the talk of the town; in 2024, it will be the walk. Companies are popping up with new tools for every imaginable sector, to increase efficiency, task automation, customization, personalization and cost reduction. Business leaders are scrambling to integrate AI to gain a competitive edge, while navigating the everyday risks related to privacy, liability and security. While there are concerns that AI will displace humans, there is a growing consensus that while some jobs will disappear, people will focus on higher value work. That said, new rounds of labor disruptions linked to workforce transition are likely in 2024.

2024 will also bring AI-generated misinformation and disinformation. Bad actors will spread “synthetic” content, such as sophisticated voice cloning, doctored images and counterfeit websites, seeking to manipulate people, damage companies and economies, and foment dissent.

In 2024, around 2 billion people in more than 50 countries will vote in elections at risk of manipulation by misinformation and disinformation, which could destabilize the real and perceived legitimacy of newly elected governments, risking political unrest, violence, terrorism and erosion of democratic processes. Large democracies will hold elections in 2024, including the U.S., the EU, Mexico, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and South Africa. Synthetic content can be very difficult to detect, while easy to produce with AI tools.

This is not a theoretical threat; synthetic content is already being disseminated in the U.S., targeting New Hampshire voters with robocalls that share fake recorded messages from President Biden encouraging people not to vote in the primary election. The U.S. is already polarized with citizens distrustful of the government and media, a ready vulnerability. Businesses are not immune. Notably, CEOs have stood apart, with higher ratings for trustworthiness and risk being called upon to vouch for “truth” (and becoming collateral damage in the fray).

AI-powered malware will make 2023 cyber risks look like child’s play. Attackers can use AI algorithms to find and exploit software vulnerabilities, making attacks precise and effective. AI can help hackers quickly identify security measures and evade them. AI-created phishing attacks will be more sophisticated and difficult to detect because the algorithms can assess larger amounts of piecemeal information and craft messages that mimic communication styles.

The role of states backing cyber armies to spread disinformation or steal information is growing and is part and parcel of the erosion of the existing international order. States face little deterrence from digital cross-border attacks because there are yet to be established mechanisms to impose real costs.

OFAC Offers Guidance in the Wake of Tornado Cash Sanctions

The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) updated its “frequently asked questions” (FAQs) Tuesday, providing guidance relating to the sanctions against Tornado Cash, the Ethereum “mixer” it blacklisted in August, following allegations that North Korea used Tornado Cash to launder stolen digital assets. The updated information from OFAC comes as a welcome snippet of communication, allowing for clarity on the scope of the action taken against Tornado Cash, as well as providing guidance for U.S. persons affected by the blacklisting who, through no fault of their own, were caught up in federal action.

The updated FAQs provide guidance on four points: (1) the ability to withdraw funds from wallets associated with the Tornado Cash blacklist; (2) whether the OFAC reporting obligations apply to “dusting” transactions; (3) whether U.S. persons can engage in transactions involving addresses implicated in the blacklist without a license; and (4) what, more generally, is prohibited in the wake of the OFAC blacklisting of Tornado Cash.

(1)        Withdrawing Funds

If a U.S. person sent virtual currency to Tornado Cash, but did not complete the mixing transaction or otherwise withdraw such virtual currency prior to August 8, 2022 (the effective date of the OFAC blacklist), such person can request a specific license from OFAC to engage in transactions involving that virtual currency (assuming such person conducts the contemplated transactions within U.S. jurisdiction).

In order to obtain this license, such persons will need to provide, “at a minimum, all relevant information regarding these transactions with Tornado Cash, including the wallet addresses for the remitter and beneficiary, transaction hashes, the date and time of the transaction(s), as well as the amount(s) of virtual currency.”

OFAC indicates that they will embrace a favorable licensing policy towards such applications, so long as the contemplated transactions did not involve conduct that it deems to be otherwise sanctionable, and that licensing requests can be submitted by visiting the following link: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/ofac-license-application-page.

(2)        “Dusting” Transactions

Dusting is the act of sending unsolicited and nominal amounts of virtual currency or other digital assets to third parties. This can be done in order to cause consternation on the part of the recipient, particularly in a situation where there is confusion as to the legality of receiving such funds or actions.

OFAC indicates that it has been made aware of Dusting involving virtual currency or other virtual assets from Tornado Cash, and indicates that while, technically, OFAC’s regulations would apply to these transactions, to the extent that these Dusting transactions have no other sanctions associated with them other than Tornado Cash, “OFAC will not prioritize enforcement against the delayed receipt of initial blocking reports and subsequent annual reports of blocked property from such U.S. persons.”

In short, while not a desirable transaction to take place, OFAC does not intend to pursue action against persons simply because they are the target of Dusting.

(3)        Engaging in Transactions With Tornado Cash

OFAC clarified that, without explicit license from OFAC, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any transaction involving Tornado Cash, including any transaction done via currency wallet addresses OFAC has identified as part of the blacklist.

Specifically, “[i]f U.S. persons were to initiate or otherwise engage in a transaction with Tornado Cash, including or through one of its wallet addresses, such a transaction would violate U.S. sanctions prohibitions, unless exempt or authorized by OFAC.”

(4)        Further Tornado Cash Guidance

Referencing FAQs 561 and 562, OFAC reemphasized their authority to include as identifiers on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) specific virtual currency wallet addresses associated with blocked persons, and that such SDN List entry for Tornado Cash included as identifiers certain virtual currency wallet addresses associated with Tornado Cash, as well as the URL address for Tornado Cash’s website.

While the Tornado Cash website has been deleted, it remains available through certain Internet archives, and accordingly OFAC emphasized that engaging in any transaction with Tornado Cash or its blocked property or interests in property is prohibited for U.S. persons.

Interacting with open-source code itself, in a way that does not involve a prohibited transaction with Tornado Cash, is not prohibited. By way of example, “U.S. persons would not be prohibited by U.S. sanctions regulations from copying the open-source code and making it available online for others to view, as well as discussing, teaching about, or including open-source code in written publications, such as textbooks, absent additional facts.  Similarly, U.S. persons would not be prohibited by U.S. sanctions regulations from visiting the Internet archives for the Tornado Cash historical website, nor would they be prohibited from visiting the Tornado Cash website if it again becomes active on the Internet.”

While this update to FAQs come as a welcome bit of clarity, Web3 investors, entrepreneurs, and users should continue to tread carefully when engaging with opportunities and technologies on the periphery of Tornado Cash and the accompanying OFAC action. When questions arise, it is important to seek out informed counsel, to discuss the risks of proposed actions and how best to mitigate that risk while working to pioneer new and emerging technologies.

© 2022 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

EU Adopts New Sanctions on North Korea

On 16 October, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted new EU autonomous measures reinforcing the sanctions on North Korea imposed by the UN Security Council, effective immediately. They include a total ban on EU investment in North Korea across all sectors, whereas previously the ban related to certain sectors, such as the arms industry and chemical industries. Also, there is a total ban on the sale of refined petroleum products and crude oil. The amount of personal remittances to North Korea has been lowered from €15,000 to €5,000 in light of suspicions that they are being used in support of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. In addition, three persons and six entities were added to the list of those subject to an asset freeze and travel restrictions.

This post was written by International Trade Practice at Squire Patton Boggs of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP., © Copyright 2017
For more Antitrust Law legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Increased Sanctions on North Korea Focus on China and Russia

Last week, President Obama significantly increased sanctions on North Korea through Executive Order 13722, which implements the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (H.R. 757). The Executive Order’s prohibitions and blocking provisions, and designation criteria are substantially more expansive than that Act. Concurrently with the issuance of the Executive Order, OFAC announced the designations of 17 North Korean government officials and organizations, 15 entities, two individuals, and identified 40 blocked vessels under various sanctions authorities.

While neither Congress nor the President imposed secondary sanctions per se, China and Russia should  interpret the Executive Order as a clear warning about their economic ties with North Korea. In the Iran sanctions program, secondary sanctions require that a foreign financial institution “knowingly facilitate or conduct a significant financial transaction” for a particular individual or entity. This evidentiary standard greatly limited the use of those sanctions authorities. The new sanctions against North Korea are clearly aimed at foreign business interests, but unlike secondary sanctions, this new authority does not have an evidentiary impediment to its implementation.

Transportation, Mining, Energy, and Financial Services

Subsection 2(a)(i) of the Executive Order authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to identify industries in the North Korean economy, the participants of which may be designated solely based on their operating within that industry. The Secretary of the Treasury determined that entities within the transportation, mining, energy, and financial services industries are subject to designation. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) then designated Ilsim International Bank and Korea United Development Bank for operating in the financial services industry.

OFAC’s authority to derivatively designate any bank that provides services to any identified North Korean bank creates de facto secondary sanctions. Executive Order 13722 authorizes OFAC to designate any individual or entity that provides services to any identified Korean bank. Therefore, any financial institution that provides an identified North Korean bank with an account, serves as an intermediary, confirms or advises a letter of credit, or provides any other service can be designated. The most likely targets of these derivative actions are Russian and Chinese financial institutions.

North Korean Slave Labor and Coal

The Executive Order authorizes OFAC to designate businesses that “have engaged in, facilitated, or been responsible for the exportation of workers from North Korea, including exportation to generate revenue for the Government of North Korea.” According to open source reporting, North Korea has between 50,000 and 100,000 “state-sponsored slaves” predominantly located in China and Russia. The North Korean regime earns between $1.2 and $2.3 billion annually in foreign currency through these slave laborers. Apart from the appalling human rights violations, this practice finances the North Korean nuclear and missile development programs.

In addition to companies that utilize North Korean slave labor, entities that deal in metal, graphite, coal, or software to or from North Korea are now subject to designation, “where any revenue or goods received may benefit the Government of North Korea.” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 of March 2, 2016 address the sale of coal and iron from North Korea, but in a very limited manner. Unlike the United States sanctions program, the prohibitions do not apply to transactions  “exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs.” As a result of these substantial limitations, any application of the sanctions on coal and iron are likely to be enforced unilaterally by the United States.

Chinese companies are clearly the most susceptible to this designation criteria. According to the press release announcing the Executive Order and designations, “coal generates over $1 billion in revenue per year for North Korea.” Open source reporting also indicates that in 2015, North Korea supplied China with 19.63 metric tons of coal.

Return to a Comprehensive Sanctions Program

In addition to the designation criteria highlighted above, Executive Order 13722 also transitions U.S. sanctions against North Korea back into a comprehensive sanctions program. All property and interests in property of the North Korean government are now blocked, and the Department of Commerce licensing requirements are now supplemented with a prohibition on the exportation of goods and services.

OFAC released a series of 9 General Licenses to address issues that commonly arise from comprehensive programs. These include authorization of certain legal services, certain services in support of nongovernmental organizations,  transactions related to intellectual property, and noncommercial personal remittances.

Article By Jeremy P. Paner of Holland & Hart LLP.
Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.

The Day of North Korea Sanctions: the UN Imposes the Toughest North Korea Sanctions Yet While OFAC and State Designate More North Korean Entities

After weeks of negotiations and a Putin-backed delay, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2270 on March 2, 2016, imposing new sanctions against North Korea. According to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, the resolution imposes the strongest set of UN sanctions in over two decades. This article provides a summary of the new UN North Korea sanctions followed by an overview of the most recent developments in North Korea sanctions under US law.

New UN North Korea Sanctions

The new sanctions require:

  • An asset freeze on all funds and other economic resources owned or controlled by the North Korean government or the Worker’s Party of Korea, if associated with its nuclear or ballistic missile program or other prohibited activities
  • A ban on the opening and operation of North Korean banks abroad
  • A ban on foreign financial institutions opening new offices in North Korea under all circumstances, unless first approved by the Sanctions Committee, and a requirement for UN Member States to order the closing of existing branches if there is credible information indicating the associated financial services are contributing to North Korea’s illicit activities
  • Designation of 16 new individuals and 12 entities (including North Korea’s Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Reconnaissance Energy Bureau)
  • A ban all public and private financial trade support to North Korea if there are reasonable grounds to believe there is a link to proliferation
  • Sectoral sanctions on North Korean trade in natural resources banning the export of all gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore and rare earth metals and banning the supply of all types of aviation fuel, including rocket fuel
  • A ban on the export of coal, iron, and iron ore used for North Korea’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs
  • Inspection of all cargo going to and from North Korea, not just those suspected of containing prohibited items
  • Expanding the arms embargo to include small arms and light weapons
  • A ban leasing or chartering vessels or airplanes, providing crew services to North Korea, and registering vessels
  • Expanding the list of luxury goods (prohibited for export to North Korea) to include luxury watches, aquatic recreational vehicles, snowmobiles worth more than $2,000, lead crystal items and recreational sports equipment
  • A sweeping ban on the transfer of any item if a UN Member State has reason to believe the item can contribute to the development and capabilities of the North Korean armed forces, except for food and medicine

China, a permanent member of the Security Council, joined the unanimous vote despite prior reluctance to strengthen UN sanctions against North Korea. It remains yet to be seen how China will enforce the sanctions.

U.S. North Korea Sanctions

Separately, the United States took action earlier against North Korea. We speculate that this action helped align the UNSC members toward the unanimous vote on UNSCR 2270. On February 18, 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016. The bill had easily passed through both Houses of Congress on the heels of the most recent nuclear test and rocket launch by North Korea.

Then on March 2, the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) named two entities and 10 individuals to its list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. On the same day, the State Department designated three entities and two individuals for activities related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Over the next few months, OFAC is expected to issue new North Korea regulations to implement other provisions of the new statute.

The Act

The new statute provides for both mandatory and discretionary designations. These sanctions are directed at activities by U.S. Persons, which includes any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, any entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (foreign branches of U.S. companies, that means you too), and any person in the United States.

In addition, any transaction by any non-U.S. persons supporting any of the designated entities or prohibited activities must be carefully scrutinized, especially if the transactions involve the U.S. financial system in any way.

Mandatory Designations

The Act requires the designation and freezing of all assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction of any person that engages in any of the following activities relating to North Korea:

  • Nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation
  • Dealings in North Korean metals and products tied to WMD activities, the Korean Workers’ Party, armed forces, intelligence, or the operation of political prison camps
  • “Significant financial transactions” related to weapons of mass destruction
  • Undermining cybersecurity
  • Internal repression
  • Forced labor
  • Censorship
  • Human rights violations

In addition, the Act requires the President to decide on the designation of North Korea as a Primary Money Laundering Concern in the coming months.

As a result, companies must ensure that no company activity supports the activities of entities designated under the above act provisions. Compliance programs, including those related to anti-money laundering, should be reevaluated as the sanctions are not simple reiterations of previous measures. These mandatory designations will make it all the more necessary that companies maintain reasonable and proportionate due diligence and screening procedures to prevent facilitating the enumerated activities.

Discretionary Designations

Before we reach the current regulation regime, we will leave you with the remaining provisions of the Act that have not yet been implemented. While no one holds the OFAC crystal ball, these provisions may rear their head and are worth considering in advance of promulgation.

1. Blocking sanctions

The Act explicitly codified the blocking of assets of the Government of North Korea, the Workers’ Party of Korea, and North Korean Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs). While this sanction is essentially already in effect under the various executive orders, the explicit restrictions would prohibit the use of the U.S. financial system in connection with any transaction with the Government of North Korea, the Workers’ Party of Korea, or SDNs of North Korea.

2. UN Security Council resolutions

The Act also authorizes designation as an SDN of any person who supports a person designated pursuant to an applicable UN Security Council resolution. The potential implications of this Act provision deserve attention as the recent resolution imposed the toughest set of sanctions yet.

3. Bribery

If you thought the FCPA was the sole concern out of U.S. soil relating to bribery of foreign officials, think again. The Act also authorizes designation of any person who knowingly contributes to bribery of a North Korean official, or to misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by, or for the benefit of, a North Korean official.

4. Sanctions grab bag

The Act also authorizes the President to prohibit any person already designated under the above three categories from transactions in foreign exchange or credit or payments subject to U.S. jurisdiction, procurement, and/or travel by the designated person’s officers and shareholders.

Refresher: Pre-Existing OFAC Regulations

The new Act builds upon the pre-existing U.S. sanctions against North Korea. For further background, see Trading Up: Newly Implemented North Korea and Libya Sanctions.

Blocking sanctions

The regulations provide for the continued the blocking of property and interests in property of certain persons with respect to North Korea that had been blocked pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) as of June 2000.Further, the regulations block property and interests in property of persons listed in the Annex to E.O. 13551 and of individuals and entities determined by Treasury in consultation with the State Department to have engaged in activities related to:

  • The import, export, or reexport of arms or related materiel from North Korea

  • The import, export, or reexport of luxury goods to North Korea

  • Money laundering, counterfeiting of goods or currency, bulk cash smuggling, narcotics trafficking, or other illicit economic activity supporting the Government of North Korea or its senior officials

  • Providing support for or goods or services of any of the above-listed activities or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13551

  • Owning, controlling, or acting on behalf of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13551

Vessels

The regulations prohibit U.S. persons from registering, owning, leasing, operating, insuring or otherwise providing support to North Korean vessels.

Imports to North Korea

Lastly in terms of prohibitions, the regulations prohibit imports of goods, services, and technology (including those used as components of finished products of, or substantially transformed in, a third country) from North Korea without an OFAC licenses or applicable exemption.

Authorizations

The preexisting regulations also provided authorization for the provision of certain legal services, emergency medical services, and entries in certain accounts for normal service charges by U.S. financial institutions.

The Takeaway

Interactions with North Korea are an increasingly dangerous minefield of sanctions. The new North Korea sanctions add to an already restrictive program. As a result, we recommend additional review and specialized controls as the new sanctions reach new heights (or depths, depending your level of preparation).

Copyright © 2016, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.