Tag: NLRB

Following the Recent Regulatory Trends, NLRB General Counsel Seeks to Limit Employers’ Use of Artificial Intelligence in the Workplace

On October 31, 2022, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) released Memorandum GC 23-02 urging the Board to interpret existing Board law to adopt a new legal framework to find electronic monitoring and automated or algorithmic management practices illegal if such monitoring or management practices interfere with protected activities under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“Act”).  The Board’s General Counsel stated in the Memorandum that “[c]lose, constant surveillance and management through electronic means threaten employees’ basic ability to exercise their rights,” and urged the Board to find that an employer violates the Act where the employer’s electronic monitoring and management practices, when viewed as a whole, would tend to “interfere with or prevent a reasonable employee from engaging in activity protected by the Act.”  Given that position, it appears that the General Counsel believes that nearly all electronic monitoring and automated or algorithmic management practices violate the Act.

Under the General Counsel’s proposed framework, an employer can avoid a violation of the Act if it can demonstrate that its business needs require the electronic monitoring and management practices and the practices “outweigh” employees’ Section 7 rights.  Not only must the employer be able to make this showing, it must also demonstrate that it provided the employees advance notice of the technology used, the reason for its use, and how it uses the information obtained.  An employer is relieved of this obligation, according to the General Counsel, only if it can show “special circumstances” justifying “covert use” of the technology.

In GC 23-02, the General Counsel signaled to NLRB Regions that they should scrutinize a broad range of “automated management” and “algorithmic management” technologies, defined as “a diverse set of technological tools and techniques to remotely manage workforces, relying on data collection and surveillance of workers to enable automated or semi-automated decision-making.”  Technologies subject to this scrutiny include those used during working time, such as wearable devices, security cameras, and radio-frequency identification badges that record workers’ conversations and track the movements of employees, GPS tracking devices and cameras that keep track of the productivity and location of employees who are out on the road, and computer software that takes screenshots, webcam photos, or audio recordings.  Also subject to scrutiny are technologies employers may use to track employees while they are off duty, such as employer-issued phones and wearable devices, and applications installed on employees’ personal devices.  Finally, the General Counsel noted that an employer that uses such technologies to hire employees, such as online cognitive assessments and reviews of social media, “pry into job applicants’ private lives.”  Thus, these pre-hire practices may also violate of the Act.  Technologies such as resume readers and other automated selection tools used during hiring and promotion may also be subject to GC 23-02.

GC 23-02 follows the wave of recent federal guidance from the White House, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and local laws that attempt to define, regulate, and monitor the use of artificial intelligence in decision-making capacities.  Like these regulations and guidance, GC 23-02 raises more questions than it answers.  For example, GC 23-02 does not identify the standards for determining whether business needs “outweigh” employees’ Section 7 rights, or what constitutes “special circumstances” that an employer must show to avoid scrutiny under the Act.

While GC 23-02 sets forth the General Counsel’s proposal and thus is not legally binding, it does signal that there will likely be disputes in the future over artificial intelligence in the employment context.

Article By Steven M. Swirsky, Adam S. Forman, Nathaniel M. Glasser, Neresa A. De Biasi, and Ridhi D. Madia of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more labor law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Supreme Court Set to Decide Whether NLRA Preempts State Law Claims for Property Damage Caused During Strikes

The U.S. Supreme Court’s upcoming term will include review of whether the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”) preempts state court lawsuits for property damage caused during strikes, which could have significant implications for employers and unions.

Factual Background

The case – Glacier Northwest Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 174 – began over five years ago when the Union in Washington State representing the Employer’s truck drivers went on strike.  The Union timed their strike to coincide with the scheduled delivery of ready-mix concrete, and at least 16 drivers left trucks that were full of mixed concrete, forcing the Employer to rush to empty the trucks before it hardened and caused damage.  The Employer was able to do so, but incurred considerable additional expenses and, because it dumped the concrete in order to avoid truck damage, lost its product.

Employer Brings State Law Suit for Property Damage

After the incident, the Employer sued the Union under Washington State law for intentional destruction of property.  The Union argued that the suit was preempted by the Supreme Court’s decision in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (“Garmon”).  In Garmon, the Supreme Court held that, although the Act does not expressly preempt state law, it impliedly preempts claims based on conduct that is “arguably or actually protected by or prohibited by the Act.”  The Supreme Court held in Garmon that conduct is “arguably protected” when it is not “plainly contrary” to the Act or has not been rejected by the courts or the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”).

State Court Holdings

The Washington State trial court dismissed the Employer’s suit for property damage because strikes are protected by the Act.  The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that intentional destruction of property during a strike was not activity protected by the Act, and thus, not preempted under Garmon.

Finally, the Washington Supreme Court reversed again, holding that the Act impliedly preempts the state law tort claim because the intentional destruction of property that occurred incidental to a work stoppage was at least arguably protected, and the Board would be better-suited to make an ultimate determination on this legal issue.

Question Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court will now determine whether the National Labor Relations Act bars state law tort claims against a union for intentionally destroying an employer’s property in the course of a labor dispute.

Under Garmon, the Act does not preempt suits regarding unlawful conduct that is plainly contrary to the NLRA, and the Employer argues that the strike at issue here was plainly unprotected because of the intentional destruction of property.  In other words, the conduct is not even arguably protected by the Act such that the Act would preempt – it was, rather, plainly unprotected conduct, and thus, the proper subject of a lawsuit.  The Employer also cited the “local feeling” exception to Garmon, which creates an exception to preemption where the States may have a greater interest in acting, such as in the case of property damage or violence.

The Union argued in opposition to the Employer’s certiorari petition that the Employer merely challenged the Washington Supreme Court’s conclusion that the conduct was arguably protected by the Act, and not its reasoning.  Moreover, whether or not the conduct was protected should be decided by the Board, which is better-suited to decide the matter.

Takeaway

Employers should gain much greater clarity into whether they can seek relief from such conduct via a damages lawsuit.  If the Court finds that such conduct is not preempted and may be litigated in state court, such a ruling could go far in protecting employers’ interests in contentious labor disputes and potentially shift the balance of power towards employers during these disputes.

Article By Michael J. Lebowich, Joshua S. Fox, and Thomas B. Fiascone of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

NLRB’s Proposed New Joint Employer Rule: What to Do Now to Manage the Risk

On September 7, 2022, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would, if adopted, make it much easier for the NLRB to find a company to be a “joint employer” of persons directly employed by its contractors, vendors, suppliers and franchisees. The consequences of a joint employer finding are significant and can lead to: liability for unfair practices committed by the direct employer; a duty to bargain with a union representing the direct employer’s employees; exposure to liability for one’s own conduct that fails to take into account the indirect employer relationship and spread of a union from the direct employer’s employees to the indirect employer.

Joint-employer theory creates far more risk for employers than related doctrines such as single employer or alter ego because, unlike those theories, joint employer status does not require any common ownership or corporate control. Two companies operating entirely at arm’s length can be found joint employers.

The major proposed change relates to the degree of influence that an indirect employer must have to justify a finding of single employer status. Under the current NLRB standard, the indirect employer must actually exercise “immediate and direct” control over key terms of employment, normally limited to wages, benefits, hours and termination.

The proposed rule relaxes that standard in three key ways. First, it eliminates the actually exercise requirement and states that possession of even unused authority can be sufficient.

Second, it does away with the immediate and direct requirement so that influence exercised by the indirect employer through the direct employer can be used to support a finding.

Third, it expands, beyond the list enumerated in the current rule, the types of employment terms control of which will justify a finding of joint employer status. The Obama Board had adopted the currently proposed standard by an NLRB decision, Browning-Ferris Inds. 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015). However, that decision was overturned by the Trump Board’s adoption of the current rule, 85 FR 11184, codified at 29 CFR 103.40, (Feb. 26, 2020). The proposed rule seeks to reinstate Browning-Ferrisas the governing law.

Because Browning-Ferrisand the NPRM endorse pre-1984 NLRB decisions regarding joint employer status, those decisions provide guidance for how the new rule may be enforced. The NLRB and courts frequently relied on what authority was given to the alleged indirect employer in its agreement with the contractor or vendor. Clauses that required or allowed the indirect employer to approve hirings, terminations or wage adjustments to contractor employees usually resulted in finding joint employer status. In addition, cost-plus arrangements, particularly those that were terminable on short notice were often found to support a joint employer finding. Finally, clauses allowing the indirect employer to set work schedules, production rates, or requiring contractor employees to abide by the indirect employer’s work rules and other policies governing conduct also were found supportive of joint employer status.

The proposed rule is still subject to comment and revision, but it is likely to be adopted without significant change. The comment and review period, which closes on November 21, 2022, provides a window in which savvy employers can assess the risks to their organization when the Rule goes into effect. A key step is to examine existing contractual relationships with vendors to identify and modify those terms that may potentially support joint employer status, or, if modification is untenable, to manage the risk through indemnity agreements with the vendor.

Article By Ahmad Chehab and Robert T. Zielinski of Miller Canfield
© 2022 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

Could Leagues and Teams be Joint Employers Before the NLRB?

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to change the standard for determining if two employers may be joint employers under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The proposed rule, expected to become effective sometime in 2023, could make it more likely that professional and collegiate leagues would be found to be joint employers of any unionized professional players or collegiate student-athletes who play for teams that are members of those leagues.

As a joint employer of unionized players of member teams, a league could be jointly responsible for unfair labor practices committed by the teams or the team’s supervisors or managers (i.e., coaches and administrators), be required to participate in collective bargaining negotiations with the teams concerning the wages and other terms and conditions of employment of the players, and picketing directed at the league would be considered primary and therefore permissible (rather than secondary and subject to injunction).

Currently, the NLRB will find two or more employers to be joint employers if there is evidence that one employer has actually exercised direct and regular control over essential employment terms of another employer’s employees. An employer that merely reserves the right to exercise control or that has exercised control only indirectly will not be found to be a joint employer. The NLRB has proposed that the Browning Ferris standard be restored. Under the proposed rule, two or more employers will be found to be joint employers if they “share or codetermine those matters governing employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment.” Importantly – and the critical import of the proposed rule – the NLRB will consider both evidence that direct control has been exercised and that the right to control has been reserved (or exercised indirectly) over these essential terms and conditions of employment when reviewing two or more employers for status as joint employers.

Professional athletes are employees under Sec. 2(3) of the NLRA, of course. As for collegiate student-athletes, NLRB General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo issued a memorandum, GC 21-08, announcing the intention to consider scholarship athletes at private colleges and universities to be employees because, as she wrote, they “perform services for their colleges and the NCAA, in return for compensation, and subject to their control.” Stating in summation “that this memo will notify the public, especially Players at Academic Institutions, colleges and universities, athletic conferences, and the NCAA, that [she] will be taking that legal position in future investigations and litigation” under the NLRA, Abruzzo signaled that conferences, leagues, and the NCAA will face joint-employer analysis in an appropriate case.

The “essential terms and conditions of employment” will translate to the sports workplace in the nature of game, practice and meeting times, travel and accommodation standards, equipment and safety standards, conduct rules and disciplinary proceedings, the length of a season, the number of games and playoff terms, and numerous other areas. Professional leagues may already coordinate with their member teams on a number of employment terms for players. For collegiate conferences and leagues, this may be new. Under the current standard, a league could better insulate itself from the decisions made by its members’ coaches and administrators by not exercising direct involvement in those matters. Under the proposed rule, a league or conference that merely has the power (even if reserved and unexercised) to make decisions affecting the “work” conditions for student-athletes could be jointly liable along with the institution for decisions made solely by the institution’s agents.

Consequently, conferences and leagues should consider training managers on their responsibility under the NLRA to private sector employees. They should also consider the role they want to play in collective bargaining should any of the student-athletes at their member institutions unionize.

Article By Patrick L. Egan of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

NLRB To Begin Partnering With DOJ To Combat Collusion

The National Labor Relations Board and The Department of Justice joined forces to sign a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) between the two entities. The MOU follows President Biden’s Executive Order in 2021 aimed at increasing competition in the economy. The NLRB and DOJ plan to coordinate in order to ensure workers are able to freely exercise their rights and to protect competitive labor markets.

According to the DOJ, this new partnership will allow the two agencies to “share information on potential violations of the antitrust and labor laws, collaborate on new policies and ensure that workers are protected from collusion and unlawful employer behavior.” The two agencies plan on greater coordination in information sharing, enforcement activity and training. Furthermore, the two agencies will now refer potential violations that they discover in their own investigations to each other.

For employers, this continues the trend of the federal government stepping up their investigatory and enforcement actions.

Article By Isaac T. Caverly of Polsinelli PC

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

Crosshairs: Labor Board Targets Gig Economy, Noncompete Agreements, and More

Many employers in the “gig economy” – such as rideshare companies – rely heavily on independent contractors for various functions within their organizations. Because independent contractors are exempt from coverage under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which includes the right to form or join unions, this appears to have garnered the attention of the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) top lawyer. And it appears the NLRB may be seeking to disrupt those companies’ current staffing models.

According to a recent press release from the agency:

“National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) General Counsel Jennifer A. Abruzzo and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chair Lina M. Khan executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) forming a partnership between the agencies that will promote fair competition and advance workers’ rights. The agreement enables the NLRB and FTC to closely collaborate by sharing information, conducting cross-training for staff at each agency, and partnering on investigative efforts within each agency’s authority.”

The statement then goes on to describe specifically how the agencies will be targeting the gig economy:

“The MOU identifies areas of mutual interest for the two agencies, including: labor market developments relating to the ‘gig economy’ such as misclassification of workers and algorithmic decision-making; the imposition of one-sided and restrictive contract provisions, such as noncompete and nondisclosure provisions; the extent and impact of labor market concentration; and the ability of workers to act collectively.”

What does this mean for employers? For one thing, it reinforces that the NLRB is going to be taking a much closer look at workers classified as independent contractors – and likely finding independent contractor status more often. For another, it means the NLRB may soon be looking at noncompete agreements and similar restrictive covenants and finding the maintenance of overbroad terms to be violations of labor law. And while the memorandum calls out the gig economy, it is not limited solely to companies operating in that space.

Employers – in the gig economy and otherwise – should take note of these agencies’ moves and be aware that these issues are likely to receive much scrutiny in the coming months and years.

Article By David J. Pryzbylski of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

The FTC Seemingly Thumbs Its Nose at the Supreme Court

Despite the Supreme Court’s recent 6-3 ruling in West Virginia v. EPA that regulatory agencies must have “clear congressional authorization” to make rules pertaining to “major questions” that are of “great political significance” and would affect “a significant portion of the American economy,” and the import of that ruling to the area of noncompete regulation, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) announced yesterday that they are teaming up to address certain issues affecting the labor market, including the regulation of noncompetes.

In a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) issued on July 19, 2022, the FTC and NRLB shared their shared view that:

continued and enhanced coordination and cooperation concerning issues of common regulatory interest will help to protect workers against unfair methods of competition, unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and unfair labor practices. Issues of common regulatory interest include labor market developments relating to the “gig economy” and other alternative work arrangements; claims and disclosures about earnings and costs associated with gig and other work; the imposition of one-sided and restrictive contract provisions, such as noncompete and nondisclosure provisions; the extent and impact of labor market concentration; the impact of algorithmic decision making on workers; the ability of workers to act collectively; and the classification and treatment of workers. (Emphasis added.)

Accordingly, the purpose of the MOU is “to facilitate (a) information sharing and cross-agency consultations on an ad hoc basis for official law enforcement purposes, in a manner consistent with and permitted by the laws and regulations that govern the [FTC and NLRB], (b) cross-agency training to educate each [agency] about the laws and regulations enforced by the other [agency], and (c) coordinated outreach and education as appropriate.”

This follows the Biden Administration’s July 9, 2021 Executive Order in which it “encourage[d]” the FTC to “consider” exercising its statutory rulemaking authority under the FTC Act “to curtail the unfair use of non-compete clauses and other clauses or agreements that may unfairly limit worker mobility.” Nothing concrete has yet come of that Executive Order, although the MOU perhaps represents the next stage of the FTC’s “consider[ation]” of the issue. As we previously reported, FTC Chairwoman Lina Khan recently told the Wall Street Journal that regulating noncompetes “falls squarely in [the FTC’s] wheelhouse,” and she has never been shy about sharing her view that noncompetes should be banned nationwide and that the FTC has the authority to do so. This view does not appear to have changed despite the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia v. EPA.

Only time will tell what, if any, action the FTC takes with respect to regulating noncompetes, but if it does take steps to ban or otherwise limit noncompetes nationwide under Section 5 of the FTC Act, there will no doubt be litigation challenging those regulations. And you can bet that the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia v. EPA will be front and center in any such challenge. Indeed, according to Law360, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Executive Vice President and Chief Policy Officer Neil Bradley said that the MOU shows Chairwoman Khan’s vision for the FTC “goes well beyond what is provided in law and what was envisioned by Congress.” Chairwoman Khan does not seem too perturbed by the prospect of challenges to the FTC’s authority in this regard, however, and seems intent on moving forward despite the Supreme Court’s admonition.

Article By Erik W. Weibust and Stuart M. Gerson of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more antitrust legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

NLRB, Labor Laws and the Impact on NCAA Athletes

Can—and should—college athletes be classified as employees? The answer to that question may be in flux. In a recent episode of the In-House Roundhouse Podcast, Womble Bond Dickinson attorney and host Mark Henriques welcomed Womble Bond Dickinson attorney Mike Ingersoll and University of North Carolina School of Law Professor Barbara Osborne to discuss the latest developments. Both guests were scholarship student-athletes themselves during their college days, adding to their perspective on the many issues pertaining to college athletes as employees. This article is derived from that conversation and is the latest installment in Womble Bond Dickinson’s Opportunity Economy series.

Just when you think you have all the answers about college athletes as employees, the National Labor Relations Board changes the questions.

NLRB General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo’s September 2021 memorandum states that her office will consider some college athletes to be employees moving forward. But a number of significant questions—including whether Abruzzo’s memo has the full support of the NLRB—remain unanswered.

The NLRB Memo: What it Says

Ingersoll explained that Abruzzo’s memo dovetailing off of the NLRB’s 2015 Northwestern University decision—which really was a non-decision. In that case, the NLRB failed to render a decision as to whether or not Northwestern University’s scholarship football players were university employees under the National Labor Relations Act. That non-decision created a gray area of the law that Abruzzo’s memo seeks to fill.

“Essentially, she has decided her office will prosecute disputes brought by students under the NLR Act as if they are employees,” Ingersoll said. “She said any mischaracterization of players as ‘student-athletes’ – which is a nomenclature that has been used for decades – will itself be consider a violation of the NLRA as far as her office is concerned.”

The NLRB hasn’t adopted this as its official position, though, and the memo appears to be limited only to private colleges and universities, because the NLRA only applies to private schools.

“The memo itself raises more questions than it answers,” Osborne said. “I think it invites student-athletes to file claims that they deserve to be paid as employees, and that opens a whole new can of worms.”

“The memo itself raises more questions than it answers. I think it invites student-athletes to file claims that they deserve to be paid as employees, and that opens a whole new can of worms.”

BARBARA OSBORNE, PROFESSOR AT UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA SCHOOL OF LAW

So should the term “student-athlete” be scrubbed from the college sports lexicon?

Ingersoll believes colleges and universities should avoid using it, at least in the short term, if they believe they are at risk of having to defend employment claims in front of the NLRB.

“I always thought of myself as a student-athlete and was proud of that,” Osborne said. “I don’t necessarily know that using that term misidentifies, but you need to classify those people as employees.”

Unanswered Questions in the NLRB Memo

However, as Osborne notes, this raises the first of many serious unanswered questions. The NLRB memo would require at least some college athletes to be classified as employees. However, this is at odds with NCAA rules, which prohibit athletes from being institutional employees.

“So we have a conundrum,” she said.

Another question: Which athletes are covered by the memo? Ingersoll said that is unclear.

“The memo distinguishes ‘Certain Players’ as a capitalized term – but it doesn’t actually define the term,” he said. The NLRB only has jurisdiction over private colleges and universities, not state-supported schools.  The Northwestern University case applied only and explicitly to scholarship football players at Northwestern. It provided no opinion on other players in any other sport or at any other university, Ingersoll noted.

So to which students and sports does the memo apply? Only scholarship players or all varsity athletes? Both men’s and women’s athletics? Only so-called “revenue sports” or any officially sanctioned sport? To date, college officials and athletes don’t have any answers to these questions.

“Wait and see how it gets enforced,” Ingersoll said. “My assumption would be that it is intended to apply as broadly as the GC’s office can make it apply.”

Osborne said, “The ‘Certain Players’ term is very unclear. The only sport she mentions is football, but it’s hard to say if it’s just about football. But if the memo only applies to scholarship football players, you are leaving everybody else vulnerable.”

She explained that the NLRA is all about the ability to unionize and engage in activities related to exploring unionization, with the employer being prohibited from interfering.

“What she’s saying is that if these athletes want to unionize, we’re going to support that and (the colleges) can’t interfere. Again, though, that opens up so many more questions than there are answers,” Osborne said. For example, which athletes may organize? Can only private school athletes organize? And what exactly are “revenue sports?” This may vary from school to school. For example, the University of Georgia’s Gymnastics program is a profitable operation, while many schools actually lose money on football.

Another key question is that if athletes can organize, may they then collectively bargain with the NCAA about its rules and requirements. Ingersoll said all of this is unprecedented territory for college sports.

“From a legal standpoint, there’s been no union activities among college sports that I’m aware of,” he said. “As an athlete, it’s made clear to you early on that when you participate on a team, you are part of a dictatorship, not a democracy. There is no forcing the coaching staff or administration to do something they don’t want to do.”

Osborne said, “I absolutely agree that it’s not something athletes think about doing – they’ve got too much personally at stake…. The flip side is that we do see student-athletes, through the free speech aspect, uniting for causes. I see that as a more hospitable way to open up a dialogue as to what could be done to make things better, but I don’t see that in union terms.”

“From a legal standpoint, there’s been no union activities among college sports that I’m aware of. As an athlete, it’s made clear to you early on that when you participate on a team, you are part of a dictatorship, not a democracy.”

MIKE INGERSOLL

As an example, Ingersoll noted the 2020 college football season, in which a number of teams influenced their conferences to hold the season amid COVID-19 concerns.

What’s Next for Athletes as Employees?

The NLRB memo isn’t the only significant development related to the employment status of college athletes.

An Eastern District of Pennsylvania case brought by college athletes alleges employment status under FLSA demanding wages. The claim survived a motion to dismiss and is now up on appeal. This is quite different from the Seventh Circuit precedent in Berger, which the Appeals Court dismissed because it decided college athletes weren’t employees and, thus, aren’t subject to the FLSA.

“We’ll see what ends up happening at the appellate level in light of these decisions,” Ingersoll said. “At the time of the Berger decision (in 2016), the landscape was significantly different than it is now.”

Also, the NLRB hasn’t adopted the Abruzzo memo as its official position and is limited in scope. But Ingersoll said the memo may “bleed into” state and federal litigation—litigation he expects to increase in volume.

One factor driving increased litigation surrounding college athletes-as-employees is Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s concurrence in this year’s NCAA v. Alston decision. The case opened the door for college athletes to use their name, image and likeness for commercial purposes

“At the point where you get favorable state and federal decisions in court, you get some teeth behind this notion of athletes as employees,” he said.

“At the point where you get favorable state and federal decisions in court, you get some teeth behind this notion of athletes as employees.”

MIKE INGERSOLL

Osborne pointed out that there may be many unintended consequences if student-athletes are reclassified as university employees. For example, scholarships would be considered taxable income, and athletes may even be owed wages. Employment status also may impact Pell Grants or need-based financial aid eligibility. For student-athletes who are dependents on families, how would family taxes be impacted? “There are all sorts of tax implications,” Osborne said.

Such a change in status also could require colleges and universities to provide Worker’s Compensation coverage for student-athletes who are hurt on the job.

And then there is the NLRB memo itself. Is it effective without board adoption? And what would happen if the board does (or does not) adopt it?

“The memo essentially means that Abruzzo and her office will investigate and prosecute claims with the assumption that the athlete is a university employee,” Ingersoll said. However, he said the full board ultimately will have to make a decision on the memo and stake out a position.

“If the board were to reject Abruzzo’s position, that essentially kills it—Abruzzo is bound by the board. The board is going to have to stake out an official position. If the board adopts it, that will be the NLRB’s position and as long as the athlete meets the criteria, then the case will have to proceed under the assumption the athlete is an employee under the NLRA.”

“If the board were to reject Abruzzo’s position, that essentially kills it—Abruzzo is bound by the board. The board is going to have to stake out an official position.”

MIKE INGERSOLL

But the NLRB’s position certainly could change later under a different administration. “The real teeth are in state and federal litigation decisions. That’s when you will see a bit of a sea change,” he said.

“The thing that stops that wave of litigation would be if we have federal legislation—which we’ve had a lot of lobbying for,” Osborne said. Proposals on the table run the gamut from supporting everything the NCAA has done in the past to the proposed College Athlete Bill of Rights, which would provide compensation and revenue sharing for student-athletes. Osborne wonders if the uncertainty created by the memo might force some form of Congressional action.

In addition, she notes that 37 court cases decided that state student-athletes are not employees and do not have rights associated with employment. “We have to reconcile those precedents,” she said.

So the path forward remains uncertain, with many questions still left to be decided.

Ingersoll said, “Justice Kavanaugh did provide a road map for these challenges to move forward. But right now, the NLRB memo is limited in its scope and impact. There should be no rush to judgment until we have some binding case law.”

Also, click here to read “Alston Aftermath: NLRB General Counsel Memo Confirms Employment Status for Certain College Football Players Under the National Labor Relations Act and Declares an End to the ‘Student-Athlete’” by Mike Ingersoll.

Copyright © 2021 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.
For more articles on employment law, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Federal Judge Says President Can Fire NLRB General Counsel

As we have previously reported, on his first day in office, President Biden fired former NLRB General Counsel Peter Robb after Robb refused to resign. This controversial move immediately sparked debate over the President’s authority to fire Robb, who was serving in the last year of his statutory four-year term when fired.

In response to Robb’s abrupt departure, challengers have argued that Robb’s replacement, Acting General Counsel Peter Sung Ohr, does not have authority to bring cases before the NLRB because his appointment was invalid. The NLRB has refused to weigh in on the issue, saying that it is a matter for federal courts to decide.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey addressed the issue in its recent order in the case Goonan v. Amerinox Processing. U.S. District Judge Noel Hillman granted the NLRB’s request for an injunction, despite Amerinox’s argument that the NLRB acting general counsel does not have authority to prosecute this matter because of Robb’s removal. Judge Hillman stated that federal labor law gives the President authority to fire NLRB general counsels without cause, and that the temporary assignment of an acting general counsel without compliance with the Appointments Clause does not render the NLRB’s petition for injunctive relief invalid.

Judge Hillman, however, did not specifically rule on the legality of President Biden’s firing of Peter Robb, nor were his comments about firing general counsels a deciding factor in issuing the injunction. Moreover, Judge Hillman noted that the NLRB’s regional director was seeking an injunction on behalf of the Board, not the general counsel.

Given the peripheral nature of Judge Hillman’s comments about firing general counsels generally, this case is not likely the end-all, be-all on the matter. Thus, unless the Supreme Court rules squarely on the issue of Robb’s firing, challenges will likely still roll in as potential defenses to charges brought by Ohr.

© 2021 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more articles on the NLRB, visit the NLRLabor & Employment section.

Are Your Workplace Policies Compliant with the NLRA?

NLRB issues Memorandum GC-21-03 Signaling Aggressive and Expanded Enforcement of Section 7 Rights

On 31 March 2021, Peter Sung Ohr, Acting General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), issued Memorandum GC 21-03 (GC 21-03) to the regional field offices signaling significant changes to enforcement priorities under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In part, GC 21-03 indicates that the NLRB will be “robustly enforcing the Act’s provisions that protect employees’ Section 7 rights” and that “cases involving the retaliation against concerted employee conduct will be vigorously pursued.” GC 21-03 cites to increased workplace health and safety issues resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic as well as employees’ political and social justice advocacy concerns as factors necessitating increased enforcement of the NLRA.

NLRA Protections

The NLRA is a federal law that grants employees the right to form or join unions; engage in protected, concerted activities; address or improve working conditions; or refrain from engaging in such activities. The NLRA applies to almost all private employers but does not apply to federal, state, or local governments; employers who employ only agricultural workers; and employers subject to the Railway Labor Act. Some employers are surprised to find that the NLRA protects nearly all employees in the private sector, not only union employees or employees seeking to form or join a union. In fact, concerted activities protected under the NLRA often occur outside of the context of union activity. The NLRA does not cover, however, government employees, agricultural laborers, independent contractors, and supervisors (with limited exceptions).

It is not uncommon for the NLRB and its general counsel to modify or reverse their interpretations of the NLRA with changes in the composition of the Board. The political party of the presidency enjoys majority representation on the NLRB. Consequently, changes in the presidential administration often lead to significant changes for employers. GC 21-03 is emblematic of that trend. It states that “recent decisions issued by the current Board have restricted [Section 7 rights] for employees.” Specifically, GC 21-03 criticizes Alstate Maintenance1 and Quicken Loans2 for applying “mutual aid and protection” narrowly. The enforcement priorities highlighted in GC 21-03 are in stark contrast to enforcement priorities under the previous administration and a clear indication that employers should expect increased NLRB oversight for the foreseeable future.

Broadened Concerted Activities for Mutual Aid and Protection

Section 7 of the NLRA grants all covered employees the right to engage in “concerted” activities for the purpose of “mutual aid or protection.” The phrase “mutual aid or protection” focuses on “whether there is a link between the activity and matters concerning the workplace or employees’ interests as employees.”3 GC 21-03 indicates that such a link will be broadly construed, and it outlines an expansive characterization of what constitutes protected, concerted activity. As noted in GC 21-03, employee advocacy can have the goal of “mutual aid or protection” even when the employees have not explicitly connected their activity to workplace concerns. As examples, GC 21-03 cites to a solo strike by a pizza shop employee to attend a convention; protests in response to a sudden crackdown on undocumented immigrants or social justice concerns; and a hotel interview with a journalist concerning minimum wage issues. In addition, GC 21-03 highlights how concerted activity can occur outside of the context of union activity—such as when employees raise health and safety issues resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic or seek protections from government agencies.

Renewed Application of Inherenty Concerted Conduct

In addition to a clear directive to interpret concerted and protected activity more broadly under the NLRA, GC 21-03 also signals a renewed enforcement of conduct that is deemed “inherently concerted.” As noted in GC 21-03, employee conduct generally becomes concerted when it is “engaged in with or on the authority of other employees”4 or when an employee seeks either “to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action.”5 In other words, concerted conduct revolves around employees’ intention to band together to improve their wages or working conditions. However, contemplation of group action is not required and employee discussions surrounding certain employment policies may be sufficient to constitute inherently concerted activity—even if group action has not yet been contemplated or is in its early stages. Indeed, as noted in GC 21-03, inherently concerted conduct need only involve a “speaker and a listener.” Further, GC 21-03 emphasizes that there are no “magic works” required for concert to attach. However, the NLRB has previously found that certain categories of workplace life have been found to be “inherently concerted”—namely, exchanges of information concerning (i) wages or wage differentials, (ii) changes in work schedules, (iii) job security, (iv) workplace health and safety, and (v) racial discrimination. GC 21-03 expressly warns that the NLRB will be considering such categories as well as “other applications of the inherently concerted doctrine” for the foreseeable future.

Key Takeaways

  • Employers should work with their counsel to ensure their workplace policies are compliant with the NLRA, including the expansive definition of protected conduct that will be enforced for the foreseeable future.
  • Employers should expect an increase in NLRB oversight and NLRA enforcement.
  • Employers should expect an increase in complaints brought by the NLRB, including increased prosecution of cases involving retaliation against concerted employee conduct.
  • Employers should exercise caution when deciding whether or not to discipline or discharge employees who have engaged in discussions or activities related to workplace health and safety (importantly as related to the COVID-19 pandemic), social justice issues, or political views.

1 367 NLRB No. 68 (2019).

2 367 NLRB No. 112 (2019).

3 Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Mkt., Inc., 361 NLRB 151, 153 (2014).

4 Meyers Indus., 268 NLRB 493, 497 (1984) (Meyers 1), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F. 2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. den. 474 U.S. 948 (1985).

5 Meyers Indus., 281 NLRB 882, 887 (1986) (Meyers II), affd. sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F. 2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. den. 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).

Copyright 2021 K & L Gates

ARTICLE BY Rosemary Alito and  Rio J. Gonzalez of K&L Gates
For more articles on the NLRB, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.