Can You Spy on Your Employees’ Private Facebook Group?

For years, companies have encountered issues stemming from employee communications on social media platforms. When such communications take place in private groups not accessible to anyone except approved members, though, it can be difficult for an employer to know what actually is being said. But can a company try to get intel on what’s being communicated in such forums? A recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) case shows that, depending on the circumstances, such actions may violate labor law.

At issue in the case was a company that was facing unionizing efforts by its employees. Some employees of the company were members of a private Facebook group and posted comments in the group about potentially forming a union. Management became aware of this activity and repeatedly asked one of its employees who had access to the group to provide management with reports about the comments. The NLRB found this conduct to be unlawful and held: “It is well-settled that an employee commits unlawful surveillance if it acts in a way that is out of the ordinary in order to observe union activity.”

This case provides another reminder that specific rules come into play when employees are considering forming a union. Generally, companies cannot:

  • Threaten employees based on their union activity
  • Interrogate workers about their union activity, sentiments, etc.
  • Make promises to employees to induce them to forgo joining a union
  • Engage in surveillance (i.e., spying) on workers’ union organizing efforts

The employer’s “spying” in this instance ran afoul of these parameters, which can have costly consequences, such as overturned discipline and backpay awards.


© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

For more on employees’ social media use, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Uh-Oh: Company’s Social Media Policy Ruled Unlawful

Facebook. Instagram. Twitter. Snapchat. As the list of social media platforms continues to grow and people increasingly choose to use them as communication vehicles, more and more employers are drafting and implementing policies seeking to regulate their employees’ posted content and messaging on those sites. A recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) advice memo, however, is another reminder that companies – including non-union ones – should keep in mind there are legal parameters that come into play in this sphere.

At issue in the case was a company’s social media policy that prescribed certain expectations for employees on social sites and proscribed various types of statements on such platforms. The board ultimately concluded two provisions in the policy ran afoul of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

The first provision found to be unlawful stated:

“Make sure you are always honest and accurate when posting information or news, and if you make a mistake, correct it quickly. Be open about any previous posts you have altered. Remember that the Internet archives almost everything; therefore, even deleted postings can be searched. Never post any information or rumors that are false about Friendship Ridge, fellow employees, owners, residents, suppliers, people working on behalf of Friendship Ridge.”

The NLRB determined this was unlawful because “Board and court precedent has long recognized that employees have the right to make a wide variety of statements in the context of a labor dispute, including inaccurate statements, as long as those statements do not constitute malicious defamation.” In other words, the proscription here was too broad.

The second provision held to be unlawful provided:

“Maintain the confidentiality of Friendship Ridge private or confidential information. Do not post internal reports, policies, procedures or other internal business related confidential communications.”

This was found to violate the NLRA because “the requirement that employees keep confidential the Employer’s ‘policies, procedures’ would reasonably be interpreted by employees to include information about their terms and conditions of employment.” Under the NLRA, employees have the presumptive right to disclose and discuss the terms and conditions of their employment – such as wage rates – so this too was overbroad.

While having a social media policy may make sense, it is important for any company that decides to maintain such a policy to keep in mind that there are limits on what can be proscribed.

 


© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

For more on workplace & social media see the Labor & Employment law page of the National Law Review.

NLRB Chills At-Will Acknowledgements of Social Media in Employee Handbooks

The National Law Review recently published an article about the NLRB’s Social Media Rulings written by Jerrold J. Wohlgemuth of  Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP:

 

 

Having warned employers about the legality of their social media policies under theNational Labor Relations Act, NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon has apparently turned his attention to at-will employment statements in employer handbooks and manuals.  Employers of union and non-union workforces need to pay careful attention to this development.

Many employers use standard language in their handbooks and manuals in which their employees acknowledge that their employment is at-will; that the employer may terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any reason; and that the at-will employment relationship cannot be amended, altered or modified except by a writing signed by a senior member of management.  The Acting General Counsel apparently believes that such at-will disclaimers may interfere with or chill the right of employees to engage in protected concerted activity.

In a case that did not receive extensive publicity, the General Counsel’s Office filed an unfair labor practice charge in February 2012 against Hyatt Hotels (NLRB v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., Case 28 CA-061114) in which it alleged that the at-will disclaimer in the company’s employee handbook violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act to the extent it required employees to acknowledge that their at-will employment status could not be altered except by a writing signed by management.  The charge appears to reflect the Acting General Counsel’s belief that such an acknowledgement will have a chilling effect on the Section 7 right of employees to engage in concerted activity for the purpose of organizing to alter their employment relationship with the employer by choosing union representation.  The Hyatt case was settled before the issue was presented for a hearing.  An Administrative Law Judge issued a similar ruling in a case decided in early February against the American Red Cross; the case was resolved when the Red Cross agreed to modify its at-will disclaimer before the issue could be presented to the Board for review. (NLRB v. Am. Red Cross, 2012 WL 311334, Feb 1, 2012).

This is an important initiative on the part of the Acting General Counsel.  As we have seen in the social media context, in analyzing handbooks and policy manuals the Acting General Counsel will apply Section 7 broadly to find statements unlawful to the extent they could be interpreted in almost any fashion to chill employee rights to engage in protected concerted activity.  Accordingly, employers may want to take proactive steps to avoid NLRB scrutiny by including a disclaimer in the at-will sections of their handbooks to the effect that the at-will acknowledgment does not, and is not intended to, undermine or interfere with the employee’s right to engage in protected concerted organizing activity under Section 7 of the Act.

©2012 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

NLRB’s Acting General Counsel Releases Another Report on Social Media Policies

An article by Steve L. Hernández of Barnes & Thornburg LLP recently had an article regarding NLRB’s Social Media Policies in The National Law Review:

On May 30, 2012. Lafe Solomon, the NLRB’s Acting General Counsel (the “AGC”), released a third report on social media cases brought before the Board. This report deals with seven different cases involving social media policies, covering topics such as the use of social media and electronic technologies, confidentiality, privacy, protection of employer information, intellectual property, and contact with the media and government agencies. In the first six policies reviewed, the AGC concluded that at least some of the provisions in the employers’ policies and rules were overbroad and, accordingly, unlawful, under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Importantly, the Board found that the savings clauses in these otherwise unlawful policies did not save the policies. Only the final social media policy reviewed by the AGC was found to be entirely lawful. In finding the final reviewed policy lawful, the AGC pointed to the policies substantial use of examples of allowed and proscribed behavior. Specifically, the AGC stated that “rules that clarify and restrict their scope by including examples of clearly illegal or unprotected conduct, such that they could not reasonably be construed to cover protected activity, are not unlawful.”

© 2012 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Social Media for Employers: Recent Cases Before Courts, NLRB

The National Law Review recently published an article by John Patrick WhiteJeffrey T. Gray, Jr. and Luis E. Avila of Varnum LLP regarding Social Media and Employers:

Varnum LLP

Social media continues to be in the news.  The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued an “updated” summary of social media cases earlier this year and social media continues to find its way into court decisions.

In 2011, the NLRB’s General Counsel issued a summary of 14 social media cases handled by that office.  On January 24, 2012, the General Counsel issued an updated summary covering another 14 cases.  The General Counsel’s position in these cases is that social media policies (or any other policies) that may “reasonably chill” employees in the exercise of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (“Act”) are unlawful.  Here are the high points from the updated summary:

  • The General Counsel continues to find employer policies and work rules to be unlawfully broad when employees may reasonably view them as prohibiting conduct protected under the Act.  For example, work rules or policies prohibiting “insubordination or other disrespectful conduct” and “inappropriate conversation” were held to be unlawfully broad because employees might think that they cannot join together to complain about their terms and conditions of employment, which is protected activity under the Act.
  • Importantly, the General Counsel’s Office rejected a “savings clause” in a social media policy designed to prevent the policy from being overly broad.  The employer’s social media policy stated that “it would not be interpreted or applied so as to interfere with” employee rights under the Act.  The General Counsel found this language did not “save” the policy from being overbroad because an employee could not reasonably be expected to know that the clause would apply to discussions the employer deems inappropriate under the policy.  In light of the General Counsel’s approach, employers should narrowly tailor their social media policies rather than attempt to use “savings” language to fix overly broad policies.
  • On the other hand, the General Counsel found an employer’s “amended” social media policy to be lawful because it prohibited conduct that was “vulgar, obscene, threatening, intimidating, harassing, or a violation of the Employer’s workplace policies against discrimination, harassment, or hostility on account of age, race, religion, sex, ethnicity, nationality, disability, or other protected class, status, or characteristic.”  The General Counsel found the policy lawful because employees would not reasonably construe the policy’s language to prohibit conduct protected by the Act.
  • Individual gripes by employees are not protected activity.  Thus, the General Counsel found in several cases that employers did not violate the Act by discharging employees who complained about their employment on social media pages because they were acting solely on their own behalf rather than on behalf of themselves and other employees.
  • Employees can go overboard in their criticisms, however, and lose the protection of the Act.  Language that is “opprobrious,” or sufficiently “disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue” may remove the activity from protection, depending upon the circumstances.

In addition to the NLRB’s attention to employee activity, courts and arbitrators are increasingly addressing social media.  Here are just a few recent examples:

  • A federal district court in Illinois ruled that an employee, a marketing director for an interior design firm, could proceed with federal Stored Communications Act and Lanham Act claims against her employer based on her co-workers’ unauthorized use of her Facebook and Twitter accounts to promote the employer.  Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10C 7811 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011).
  • A federal court in Washington ruled that a trial was necessary to determine whether an employee, who had been on leave for treatment of depression, was unlawfully discharged due to her suicidal comments made via social media.  Peer v. F5 Networks, Inc., No. C11-0879-JCC (March 19, 2012).
  • An arbitrator denied a grievance challenging the discharge of a Head Start teacher who started a closed Facebook page to “gripe” about employees, parents, and students at the Head Start program.  Although the members of the invite-only group complained about work, they were also exceedingly profane, many of the posts were not connected to working conditions, and, most importantly, there was “nothing about the conversations that would lead to the conclusion that [the employees] were seeking to band together to take action to address their workplace concerns.”  Vista Neuvas Head Start, 129 LA 1519 (VanDagens, 2011).
  • A federal court in California held that a mobile news website company sufficiently stated claims for negligent and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage by alleging that a former employee appropriated a company Twitter account that drove traffic to its website.  PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012).
  • An NLRB administrative law judge recently ruled that a “Jimmy John’s” franchisee violated the Act when an assistant manager posted the telephone number of a known union supporter on an anti-union Facebook page and encouraged others to “text” him to let him know “how they feel.”  The ALJ believed this post amounted to an invitation for other anti-union co-workers to harass the employee in retaliation for this union activity.  Jimmy John’s, 18-CA-19707 (April 20, 2012).

Employers must act carefully when issuing disciplinary action in connection with social media activity.  Seeking legal advice is important because, as shown above, employee social media activity implicates numerous areas of employment law.

© 2012 Varnum LLP

Employer Social Media Policies: Another One Bites the Dust

An article by Gerald F. Lutkus of Barnes & Thornburg LLP regarding Employer Social Media Policies was recently published in The National Law Review:

The NLRB has continued its assault on employer social media policies and a recent Administrative Law Judge ruling from the Board further complicates the issue. The Acting General Counsel, in his various reports on the Board’s social media cases, has made it clear that employers need to include disclaimers in their policies that nothing in the policy is meant to interfere with employee Section 7 rights. However, a San Francisco-based ALJ, in a lengthy opinion dealing with the social media policy of G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc., struck down that company’s social media policy even though it included such a disclaimer.

Specifically, the ALJ found that G4S’s policy was overbroad and would chill the exercise of Section 7 rights by employees of the company. G4S’s policy stated, “This policy will not be construed or applied in a way that interferes with employees’ rights under federal law.” The ALJ expressly determined that “it cannot be assumed that lay employees have the knowledge to discern what is federal law, and thus permitted under the disclaimer, as opposed to what is prohibited ‘legal matter’.” Though the ALJ did not go beyond that, the clear suggestion from the opinion is that a disclaimer of noninterference with Section 7 rights must be far more particular in explaining what types of rights are, in fact, protected under Section 7 and, thus, not prohibited under an employer’s social media policy. Of course, most employers are reluctant to spell out in detail in their own policy manuals exactly what types of activity employees may engage in as protected activity under Section 7 of the NLRA.

The judge’s ruling also struck down that portion of the company’s policy forbidding employees from commenting on work-related legal matters, but allowed a provision that prohibited the posting on social media sites of pictures of employees in their security uniforms.

A full text of the ALJ’s ruling in G4S Secure Solutions can be reviewed here.

© 2012 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP