Tag: Ninth Circuit

TransUnion to Seek Supreme Court Review After Ninth Circuit Finds Class Members Had Standing and Partially Upholds Punitive Damages Award

A hotly contested ruling in a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) class action case will soon be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.  The Ninth Circuit in Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, Case No. 17-17244, recently granted the parties’ Joint Motion to Stay the Mandate, seeking to stay the Ninth Circuit’s mandate pending TransUnion’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.  The Motion to Stay comes soon after the court denied TransUnion’s Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc regarding the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, 951 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2020).

In Ramirez, the Ninth Circuit held for the first time that every class member in a class action lawsuit needs “standing” to recover damages at the final judgment stage.  The 8,185 member class alleged that TransUnion, knowing that its practice was unlawful, violated the FCRA by incorrectly placing terrorist alerts on the front page of consumers’ credit reports and later sending the consumers misleading and incomplete disclosures about the alerts and how to remove them.  The court held that each class member was required to, and did, have standing, even though the credit reports of over 75% of the class were not actually disclosed to a third party because TransUnion’s alleged violation of the consumers’ statutory rights under the FCRA, by itself, constituted a concrete injury.  The Ninth Circuit also found that the jury’s punitive damages award of 6.45 times the statutory damages award was unconstitutional, and reduced it to 4 times the statutory damages award.  The Ramirez decision is discussed in more detail here.

In its Petition for Rehearing, TransUnion claimed that the dissent had the correct view, and the majority’s decision “not only conflicts with Supreme Court teachings, but puts the Ninth Circuit on the wrong side of a lopsided circuit split.”  TransUnion argued that the class of consumers did not have standing for their FCRA claims unless their credit reports were disclosed to a third party.  TransUnion further alleged that the class should have been decertified because Ramirez, the named plaintiff, “was radically atypical of the class he purported to represent” since there was no evidence that any other class member’s credit report was disseminated.  Finally, TransUnion disputed the court’s punitive damages award because a reduction to 4 times the statutory damages award was not enough.  According to TransUnion, the Supreme Court requires, at a maximum, a punitive damages award “equal to compensatory damages . . . when compensatory damages are substantial.”

TransUnion concluded its Petition for Rehearing by stating:

It is no exaggeration to say that, for many class members, the first indication that they were injured at all will be when they receive a $4,925.10 check in the mail. That absurd result is the product of ignoring basic requirements of Article III, Rule 23, and due process.

As of the date this article is published, TransUnion has not yet filed its petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, but we will continue to monitor the case for updates.

Copyright © 2020, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

For more on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, see the National Law Review Financial Institutions & Banking law page.

Million-Dollar Settlement of Billion-Dollar Claim Found Reasonable in Light of Due Process Problems Posed By Disproportionate Damages

Another court has observed that a billion-dollar aggregate liability under the TCPA likely would violate due process, adopting the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that such a “shockingly large amount” of statutory damages would be “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportionate[] to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”

In Larson v. Harman-Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:16-cv-00219-DAD-SKO, 2019 WL 7038399 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2019),  the Eastern District of California preliminarily approved a settlement proposal that represents less than 0.1% of potential statutory damages. Like the Eighth Circuit decision that we discussed previously, both courts observed that several uncertainties exist as to whether the plaintiffs can succeed in proving certain legal issues, such as whether consent was provided and whether an ATDS was used.

The Larson case exposed the defendants to TCPA liability for allegedly sending 13.5 million text messages without prior express consent as part of a marketing program called the “A&W Text Club.” After extensive discovery and motion practice, the parties proposed a settlement that would have the defendants deposit $4 million into a settlement fund that in turn distributes $2.4 million to class members who submit a timely, valid claim.

The court preliminarily approved the proposed settlement, observing that its terms demonstrated “substantive fairness and adequacy.” As a preliminary matter, it found, “[i]t is well-settled law that a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not per se render the settlement inadequate or unfair.” Concerned that calculating damages based on $500 per message under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) would violate the Due Process Clause, it agreed that the conduct of the defendant (sending over 13.5 million messages) was not persistent or severely harmful to the 232,602 recipients to warrant the billion-dollar judgment.

While $4 million represents less than 0.1% of the theoretical aggregate damages, “the value of the settlement is intertwined with the risks of litigation.” Here, in addition to the uncertainty about whether the “A&T Text Club” program uses an ATDS, “several risks are present, including . . . whether the plaintiff can maintain the action as a class action, . . . and whether the plaintiff’s theories of individual and vicarious liability can succeed.” The proposed settlement amount was found to strike the appropriate balance as it would likely result in each class member receiving $52 to $210 for each message if 5% to 20% of the class submit timely claims.

Although the case was only at the preliminary approval stage, this decision again illustrates that at least some courts recognize the due process problem posed by disproportionate aggregate damages and do not reject settlements simply because they provide some fraction of the theoretical aggregate damages available under a given statute.

©2020 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

Federal Court Temporarily Blocks Health Insurance Requirement for Immigrant Visa Applicants

On November 2, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon issued a temporary restraining order, blocking the Trump administration from enforcing a recent presidential proclamation requiring health insurance for immigrant visa applicants. The proclamation, which had been scheduled to take effect on November 3, 2019, would have required certain immigrant visa applicants to prove that within 30 days of their entering the United States they would have approved health insurance or that they otherwise possessed the “financial resources” to cover “reasonably foreseeable medical costs.”

The restraining order will remain in effect for 28 days. In the meantime, the court will hear arguments on November 22, 2019, to determine if the proclamation warrants a preliminary injunction.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

More on immigration on the Immigration Law page of the National Law Review.

A Dark Day for Franchising: Ninth Circuit Reinstates its Misguided Vazquez Decision, Undermining the Franchise Business Model

In the course of a politically-charged frenzy to eliminate the misclassification of employees as independent contractors, the franchise business model has been trampled without respect by both the courts and the legislature in California, disrupting commercial relationships that have been a vital driver of the state’s economy for more than fifty years.  Only five years ago, the California Supreme Court acknowledged the vital importance of franchising to the California economy in generating “trillions of dollars in total sales,” “billions of dollars” of payroll and the “millions of people” franchising employs.  Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 489.

Taking into account the “ubiquitous, lucrative, and thriving” franchise business model and its “profound” effects on the economy, the Patterson court held that the usual tests for “determining the circumstances under which an employment or agency relationship exists” could not be applied to franchises.  Id. at 477, 489 and 503.  To avoid disruption of the franchise relationship and turning the model “on its head,” a different test that took into account the practical realities of franchising had to be applied to franchise relationships.  Id. at 498, 499 and 503.  The “imposition and enforcement of a uniform marketing and operational plan cannot automatically saddle the franchisor with responsibility.”  Id. at 478.  A franchisor is liable “only if it has retained or assumed a general right of control over factors such as hiring, direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and relevant day-to-day aspects of the workplace behavior of the franchisee’s employees.”  Id. at 497-98.  The special rule for franchising has been commonly referred to as the “Patterson gloss.”

On September 25, 2019, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court reinstated an opinion it had previously published on May 2, 2019, then withdrew on July 22, 2019, recklessly undermining the delicate framework of the franchise business model in derogation of the California Supreme Court’s “Patterson gloss.”  Vazquez v. Jan-Pro, 923 F.3d 575 (9th Cir. May 2, 2019), opinion withdrawn, 2019 US App. Lexis 21687 (July 22, 2019), opinion reinstated, 2019 BL 357978 (9th Cir. September 24, 2019).

The “Patterson gloss” arose from the California Supreme Court’s subtle appreciation for the historical development of the franchise business model.  At the heart of all franchise relationships is a trademark license.  At common law, trademark licenses were seen as a representation to the public of the source of a product.  An attempt to license a trademark risked the forfeiture of any right to royalties and the abandonment of the licensed mark.  See Lea v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 139 F. 732 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1905); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959).

Although the Trademark Act of 1905 did not allow for the licensing of trademarks, the Trademark Act of 1946, the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, did allow a trademark to be licensed, but only where the licensee was “controlled by the registrant. . . in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127.   After the passage of the Lanham Act, a trademark could be licensed, as long as “the plaintiff sufficiently policed and inspected its licensees’ operations to guarantee the quality of the products they sold under its trademarks to the public.”  Dawn Donut, at 367.  After the Lanham Act had legitimized trademark licensing, the franchise model began to emerge in the 1950s, as the Patterson court noted (at 489), leading to the explosive growth of franchising over the last seven decades.

“Franchising is a heavily regulated form of business in California.”  Cislaw v. Southland Corporation (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1288.  Franchisors must provide prospective franchisees with detailed pre-sale disclosure documents under the California Franchise Investment Law, Corporations Code § 31000 et seq. and the FTC Rule, 39 Fed. Reg. 30360 (1974).  There are criminal, civil and administrative consequences for failure to comply.  Franchisees’ rights are protected by the California Franchise Relations Act, Business & Professions Code § 20000, et seq., which includes recently enhanced penalties for non-compliance.

Over the years, California courts have acknowledged the fundamental obligation of franchisors to impose controls over their licensees and have uniformly held that such controls do not create an employment or agency relationship.  See, e.g., Cislaw, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1295 (the owner of a brand may impose restrictions on a licensee “without incurring the responsibilities or acquiring the immunities of a master, with respect to the person controlled.”); Kaplan v. Coldwell Banker (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 746, (“If the law were otherwise, every franchisee who independently owned and operated a franchise would be the true agent or employee of the franchisor.”).  This doctrine came to be known as the “Patterson gloss” and is the glue that holds the franchise business model together—allowing the franchisor to exert the controls necessary to license a trademark without incurring the responsibilities of an employer.

In its September 25, 2019 decision in Vazquez, the Ninth Circuit once again discarded the Patterson gloss like an extra part found in the bottom of an Ikea box after the hasty assembly of an end table.  According to the Vazquez court, Patterson had no relevance because it was just a vicarious liability decision, not an employment decision.  But Patterson was an employment case.

Patterson was a Fair Employment and Housing claim brought by a teenage girl after her supervisor had repeatedly groped her breasts and buttocks.  Patterson, at 479.  It is hard to understand why the Vazquez court considered the wage order claims before it to be more significant than Taylor Patterson’s right to pursue legal claims for sexual harassment.

Even more disturbingly, the Vazquez court disregarded the “Patterson gloss” because Dynamex [Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903] had favorably cited two Massachusetts decisions that applied the ABC test in the franchise context.  Id. at 39.  The Massachusetts cases were cited in Dynamex only as examples of cases where it had been more efficient to address “the latter two parts of the [ABC] standard” on a dispositive motion, rather than all three prongs.  Dynamex, 4 Cal.5th at 48.  The court never mentions franchising or the inconsequential fact that the parties in cited cases were franchises.  The Dynamex court could not be fairly understood to have abandoned its stalwart embrace of the franchise business model in its 2014 Patterson decision, without ever bothering to mention the case or to make any reference to franchising.  Yet the Vazquez court concluded that a passing citation to cases that happened to involve franchise companies in the Dynamex opinion—to make a procedural point that was unrelated to franchising in any way—was an occult signal from the California Supreme Court that the “Patterson gloss” had been abandoned by implication five years after its creation.

Nor was it valid for the Vazquez court to confine the “Patterson gloss” to vicarious liability cases.  As Witkin points out, California law on vicarious liability and employment developed together, so that most “of the rules relating to duties, authority, liability, etc. are applicable to employees as well as other agents.”  Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed., Agency & Employment, § 4).  The core obligation to control a trademark licensee—hard-wired by the Lanham Act into every franchise relationship—must be respected in both vicarious liability and employment cases if the franchise business model is to be preserved.

The Vazquez court had it right when it withdrew and de-published its original decision on July 22, 2019.  When the court certified the retroactivity issue to the California Supreme Court that day, it could have also certified the franchise issue back to the court that created the Patterson gloss, but it did not do so.  Franchisors are now left to wonder how they are to maintain existing long-term commercial relationships and to continue to sell franchises after the Vazquez opinion has taken from them the fundamental right to license trademarks without incurring the unintended liabilities of employers.

© 2019 Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP

Read more on the topic on the National Law Review Franchising Law page.

Facebook “Tagged” in Certified Facial Scanning Class Action

Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an Illinois class of Facebook users can pursue a class action lawsuit arising out of Facebook’s use of facial scanning technology. A three-judge panel in Nimesh Patel, et al v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. 18-15982 issued an unanimous ruling that the mere collection of an individual’s biometric data was a sufficient actual or threatened injury under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) to establish standing to sue in federal court. The Court affirmed the district court’s decision certifying a class. This creates a significant financial risk to Facebook, because the BIPA provides for statutory damages of $1,000-$5,000 for each time Facebook’s use of facial scanning technology was used in the State of Illinois.

This case is important for several reasons. First, the decision recognizes that the mere collection of biometric information may be actionable, because it creates harm to an individual’s privacy. Second, the decision highlights the possible extraterritorial application of state data privacy laws, even those that have been passed by state legislatures intending to protect only their own residents. Third, the decision lays the groundwork for a potential circuit split on what constitutes a “sufficiently concrete injury” to convey standing under the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). Fourth, due to the Illinois courts’ liberal construction and interpretation of the statute, class actions in this sphere are likely to continue to increase.

The Illinois class is challenging Facebook’s “Tag Suggestions” program, which scans for and identifies people in uploaded photographs for photo tagging. The class plaintiffs alleged that Facebook collected and stored biometric data without prior notice or consent, and without a data retention schedule that complies with BIPA. Passed in 2008, Illinois’ BIPA prohibits gathering the “scan of hand or face geometry” without users’ permission.

The district court previously denied Facebook’s numerous motions to dismiss the BIPA action on both procedural and substantive grounds and certified the class. In moving to decertify the class, Facebook argued that any BIPA violations were merely procedural and did not amount to “an injury of a concrete interest” as required by the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).

In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit determined that Facebook’s use of facial recognition technology without users’ consent “invades an individual’s private affairs and concrete interests.” According to the Court, such privacy concerns were a sufficient injury-in-fact to establish standing, because “Facebook’s alleged collection, use, and storage of plaintiffs’ face templates here is the very substantive harm targeted by BIPA.” The Court cited with approval Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., — N.E.3d —, 2019 IL 123186 (Ill. 2019), a recent Illinois Supreme Court decision similarly finding that individuals can sue under BIPA even if they suffered no damage beyond mere violation of the statute. The Ninth Circuit also suggested that “[s]imilar conduct is actionable at common law.”

On the issue of class certification, the Ninth Circuit’s decision creates a precedent for extraterritorial application of the BIPA. Facebook unsuccessfully argued that (1) the BIPA did not apply because Facebook’s collection of biometric data occurred on servers located outside of Illinois, and (2) even if BIPA could apply, individual trials must be conducted to determine whether users uploaded photos in Illinois. The Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments. The Court determined that (1) the BIPA applied if users uploaded photos or had their faces scanned in Illinois, and (2) jurisdiction could be decided on a class-wide basis. Given the cross-border nature of data use, the Court’s reasoning could be influential in future cases where a company challenges the applicability of data breach or data privacy laws that have been passed by state legislatures intending to protect their own residents.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision also lays the groundwork for a potential circuit split. In two cases from December 2018 and January 2019, a federal judge in the Northern District of Illinois reached a different conclusion than the Ninth Circuit on the issue of BIPA standing. In both cases, the Northern District of Illinois ruled that retaining an individual’s private information is not a sufficiently concrete injury to satisfy Article III standing under Spokeo. One of these cases, which concerned Google’s free Google Photos service that collects and stores face-geometry scans of uploaded photos, is currently on appeal to the Seventh Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision paves the way for a class action trial against Facebook. The case was previously only weeks away from trial when the Ninth Circuit accepted Facebook’s Rule 23(f) appeal, so the litigation is expected to return to the district court’s trial calendar soon. If Facebook is found to have violated the Illinois statute, it could be held liable for substantial damages – as much as $1000 for every “negligent” violation and $5000 for every “reckless or intentional” violation of BIPA.

BIPA class action litigation has become increasingly popular since the Illinois Legislature enacted it: over 300 putative class actions asserting BIPA violations have been filed since 2015. Illinois’ BIPA has also opened the door to other recent state legislation regulating the collection and use of biometric information. Two other states, Texas and Washington, already have specific biometric identifier privacy laws in place, although enforcement of those laws is accomplished by the state Attorney General, not private individuals. A similar California law is set to go into effect in 2020. Legislation similar to Illinois’ BIPA is also currently pending in several other states.

The Facebook case will continue to be closely watched, both in terms of the standing ruling as well as the potential extended reach of the Illinois law.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

For more in biometric data privacy, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law page.

“Bikini Baristas” Ordered to Cover-Up

The 9th Circuit court of appeals has enforced the City of Everett, Washington’s Dress Code Ordinance and amendments to the Lewd Conduct Ordinances. These ordinances require employees of “Quick-Service” facilities to cover “minimum body areas” (the dress code ordinance specifically stated that it was targeting an apparent influx of “bikini barista stands”). The owner of “Hillbilly Hotties,” a coffee stand where employees wear only bikinis, and several of the bikini baristas themselves challenged the ordinances as unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs also alleged that the Ordinances violated their First Amendment right to free expression.

The Court of Appeals reversed a lower court ruling that prohibited enforcement of the Ordinances on the ground that they are unconstitutionally vague. The appeals court explained that a person of ordinary intelligence would be able to understand the terms in the Ordinance and would be adequately informed of which body areas cannot be exposed or displayed.

The Ninth Circuit also concluded that Plaintiffs’ first amendment claim faltered based upon their failure to show a great likelihood that their intended message would be understood by those who received it. The court found that the baristas’ acts of wearing pasties and g-strings in close proximity to customers did not necessarily convey the baristas’ purported message of female body confidence and empowerment.

Read the full decision here.

 

© 2019 Proskauer Rose LLP.
This article was written by Anthony J Oncidi and Cole D. Lewis of Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more on First Amendment questions please see the National Law Review Constitutional Law page.

Intentional Accidents: California Supreme Court Announces that General Commercial Liability Policies Apply to Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervising Claims for Failing to Prevent Intentional Torts

In a recent decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed that under California law, there was an unresolved question as to whether a commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policy covers an employer-insured for negligently failing to prevent an employee’s intentional misconduct. In essence, it was unclear whether such an incident constituted an “occurrence” that only covers “accidents,” as an intentional act cannot, by definition, be an accident. Through a certified question from the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the California Supreme Court answered that such insurance policies indeed cover negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims because the crux of inquiry is the insured’s negligence—not the employee’s intent.

In Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation, et al. v. Ledesma and Meyer Construction Company, Inc., No. 14-56120 (9th Cir. Oct. 19, 2018), the insured construction company was sued because its employee sexually abused a minor. Ledesma and Meyer Construction Company, Inc. (“L&M”) had been retained by a school district to oversee the construction of a middle school. During the course of construction, an employee sexually abused a 13-year-old student. The student sued L&M alleging claims of negligent hiring, training, and supervision of the employee that committed the intentional tort.

L&M’s CGL carrier filed a declaratory judgment action in federal district court, alleging that the claim against L&M was not covered by the insurance policy because it was premised on an intentional act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff insurer. It reasoned that, because the policy covered “bodily injury” that was “caused by an occurrence,” and because an “occurrence” is defined as an “accident,” the claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision were too attenuated from the intentional injury-causing conduct to trigger coverage.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified the question of coverage to the California Supreme Court. The Supreme Court rephrased the question as follows: “When a third party sues an employer for the negligent hiring, training, and supervision of an employee who intentionally inured that third party, does that suit allege an ‘occurrence’ under the employer’s commercial general liability policy?” The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, reasoning that, “[b]ecause the term ‘accident’ includes negligence, a policy which defines ‘occurrence’ as an ‘accident’ provides ‘coverage for liability resulting from the insured’s negligent acts.’” (internal citations omitted). On the basis of this answer, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.

This decision solidifies what amounts to an expansion of insurance coverage in the Ninth Circuit over an employer-insured’s employee’s intentional acts, where the claims are premised on the employer-insured’s negligent hiring and supervision of the employee. Underwriters should take note and consider appropriate exclusions and/or pricing of premiums of insured risks in California and elsewhere in the Ninth Circuit.

 

©2011-2018 Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A.

Are You Ready for the Next Downturn? Ninth Circuit “Cramdown” Cases Affecting Real Estate Lenders

Plan Approval in a Multi-Debtor, Single-Plan Context

In In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., the Ninth Circuit addressed the Chapter 11 reorganization plan approval process where a single plan was proposed for multiple affiliated debtor entities whose cases were being administered jointly. Generally, for “cramdown” plans, the Bankruptcy Code requires that at least one class of impaired creditors vote in favor of a plan for it to be approved. In Transwest, a mezzanine lender who was the sole creditor for two of the five debtor entities and whose loan would be extinguished under the single, jointly administered plan, argued that impaired class approval had to occur on a per debtor basis, and that since it was the only impaired class member for two of the debtors, its votes against the plan in those debtor cases barred confirmation (as there were no impaired classes of creditors in those cases voting in favor of the plan). The bankruptcy court, the district court, and the Ninth Circuit rejected that position, holding instead that impaired class approval applied on a per plan basis, and that the votes of the impaired class of creditors of the other three debtors established consent from an impaired class across all debtors, and supported plan confirmation. The Ninth Circuit is the first circuit-level court to address this issue, and the lower bankruptcy courts remain split on the issue.

Potential Impact

Lenders, particularly mezzanine lenders, who lend to one or more isolated borrowing entities within a corporate group of debtor entities may not have the voting control in the plan confirmation process they assume exists to block “cramdown”, and should factor that reality into their risk assessments.

“Cramdown” Value = Replacement Value (even if it’s less than foreclosure value)

In In re Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership, the Ninth Circuit, in an en banc opinion, addressed how a secured creditor’s interest should be valued in the context of a “cramdown,” i.e. where the debtor seeks to retain and use creditor’s collateral in the reorganization plan and the value of that collateral is to be determined based on the proposed use of the property. Valuation of the property in the “cramdown” context was critical to how much the secured creditor would recover under the proposed plan, given that amount of its secured claim would be determined by the value of the property. The Sunnyslope case presented a highly unusual circumstance where the foreclosure value of the apartment complex collateral was significantly higher than its replacement or use value due to the existence of low-income housing covenants that would be extinguished in a prospective foreclosure.

Despite the higher foreclosure value supported by the secured creditor, the Ninth Circuit affirmed application of the replacement value standard for determining the secured creditor’s present value of its claim under the plan. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit affirmed prior precedent holding that only a property’s replacement value – to be determined in light of its “proposed disposition or use” – could be utilized for determining the amount of a secured claim in the cramdown context. In applying its replacement value standard in Sunnyslope, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that the highest and best use of collateral may not dictate the value of a creditor’s secured claim, even where the replacement value, as determined by the collateral’s anticipated use or disposition, is lower than its foreclosure value.

Potential Impact

Lenders facing a potential “cramdown” of its secured claim, based on present value of its claim against real property, should carefully analyze the potential difference between a property’s foreclosure value and its replacement value and adjust expectations accordingly.

© 2010-2018 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

This post was written by Michael R. Farrell of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP.

Ninth Circuit Issues Decision in Novel Clean Water Act Case

The Ninth Circuit issued its long-anticipated decision in the Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui case yesterday. County of Maui affirmed a decision awarding summary judgment to environmental groups based on what the court viewed to be undisputed proof that four effluent disposal wells at a wastewater disposal facility were known to discharge into the Pacific Ocean and that the County of Maui had failed to secure an National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for them.

We have previously blogged regarding existing regulatory uncertainty under the Clean Water Act (CWA). In this case, the Ninth Circuit’s decision focuses on whether a CWA “point source” that indirectly transfers material to relevant waterways falls within the statute. The Ninth Circuit essentially rejected the connection that the wells were “indirect,” instead holding that they were analogous to stormwater collection systems, which had previously been found to be regulated by the CWA.

The court supported this conclusion based on the evidence that the County of Maui knew from the time the wells were constructed “that effluent from the wells would eventually reach the ocean some distance from shore.” The court also noted that the fact that “groundwater plays a role in delivering the pollutants from the wells to navigable water does not preclude liability under the statute.”

 

© 2018 Schiff Hardin LLP
This post was written by J. Michael Showalter of Schiff Hardin LLP.
Read more Environmental News on the National Law Review Environment News page.

The Ninth Circuit Asks the California Supreme Court to Weigh in on Bag Checks

On August 16, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order certifying a question regarding an important wage and hour issue to the California Supreme Court: Is time spent on an employer’s premises waiting for and undergoing required exit searches of bags or packages voluntarily brought to work for purely personal convenience by employees compensable as “hours worked” under California law?

The question arose in Frlekin v. Apple, Inc., an appeal in a wage and hour class action brought against Apple, Inc., by current and former nonexempt California retail store employees. In the suit, the plaintiffs sought compensation for time that they spent waiting for and undergoing exit searches whenever they left Apple’s retail store locations, pursuant to the company’s Employee Package and Bag Searches policy. The at-issue policy, which is similar to ones in place at many other large retailers, required that employees undergo unpaid, manager-performed bag/package checks before leaving the stores—at breaks or at the end of their shifts.

In July 2015, a district court certified the case as a class action. However, in November 2015, the district court granted Apple’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and ruled that time spent by class members waiting for and undergoing exit-related bag searches pursuant to Apple’s policy was not compensable as “hours worked” under California law because such time was neither “subject to the control” of the employer nor time during which the class members were “suffered or permitted” to work.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that employees are under the control of the employer while waiting for and undergoing the bag checks because they are required whenever entering or leaving the premises. Apple countered that the time is not compensable because employees are not required to bring bags to work, and may avoid the searches altogether by not bringing a bag or package to the workplace. In its order certifying the issue for the California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit noted that Apple’s position “finds strong support” in the seminal California Supreme Court decision Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575 (2000), in which the court held that time spent by employees using employer-mandated transportation to get to a worksite was compensable, while noting that time spent on “optional free transportation” would not be compensable. However, the Ninth Circuit expressed questions about whether differences in context—i.e., employer-provided transport to and from the workplace versus searches at the worksite—rendered Morillion distinguishable.

Although the U.S. Supreme Court previously determined that similar bag checks were not compensable in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014), the California Supreme Court has not addressed the compensability of bag checks under California’s wage and hour laws, which involve a somewhat different definition of compensable work time. As the Ninth Circuit noted in its order, the consequences of any interpretation of California law with respect to bag searches “will have significant legal, economic, and practical consequences for employers and employees” throughout California and will materially affect the outcome of many pending lawsuits. For the time being, employers should consult with qualified employment counsel to mitigate risk while we wait for the California Supreme Court to weigh in.

This post was written by Philippe A. Lebel of  Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.
Read more on litigation of wage and hour issues at the National Law Review.