The CTA Filing Deadline is Approaching. Is Your BOIR Filed Yet?

The clock is ticking—just 49 days remain until the one-year filing deadline for the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA)! Entities established before January 1, 2024, must submit a beneficial owner information report (BOIR) by December 31, 2024.

The CTA is a new reporting requirement that came into effect on January 1, 2024. The CTA requires any entity created by or registered to do business by the filing of a document with a secretary of state, or another similar office, to report its information and its beneficial owners to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which is a bureau of the United States Treasury. The goal is to decrease money laundering and fraud.

We previously published advisories on the general application of the CTA and its specific application to entities created for estate planning purposes. The rules and guidelines about which we previously reported are largely unchanged. A reporting company still needs to report its legal name, all trades and d/b/a names, address, and beneficial owners. Beneficial owners are those with substantial control or who own or control 25% or more of the reporting company, directly or indirectly. The reporting company needs to report each beneficial owner’s name, date of birth, residential address, and an identifying number and image from one of four acceptable identification documents.

Although the CTA was declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in Alabama, the ruling only prevents the CTA’s enforcement on the parties directly involved in the case. The court did not issue a nationwide ruling to prevent the law from being enforced. Thus, other companies are expected to continue filing BOIRs. The Alabama case is currently on appeal and oral arguments were held at the end of September 2024.

FinCEN has been periodically updating its Frequently Asked Questions to provide some clarification since the CTA became effective. We outline the most relevant guidance below:

General Updates:

  1. Entities that are created before January 1, 2024, even if dissolved sometime in 2024 before the December 31, 2024, deadline, must still report their information and beneficial owners by December 31, 2024.
  2. Entities that are created in 2024 have 90 days to file the BOIR. Entities created on or after January 1, 2025, will have 30 days to file the BOIR. Entities that are created in 2024 but are wound up, dissolved, or otherwise cease to exist must still file the BOIR with FinCEN.
  3. Beneficial ownership is determined in the aggregate. This means that companies need to analyze each beneficial owner to determine if he or she indirectly/directly substantially controls or owns 25% or more of a reporting company. For example, Individual X owns 10% of Company Y. Individual X is also trustee of a trust that owns 20% of Company Y. Individual X needs to be reported as a beneficial owner because he owns an aggregate 30% of the company.
  4. Beneficial owners may now apply for a FinCEN Identifier here. This allows the beneficial owners to report their information to FinCEN directly, obtain an Identifier number, and simply provide the Identifier to those reporting companies of which he or she is a beneficial owner. This prevents a beneficial owner from having to share personal and sensitive information with a company. This also streamlines the process for any change in the beneficial owner’s information. Each beneficial owner can log into FinCEN and simply update the information within 30 days of the change rather than first providing it to the reporting company and then the company filing a new BOIR to update the information.

a. In order to create a FinCEN Identifier, an individual will have to create a login.gov account. This is the account that the federal government is using to streamline many of its services, such as, global entry and applying for federal jobs.

5. Reporting companies may complete and submit a BOIR online here. A company could also submit a PDF of the report at the same link if it chose to complete a paper copy. There is no fee to submit online. There are also many vendors offering a service to assist with the process and submit the report for a fee.

Real Estate/Corporate Updates:

6.FinCEN clarified that the subsidiary exemption applies when a subsidiary’s ownership interests are entirely controlled or wholly owned, directly, or indirectly, by any of the following types of exempt entities: (1) Securities reporting issuer; (2) Governmental authority; (3) Bank; (4) Credit union; (5) Depository institution holding company; (6) Broker or dealer in securities; (7) Other Exchange Act registered entity; (8) Investment company or investment adviser; (9) Venture capital fund adviser; (10) Insurance company; (11) State-licensed insurance producer; (12) Commodity Exchange Act registered entity; (13) Accounting firm; (14) Public utility; (15) Financial market utility; (16) Tax-exempt entity; or (17) Large operating company. Further, if a reporting company’s ownership interests are controlled or wholly owned by more than one exempt entity, the reporting company may still qualify for the subsidiary exemption if the entities are unaffiliated; however, every controlling or owning entity must itself be an exempt entity in order for the reporting company to qualify for the subsidiary exemption.

Trusts and Estates Updates:

7.If there is a corporate trustee, the reporting company will be reporting those individual beneficial owners that indirectly own or control at least 25% of the ownership interests of the reporting company through the ownership in the corporate trustee. This will be determined by multiplying the percentage of ownership of the corporate trustee with the trust’s ownership/control of the reporting company. For example, if Individual A owns 70% of the corporate trustee of a trust, and that trust holds 30% of the reporting company, Individual A holds or controls 21% of the reporting company (70% x 30 = 21). If Individual A owned 90% of the corporate trustee, then it would own/control 27% of the reporting company (90% x 30 = 27) and the company must report Individual A as a beneficial owner. There may be other beneficial owners if someone else at the corporate trustee exercises substantial control over the reporting company.

A reporting company may submit the corporate trustee’s information in lieu of each beneficial owner’s information only if all of these conditions are met:

a. The corporate entity is an exempt entity from the reporting requirements.

b. The individual owns or controls 25% of the reporting company only through the corporate trustee.

c. The individual does not exercise substantial control over the reporting company.

A company can obtain its own FinCEN Identifier when it submits an initial BOIR for its beneficial owner(s). This way, such company may be reported as a beneficial owner, such as a corporate trustee that meets the above requirements. For example, when LLC A reports Individual A as its beneficial owner, LLC A has the option of clicking a button to obtain its own FinCEN Identifier.

8. An individual who has the power to remove a trustee, remove and replace a trustee, and/or appoint an additional trustee is deemed to have substantial control through the power to change the person who makes decisions for the trust, and thereby, the reporting company. While this is not explicit in the Frequently Asked Questions, it is consistent with FinCEN’s position that someone who has the power to remove a senior officer of a reporting company is a beneficial owner.

While this is an extensive list, it is by no means an exhaustive list, and various circumstances not discussed above may change how the CTA applies in a particular case.

Sportswashing: The New Money Laundering and Sanctions Avoidance Mechanism

In the world of international finance and crime, criminals and terrorists have always sought innovative ways to launder money and avoid sanctions. One relatively recent method that has gained prominence is known as “sportswashing.” This term refers to the use of sports events and organizations to legitimize illicit wealth, evade sanctions, and make millions for those with nefarious intentions. While the practice of sportswashing isn’t exclusive to one sport or country, this article will focus on the intriguing case of MTN Irancell’s involvement with Spain’s La Liga Soccer League and provide a broader context of potential money laundering in the world of football.

The MTN Irancell and IRGC Connection

By way of background, according to recent federal court filings, when MTN Irancell (an Iranian mobile network operator) was formed, the Electronic Development Company (IEDC) owned 51% of MTN Irancell, and IEDC was in turn owned by two companies that allegedly were and are front companies for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Importantly, in 2019, the U.S. State Department designated the IRGC as an Foreign Terrorist Organization.

The MTN Irancell and La Liga Connection

Arguably, one of the most high-profile examples of sportswashing can be seen in the case of MTN Irancell and its association with Spain’s La Liga Soccer League. MTN Irancell reportedly invested a significant amount of money in a sponsorship deal with La Liga, which allowed them to gain access to a global audience through advertising and promotions.  In a recent article published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), as part of that contractual arrangement, MTN Irancell “committed to pay La Liga 10 percent of any profit it earned from subscribers who watched Spanish soccer on its online channel…” But getting money out of a sanctioned regime can be difficult, apparently. According the OCCRP, yet another front company was formed (a Hong Kong-based shell company) to facilitate at least one payment to La Liga.

However, what might seem like a legitimate business arrangement can often serve as a cover for money laundering and sanctions avoidance. Criminal organizations and sanctioned individuals can funnel their illicit gains through these deals, effectively “cleaning” their money and making it appear legitimate. The global reach of popular football leagues like La Liga makes them an attractive channel for such activities.

Money Laundering in Football

The case of MTN Irancell is not an isolated incident when it comes to potential elicit financial flows. Football has long been associated with money laundering, with numerous instances of clubs, agents, and players being involved in financial misconduct. Criminals and corrupt officials exploit the complex financial structure of the sport, which involves multiple jurisdictions, hidden ownership structures, and massive sums of money changing hands.

In 2020, a BBC Panorama investigation revealed that some football agents and officials used secret bank accounts to move money across borders, raising concerns about the integrity of the sport. The combination of vast transfer fees, player salaries, and lucrative broadcasting deals provides ample opportunities for money launderers to exploit the system.

Adding to the challenges presented by sportswashing is its convergence with other money laundering typologies, such as human trafficking and the illegal drug trade.

Combating Sportswashing through KYC Mechanisms

To prevent their organizations from inadvertently engaging in sportwashing, companies and sports leagues must employ robust Know Your Customer (KYC) mechanisms. KYC is a vital component of financial regulations that requires businesses to verify the identity of their customers and assess their risk factors.

Here are some suggestions for companies seeking to avoid issues related to sportswashing through KYC mechanisms:

Due Diligence: Perform thorough due diligence on potential sponsors, investors, and partners. Investigate their financial backgrounds and the source of their funds to ensure they are not involved in illicit activities.

Transparency: Encourage transparency in financial transactions within the sports industry. Clearly define ownership structures and financial flows to minimize the potential for money laundering.

Compliance: Ensure compliance with international sanctions and financial regulations. Regularly update and enhance your compliance programs to adapt to evolving threats.

Third-Party Verification: Engage third-party firms that specialize in KYC and anti-money laundering (AML) services to vet and verify the legitimacy of business partners.  Third-party firms that use advanced artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies, particularly those that support name reconciliation and network analysis, can be especially helpful in detecting front companies used to disguise illicit financial flows.

Reporting Suspicious Activity: Encourage whistleblowing and reporting mechanisms to allow individuals to report suspicious activity without fear of reprisal.

Education and Training: Train employees and stakeholders on the risks associated with sportswashing and the importance of complying with financial regulations.

Oversight and Governance: Implement strong governance structures that include oversight by independent bodies to ensure financial integrity and transparency.

Sportswashing is a growing concern in the world of sports, particularly football, and it requires vigilance and cooperation between governments, sports organizations, and the private sector to combat it effectively. By prioritizing KYC mechanisms and maintaining strict compliance standards, companies can help prevent criminals and terrorists from exploiting the global appeal of sports for their illicit activities, thereby preserving the integrity of the beautiful game.

For more articles on sports, visit the NLR Entertainment, Art & Sports section.

FinCEN Issues Final Rule on the Corporate Transparency Act Requiring Businesses to Report Beneficial Ownership Information

On September 30, 2022, the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) published its final rule implementing Section 6403 of the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”). The final rule, which will take effect on January 1, 2024, will require “tens of millions” of companies doing business in the U.S. to report certain information about their beneficial owners. The reporting companies created or registered before January 1, 2024, will have until January 1, 2025, to file their initial beneficial ownership reports with FinCEN. Reporting companies created or registered on or after January 1, 2024, will be required to file initial beneficial ownership reports within 30 days of formation.

The CTA was passed by Congress on January 1, 2021, as part of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. After publishing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and receiving public comments, FinCEN adopted the proposed rule largely as proposed, with certain modifications intended to minimize unnecessary burdens on reporting companies.

What Entities are Reporting Companies? The final rule describes two types of reporting companies: domestic and foreign.

  • A domestic reporting company is any entity that is a corporation, a limited liability company, or other entity (such as limited liability partnerships, limited liability limited partnerships, business trusts, and most limited partnerships and business trusts) created by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or any similar office under the law of a state or American Indian tribe.

  • A foreign reporting company is any corporation, limited liability company, or other entity formed under the law of a foreign country and registered to do business in any state or tribal jurisdiction by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or any similar office under the law of a state or American Indian tribe.

What Entities are Exempt? The final rule exempts twenty-three separate categories of entities from the definition of the reporting company. Many of the exempted entities are already subject to federal or state regulations requiring disclosure of beneficial ownership information, such as banks, credit unions, depositary institutions, investment advisors, securities brokers and dealers, accounting firms, governmental entities, tax-exempt entities, and entities registered with the SEC under the Exchange Act of 1934. Additionally, the rules set forth an exemption for “large operating companies” that can demonstrate each of the following factors:

  • Employ more than 20 full-time employees in the U.S.

  • Have an operating presence at a physical office within the U.S.

  • Filed a federal income tax or information return in the U.S. for the previous year demonstrating more than $5 million in gross receipts or sales (excluding gross receipts or sales from sources outside the U.S.)

Finally, under the so-called “subsidiary exemption,” entities whose ownership interests are controlled or wholly owned by one or more exempt entities may also qualify for exemption. If a reporting company was formerly exempt but loses its exemption, it must file an updated report that announces the change and includes all the information required in a reporting company’s initial report.

Who are Beneficial Owners? The final rule requires reporting companies to report each individual who is a beneficial owner of such reporting company. A “beneficial owner” is any individual who, directly or indirectly, either exercises substantial control over the reporting company or owns or controls at least 25 percent of the ownership interests of the reporting company. An individual exercises “substantial control” if such individual:

  • Serves as a senior officer (except for corporate secretary or treasurer)

  • Has authority over the appointment or removal of any senior officer or a majority of the board of directors (or similar body)

  • Directs, determines, or has substantial influence over important decisions made by the reporting company

  • Has any other form of substantial control over the reporting company

Additionally, an individual may exercise substantial control over a reporting company, directly or indirectly, including as a trustee of a trust or similar arrangement, through:

  • Board representation

  • Ownership or control of a majority of the voting power or voting rights of the reporting company

  • Rights associated with any financing arrangement or interest in a company

  • Control over one or more intermediary entities that separately or collectively exercise substantial control over a reporting company

  • Arrangements or financial or business relationships, whether formal or informal, with other individuals or entities acting as nominees

  • Any other contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise

The final rule exempts five categories of individuals from the definition of beneficial owner: (i) minors, (ii) nominees, intermediaries, custodians, and agents, (iii) certain employees who are not senior officers, (iv) heirs with a future interest in the company, and (v) certain creditors.

Who are Company Applicants? In addition to the beneficial owner information, the final rule requires reporting companies created or registered on or after January 1, 2024, to report identifying information about each “company applicant.” A “company applicant” is:

  • Any individual who directly files the document to create a domestic reporting company or register a foreign reporting company with a secretary of state or similar office in the U.S.

  • Any individual who is primarily responsible for directing or controlling such filing if more than one individual is involved in the filing

The final rule provides further clarification as to certain individuals who, by virtue of their formation roles, fall under the definition of “company applicants.” For example:

  • If an attorney oversees the preparation and filing of incorporation documents and a paralegal files them, the reporting company would report both the attorney and paralegal as company applicants.

  • If an individual prepares and self-files documents to create the individual’s own reporting company, the reporting company would report the individual as the only company applicant.

The final rule removes the requirements that i) entities created before the effective date report company applicant information and ii) reporting companies update their company applicant information (except to correct inaccuracies), each of which were set forth in the proposed rules.

When are Initial Reports Due? When an initial report must be filed depends on the status of the reporting company as of January 1, 2024:

  • If Created or Registered on or after January 1, 2024 – It must file a report within 30 calendar days from the earlier of: i) the date on which the company receives actual notice that its creation or registration has become effective, or ii) the date a secretary of state or similar office first provides public notice, such as through a publicly accessible registry, that the company has been created or registered.

  • If Created or Registered Prior to January 1, 2024 – It must file a report not later than January 1, 2025.

What Information Must be Reported? An initial report must include the following information with respect to the reporting company:

  • The full legal name of the reporting company

  • Any trade name or “doing business as” name of the reporting company

  • The street address of the principal place of business of the reporting company (if outside the U.S., the street address of the primary location in the U.S. where it conducts business)

  • The state, tribal, or foreign jurisdiction of formation of the reporting company (a foreign reporting company must also report the state or tribal jurisdiction where it first registers)

  • The IRS Taxpayer Identification Number (“TIN”) of the reporting company (including the EIN of the reporting company, or if a foreign reporting company without a TIN, a tax identification number issued by a foreign jurisdiction and the name of such jurisdiction)

For each company applicant (of a reporting company registered or created on or after January 1, 2024) and each beneficial owner of a reporting company, the following information must be reported:

  • The full legal name of the individual

  • The date of birth of the individual

  • The current business street address (for a company applicant who forms or registers an entity in the course of such company applicant’s business) or residential street address (for all other individuals including beneficial owners)

  • A unique identifying number from, and image of, an acceptable identification document (e.g., a passport)

If a reporting company is directly or indirectly owned by one or more exempt entities and an individual is a beneficial owner of the reporting company exclusively by virtue of such individual’s ownership interest in the exempt entity, the reporting company’s report may list the name of the exempt entity in lieu of the beneficial ownership information set forth above.

When do Companies have to Report Changes? If there is any change with respect to required information previously submitted to FinCEN concerning a reporting company or its beneficial owners, including any change with respect to who is a beneficial owner or information reported for any particular beneficial owner, the reporting company is required to file an updated report within 30 calendar days of when the change occurred.

What are the Penalties for Violations? The final rule provides for a fine of up to $10,000.00 and/or imprisonment of up to two years for any person who willfully: (i) provides or attempts to provide false or fraudulent beneficial ownership information, or (ii) fails to report complete or updated beneficial ownership information to FinCEN. The penalties may also extend to individuals causing a reporting company’s failure to report or update information and senior officials of a reporting company at the time such failure occurs.

What is Coming Next from FinCEN? FinCEN is expected to publish the forms and instructions to be used for reporting beneficial ownership information well in advance of the effective date. FinCEN will further establish a secure nonpublic database for storage of the beneficial ownership information. Finally, FinCEN will issue rules on who may access the information (a limited group of governmental authorities and financial institutions), under what circumstances, and how the parties would generally be required to handle and safeguard the information.

What Should Reporting Companies be Doing Now? Existing companies should begin evaluating whether they are a “reporting company” and if so, determining who are their beneficial owners. Such reporting companies, including any other reporting companies that may be created or registered before the effective date, will have until January 1, 2025, to file an initial report. As noted, reporting companies created or registered on or after the effective date will have 30 calendar days after the date of creation or registration to file an initial report.

© 2022 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

Four Indicted for $16 Million Money Laundering Scheme

Four Indicted for $16 Million Money Laundering Scheme

On March 23, 2022, an indictment was unsealed in the Western District of Arkansas, charging four men for their involvement in wire fraud and money laundering schemes involving fake investment offerings amounting to an alleged $16 million.

According to court documents, the four men allegedly engaged in an investment fraud scheme between 2013 and 2021 in which they falsely represented the nature of their investment offerings and promised large returns, which they could not and did not yield. The indictment also alleges that two of the defendants encouraged victims to send their funds to bank accounts controlled by the other two defendants, and then transferred the money through a complex series of accounts worldwide.

The defendants were charged with wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. One defendant was further charged with money laundering. If convicted, the men will face up to 20 years in prison for each count. The additional count of money laundering carries an additional sentence of up to 10 years.

The DOJ press release can be found here.

California Man Pleads Guilty To Stealing Government COVID-19 Relief Funds

On March 18, 2022, a California man pleaded guilty in the Central District of California to misappropriating COVID-19 relief funds obtained through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act.

Under the CARES Act Provider Relief Fund, CARES Act health care providers who were financially harmed by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic are granted federal funds to provide care to patients suffering from COVID-19. According to court documents, the defendant admitted he owned a hospice agency in North Hollywood that was never operational during the COVID-19 pandemic, yet he received approximately $89,162 designated for the medical treatment and care of COVID-19 patients. The defendant admitted he misappropriated the CARES Act funds by spending them for his personal use and then transferring the funds to family members, including one family member in Armenia, rather than using the funds in any way related to the pandemic relief efforts as required.

As part of his guilty plea, the defendant further admitted that he submitted five Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) applications to the Small Business Administration (SBA) on behalf of his hospice agency and four other entities he controlled. As a result of his fraudulent applications, the SBA disbursed approximately $428,100 in EIDL funds to the man, which he used for his benefit against EIDL requirements.

The man pleaded guilty to three counts of theft of government property and is scheduled to be sentenced on June 13, facing up to 10 years in prison for each count.

The DOJ press release can be found here.

New Jersey Man Convicted for Fraudulently Obtaining US Visas for Chinese Government Employees

On March 23, 2022, a New Jersey man was convicted by a federal jury of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit visa fraud for his participation in a conspiracy to fraudulently obtain United States visas for Chinese government employees.

According to court documents, the defendant was involved in a scheme to fraudulently obtain J-1 research scholar visas for employees of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to allow them to covertly work for the PRC government while in the United States. The defendant operated an office of the China Association for the International Exchange of Personnel (CAIEP), an agency of the PRC government, in New Jersey that seeks to recruit US scientists, academics, engineers, and other experts for the PRC.

The J-1 research scholar program allows foreign nationals to visit the United States to conduct research at a corporate research facility, library, museum, university, or other research institution. The defendant allegedly worked to obtain a J-1 research scholar visa for a prospective employee based on the false representation that the employee would conduct research at a United States university, to conceal unlawful work of another employee who was present in the United States on a J-1 visa sponsored by a US university. The two employees represented to the US government that they were entering the US for the primary purpose of conducting research at US universities, but their actual purpose consisted of working for the CAIEP. The defendant reported the employee’s arrival to the United States to the US universities, procured a local driver’s license for her and disguised her CAIEP salary as a subsidy for research scholar living expenses to make her presence as a research scholar appear legitimate.

As a result of his conviction, the defendant faces a maximum sentence of five years; he is scheduled to be sentenced on July 11.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) press release can be found here.

UPS To Pay $5.3 Million for False Claims Act Allegations

On March 21, 2022, the DOJ announced that United Parcel Service Inc. (UPS) agreed to pay approximately $5.3 million to settle allegations that the company falsely reported information about the transfer of U.S. mail to foreign posts or other intended recipients under contracts with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), in violation of the False Claims Act (FCA).

UPS was engaged by USPS to pick up U.S. mail at various locations and deliver it to its international and domestic destinations. As a condition of payment, UPS was required to submit electronic scans to USPS to report when the mail was delivered, and there were specified penalties for mail that was delivered late or to the wrong location. The settlement resolves allegations that scans submitted by UPS were falsified times and that UPS, in fact, transferred possession of the mail.

According to DOJ, this is the fifth civil settlement involving air carrier liability for false delivery scans under the USPS International Commercial Air Contracts, pursuant to which the United States has recovered more than $70 million.

The DOJ press release can be found here.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

Israeli Bank to Pay $30 Million for FIFA Money Laundering Violations

In 2015, the world was shocked by well-documented revelations of widespread corruption and bribery within the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”). At the time, the full extent of the FIFA money laundering scandal was unknown. This month, that 2015 revelation and the subsequent investigation has led to Bank Hapoalim (“BHBM”), an Israeli subsidiary of Swiss bank Hapoalim Ltd. (“HBS”), to pay $30 million of forfeiture and criminal fines.

In an April 30, 2020 press release, Assistant Director in Charge William F. Sweeney of the FBI’s New York Field Office described the difficulty in interrupting and identifying large scale sophisticated financial crimes. “This announcement illustrates another aspect in the spider web of bribery, corruption and backroom deals going on behind the scenes as soccer games were played on the field,” Sweeney said. He further explained that “Bank Hapoalim admits executives looked the other way and allowed illicit activity to continue even when employees discovered the scheme and reported it.”

Chuck Blazer, an “insider” and a former top FIFA official, provided vital evidence relied upon by the United States in securing the indictments that served as a basis for allegations against BHBM. The key to unlocking the FIFA money laundering scandal is the long reach of U.S. anti-bribery and corruption laws, which allow any person, whether a U.S. person or not, to report international financial misconduct. Yesterday, the Department of Justice reported that Bank Hapoalim would forfeit over $20 million and pay nearly $10 million in fines as a penalty for almost five years of financial misconduct.

In 2015, the full extent of the fraud within the inner workings and financial institutions like BHBM and BHS that knowingly enabled these corrupt activities within FIFA remained undisclosed. BHBM’s admission that it conspired to launder money and did facilitate bribes to corrupt FIFA officials, and the resulting $30 million to be paid as a consequence, reinforces the value of whistleblower contributions in concrete terms. This case serves as ample evidence that backroom dealings around the world can be brought to light by brave individuals who are willing to share what they know with authorities.

Whistleblower laws are potent tools available to individuals regardless of nationality or citizenship. They also provide substantial monetary rewards. When information leads to a recovery, the whistleblower is entitled to a financial award of 10%-30% of the total recovery. Another critical component of the U.S. anti-fraud program is that whistleblowers can anonymously provide information and still recover the reward. In this case, a whistleblower could have a claim for almost $10 million of the funds paid by BHBM. Due to the strict rules regarding anonymity, the world may never know whether such a claim is paid. However, the possibility of such a significant award serves as an effective incentive to other potential insiders contemplating blowing the whistle on misconduct.


Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2020. All Rights Reserved.

For more on similar topics, see the National Law Review Criminal Law & Business Crimes section.

And Here Come the Lawyers: Securities Fraud Suits Commence Private Litigation Phase of Danske Bank Scandal

More Allegations of Nordic Malfeasance Surface as Private Party Lawsuits Beset Danske Bank and SwedBank Gets Sucked into Unfolding Scandal

“Something was indeed rotten in the state of Denmark.” – Olav Haazen

In what is perhaps the least surprising development in the sprawling, continuously unfolding Danske Bank (“Danske”) money laundering scandal, investor groups have filed private securities fraud actions against the Denmark-based bank and its top executives: first in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York then, most recently, in Copenhagen City Court in Denmark. These suits coincide with an announcement from the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) that it, too, was opening its own probe of potential securities and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) violations at Danske that could result in significant financial penalties on top of what could be the enormous private judgments. More significantly, the Danske shareholder suits and SEC investigation illustrate a second front of enormous exposure from a securities fraud standpoint for banks involved in their own money laundering scandals and a rock-solid guaranteed template for future investors similarly damaged by such scandals.

As we have blogged herehere and here, the Danske scandal – the largest alleged money laundering scandal in history – has yielded criminal and administrative investigations in Estonia, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom and by the United States Department of Justice. Those investigations have focused primarily on Danske’s compliance with applicable AML regulations, as well as the implementation and effectiveness of those regulations. The SEC and civil plaintiffs now have opened a new line of inquiry focusing less on the institutional and regulatory failures that yielded the scandal and responsibility for them and more on the damage those failures have caused Danske investors.

Meanwhile, banking stalwart Swedbank is reacting, with mixed success at best, to allegations that suspicious transactions involving billions of Euros passed from Danske’s Estonian branch through Swedbank’s own Baltic branches — allegations which have produced a controversial internal investigation report, a law enforcement raid, the loss of the bank’s CEO, and plunging stock value.

Background

The Danske story has been told many times. Between 2007 and 2016, at least 200 billion Euros were laundered through Danske’s Estonia branch primarily by actors connected to the former Soviet Union. During that time, numerous red flags allegedly were ignored by Danske operatives permitting countless suspicious transactions to flow through the bank unabated. Ultimately, a whistleblower alerted Danske management of his concerns over the suspicious transactions, prompting an internal investigation that ultimately revealed the massive scope of the money laundering operation.

The Securities Fraud Angle

While initial investigations have examined how a substantial European bank and the regulators responsible for overseeing it could miss or ignore thousands of suspicious transactions channeling hundreds of billions of illicitly-gained Euros to the West, the bank’s investors and the SEC are attempting to hold the bank accountable for misleading investors concerning what it knew of the Estonian money laundering and what it meant to the bank’s overall bottom line. When the results of the Danske internal investigation were announced in October 2018, revealing for the first time the full scope of the scandal, Danske’s share value cratered. Ultimately, Danske’s share price halved and investors in Denmark holding direct shares in the bank and foreign investors holding depositary shares lost almost $9 billion.

Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 773 Pension Fund v. Danske Bank, et al.

On January 9, 2019, the Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 773 Pension Fund filed a class action complaint (the “SDNY Action”) on its own behalf and on behalf of purchasers of Danske Bank American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”) between January 9, 2014 and October 23, 2018. An ADR is a security that allows American investors to own and trade shares of a foreign company, created when a foreign company wants to list its shares on an American exchange. The company first sells its shares to a domestic branch of an American brokerage. Then those shares are deposited with a depositary bank, a United States bank with foreign operations that acts as a foreign custodian that, in turn, issues depositary shares to the purchasing broker. The depositary shares are then sold on an American exchange. Depositary shares are derivatives – they represent a security issued by the foreign company and their value derives from the share value of the foreign company. Thus if, for instance, the foreign company became embroiled in a money laundering scandal of unprecedented magnitude, and if that scandal had a deleterious effect on the company’s stock, it would create a coextensive loss in value to the ADR. As it happens, the American class of Danske investors who brought the SDNY Action have alleged this precise scenario.

The SDNY Action presents a standard Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 fraud claim (as well as a claim for control person liability under Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act) against Danske and its chief executives centered on the bank’s alleged knowledge of and failure to disclose the Estonian money laundering since 2014. According to the complaint, the deception took two forms.

First, in 2014, Danske executives became aware that billions of dollars in illegal transactions were flowing through the Estonian branch and generating significant profits for the branch and the bank generally. Yet, armed with the knowledge that its “outsized profits” were the result of illegal money laundering, Danske issued annual reports in 2014 to 2016 to its investors in which it “attributed the results to Danske Bank’s purported ongoing operation and strategic prowess, rather than to the money laundering that the whistleblower had already disclosed to Dansk Bank’s senior executives.” Danske’s concealment of the true basis for its financial performance permitted its shares to trade at artificially inflated prices. Share prices were further inflated when Danske, relying on its financial performance (driven by its processing of stolen Russian money) sought and obtained several corporate debt rating increases that facilitated its raising hundreds of millions of dollars by issuing and selling bonds in the European bond markets.

Second, in February 2017, rumors began to spread concerning Danske’s Estonian bank operations. Danske initially downplayed these rumors, releasing a statement that “[s]everal media today report on a case of possible international money laundering, and Danske Bank is mentioned as one of the banks that may have been used. For Danske Bank, the transactions involved are almost exclusively transactions carried out at out Estonian branch in the 2011-2014 period.”   The statement continued to tout the significant steps Danske had taken since 2014 to combat money laundering and the success of those efforts. Later, in September 2017, as reporting increased on Danske’s involvement in money laundering, it issued another release, stating that it had “expanded its ongoing investigation into the situation at its Estonian branch” and following “a root cause analysis concluding that several major deficiencies led to the branch not being sufficiently effective in preventing it from potentially being used for money laundering in the period from 2007 to 2015.”

From there the scandal broke in waves of investigations, fines, management departures, scaled-down and closing operations, and an ever-increasing total figure culminating in a Wall Street Journal report in October 2017 on Danske’s investigations pegging the total amount of illicit transactions at 200 billion Euros involving upwards of 15,000 non-resident customers.

According to the SDNY Action plaintiffs, between February 2018, “when Danske Bank ADRs traded at their Class Period high of $20.90 per share” and October 2018, when the magnitude of the scandal was revealed, “Danske Bank lost $11.40 per share in value, or 54%, erasing more than $2.793 billion in market value.” As luck would have it, the plaintiffs further note that “[a]s the U.S. SEC, DOJ and Treasury and Estonian Authorities continue to investigate, Danske Bank has built a reserve of $2.7 billion – equivalent to 85% of its 2017 net profit – to cover potential fines and reportedly continues to add to that reserve.”

The Danish Front

And Danske might be right to “continue to add to that reserve.” On March 14, 2019, a group of institutional investors filed a lawsuit against Danske in Copenhagen City Court on behalf of “[a]n international coalition of public pension funds, governmental entities, and asset managers” from Asia, Australia, Europe and North America (the “Copenhagen Action”). The Copenhagen Action was brought by the Delaware law firm Grant & Eisenhower and Florida securities fraud firm DRRT and was filed on behalf of all investors who purchased Danske securities since December 31, 2012.

Grant & Eisenhower explains in its press release, “[t]o date, more than 169 institutional investors, including many of the world’s largest pension funds, suffered substantial losses at the hands of Danske Bank unchecked laundering of funds passing through its branch in Estonia. The claimant group seeks $475 million USD in damages.” The Copenhagen Action follows the arc of the SDNY Action. As the lead attorney on the matter, Olav Haazan, describes: “Although the criminal laundering scheme flowed through the little Estonian branch, our lawsuit asserts that something was indeed rotten in the state of Denmark. . . . Danske Bank’s management engaged in a concerted cover-up of its enormous money laundering exposure, while continuing to paint a rosy picture to investors. For years, leadership made no disclosures about the problem and then misrepresented the extent of its participation in the scheme, while touting the bank’s anti-money laundering policies and procedures.”

Mr. Haazan has promised a second filing by June 1 by another group of aggrieved investors.

What – Me Worry?

Danske held its annual shareholders meeting over the course of five days after the Copenhagen suit was filed. Predictably, investors were displeased. Yet, Danske’s new Chairman, Karsten Dybvad struck a defiant tone in the face of potential civil exposure in the billions of dollars. Responding to the lawsuits, Dybvad told investors, “[i]t is our fundamental position that the bank has lived up to its information obligation. As such we don’t find any basis for lawsuits or for a settlement.” Nevertheless, according to Dybvad, “[t]he executive board has decided to waive the bonuses that could have been paid for 2018.”

Enter Swedbank

Howard Wilkinson, the Danske insider whose report launched a thousand investigations, testified that, while Danske’s role in facilitating money laundering was clear, where that money ultimately went is unknown. He went on to speculate that with the uncertainty surrounding any subsequent transactions from Danske involving laundered funds, Danske’s involvement is likely “the tip of the iceberg.” Recent events involving Swedbank have begun to take us further from the summit.

In late February, reports from Swedish broadcaster SVT revealed that between 2007 and 2015, suspicious transactions involving billions of Euros passed from Danske’s Estonian branch through Swedbank’s own Baltic branches. Swedbank’s shares fell nearly 20% on this news. Swedbank then hastily commissioned an internal investigation that yielded a widely lambasted and heavily redacted report from Forensic Risk Alliance concluding that an undisclosed number of suspicious Danske customers were also Swedbank customers and those customers moved some amount of money through Swedbank. From there, the Swedbank story has predictably exploded in size and scope.

First, on March 26, 2019, Swedish broadcaster SVT, which initially reported on the Swedbank scandal, reported that as much as 23 billion Euros in suspicious transactions flowed through the Swedbank Estonian operations. The following day, SVT reported that Swedbank was under investigation for withholding information from U.S. investigators about suspicious transaction and customers, including Paul Manafort and deposed Ukranian President Viktor Yanukovych. Later that day, Sweden’s Economic Crime Authority raided Swedbank’s headquarters related to an insider trading probe investigating whether the bank informed its largest shareholders of the February SVT report in advance.

Later still that day, news broke that Swedbank is under investigation by the New York Department of Financial Services for providing investors with misleading information concerning the money laundering scandal. Finally, March 27, 2019 was capped with an announcement that the Economic Crime Authority was also investigating whether Swedbank misled investors and the market through communications made in the months preceding the emergence of the scandal. The bank’s shares plunged an additional 12%.

Responding to the onslaught, Swedbank CEO Birgette Bonnensen – former head of Swedbank’s Baltic operations – issued a press release intended to reassure shaken investors. Noting that “[t]his has been a very tough day for Swedbank, our employees and our shareholders” Bonnensen stated that “Swedbank believes that it has been truthful and accurate in its communications,” adding “I will do everything in my power to handle the current situation.” Ms. Bonnensen was fired by the Swedbank board the following day.

Swedbank halted trading on the Stockholm exchange that day, but not before its shares fell another 7.8%, bringing its total decline since February to over 30% – wiping away approximately 7 billion Euro of its market value.

Adding to the intrigue swirling around the Swedbank story, a legal fight has broken out between Swedbank and Swedish prosecutors concerning the contents of a sealed envelope – a report prepared by Norwegian lawyer Erling Grimstad, who was commissioned by the bank to examine its activities after the scandal came to light in February. Swedbank contends the report is protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and the bank will not waive the privilege until “all foreseeable consequences are known and assessed,” stating further “[i]t is incomprehensible that the prosecutor doesn’t respect the law and instead uses media to cast suspicion over the management of the bank by implying that the management is hampering the investigation.”

In just over a month, Swedbank went from Danske spectator to the subject of its own now 135 billion Euro Estonian money laundering scandal. More details will follow when the inevitable shareholder complaints are filed.

 

Copyright © by Ballard Spahr LLP.
This post was written by Terence M. Grugan of Ballard Spahr LLP.

U.S. Designations Targeting a Major Panamanian Money Laundering Organization Not Aided by the Panama Papers Leak

Yesterday, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced designations against the Panama-based Waked Money Laundering Organization, including its leaders, network of supporters and associates, and companies. According to press reports, Colombian law enforcement arrested the organization’s leader, Nidal Ahmed Waked Hatum, at a Bogota airport the day prior to the designations.

In total, OFAC added 8 individuals and 68 business entities to the List of Specially Designated Nationals (SDN List) pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act). Narcotics traffickers have used these businesses to obscure the source of drug money through a variety of means, including trade-based money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, real estate development, and illicit financial services.  The designation of Balboa Bank & Trust is particularly noteworthy, as it reflects Treasury’s continued willingness to use the Kingpin Act against financial institutions.  As noted in a previous entry, OFAC had not designated a bank pursuant to the Kingpin Act prior to November 2015.

OFAC clearly anticipates that these designations will cause significant disruptions, as it concurrently issued three General Licenses authorizing certain wind down transactions involving a hotelnewspapers, and a shopping mall.  U.S. persons should carefully consider the scope and expiration dates of these licenses prior to engaging in any dealings with these designated companies.

The designations do not signal the beginning of United States government actions in response to the Panama Papers leak.  Any potential use of those documents will be limited by the legal ethical issues surrounding the use of intentionally disclosed materials likely protected by the attorney-client privilege.  In addition to the legal ethical limitations, the evidentiary which serves as the administrative record for the designations would have required several months for investigation, drafting and interagency approval.  OFAC could not have finalized such an extensive package of designations within one month of the leak.

Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.

Continued International and Domestic Coordinated Focus on Money Laundering

On February 1st, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) announced an unspecified number of arrests of Hizballah money launderers, including Mohamad Noureddine. stack of moneyThese arrests followed the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designation of Noureddine pursuant to its counterterrorism authority. The OFAC press release for this designation identifies Noureddine as a key Hizballah money launderer. According to OFAC,  Noureddine and his company Trade Point International S.A.R.L. established a money laundering network across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East that provides bulk cash shipping and black market currency exchange services for those seeking to hide their ill-gotten gains.

Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015

Irrespective of the detention of Noureddine, foreign financial intuitions that knowingly facilitate or conduct significant financial transactions for Trade Point International S.A.R.L. may have their U.S. correspondent or payable through accounts severed. OFAC has this authority under Section 102 of the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015, which authorizes secondary sanctions on Hizballah.

Lebanese Canadian Bank

The arrests stem from  interagency  investigations of the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB). U.S.  law enforcement agencies have a long history with this now defunct Hizballah-linked bank.  In February 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to exclude  LCB from the U.S. financial system, finding that the bank is of “primary money laundering concern.”  In response to this action, the Banque du Liban revoked LCB’s banking license in September 2011. The bank’s remaining assets and liabilities were then sold to Societé General. Two years later, LCB entered into a $102 million settlement agreement to resolve a civil forfeiture and money laundering lawsuit filed by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.  FinCEN withdrew  its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in September 2015, on the basis that LCB no longer exists.

Coordinated Effort to Combat Money Laundering

The success of the ongoing money laundering investigation and recent arrests were possible because of the cooperation and coordination among the following international and domestic agencies:

  • DEA Philadelphia, DEA Miami, DEA Newark, DEA New York

  • DEA Special Operations Division and DEA Bilateral Investigative Unit

  • DEA country offices in Europe

  • DEA country offices in Bogota and Cartagena, Colombia

  • S. Customs and Border Protection National Targeting Center

  • S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)

  • S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

  • Various French, German, Italian and Belgian law enforcement agencies

  • EUROPOL

  • EUROJUST

Like the LCB investigation before it, yesterday’s arrests will likely lead to additional U.S. and international actions against money launderers around the world.

ARTICLE BY Jeremy P. Paner of Holland & Hart LLP

Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Proposes Anti-Money Laundering Rules

Vedder Price Law Firm

On July 23, 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would amend existing Bank Secrecy Act regulations with respect to customer due diligence (CDD) requirements for certain covered financial institutions, including mutual funds, brokers or dealers in securities and futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities. The proposed rules would formalize certain CDD requirements and also require that covered financial institutions “identify and verify the beneficial owners of legal entity customers.” FinCEN’s proposal includes a standard certification form that covered financial institutions would be required to use for documenting the beneficial ownership of their legal entity customers. An individual may qualify as a “beneficial owner” of a legal entity customer if the individual either (1) owns 25% or more of the equity interests of the entity, or (2) has significant management responsibilities within the entity. As proposed, covered financial institutions would be exempted from identifying the beneficial owners of an intermediary’s underlying clients if the covered financial institution has no customer identification program obligation with respect to those underlying clients.

Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking are due by October 3, 2014.

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