Tag: Mexico

6 Steps to Manage Tariff Risks in a Trade War

As Trump seeks to raise U.S. tariffs (which currently tend to be among the lowest worldwide), manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and other companies that frequently import (“importers”) must determine the best strategy to deal with the resulting uncertainties. Determining such a strategy is further complicated by the fact that President Trump has made a number of different proposals depending on the country and product.

Trump Tariff Proposals

  • 25% tariffs on Mexico and Canda
  • 10% tariffs on China
  • 100% tariffs on BRICS countries (comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and more recently additional countries in the Middle East and Africa)
  • 10–20% tariffs on the rest of the world
  • “Reciprocal tariffs” that would impose varying tariff levels by country

But while the exact form of higher tariffs is unknown, the reality is that higher tariffs are coming. This means importers have three tariff-related problems:

  1. Identifying and Managing Immediate Risks and Cost Increases. Importers need to manage the immediate risk of higher tariffs, which can sharply change production cost structures.
  2. Nimbly Responding by Changing Supply Chain Structure. Importers need to ensure they can nimbly respond to rapid shifts in importing from planned suppliers, even if it means entirely changing long-standing supply chains.
  3. Maintaining Supply Chain Integrity to Avoid Detained Goods. Importers need to continue to comply with ongoing efforts of Customs & Border Protection (CBP) to emphasize supply chain integrity issues so that goods do not get detained at the border — specifically, supply chain integrity issues related to forced labor, human trafficking, and the importing of goods potentially violating the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA).

To cope with these problems, importers need to identify their import-related risks, add flexibility within their supply chains, address tariff-related risks in both their buy- and sell-side contracts, and ensure their customs and supply chain integrity compliance is in good working order. Below are six practical steps that importers can take to identify and mitigate their import-related risks.

  • Step 1: Risk Identification – Understanding Your Company’s Importing Patterns and How They Impact Your Company’s Importing Risk Profile. Importers need to gather full information on their historic and planned import patterns so that they can understand the full scope of potential supply chain disruptions and higher tariffs on importing costs.
  • Step 2: Risk Planning – Understanding How to Add Flexibility to Your Supply Chain to Address Your Company’s Import-Related Risk. It is likely that the Trump Administration will announce tariff rates that target certain countries, including not just China, Canada, and Mexico but also Europe and countries that have free trade agreements with the United States. Accordingly, importers need to conduct risk planning and identify areas where they can build in supply chain flexibility to ensure they have the ability to quickly pivot import patterns if needed to respond to a rapidly changing tariff environment, particularly when importing from countries that maintain higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers, such as China, India, and Brazil (which will likely be targets of reciprocal tariffs).
  • Step 3: Contractual Risk Management – Identifying Ways to Increase Your Company’s Contractual Ability to Adapt to Unexpected Changes in the Importing Environment. Importers should gather and audit their contractual provisions, on both the buy and sell sides, to determine how the contracts address tariff-related risks. The goal is to ensure all contractual arrangements incorporate supply, sales, and pricing flexibility to deal with unanticipated tariff changes.
  • Step 4: Risk Minimization– Ensuring Your Company’s Customs Compliance Is in Order. In a high-tariff environment, tariff underpayments mount up much more quickly, as do potential penalties. As a result, manufactures must examine import-related compliance to ensure your company is exercising reasonable care in import operations and not underpaying customs tariffs.
  • Step 5: Opportunity Identification – Ensuring Your Company Is Maximizing Tariff Savings. In a high-tariff environment, it also is more important to identify potential tariff-saving opportunities. Therefore, importers must examine their historic and planned import patterns to identify available tariff-saving opportunities, including potential ways to minimize tariffs if USMCA disappears (or if it is substantially modified), or if additional tariffs are imposed on Canada or Mexico or other major sources of imports.
  • Step 6: Minimizing Supply Chain Integrity Risks– Understanding Your Supply Chain and Mitigating Supply Chain Integrity Risk, Right Down to the Last Sub-Supplier. Finally, CBP has been detaining a record number of goods for supply chain integrity issues, especially for UFLPA violations. An importer must carefully consider whether it has implemented measures to help ensure it is ethically sourcing goods from abroad, including the need to quickly vet secondary or alternative suppliers brought on board to expand supply chain flexibility.
© 2025 Foley & Lardner LLP
For more on Tariffs, visit the NLR Antitrust Trade Regulation section

The Trade War Begins with Canada, China, and Mexico

On February 1, 2025, President Trump declared a national emergency based upon the threat posed by undocumented foreign workers and drugs entering the United States. The White House has published a fact sheet outlining steps to address the threat by implementing (i) a 25% additional tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico, (ii) a 10% additional tariff on imports from China, and (iii) a carveout for a lower 10% tariff for energy resources from Canada (see Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Imports from Canada, Mexico and China – The White House).

President Trump declared the national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act. This action marks the first time a President has used the IEEPA to impose tariffs. President Nixon had used a precursor law to impose 10% tariffs on all imports in 1971 in order to avoid a balance of payments crisis resulting from ending the U.S. dollar’s gold standard (see prior alert Can the President Impose Tariffs Without Congressional Approval?).

President Trump issued Executive Orders imposing these additional tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico (see link to Canada EO, China EO (unpublished), and Mexico EO (unpublished)).[1] The Executive Orders generally provide that the IEEPA national security tariffs may be removed if Canada and Mexico demonstrate adequate steps have been undertaken to alleviate the illegal migration and illicit drug crisis through cooperative actions, and China demonstrates adequate steps have been taken to alleviate the opioid crisis through cooperative actions.

A quick overview of five key initial questions:

1. When do the IEEPA national security tariffs take effect?

These IEEPA national security tariffs will be collected at the ad valorem rate of duty beginning 12:01 am ET, Tuesday, February 4, 2025.

2. How do I know if my import is subject to the IEEPA national security tariffs?

The Executive Orders reference “all articles” suggesting that the IEEPA national security tariff will apply to all merchandise imported from Canada, China, and Mexico; excepting that, there will be a carveout for energy from Canada, with the definitions based upon section 8 of Executive Order 14156 of January 20, 2025 (Declaring a National Energy Emergency). The necessary modifications to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States will be updated by the Department of Homeland Security and published in the Federal Register.

3. How is the IEEPA national security tariff rate calculated and applied?

The IEEPA national security tariff will be collected at an ad valorem rate based upon the entered value of the merchandise, meaning that the IEEPA national security tariff will be calculated on the entered value of the merchandise and simply added to any other duty applicable on the subject merchandise.

4. Who is responsible for paying the IEEPA national security tariff?

The importer of record is responsible for paying all duties to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. There is no change to this requirement.

5. Is there a process to apply for exclusions from IEEPA national security tariffs?

There have been no stated exemptions or processes for exclusions from the IEEPA national security tariffs, but importers may continue to review mitigation strategies for application (see prior alert Preparing for Tariff Increases – Mitigation Strategies: Miller Canfield).

In addition, the Executive Orders further provide that:

  • There is no duty drawback available for the covered merchandise, i.e. the refund of duties, taxes, and fees paid on imported merchandise subsequently exported or destroyed;
  • Merchandise must be admitted as “privileged foreign status,” meaning the merchandise remains subject to the tariff based upon its imported state, regardless of whether the classification changes in a Free Trade Zone, i.e. no avoiding the tariff by importing the merchandise into a Free Trade Zone;
  • There is no de minimis treatment available under Section 321, i.e. duty free treatment for shipments below $800; and
  • The President may increase or expand in scope the tariffs imposed under the Executive Orders upon retaliation against the United States by Canada, China, or Mexico through the application of tariffs or similar.

Because the imposition of additional IEEPA national security tariffs remains in flux, importers should carefully monitor this situation. For up-to-date advice and assistance on mitigation options to tariff exposure applicable to your business, please contact your Miller Canfield attorney or one of the authors of this alert.

[1] Press reports indicate that the China EO and Mexico EO have been signed and are similar in form, but as of the time of this publication the China EO and Mexico EO have not yet been posted to www.whitehouse.gov.

© 2025 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC
For more on Trade, visit the NLR Antitrust Trade Regulation section

The New Paradigm in Mexico for Damage Claims in Industrial Property.

The Federal Law for the Protection of Industrial Property, in force since the 5th of November of 2020, is distinguished from its predecessor, among other things, by the particularities in the claims of a compensation for damages caused by the infringement of industrial property rights.

Currently, individuals may claim a compensation for damages through the administrative venue, before the Mexican Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI), or through the civil venue before the corresponding Courts in the matter. This implies that the holder of infringed exclusive rights may opt for two procedures and authorities of different nature, which has its benefits and disadvantages.

Before the IMPI, the compensation action is exercised in an ancillary proceeding, provided that such authority has previously issued a declaration of administrative infringement that is enforceable. Alternatively, it is still possible for the action to be brought directly before the Civil Courts, once the resolution from IMPI is final.

Although the exercise of the action for compensation before the administrative authority implies that a specialized authority in the matter is to hear the case, it has the disadvantages that its ancillary proceeding requires the prior prosecution of an administrative infringement claim before the same administrative authority (IMPI) and the lack of experience to quantify damages and losses. Additionally, the time required for the enforcement of the resolution issued by the IMPI before the Federal Courts in Civil Matters must be added to the time required for the substantiation of the action.

Thanks to the entry into force of the new Law, individuals may also resort directly to the civil Courts to claim infringement of their industrial property rights and compensation for damages, without the need for a prior declaration of infringement by the IMPI. This implies that a Judge, an expert in civil law, will have to delve into complex, specialized and technical issues, specific to industrial property.

Additionally, it is provided that the proceeding of the civil action will be suspended if an invalidity claim is filed before the IMPI against the right basis the civil claim, as long as the administrative authority does not issue a final resolution to such nullity action. This counteracts the advantage of a civil proceeding whose resolution may be quicker than before IMPI.

The new landscape for the claim for damages requires a careful study of the particularities of each specific case to determine the suitability of each route, since this is influenced, among other factors, by the complexity, the sophistication of the counterparty, the causes and technical considerations of the violation caused, among others.

© 2005-2024 OLIVARES Y COMPAÑIA S.C.
For more news on Damage Claims in Industrial Property in Mexico, visit the NLR Real Estate section.

Mexico’s Minimum Wage Set to Increase on January 1, 2023

On December 1, 2022, Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador announced that, unanimously, the business and labor sectors, as well as the government, had agreed to increase the minimum wage by 20 percent for 2023, which will be applicable in the Free Zone of the Northern Border (Zona Libre de la Frontera Norte or ZLFN), as well as the wage applicable in the rest of the country. The increase will become official when it is published in the Official Gazette of the Federation (Diario Oficial de la Federación).

Before the increase was determined, the Mexican National Commission on Minimum Wages (Comisión Nacional de los Salarios Mínimos, or CONASAMI) applied an independent recovery amount (Monto Independiente de Recuperación or MIR) in accordance with the following:

  • MIR for the ZLFN: MXN $23.68
  • MIR for the rest of the country: MXN $15.72

On top of the MIR, the CONASAMI approved a 10 percent increase from the 2022 rate to the daily minimum wage applicable to the ZLFN and the rest of the country, resulting in MXN $312.41 (approximately USD $16.11) for the ZLFN and MXN $207.44 (approximately USD $10.69) for the rest of the country. The new rates would be effective as of January 1, 2023.

The MIR and the 10 percent increase—combined—would represent a 20 percent increase in the daily minimum wage rate which translates to more than MXN $30 per day.

Finally, Secretary of Labor Luisa Maria Alcalde stated that the above increases would directly benefit 6.4 million workers in Mexico.

Article By Pietro Straulino-Rodriguez, Nora M. Villalpando Badillo, and Ana Paula Delsol Espada of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Legal Standing in Trademark Non-Use Cancellation Actions

In recent years the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office (IMPI) allowed the possibility that complainants credit their legal standing on trademark non-use cancellation proceedings through the existence of a trademark application without the need of initially demonstrating that such application was blocked to registration in view of the prior existence of third parties’ confusingly similar registered marks, as long as the official action citing the conflicting registration as pertinent barrier was submitted as subsequent evidence in the proceeding.

Accordingly, it started to be a common practice to file non-use cancellation actions submitting as evidence a certified copy of the trademark application serving as a basis to attack the registration not being used accompanied with the results of an availability search showing the existence of the registration subject to the proceeding.

Nonetheless, such criteria adopted by IMPI was revoked by the Federal Court of Administrative Affairs and by Federal Circuit Courts sustaining that legal standing must be credited initially along with the complaint without being possible to do it at a later stage by submitting the evidence attesting that IMPI objected the registration of complainant’s trademark application on grounds of likelihood of confusion because of the existence of defendant’s registration.

The Court’s reasonings behind the revocation of such criteria were mainly based on legal certainty arguments stating that legal standing can only born when a formal objection is raised by IMPI communicating to the applicant the existence of a citation based on likelihood of confusion.

Therefore, IMPI is now starting to analyze and solve non-use cancellation actions following the Court’s legal reasonings stating that legal standing must be credited initially along with the complaint, without enabling complainants to credit such standing subsequently.

Consequently, it is advisable that titleholders file non-use cancellation actions only after being served with the official actions communicating the existence of pertinent barriers blocking the registration.

Article By Jaime Rodríguez of OLIVARES

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2005-2022 OLIVARES Y COMPAÑIA S.C.

Reform Bill Proposal to Article 8 of The Federal Law of Cinematography in Mexico

A proposal was published in the Gazette of the Chamber of Senators on February 9, 2022, to reform Article 8 of the Federal Law of Cinematography, signed by María del Carmen Escudero Fabre together with other members of the PAN Parliamentary Group.

The intention of the proposed bill is to reform Article 8 of the Federal Law of Cinematography, which may guarantee access to audiovisual material exhibited in movie theaters for people who suffer from some degree of visual disability.

The explanatory memorandum of the proposal states that the General Law for the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities establishes that the denial of reasonable adjustments constitutes a discriminatory act on the grounds of disability, a provision expressly prohibited in the first article of the Constitution.

It further details that it is necessary to recognize that people who suffer from disability may face difficulties when exercising their rights, such as access to health, work, education, transportation, communications, to culture, tourism, among others, being the responsibility of the State to design a normative framework that allows its access in equitable conditions.

The bill’s author comments that this would be an advancement for Mexicans with some degree of visual impairment, with the understanding that auditory stimuli can be used to compensate for visual ones and build the ideas of the spectators based on them, and that access to educational and recreational material for this group continues to be a challenge under the current legislation.

She continues that for this reason and being aware of the difficulties faced by a person with any type of disability, efforts like this can help reduce barriers found in society, highlighting the importance of adapting places, services, and information, so they are accessible to this sector of the population, ensuring their full inclusion and participation.

The bill proposes that films should be shown to the public in their original version, dubbed and subtitled in Spanish, under the terms established by the Regulations. Those classified for children and educational documentaries must be shown dubbed and always subtitled in Spanish.

This proposal may be unfeasible, since the Federal Law of Cinematography cannot govern by itself in the field corresponding to the Federal Law of Copyright. Forcing audiovisual works in certain categories to be exhibited dubbed, eliminating the possibility of being exhibited in their original language, would constitute a limitations of copyrights, which should be regulated, where appropriate, by the law of the matter, in accordance at all times, to what is established in international treaties that Mexico is a part of.

The protection of copyright and related rights comes from various international treaties considered by the court as human rights treaties, so the proposal would not only constitute a direct violation of the LFDA but of various treaties as well.

The control of conventionality is understood as the tool that allows countries to specify the obligation to guarantee human rights in the internal sphere through the verification of the conformity of national norms and practices with the American Convention on Human Rights and its Jurisprudence. Therefore, the reform to our fundamental law of June 10, 2011 on human rights, orders that the interpretation of the norms related to this subject be carried out in accordance with the Constitution of Mexico and the international treaties that the nation has signed in this matter, observing at all times the pro homine principle.

There are specific treaties that deal with limitations to Author’s Right, such as the Marrakesh Treaty, but what the Legislator intends to reform is not a specific case.

To conclude, this reform would create a direct impediment to access to culture and education, since forcing people to appreciate certain genres of audiovisual productions only in Spanish and not in their original languages, would also create direct harm to those who seek to expand their knowledge and learning of new languages and cultures.

© 2005-2022 OLIVARES Y COMPAÑIA S.C.
Article By Luis C. Schmidt with OLIVARES
For more articles on the arts, visit the NLR Entertainment, Art & Sports section.

Mexico Mandates Protection From Workplace “Psychosocial Risks”

Globalization, technology developments, and the world’s economy, among other factors, have changed our day-to-day dynamics and have transformed the way we work. This means that employees must deal with emotions and circumstances that in the past were not significant but today are studied and classified by scientists as “psychosocial risks.”

The World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) define psychosocial risks as the interactions within the work environment, content of the work, conditions of the organization and capacities, needs and culture of the employee, and personal considerations—external from work—based on perceptions and experience that can negatively influence health, performance at work, and labor satisfaction.

International organizations are trying to create a broad awareness of psychosocial risks and thereby prevent such risks from damaging employee health, both physical and psychological.

Mexico’s Regulation of Psychosocial Risks at Work

Mexico has taken a big step in the protection of employees with the amendment to the Federal Labor Law on November 30, 2012. This amendment incorporates into the law the concept of “decent and dignified work,” which encompasses respect for the human dignity of employees and, in consequence, the prevention of harm that employees may suffer because of the activities they perform at work.

The amendment and subsequent obligations agreed upon by the current federal government in its national development plan, as well as internationally, compelled the Mexican Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare to issue the Federal Regulation of Health and Safety at Work. Its goal is to establish health and safety provisions, which must be observed at the workplace, “in order to have the conditions to prevent risks, and as a consequence, guarantee employees their right to perform their activities in an environment that assures their lives and health, according to the Federal Labor Law.”

What to Expect in 2019 and 2020: The Psychosocial Risk Factors Standard

Based on the above and with the purpose of complying with current legislation, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare developed the Official Mexican Norm: NOM-035-STPS-2018 “Psychosocial Risk Factors at Work – Identification, Analysis and Prevention.” Its main objective is to “identify, analyze and prevent psychosocial risk factors, as well as to promote a favorable organizational environment at workplaces.”

Though the rule has been valid since October 23, 2018, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare will not review employers’ compliance with the rule until the October 2019 or October 2020, depending on the employer’s size. Since this matter requires specialist analysis and evaluation, employers may want to contact a specialist on psychosocial risks in order to achieve compliance.

The following are employers’ main obligations under the rule:

  • Establish, maintain, and disseminate among the employees a psychosocial risks prevention policy

  • Identify psychosocial risk factors and evaluate the organizational environment (applicable to work places with more than 50 employees)

  • Use questionnaires to identify psychosocial risk factors (applicable to work places with 16–50 employees)

  • Disseminate to employees the policy and measures adopted to reduce psychosocial risks

  • Identify the employees subject to psychosocial damages while working or derived from their work

  • Provide a registry where employees can learn about psychosocial risk factors and corrective actions taken

  • Maintain a confidential complaint system so the employees can inform the employer about psychosocial risk factors

  • Take actions to prevent psychosocial risk factors and corrective measures if psychosocial damage occurs

Co-Authored by Natalia Merino, a law clerk in the Mexico City office of Ogletree Deakins.

© 2019, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
Learn more about International Legal issues on the National Law Review Global page.

Trade Trouble – East, West, and South, But North is Settled For Now!

Agriculture Secretary Perdue recently stated the trade damages to be addressed in a new round of farm aid is $15 to $20 billion! The general press is replete with stories about how, as these tariffs continue, companies are making sourcing changes that will be hard to reverse. So, what is the latest news?

First, there is trade with China. It seems clear that unless there is a breakthrough at the G-20 meeting in Tokyo, or shortly thereafter, the anecdotal headaches we hear about will get far more costly. The American Chamber of Commerce in China and the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai conducted a survey before List 3 was announced. Even at that point, American companies operating in China acknowledged higher production costs, decreased demand for products, reduced staffing, reduced profits, increased inspections at importation, increased bureaucratic oversight and regulatory scrutiny, slower approval of licenses and permits, higher product rejections, and increasing plans to relocate (but not back to the U.S.).

On a point one can consider only marginally helpful, those with goods on List 3 now have until June 14th to file their entries. To be clear, the goods still must have left China before May 10, and the entry filed no later than June 14th for the 10% to apply. Otherwise, you pay the 25%.

On a somewhat more positive note, if you found the May 21, 2019 Federal Register notice, it published the submission by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to the Office of Management and Budget of a request for expedited approval of a form to be used for List 3 exclusion requests. In that notice, USTR stated it expected the window to open for List 3 exclusion requests around June 30, 2019, which is 10 days after the Tokyo G-20 meeting. If they have not already done so, companies would be wise to start the data gathering process. Among the information to be submitted are product details, whether the product or one comparable can be purchased in the U.S. or other sources outside China, the value and quantity of the product imported in 2017, 2018 and Q1 2019 distinguished by sourcing from China, other third countries and domestically, the degree of severe economic harm caused by the tariffs, and whether or not the applicant submitted any exclusion requests regarding products on List 1 or 2. Those who have prepared exclusion requests for goods on Lists 1 and 2 will instantly recognize the data requirements.

Complicating U.S.-China relations further, on May 15, 2019, a Presidential Document was issued entitled Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain. It forms the framework permitting the Administration to name companies barred from doing business with U.S. entities on national security grounds. On May 21, 2019, the Bureau of Industry and Security published a Federal Register notice adding Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. and various affiliates (68 in total) to the Entity List on the ground there is reasonable cause to believe that Huawei “has been involved with activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” A May 22, 2019 Federal Register notice reversed that position and issued a Temporary General License effective between May 20, 2019 and August 19, 2019 for these same entities. See Supplement 7 to 15 CFR part 744.

Underscoring that tit-for-tat is very real, China announced on June 1, 2019 the creation of its own “unreliable” entities list. The initial rollout of this new policy took the form of a press briefing. That coverage made clear the criteria which China will rely upon is typically opaque: “foreign enterprises, organizations and individuals could land on this list because they do not obey market rules, violate contracts and block or cut off supply for non-commercial reasons, severely damage the legitimate interests of Chinese companies” or “pose a threat or potential threat to national security.” Almost immediately thereafter, it was announced that FedEx is under investigation in China for misdelivering some packages for Huawei (including returning them to sender or improperly routing them to the U.S.). China stated the purpose of the “unreliable entities list” was to “protect international economic and trade rules and the multilateral trading system, to oppose unilateralism and trade protectionism, and to safeguard China’s national security, social and publish interests,” according to a Ministry of Commerce spokesman.

Then there is the issue of China’s supply of rare earth minerals. China’s official press points out it is only a matter of time before China rolls out a plan to severely limit its exports of these metals which are used to make a variety of electronic products or accessories (including lithium batteries) along with items for U.S. military purposes such as to manufacture night vision goggles, precision-guided weapons and communications/GPS equipment. The latest numbers show that 52% of these metals are found in China and Russia (neither is exactly a friend to the U.S. right now), whereas 18% can be found in Brazil, but only about 1% in the U.S.

Add to this the announcement on May 30th, there will be tariffs imposed on “all goods imported from Mexico.” Even a few days later the most basic questions remain unanswered. Does this statement literally mean all goods from Mexico? What about American products returned which are duty free because unchanged? How about American products used to assemble the final product in Mexico but qualifying for duty free on the American components in the final product? [For you trade nerds – think 9801 and 9802.] What about goods which are of not of Mexican origin? Or are NAFTA qualifying?

Right now, all we have is the timeline – 5% on June 10%, 10% on July 1, 15% on August 1, 20% on September 1 and 25 % on October 1. Every indication right now is these tariffs will be imposed. Then the question becomes: are there grounds on which the tariffs would be removed? The only answer we have right now is if Mexico does “enough” to satisfy President Trump that all reasonable action was taken to stem the tide of migration, the tariffs would be removed. However, the determination as whether “enough” has been done is solely within the discretion of the President in the current proposal.

Having declared in February 2019 the migration situation at the U.S. southern border to be a matter of national security, President Trump has chosen now to invoke IEEPA to support the current action. IEEPA is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, see 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. It authorizes the President to act in the national security interest of the country if dealing with “any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States.”

 Article 302 of NAFTA as currently enacted provides: “… no Party may increase any existing customs duty, or adopt any customs duty, on an originating good.” In other words, the imposition of this additional tariff on NAFTA-qualifying goods violates NAFTA and presents yet another reason why a precisely-worded policy is needed and a claim is possible. Can we also expect a World Trade Organization claim, assuming the bilateral discussions between the two countries do not diffuse the situation?

How does any of this help hardworking American business owners (of any size and in any industry) to keep their companies operating and profitable? This situation makes us all wonder how long it will take for the American public to wake up and realize China and Mexico are not paying these tariffs?

 

© 2019 Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP
This post was written by Susan Kohn Ross of Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP.
Read more on Trade on our Antitrust and Trade Regulation Page.

Trump Administration Notifies Congress of Intent to Renegotiate NAFTA

The White House formally notified Congress on Thursday of the Trump administration’s intent to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The notification letter from U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer marked the start of a 90-day window to consult with members of Congress on developing negotiation priorities before beginning formal negotiations with Canada and Mexico as early as August 16, 2017.NAFTA, USA, Mexico, Canada

Currently, there is no indication that renegotiations will impact NAFTA-related immigration programs. However, under the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, the administration’s negotiation objectives are required to be made public 30 days before formal negotiations begin. While the letter to Congressional leadership did not discuss any specific changes to NAFTA, the administration indicated that it would aim to modernize outdated chapters of the agreement and address challenges faced by U.S. consumers, businesses, and workers.

NAFTA Immigration Programs

Among other economic and trade relationships established under NAFTA, the agreement created the TN nonimmigrant classification, which allows certain citizens of Canada and Mexico to work temporarily in the United States in a professional capacity. The agreement also provides an expanded range of permissible business activities for Canadian and Mexican citizens in B-1 visitor status and permits Canadian citizens to submit L-1 intracompany transferee petitions directly at U.S. ports of entry and pre-flight inspection stations for adjudication by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Whether the Trump administration intends to alter existing immigration programs under NAFTA is not yet known.

This post was written by Kara Kelly of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

NAFTA: Mexican Trucking Program

NAFTA Mexican carriers long-haul deliveriesPresident Trump’s plans to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may also impact a controversial program that allows Mexican carriers to make long-haul deliveries in the U.S.

As part of the NAFTA agreement, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to allow trucks from each country to carry goods across the border for deliveries anywhere inside each of their respective countries, but the program faced challenges from the get-go.  In 2007, the George W. Bush Administration launched a trial program to expand Mexico’s trucking operations beyond the border. However, the program ended in 2009 after Congress defunded the program following pressure from labor unions.

Following retaliatory tariffs imposed by Mexico, the Obama Administration established a new pilot program in 2011 that would allow long-haul operations in the United States by Mexican drivers, beyond the 25-mile “buffer zone” that allows U.S. truckers to transfer and begin transport of merchandise further into U.S. territory.   U.S. labor unions objected but failed in their legal challenges against the program, and it was made permanent in January 2015.  The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, together with other groups, sued the Department of Transportation in 2015 over a report that they argued was not based on sufficient data to allow for these long-haul deliveries.  The program remains in effect while that case is still pending.

Safety has been one of the biggest concerns raised by critics of the program.  However, a 2014 Congressional Research Service report suggests safety likely has less to do with whether the truck originates in the U.S. or Mexico, and more to do with the type of truck being used:

Drayage carriers, whose trucks make short-haul movements and spend much time idling while awaiting customs processing, tend to use older equipment. Long-haul trucks tend to carry relatively high-value goods or temperature-controlled cargo, because lower-value goods and less time-sensitive goods can be carried over long distances much more economically by rail or water. If shippers are willing to pay a substantial premium over rail or water transport to truck their product long distances, it seems plausible that they would choose a reliable trucker with modern equipment to avoid risk of delay or spoilage.

Opponents of the program are almost certain to call for its repeal as part of any new NAFTA negotiations.  Representative Peter DeFazio (D-Oregon), Ranking Member of the House Transportation Committee, opposes the long-haul program and has already said he plans to raise the issue with Trump Administration officials.

ARTICLE BY Mayte Gutierrez of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

© Copyright 2017 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP