Sharing Scientific Information with HCPs on Unapproved Uses of Medical Products: Dos and Don’ts Under FDA’s New Draft Guidance

In October 2023, the FDA released draft guidance entitled “Communications From Firms to Health Care Providers Regarding Scientific Information on Unapproved Uses of Approved/Cleared Medical Products: Questions and Answers Guidance for Industry” (“2023 Draft Guidance”).[1] The 2023 Draft Guidance supersedes previous draft guidance from 2014 entitled “Distributing Scientific and Medical Publications on Unapproved New Uses–Recommended Practices” (“2014 Draft Guidance”), which was a revision of a 2009 final guidance entitled “Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices.”

All three of these FDA guidance documents provide recommendations for industry regarding the sharing of scientific information with Health Care Providers (“HCPs”)[2] on unapproved uses of approved or cleared drugs and medical devices, termed “SIUU communications” by the 2023 Draft Guidance. HCPs are permitted to prescribe medical products for unapproved uses when the unapproved use is determined to be medically appropriate for a given patient. However, manufacturers may not promote their products for an unapproved use. For this reason, FDA’s position (which is articulated to some extent across all of the above-mentioned guidance documents, but most clearly and emphatically in the 2023 Draft Guidance) is that firm[3] communications to HCPs regarding unapproved uses of approved or cleared products should include all of the information necessary for HCPs to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, validity, and utility of the information about the unapproved use in order to make determinations regarding medical appropriateness.

In the 2023 Draft Guidance, FDA seeks to balance the interests of HCPs in learning, and manufacturers in sharing, truthful and non-misleading information about unapproved uses of approved medical products, with the intent to inform clinical practice decisions against the government’s interest in protecting patients from medical product uses that have not met applicable safety and effectiveness standards required under FDA’s premarket approval framework.

While the 2023 Draft Guidance reiterates many of the recommendations from the 2014 Draft Guidance, the 2023 Draft Guidance leverages a new “Q&A” format to provide firms with more detailed and specific recommendations, including hypothetical scenarios, around SIUU communications. Below, we restate the four Q&A questions included in the 2023 Draft Guidance and then highlight key aspects of the responses provided by FDA through brief commentary and recommended Dos and Don’ts.

Q1. What should firms consider when determining whether a source publication is appropriate to serve as the basis for an SIUU communication?

According to the 2023 Draft Guidance, any study or analysis described in a source publication that serves as the basis for an SIUU communication should be scientifically sound,[4] and should provide information that is relevant to HCPs engaged in making clinical practice decisions for the care of an individual patient; in other words, these sources should be clinically relevant.[5] While the 2014 Draft Guidance suggested that scientific or medical journal article reprints intended for distribution to HCPs should describe studies that are considered “scientifically sound” by appropriate experts, the 2023 Draft Guidance builds out this standard and provides greater insight into what types of source material would meet (and not meet) the standard.

Do:

  • Choose scientifically sound studies that provide clinically relevant information to support your SIUU communications
    • For human and animal drugs, randomized, double-blind, concurrently controlled superiority trials are most likely to provide both scientifically sound and clinically relevant information (though other well-designed and well-conducted studies may also be appropriate)
    • For medical devices,[6] look to well-controlled investigations, partially controlled studies, studies and objective trials without matched controls, well-documented case histories conducted by qualified experts, reports of significant human experience with a marketed device as sources of scientifically sound and clinically relevant information
  • Consider studies with real-world data and associated real-world evidence, which may meet the scientifically sound and clinically relevant threshold depending on the nature of the data and underlying analyses

Don’t:

  • Rely on studies without an adequate control group, isolated case reports, or studies that lack sufficient detail to permit scientific evaluation as the sole basis for an SIUU communication
  • Rely on studies with “unreliable” data, even if you include disclaimers noting the limitations (e.g., studies that fail to control for confounding factors or fail to clearly define study endpoints)
  • Rely on articles focused on non-clinical studies as the sole basis for an SIUU communication
  • Rely on scientific data generated in early stages of medical product development as the sole basis for an SIUU communication, as such data can produce results that are inconsistent with later studies
  • Distort studies in SIUU communications or base SIUU communications on publications that distort studies or include fraudulent data
  • Continue to share an SIUU communication that is based on a study or analysis that is no longer clinically relevant (ex: subsequent research has established the findings from the study are not reliable)

Q2. What information should firms include as part of SIUU communications?

Like the 2014 Draft Guidance, the 2023 Draft Guidance emphasizes the importance of providing certain disclosures with SIUU communications to ensure such communications are not misleading and provide all the information necessary for HCPs to interpret the strengths and weaknesses and validity and utility of the information. The recommended disclosures in the 2023 Draft Guidance are similar to those recommended in the 2014 Draft Guidance, but are more detailed and extensive.

Do:

  • Provide a disclosure statement with any SIUU communication, which should include:
    • A statement that the use described in the communication is unapproved and the safety and effectiveness of the medical product for the unapproved use(s) has not been established
    • Disclosure of the FDA approved use of the medical product, including any limitations and contraindication(s) specified by the product’s FDA-required labeling[7]
    • Disclosure of any limitations, restrictions, cautions, warnings, or contradictions described in the FDA-required labeling about the unapproved use(s)
    • Disclosure of any serious, life-threatening, or fatal risks posed by the medical product that are relevant to the unapproved use(s) (that are either in the FDA-required labeling or known by the firm and relevant to the unapproved use)
    • Disclosure of any financial relationships between the firm and any authors, editors, or other contributors to the publications in the SIUU communication
    • A copy of the most current FDA-required labeling (or a mechanism for obtaining the labeling)
    • The publication date of any referenced or included publication(s) (if not specified in the publication or citation)
  • For an SIUU communication based on a source publication that is primarily focused on a particular scientific study or studies, for each such study where the following information is not included in the publication, provide a description of:
    • All material aspects of study design, methodology, and results
    • All material limitations related to the study design, methodology, and results
    • Any conclusions from other relevant studies, when applicable, that are contrary to or cast doubt on the results shared, including citations for any such studies

Don’t:

  • Omit any risk evaluation and mitigation strategy (REMS) applicable to the medical product (firms should disclose any REMS and should describe the goal(s) of the REMS)

Q3. What presentational considerations should firms take into account for SIUU communications?

The 2023 Draft Guidance offers a number of presentation-focused recommendations to ensure that SIUU communications are conveyed in a manner that enhances and does not interfere with HCP understanding of the underlying scientific information, and to avoid such SIUU communications being confused with promotional communications about approved uses.

Do:

  • Clearly and prominently present all recommended disclosures, considering type size, font style, layout, contrast, graphic design, headlines, spacing, volume, articulation, pace, and any other techniques to achieve emphasis or notice
  • For SIUU communications with both audio and visual components, present disclosures in both the audio and in text at the same time using the same/substantially similar language
  • Keep SIUU communications (including those relayed via email) separate and distinct from promotional communications about approved uses of medical products
  • Use dedicated vehicles, channels, and venues for sharing SIUU communications that are separate from the vehicles, channels, and venues used for promotional communications about approved uses of medical products. For example –
    • Present SIUU communications on a separate web page from the web page that hosts promotional communications about approved uses
    • At conferences and similar venues, ensure that SIUU communications are clearly identified and distinct from promotional communications about approved uses (e.g., by dividing booth space to allow a dedicated space for SIUU communications)
  • Use plain language in the content developed for SIUU communications to facilitate comprehension (i.e., clear and concise language that does not include technical jargon and clearly explains any scientific or technical terms)

Don’t:

  • Use persuasive marketing techniques, such as the use of celebrity endorsements, premium offers, and gifts. According to FDA, a firm’s choice to use persuasive marketing techniques suggests an effort to convince the HCP to prescribe or use the product for the unapproved use based on elements other than the scientific content of the communication
  • Include direct links from web pages that host promotional communications about approved uses to webpages that host SIUU communications
  • Utilize platforms with character limits that do not enable the firm to include the recommended disclosures for sharing SIUU communications (however, such platforms could be used to direct an HCP to an SIUU communication, subject to certain restrictions)

Q4. What additional recommendations apply to specific types of SIUU communications?

The 2023 Draft Guidance offers additional recommendations related to certain specific types of SIUU communications including journal reprints and clinical reference resources (such as clinical practice guidelines and reference texts). Of note, the 2023 Draft Guidance provides recommendations for a category of SIUU communications that is not specifically addressed in the 2014 Draft Guidance – “firm-generated presentations of scientific information from an accompanying published reprint.”

Discussion of such firm-generated presentations in the 2023 Draft Guidance represents a departure from the 2014 Draft Guidance, which stated that reprints (as well as clinical reference resources) regarding unapproved uses (of cleared or approved medical products) should not be “marked, highlighted, summarized, or characterized” by medical product manufacturers to emphasize or promote an unapproved use. The 2023 Draft Guidance provides new flexibility in this regard, expressly acknowledging that firms may develop their own presentations of scientific information from an accompanying reprint provided such presentation is truthful, non-misleading, factual, unbiased, and provides all the information necessary for HCPs to interpret the strengths and weaknesses and validity and utility of the presented information. The 2023 Draft Guidance includes a number of recommendations for firms to follow to prepare and distribute firm-generated presentations of information from an accompanying reprint.

Do:

  • Include the full reprint with the firm-generated presentation
  • Include the disclosures outlined above in Q2, and clearly disclose what portions of the communication are firm-generated
  • Follow the presentational considerations outlined in Q3

Don’t:

  • Imply that the study, analysis, or underlying data or information from the reprint(s) represents larger or more-general experience with the medical product than it actually does
  • Present information, such as excerpts, quotes, etc., from the reprint(s) out of context, without the information necessary for HCPs to interpret the strengths and weaknesses and validity and utility of the information
  • Include representations or suggestions about the safety or effectiveness of the medical product for the unapproved use(s) that are not consistent with the reprint
  • Present any conclusions or representations about safety or effectiveness for the unapproved use without expressly attributing such statements to the reprint, and without immediately following such statements with a disclosure of any financial relationships between the firm and any authors, editors, or other contributors to the publications in the SIUU communication
  • Use statistical analyses or techniques to indicate clinical significance or validity of a finding not supported by the data or information in the reprint
  • Use tables or graphs or other presentational elements to distort or misrepresent the relationships, trends, differences, or changes among the outcomes evaluated in the reprint

Conclusion

While the 2023 Draft Guidance veers from the 2014 Draft Guidance in some respects, many of the same principles have been pulled through into the current guidance. As such, a medical product manufacturer who has already implemented the recommendations from the 2014 Draft Guidance should not face too heavy of a lift to adjust its activities to align with the 2023 Draft Guidance. While the landscape has not shifted drastically overall, firms should still closely review the additional detail and clarifications provided by the 2023 Draft Guidance to mitigate potential risk in navigating the often murky regulatory waters of engaging in off-label and pre-approval communications.

ENDNOTES

[1] Comments on the 2023 Draft Guidance are due by December 26, 2023.

[2] The 2023 Draft Guidance only applies to HCPs engaged in making clinical practice decisions for the care of an individual patient. Per the 2023 Draft Guidance, HCPs include physicians, veterinarians, dentists, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, pharmacists, or registered nurses who are licensed or otherwise authorized by law to prescribe, order, administer, or use medical products in a professional capacity. The 2014 Draft Guidance applied to “health care professionals,” but the term was not specifically defined.

[3] As defined by the 2023 Draft Guidance, firms are the “persons legally responsible for the labeling of medical products, and includes applicants, sponsors, requestors, manufacturers, packers, and distributors of medical products, and licensees of such persons, and any persons communicating on behalf of these entities.”

[4] To be “scientifically sound,” at a minimum, studies should meet generally accepted design and other methodological standards for the particular type of study performed, taking into account established scientific principles and existing scientific knowledge.

[5] Additionally, statistical robustness is generally necessary, though not sufficient, to determine if a study or analysis is appropriate for an SIUU communication. While statistical robustness factors into the rigor of the design and methodology of a study, it does not assure that the study relates to outcomes of clinical relevance to HCPs.

[6] Notably, while the 2014 Draft Guidance stated that journal articles discussing significant non-clinical research could fall within FDA’s enforcement discretion policy under the guidance, the 2023 Draft Guidance clarifies that, generally, sharing articles focused on non-clinical studies alone would not be consistent with FDA’s enforcement discretion policy as a non-clinical study alone is unlikely to provide information that is clinically relevant.

[7] “FDA-required labeling” includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the labeling reviewed and approved by FDA as part of the medical product premarket review process. For a prescription human drug (including biological products), this consists of the FDA-approved prescribing information that meets the requirements of 21 CFR 201.100. For a device, it includes the labeling approved during the review of a premarket approval application or De Novo classification.

Software as a Medical Device: Challenges Facing the Industry

SaMD Blog Series: Introduction

Editor’s Note: We are excited to announce that this article is the first of a series addressing Software as a Medical Device and the issues that plague digital health companies, investors, clinicians and other organizations that utilize software and medical devices. We will be addressing various considerations including technology, data, intellectual property, licensing, and contracting.

The intersection of software, technology and health care and the proliferation of software as a medical device in the health care arena has become common place and has spurred significant innovations. The term Software as a Medical Device (SaMD) is defined by the International Medical Device Regulators Forum as “software intended to be used for one or more medical purposes that perform these purposes without being part of a hardware medical device.” In other words, SaMD need not be part of a physical device to achieve its intended purpose. For instance, SaMD could be an application on a mobile phone and not be connected to a physical medical device.

With the proliferation of SaMD also comes the need for those building and using it to firmly grasp legal and regulatory considerations to ensure successful use and commercialization. Over the next several weeks, we will be addressing some of more common issues faced by digital health companies, investors, innovators, and clinicians when developing, utilizing, or commercializing SaMD. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has already cleared a significant amount of SaMD, including more than 500 algorithms employing artificial intelligence (AI). Some notable examples include FDA-cleared SaMD such as wearable technology for remote patient monitoring; doctor prescribed video game treatment for children with ADHD; fully immersive virtual reality tools for both physical therapy and mental wellness; and end to end software that generates 3D printed models to better plan surgery and reduce operation time. With this rapid innovation comes a host of legal and regulatory considerations which will be discussed over the course of this SaMD Blog Series.

General Intellectual Property (IP) Considerations for SaMD

This edition will discuss the sophisticated IP strategies that can be used to protect innovations for the three categories of software for biomedical applications: SaMD, software in a medical device, and software used in the manufacture or maintenance of a medical device, including clinical trial collaboration and sponsored research agreements, filing patent applications, and pursuing other forms of protection, such as trade secrets.

Licensing and Contracting with Third Parties for SaMD

This edition will unpack engaging with third parties practically and comprehensively, whether in the context of (i) developing new SaMD or (ii) refining or testing existing SaMD. Data and IP can be effectively either owned or licensed, provided such licenses protect the future interests of the licensee. Such ownership and licensing are particularly important in the AI and machine learning space, which is one area of focus for this edition.

FDA Considerations for SaMD

This edition will explore how FDA is regulating SaMD, which will include a discussion of what constitutes a regulated device, legislative actions to spur innovation, and how FDA is approaching regulation of specific categories of SaMD such as clinical decision support software, general wellness applications, and other mobile medical devices. It will also examine the different regulatory pathways for SaMD and FDA’s current focus on Cybersecurity issues for software.

Health Care Regulatory and Reimbursement Considerations for SAMD

This edition will discuss the intersection of remote monitoring services and SaMD, prescription digital therapeutics and how they intersect with SaMD, licensure and distributor considerations associated with commercializing SaMD, and the growing trend to seek out device specific codes for SaMD.

Our hope is that this series will be a starting point for digital health companies, investors, innovators, and clinicians as each approaches development and use of SaMD as part of their business and clinical offerings.

© 2023 Foley & Lardner LLP

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FDA’s Digital Health High Notes from 2022

There has been a lot of discussion lately of the Food and Drug Omnibus Reform Act of 2022 (FDORA), which was enacted on December 29, 2022 as part of the larger Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2023 (you can find our blog post on it here). As important as these kinds of future reforms are to medical product developers, we should also take a moment to review last year’s actions and policy updates on digital health from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and to reflect on the transformations that have been taking place at the agency as a result of the rapid pace of innovation in the field. The year 2022 marked the conclusion of the five-year Software Precertification Pilot Program and the release of the final Clinical Decision Support Software guidance, among other things, although FDA’s digital health policies generally remained consistent. In this post, we summarize the agency’s key actions in the digital health space in 2022.

Expanding into Extended Reality

Over the past few years, FDA has started a number of initiatives to explore the use of virtual, mixed, and augmented reality (the agency typically uses the term “extended reality” to cover all types of immersive digital systems) as therapeutic devices for use by patients in clinical environments and at home. The agency granted marketing authorization to two virtual reality devices for patient use, EaseVRx for chronic pain (de novo classification) and Luminopia One for treatment of lazy eye in children, in 2021 and the CureSight system, also for lazy eye in children, in 2022. It is also conducting multiple internal research projects on medical extended reality within the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH).

In conjunction with its internal research, FDA is engaging health care professionals and the industry to learn about possible benefits, as well as the risks and limitations, of medical extended reality systems to guide future decisions about the therapeutic and clinical uses of such devices. A meeting of FDA’s Patient Engagement Advisory Committee in July 2022 provided an opportunity for the agency to hear from experts and researchers in the field of extended reality and its uses, as well as companies developing medical extended reality devices and patients who have experienced such devices. The materials from the meeting are available here.

FDA also published a list of medical extended reality devices that have received marketing authorization on its website devoted to the Digital Health Center of Excellence (DHCoE), which is part of CDRH.

Application of extended reality technology and the metaverse to medicine is an exciting area of development, and we expect FDA to continue to be active in the space and to develop formal policies and guidance on extended reality devices in the near future.

Precertification Pilot Ends with Uncertain Future

FDA’s Software Precertification Pilot Program, launched in 2017 to explore innovative methods and approaches to regulating software as a medical device (SaMD), officially ended in September 2022 (see our previous posts on the Precertification program here and here). Although FDA was able to glean some key insights from the pilot, including a better understanding of SaMD manufacturer practices throughout the product life cycle, including design, development, and management of SaMD products, the agency ultimately admitted that it had encountered significant challenges in implementing the pilot program. Such challenges included:

  • limited statutory authorities, which hindered FDA’s ability to gather consistent and harmonized information on manufacturer practices and SaMD performance;
  • focusing only on SaMD for De Novo classification, which limited the number of eligible devices and created issues for testing pilot-specific special controls; and
  • the small number of participants (only nine SaMD manufacturer were accepted to the pilot program).

You can read FDA’s final report from the pilot program here.

FDA may use its observations from the pilot program when developing new guidance or other policies pertaining to SaMD, but any new rules or guidances must be consistent with the agency’s current statutory authorities. It is very likely that we have seen the end of any FDA software precertification program, unless or until Congress decides to grant the agency specific authority to implement a new or different regulatory regime for SaMD.

Leadership Changes at the Digital Health Center of Excellence

The past year marked a number of watershed changes at the DHCoE, including the departure of Bakul Patel, longstanding CDRH official in many capacities and the first director of the DHCoE, and the naming of a new acting director, Brendan O’Leary. Subsequently, in January 2023, the agency named Troy Tazbaz, former senior vice president at Oracle, as the new director of DHCoE. It will be interesting to see how Mr. Tazbaz, a newcomer to the agency, will direct the DHCoE in further developing the regulatory framework for digital health devices and in building strategic partnerships with industry stakeholders.

Digital Health Guidances

FDA introduced a number of new and revised guidance documents relating to digital health technologies in 2022. The following is a list with brief descriptions of each such agency guidance:

  • Clinical Decision Support Software (final guidance) – After a long wait (the previous draft version was published in September 2019), FDA issued a final guidance covering clinical decision support (CDS) software devices on September 28, 2022. You can find our analysis of this critical guidance in this previous post. In addition, FDA created some helpful resources to determine the regulations that may apply to a company’s CDS software or other types of SaMD: a CDS software flowchart, and a Digital Health Policy Navigator.
  • Policy for Device Software Functions and Mobile Medical Applications (revised final guidance) – FDA issued an updated version of this guidance in September 2022 to implement changes consisted with the CDS final guidance.
  • Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions (draft guidance) – In recent years, FDA has repeatedly emphasized the importance of addressing cybersecurity in medical devices and has made great efforts in keeping its policies and guidance documents aligned with current cybersecurity recommendations. This guidance describes methods for incorporating cybersecurity into the design and development process for connected medical devices (including SaMD) and for maintaining cybersecurity as part of device quality systems throughout the product lifecycle. Once finalized, this guidance will supersede final guidance Content of Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices, issued in October 2014. It is also worth noting that FDORA grants the agency new authorities to require cybersecurity plans as part of premarket submissions for so-called “cyber devices,” which will need to be considered and incorporated into any upcoming final guidance on this topic.
  • Computer-Assisted Detection Devices Applied to Radiology Images and Radiology Device Data – Premarket Notification [510(k)] Submissions (final guidance) & Clinical Performance Assessment: Considerations for Computer-Assisted Detection Devices Applied to Radiology Images and Radiology Device Data in Premarket Notification (510(k)) Submissions (final guidance) – This pair of final guidances describes FDA’s expectations for information included in premarket notification submissions for CADe devices, and specifically for the design of clinical studies to support marketing authorization of such devices. Many companies have developed, or are interested in developing, software with CADe functionality to detect lesions or abnormalities in radiology images for the purpose of assisting human readers, and with the rapid risk of artificial intelligence/machine learning-based software, some manufacturers may seek to develop CADe software that replaces human readers altogether. These guidances are especially useful for companies developing CADe software and preparing for clinical testing and submission to FDA.
  • Electronic Submission Template for Medical Device 510(k) Submissions (final guidance) – Although this guidance does not specifically apply to digital health technologies, it represents an important development for all medical device companies, including digital health device manufacturers. FDA released this guidance in conjunction with the announcement that CDRH will accept electronic submissions of device premarket notifications from all applicants using the electronic submission template and resource (eSTAR) tool. The guidance describes the structure of the template (and helpfully cross-references other guidance documents that relate to each section of the template). FDA has designated October 1, 2023 as the date of full transition to electronic submission for premarket notifications, meaning that FDA will no longer accept eCopies of premarket notification submissions for filing and review as of that date.

As the preceding list highlights, digital health is an active and rapidly advancing field both in the private sector and at FDA. We will continue to monitor and report on notable developments in terms of regulatory policies affecting developers and investors in the broader field.

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Patentability of COVID-19 Biotech, Pharma & Personal Protective Equipment Inventions

The innovative workforce has been redirected.  Spurred by the  Coronavirus pandemic, scientific research that once floundered from a lack of funding has been rejuvenated.[i]  The current innovation upsurge is not out of sheer interest for promoting the useful arts, however, but out of necessity.  Around the world, inventors are developing ways to cope with the new world engendered by COVID-19, from treatments for fighting disease to methods of predicting the next outbreak.

Alongside the proliferation of inventions and discoveries is the issue of financial rewards for these innovations.  Should inventions related to fighting COVID-19 be patentable? Many economists and lawmakers are critical of the exclusivity period granted by patents, especially in the case of vaccines and drugs.  Recently, several members of Congress requested “no exclusivity” for any “COVID-19 vaccine, drug, or other therapeutic.”[ii]

This article examines the patentability of developments in the Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical, and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)  technology sectors related to COVID-19 and looks into the merits of patent criticism.   Part two of this series examines the Patentability of  COVID-19 Software Inventions – Artificial Intelligence (AI), Data Storage & Blockchain.

The Patentability of Inventions Related to COVID-19 – Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Inventions

No doubt the most vociferous anti-patent sentiment is directed at the idea of patenting vaccines and treatments which enable companies to price their products well above the marginal cost of production.  Remdesivir, which was recently approved by the FDA for emergency COVID treatment, has a projected cost ranging from $390 to $4,460 per treatment course depending on the mortality benefit.[iii]  But an outright prohibition of patent protection for these inventions is an over-correction of these understandable concerns.  Patent protection has already been eroded over the last ten years and further erosion could lead to a decline in US leadership in the healthcare sector over time[iv]

Disclosure of Ideas

One of the basic principles of having patents is that a period of exclusivity is granted in return for inventors disclosing their inventions to the public, thereby probing further downstream studies and research into the disclosed art. Proponents of patent pools and “open science” argue that the free exchange of ideas will occur without the disclosure requirement that accompanies patent application, pointing to systems like the WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS).  Under GISRS, experts around the world collaborate to develop each year’s flu vaccine.[v]  GISRS is cited as proof that a patent-less system does not prohibit the disclosure of ideas and findings.[vi]

This type of open science system is not realistic for private companies, however.  GISRS is composed of national collaborating centers that collect data from participating public entities such as federal agencies and state public health laboratories.[vii]  The participants of GISRS have very little commercial stake when it comes to the disclosure of research findings.  A similar system cannot be expected to work in the realm of private enterprise especially in the long term.

Incentive to Innovate

Inventions related to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical spheres are already extremely difficult to patent as it is due to Mayo v. Prometheus Laboratories.[viii]  The Supreme Court found that a therapeutic treatment for a gastrointestinal disorder was not patentable whatsoever, believing that the diagnostics involved in the treatment was similar to patenting a “law of nature.”  The aftermath of Mayo was a significant increase in rejections against patent applications related to biotechnology and pharmaceuticals on the grounds of them being non-patentable subject matter.[ix]  The ongoing cost of prosecution in the face of these rejections was especially damaging to small and medium-sized companies that lack the financial means to repeatedly contend with the USPTO.[x]

Importantly, Mayo is a case related to diagnostics.  Therefore, inventions directed to diagnostics are even more difficult to patent.  It is no secret that the US has struggled when it comes to providing widespread and accurate COVID testing.  Judge Michel of the Federal Circuit believes that Mayo contributed to the country’s unpreparedness for the crisis by eliminating “incentives for private companies to develop diagnostic tests”.[xi]  There are many reasons for the failure of the test rollouts, but the US would have been better positioned to fight the pandemic had the proper innovative incentives been in place for the companies that we now rely on.

Recouping Cost

Currently, Gilead has not yet set a price for remdesivir but will be donating its initial supply of 1.5 million doses.[xii]  Ultimately, they will set a price that will most likely be above the marginal cost of $10 to produce a 10-day course of treatment per patient.  Remdesivir was in the process of R&D for over ten years.  Originally developed for SARS and MERS, the commercial price of remdesivir will not be commensurate with the cost of manufacturing but rather the overall investment towards developing the drug over time.[xiii]  The company also recently announced in a SEC filing that they could invest up to “$1 billion or more” in remdesivir in 2020.[xiv]  Pricing remdesivir marginally above cost will result in a substantial net loss for Gilead that will hurt the company’s incentive to develop further treatments.  This is an unwelcomed fact but ignoring it would be wrong and dangerous.

The Patentability of Inventions Related to COVID-19 – PPE 

Patents are not to blame for the shortage of PPE – Personal Protective Equipment and respirators.  PPE and respirators are primarily manufactured abroad and due to the current disproportionate balance between supply and demand, they are scarce commodities.  But for some reason, the Governor of Kentucky wants 3M to license its patents on the N95 mask so that “everybody else can manufacture it.”[xv]  Even Nobel laureates suggest that 3M’s patents over the N95 mask “have made it more difficult for new producers to manufacture medical-grade face masks at scale.”[xvi]

3M does not have a monopoly over the N95 mask.  No one does.  Honeywell, Kimberly-Clark Corporation, Moldex-Metric, GlaxoSmithCline are just a few companies among many that are listed by the CDC that make and manufacture NIOSH-approved N95 respirators.[xvii]

The Coalition for Breathing Safety forewarned the shortage of respirators in 2006.  Manufacturers of the N95 mask were forced to move offshore due to the cost of defending product liability suits over the tightly regulated masks.[xviii]  Again, patents are not to blame for the shortage and do not stand in the way of manufacturers other than 3M from making these products.

See the next segment: Artificial Intelligence (AI), Data Storage & Blockchain –  the patentability of COVID19 Software Inventions.

The opinions stated herein are the sole opinions of the author and do not reflect the views or opinions of the National Law Review or any of its affiliates.


[i] Robert Langreth and Susan Berfield, Famed AIDS Researcher Is Racing to Find a Coronavirus Treatment, Bloomberg Businessweek (March 20, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-03-19/this-famous-aids-researcher-wants-to-find-a-coronavirus-cure.

[ii] Congressional Progressive Leaders Announce Principles On COVID-19 Drug Pricing for Next Coronavirus Response Package, (2020), https://schakowsky.house.gov/media/press-releases/congressional-progressive-leaders-announce-principles-COVID-19-drug-pricing (last visited May 10, 2020).

[iii] Melanie D. Whittington, PhD and Jonathan D. Campbell, PhD, Alternative Pricing Models for Remdesivir and Other Potential Treatments for COVID-19, Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (May 1, 2020), https://icer-review.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ICER-COVID_Initial_Abstract_05012020-3.pdf.

[iv] Paul R. Michel, To prepare for the next pandemic, Congress should restore patent protections for diagnostic tests, Roll Call (April 28, 2020), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/04/28/to-prepare-for-the-next-pandemic-congress-should-restore-patent-protections-for-diagnostic-tests/.

[v] Joseph E. Stiglitz, Should patents come before patients? How drug monopolies hamper the fight against coronavirus, Project Syndicate (April 23, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/should-patents-come-before-patients-how-drug-monopolies-hamper-the-fight-against-coronavirus-2020-04-23?mod=article_inline

[vi] Id.

[vii]  U.S. Influenza Surveillance System: Purpose and Methods, Center for Disease Control, available at https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/overview.htm (last accessed May 10, 2020).

[viii] Mayo v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. 66 (2012), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-1150.pdf.

[ix] Mateo Aboy, Mayo’s impact on patent applications related to biotechnology, diagnostics and personalized medicine, Nature Biotechnology (May 3, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-019-0111-5.

[x] Id.

[xi] Paul R. Michel, To prepare for the next pandemic, Congress should restore patent protections for diagnostic tests, Roll Call (April 28, 2020), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/04/28/to-prepare-for-the-next-pandemic-congress-should-restore-patent-protections-for-diagnostic-tests/.

[xii] Sydney Lupkin, Putting A Price On COVID-19 Treatment Remdesivir, NPR (May 8, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/05/08/851632704/putting-a-price-on-COVID-19-treatment-remdesivir.

[xiii] John F. CoganRemdesivir Affirms the American Way, Wall Street Journal (May 1, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/remdesivir-affirms-the-american-way-11588368750.

[xiv] QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Gilead Sciences Inc., available at http://investors.gilead.com/node/36926/html (last visited May 10, 2020).

[xv] The Netherlands Joins COVID-19 IP Pool Initiative; Kentucky Governor Requests 3M Release N95 Patent, Health Policy Watch (April 8, 2020), https://healthpolicy-watch.org/the-netherlands-joins-COVID-19-ip-pool-initiative-kentucky-governor-requests-3m-release-n95-patent/?mod=article_inline.

[xvi] Joseph E. Stiglitz, Should patents come before patients? How drug monopolies hamper the fight against coronavirus, Project Syndicate (April 23, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/should-patents-come-before-patients-how-drug-monopolies-hamper-the-fight-against-coronavirus-2020-04-23?mod=article_inline.

[xvii] NIOSH-Approved N95 Particulate Filtering Facepiece Respirators, Center for Disease Control, available at https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/topics/respirators/disp_part/N95list1-a.html (last accessed May 10, 2020).

[xviii]  Sandy Smith, Six Respirator Manufacturers Warn President of Shortage of Masks, EHSToday (June 22, 2006), https://www.ehstoday.com/emergency-management/article/21912885/six-respirator-manufacturers-warn-president-of-shortage-of-masks.


Copyright (C) GLOBAL IP Counselors, LLP

For more on COVID-19 protective equipment, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

COVID-19 Update: Patent Rights in the COVID-19 Pandemic: How will Industries and Governments Respond?

As the world scrambles to address an ever-expanding wave of COVID-19 infections, new and urgent needs for medical supplies, diagnostics and treatments arise.  Shortages of such supplies are plaguing hospitals and care-givers, while doctors and nurses put their lives at risk in their desperate efforts to save COVID-19 patients.  Many of these vital supplies, however, are protected by valuable patent rights.  The essence behind patents rights is to exclude others from making, using, or selling a patented invention, except by authorization of the patent holder in carefully negotiated license agreements to ensure proper compensation for the efforts and costs invested in developing the patented invention.1  On the other hand, the U.S. government has rights to forcibly license a patented invention during times of need, in particular when there is a threat to public safety.2  Will the government resort to use of these available, yet rarely used, compulsory licensing provisions?  How patent owners are responding to the current COVID-19 pandemic is revealing that benevolence may, in some cases, have a place in commercial business without the government needing to exercise its compulsory licensing rights.

In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, several large companies have come forward with offers to manufacture medical supplies such as masks and respirators.  Manufacturers, such as the auto makers General Motors, Ford and Tesla, are offering to repurpose production lines to help manufacture and increase the supply of ventilators and other much needed medical equipment.3  Fashion and cosmetic companies, such as Louis Vuitton, L’Oréal and Coty, are also pitching in and offering to re-allocate their resources to produce hand sanitizers, while fashion designers, like Christian Siriano and Brandon Maxwell, are offering to mobilize their teams to produce masks and hospital gowns.4  Even the beer company giant, ABInBev will use its facilities to manufacture and distribute hand sanitizer.5

On the patent front, the drug manufacturer AbbVie has taken a bold public health stance by suspending enforcement of its global patent rights on all formulations of the HIV medication, Kaletra (Aluvia) while the drug is being evaluated as a candidate to treat COVID-19 in several clinical trials.  AbbVie’s bold stance would allow generic versions of Kaletra to be made by others without fear of repercussion based on patent infringement.  This would allow countries to purchase generic versions of Kaletra, if it is found effective in treating COVID-19, and would help alleviate possible drug supply shortages.  AbbVie is the first drug-maker to take such a strong public health stance amid the COVID-19 pandemic.  However, whether AbbVie’s decision to suspend its patent rights to Kaletra is an act of pure benevolence, mounting public pressures, or because at least one clinical trial  already suggested Kaletra may not be effective in treating COVID-19, AbbVie’s strong public health stance is at the very least a comforting thought and may hopefully sway other drug-makers, like Gilead Sciences Inc. (“Gilead”), to do the same.

On the other end is the drug-maker Gilead who recently halted emergency access to its COVID-19 candidate drug, Remdesivir, except for pregnant women and children with severe symptoms.6  In suspending access to Remdesivir, Gilead issued a company statement7 on March 22, 2020 citing “overwhelming demand” and “exponential increase” in requests which “flooded [its] emergency treatment access system.”  However, Gilead’s restrictions to Remdesivir come on the heels of it being granted “orphan” drug status8 by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) on February 23, 2020 and on the heels of a Chinese drug-maker, BrightGene Bio-Medical Technology (“BrightGene”),9 filing for patent protection in China for a combination drug therapy to treat COVID-19 using the active ingredients of Remdesivir.  The 1983 Orphan Drug Act10 allows a seven-year market exclusivity period for pharmaceutical companies developing treatments for a “rare disease” and also provides tax credits.  Gilead’s strategic move to obtain orphan drug status for Remdesivir blocks generic drug manufacturers from supplying the drug and thus further limiting access.

Remdesivir has been previously used to treat the Ebola virus, Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), but these infections did not cause a sustained global crisis to earn Gilead a sizable or continued financial revenue stream and other more successful experimental therapies existed.11  If Remdesivir is found to be effective for combating COVID-19, a patent protecting such a use may stand to earn a high and continued stream of global revenue for the patent owner.  As new combination drug patents or method patents for new uses of known drugs may be separately patentable, repurposing Remdesivir as a combination drug patent or for treating COVID-19 may prove to be a blockbuster hit for its patent owner.  Thus, while Gilead has cited overwhelming demand as the reason to restrict access to Remdesivir, one can’t help but wonder whether patent rights and the associated commercial revenue are Gilead’s underlying concern.

Gilead is not the only patent holder invoking a protectionist stance and seemingly attempting to profit from the global pandemic through the patent system’s exclusionary principle.  Labrador Diagnostics LLC (“Labrador”)—a company backed by its major investor SoftBank and who bought patents from a failed blood-testing start-up called Theranos—recently filed a patent infringement lawsuit against BioFire Diagnostics (“BioFire”), a health start-up who launched three COVID-19 tests.12  Labrador also requested an injunction demanding BioFire to stop using the technology covered by the Theranos patents.13  However, since filing the lawsuit and seemingly after public backlash, Labrador issued a press release14 stating it would allow third parties to use its Theranos patents to develop COVID-19 tests with a royalty-free license, but that it is continuing its lawsuit against BioFire for activities over the past six years not related to COVID-19 testing.

Similarly, in Italy, a patent holder of a special respirator valve used in respiratory machines allegedly threatened a patent infringement lawsuit against two engineers who volunteered to use their 3-D printing technology to manufacture the patented valves for a hospital in Brescia, Italy without obtaining permission or a license from the patent holder.15  However, in a follow-up statement, both the patent holder and the two engineers stopped short of calling the communications a threat, and instead characterized them as merely a refusal of the patent holder to assist or collaborate with the engineers.16

While some patent owners are choosing to suspend their global patent rights and others are taking a more protectionist stance, the U.S. government also has the right to take action by forcing patent owners to grant compulsory licenses when there is a threat to public safety.  A compulsory license refers to the government’s authority to grant permission to a party seeking use of another’s patented invention without the consent of the patent owner, and is provided broadly by 28 U.S.C. § 1498.  Several multilateral international agreements also address compulsory patent licenses.17  Other U.S. laws also allow for compulsory licenses in certain circumstances.  For example, march-in rights is a provision of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 203.  March-in rights allow the federal government the right to grant patent licenses to other parties or take licenses for themselves if the patented invention was researched and developed with the help of federally funded dollars.18

March-in rights may be a perfectly poised vehicle for increasing access to COVID-19 related therapeutic drugs and vaccines.  To fight the global pandemic, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (“BARDA”), a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), has partnered with several drug manufacturers, including Johnson & Johnson, Sanofi and Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, to fund the development of treatments and vaccines for COVID-19.19  However, some members of Congress have expressed concern as to the affordability and access should such drugs be found safe and effective, especially since federal funds are being provided.

No U.S. federal agency has ever exercised its power to march-in and license patent rights to others.  For example, advocacy groups have long petitioned the National Institute of Health (“NIH”) to exercise march-in rights for HIV/AIDS related drugs, but have been rejected by the NIH contending that high drug prices are an insufficient reason to break a patent.  However, in the face of a global pandemic, “health or safety needs” may provide a strong basis for the exercise of march-in rights and grant of a compulsory license if more patent owners, like Gilead, take a protectionist patent stance.  On the other hand, if more companies like AbbVie take a more socially conscious approach, there may not be need for government intervention in terms of compulsory patent licenses.  Nevertheless, the availability of this measure may at least provide some comfort and may motivate companies to voluntary suspend their patent rights during this global public health emergency in order to avoid government march-in, or maybe as a pure act of benevolence showing that social responsibility has a place in commercial business.

1   See 35 U.S.C. § § 154, 271.

2   See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), 35 U.S.C. § 203.

3   See https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2020/03/22/coronavirus-ventilator-shortage-gm-tesla-covid-19/2895190001/.

4   See https://wwd.com/fashion-news/fashion-scoops/fashion-designers-make-masks-hospital-gown-hand-sanitizer-to-fight-coronavirus-1203545006/.

5   See http://longisland.news12.com/story/41926769/anheuserbusch-to-make-hand-sanitizer-in-response-to-coronavirus-pandemic.

6   See Id.

7  https://www.gilead.com/purpose/advancing-global-health/covid-19/emergency-access-to-remdesivir-outside-of-clinical-trials.

8   See https://www.ibtimes.com/coronavirus-treatment-gileads-potential-covid-19-treatment-labeled-orphan-drug-could-2945353.

9   See https://time.com/5782633/covid-19-drug-remdesivir-china/.

10 Orphan Drug Act of 1983. Pub L. No. 97–414, 96 Stat. 2049.

11 See https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/16/remdesivir-surges-ahead-against-coronavirus/.

12 See https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/18/21185006/softbank-theranos-coronavirus-covid-lawsuit-patent-testingsee alsohttps://www.businessinsider.com/theranos-patents-fortress-labrador-diagnostics-lawsuit-biofire-coronavirus-tests-2020-3.

13 See Id.

14 See https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200316005955/en/.

15 See https://www.law360.com/articles/1255547/3d-printing-as-indirect-patent-infringement-amid-covid-19.

16 See https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/17/21184308/coronavirus-italy-medical-3d-print-valves-treatments.

17 See Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, 13 I.S.T. 25 (1962), Art. 5(A)(2) (“Paris Convention”); See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, Art. 31. (“TRIPS Agreement”).

18 See 35 U.S.C. § 203.

19 See https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10422.


© Copyright 2020 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

FDA Recommends New Warnings for Breast Implants Alleged to Cause Cancer

On October 24, 2019, the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) issued a draft guidance addressing textured breast implants that have been linked to breast implant-associated anaplastic large cell lymphoma (“BIA-ALCL”).”

Part of that guidance recommends a Black Box Warning, the most serious level of warning, in the device’s labeling to help ensure women receive and understand information regarding the serious risks of textured breast implants. Part of that warning should include:

  • breast implants are not lifetime devices;

  • the chances of developing complications increase the longer a patient has the implant, and additional surgery may be required to address the complications; and

  • breast implants have been associated with the risk of developing breast implant-associated anaplastic large cell lymphoma (BIA-ALCL) and may be associated with systemic symptoms (like fatigue or joint pain).

Additionally, the draft guidance recommends that textured breast implant manufacturers include a patient decision checklist at the end of a patient informational booklet or brochure. A patient decision checklist gives patients the opportunity to acknowledge individual risks of textured breast implants and can be used to help guide discussion during a patient’s consultation with a surgeon. The proposed checklist specifically addresses the risk of BIA-ALCL.

Finally, the FDA confirmed that it is coordinating with the American Society of Plastic Surgeons and the Plastic Surgeons Foundation, to develop the Patient Registry and Outcomes for Breast Implants and Anaplastic Large Cell Lymphoma Etiology and Epidemiology, which collects data from patients with a confirmed diagnosis of BIA-ALCL. The FDA contends that this will contribute to a better understanding of textured breast implants and BIA-ALCL, as well as improve FDA communication updates to the public regarding textured breast implants and BIA-ALCL.


COPYRIGHT © 2019, STARK & STARK

For more FDA medical device regulation, see the National Law Review Products Liability law page.

FDA Releases Draft Guidance for Manufacturers on Dissemination of Patient Data from Medical Devices

medical devices health dataOn June 9, 2016, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published draft guidance outlining considerations for the “appropriate and responsible” dissemination of individualized data from medical devices from device manufacturers to patients.

In the draft guidance, FDA clarifies that medical device manufacturers may share “patient-specific information” from legally marketed medical devices with patients at the patients’ request without additional premarket review by the agency, provided such dissemination falls within the lawful scope for which the manufacturer may market the device. For purposes of the draft guidance, “patient-specific information” is any information that is unique to an individual patient or unique to that patient’s treatment or diagnosis that, consistent with the intended use of the device, may be recorded, stored, processed, retrieved and/or derived from that device. Examples of patient-specific information include recorded patient data, device usage/output statistics, provider inputs, alarms and/or records of device malfunctions. Patient-specific information does not, however, include any interpretation of such data aside from interpretations normally reported by the device to the patient or the patient’s healthcare provider.

When sharing patient-specific information with patients, FDA recommends that manufacturers consider the following factors to ensure that such information is usable by patients and to avoid the disclosure of confusing or unclear information:

  • Content of information provided.  The information provided to patients should be comprehensive and up-to-date, and manufacturers should take measures to ensure that such information is easily understood and useful to the patient. Depending on the type and scope of information being shared, the manufacturer should provide supplementary instructions, materials or references to help patients understand the data. In deciding what measures may be necessary, the manufacturer should be sure to consider whether any characteristics of the intended recipient audience (e.g., mental capacity) may affect the interpretability of the information.

  • Context in which information should be understood.  Manufacturers should provide the information in context to avoid situations where the information may be misinterpreted, leading to invalid or inappropriate conclusions.

  • Necessity of access to follow-up information.  Manufacturers should consider what, if any, information they should include about whom to contact for follow-up information.  At minimum, manufacturers should advise patients to contact their health care providers with any questions about their data. Manufacturers should also consider providing their own contact information to facilitate response to patient questions about the device.

The draft guidance is the latest in a line of documents in which FDA has attempted to clarify its expectations for—and in many cases, allay the concerns of—developers of mobile health products. Though short on specifics, developers should find the guidance helpful insofar as they have questions regarding the extent to which they can disseminate medical device data to patients. Notably, however, the FDA does not address how manufacturers should proceed with respect to the dissemination of many patient-specific analyses, likely because the agency intends to address such issues in its long-awaited guidance on clinical decision support software.

© 2016 McDermott Will & Emery

FDA Outlines Future Medical Device Coordinating Center

FDALogoThe federal Food and Drug Administration’s planning board (Planning Board) for a medical device evaluation system (NMDES) recently recommended the creation of a centralized Coordinating Center to develop a national system to evaluate medical devices. Convened in 2014 by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the Brookings Center for Health Policy, the Planning Board emerged out of an FDA action plan in 2012 seeking to strengthen the medical device post-market surveillance system by building a more coordinated and efficient system that would track medical devices and share evidence regarding safety and efficacy.

In the report, issued on April 5, 2016, NMDES is described as a voluntary, coordinated network of partnerships that include government agencies, device manufacturers, provider organizations, health plans, and patient communities that share the common goal of “generating higher quality data and evidence at lower costs to inform and improve patient care.” The Coordinating Center proposed by the Planning Board would be responsible for governing, coordinating, and standardizing efforts among these participants. The Coordinating Center would not have explicit regulatory authority, but FDA’s authorities could authorize and initiate activities through the Coordinating Center.

NMDES as a Coordinated Network of Partners

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This proposed network would build on the currently-existing limitations in obtaining evidence regarding medical devices, such as the absence of a broad adoption of unique device identifiers (UDIs) for tracking purposes, the expense of manual data entry and delays in data extraction, and limited participation in medical device tracking experts by health care providers and patients.

Although the Coordinating Center should be able to meet its objectives of optimizing data sharing, promoting best practices for device evaluation, and developing a process for disseminating safety and efficacy information, the proposed plan still has several hurdles to overcome. Under the timeline proposed in the report, it is “unlikely that a de novo entity can be organized.” Therefore, the Coordinating Center would have to be incubated at an “established hosting entity” with the plan to spin off the Coordinating Center and Governing Board into a “financially stable and independent entity.” Additionally, there is little concrete discussion of the source of early seed funding. Until such organizational and funding details are determined, NMDES and the Coordinating Center will remain aproposed system; however, as the report is the first in a series of papers to be released by the Planning Board, we expect more information to be forthcoming.

Article By M. Leeann Habte & Lindsey E. Gabrielsen of Foley & Lardner LLP

© 2016 Foley & Lardner LLP

Hacking Health Care: When Cybersecurity Can Mean Life or Death

cybersecurityMillions of Americans rely on implantable medical devices to stay alive. These battery-operated devices communicate through wireless transmissions — and can be hacked like any other wireless device. For example, a wireless pacemaker regulates a person’s heartbeat and records the heart’s activity, and then transmits this information to doctors who can reprogram the pacemaker. The interconnectivity between medical devices and clinical systems leaves wireless medical devices vulnerable to security breaches.

Cybersecurity no longer just applies to computer networks and financial data; modern implantable medical devices have the same vulnerability and also require cybersecurity. In fact, in a span of six months, hackers attempted to log into MRI and defibrillator machines over ten thousand times and attempted to download malware approximately 300 times. Had these hackers been successful, they could have accessed patients’ personal information or reprogrammed the defibrillators to deliver deadly jolts of electricity to patients’ hearts.

The government is already taking action. In 2014, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) responded to these threats with guidance on how medical device manufacturers could improve the safety of implantable medical devices. The FDA advised manufacturers that their failure to develop cybersecurity controls could lead to repercussions including “compromised device functionality, loss of data (medical or personal) availability or integrity, or exposure of other connected devices or networks to security threats. This in turn may have the potential to result in patient illness, injury, or death.”

[I]n a span of six months, hackers attempted to log into MRI and defibrillator machines . . .

Further, as manufacturers well know, when a device malfunctions and causes bodily injury, consumers typically allege product liability claims. Patients whose devices are hacked could raise claims for design defects and failure to warn of the risk of cyber-vulnerabilities. These potential victims likely never considered their life-saving medical devices could be used as a weapon. For most people, the idea that someone would attack a medical device seems unfathomable.

So, what motivates attacks on implanted medical devices? According to Dr. William Maisel, “[m]otivation for such actions might include the acquisition of private information for financial gain or competitive advantage; damage to a device manufacturer’s reputation; sabotage by a disgruntled employee, dissatisfied customer or terrorist to inflict financial or personal injury; or simply the satisfaction of the attacker’s ego.” Medical data can be worth ten times as much as a credit card number. Added to that, the medical device market was a $25.2 billion industry in 2012 and is expected to be a $33.6 billion industry by 2018. That’s a vast market of potential victims.

© 2015 Schiff Hardin LLP

Making Use of Social Media: FDA Releases Two Draft Guidelines on the Use of Social Media Platforms by Drug and Device Manufacturers

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The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has released two long-awaited draft guidance documents for the drug and device industries revolving around the use of social media platforms by drug and device manufacturers — Internet/Social Media Platforms: Correcting Independent Third Party Misinformation About Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices (“Guidance on Correcting Third Party Misinterpretation”), and Internet/Social Media Platforms with Character Space Limitations – Presenting Risk and Benefit Information for Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices (“Guidance on Presenting Risk/Benefit Information”).

As the titles suggest, the purpose of the documents is to clarify how social media may be utilized by drug and medical device companies for the voluntary correction of misinformation provided by independent third parties, as well as for presenting promotional messaging regarding risk/benefit information of products. But while the guidelines provide helpful clarification regarding how such platforms may be utilized, they each also raise considerations that companies should take heed of before beginning to use these outlets, and should be factored into a company’s social media guidelines.

Internet/Social Media Platforms: Correcting Independent Third Party Misinformation About Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices

As an initial matter, the Guidance on Correcting Third Party Misinterpretation (“Draft Guidance #1”) establishes two points: first, Draft Guidance #1 only applies to misinformation posted to Internet-based platforms by an independent third party, therefore excluding content provided by the company itself, its employees and agents. Second, Draft Guidance #1 establishes that the exception to a company’s obligation to respond to or correct misinformation only applies to information that is “truly independent,” for example posted by an independent third party to an unaffiliated platform or a platform providing content that is not controlled by the company.

However, Draft Guidance #1 does not completely exclude company-operated sites. In stark contrast with the company’s obligation to correct content when that content is “owned, controlled, created …influenced or affirmatively adopted or endorsed by, or on behalf of, the firm,” where such corrections are obligatory and also carry advertising and labeling regulatory requirements, Draft Guidance #1 does not hold companies responsible for correcting misinformation where a company owns or operates an online platform that allows for user-generated content (chat room, etc.) over which a company does notexert control. However, Draft Guidance #1 cautions that such a site should contain an “overarching and conspicuous statement that the firm did not create or control the [user-generated content].”

If a company chooses to voluntarily respond to truly independent misinformation, Draft Guidance #1 sets parameters on the process for taking correction action, which should either be by (i) providing appropriate truthful corrective information or (ii) providing “a reputable source for correct information, such as the firm’s contact information. In either approach, in order to constitute “appropriate corrective information” a firm’s communication should denote the affiliation of the corrective post with the company, and be:

  • relevant and responsive to the misinformation;
  • limited and tailored to the misinformation;
  • non-promotional in nature, tone, and presentation;
  • accurate;
  • consistent with the FDA-required labeling for the product;
  • supported by sufficient evidence; and
  • posted either in conjunction with or reference the misinformation.

In acknowledgement of the vast nature of the Internet and certain forums and the reality that it may be impractical for a company to attempt to correct all misinformation about its products that may appear, Draft Guidance #1 stipulates that companies do not need to address all incorrect information that may be posted regarding a particular drug or device, even if a company elects to correct a selective portion. When addressing any misinformation, therefore, Draft Guidance #1 recommends that a company create a figurative box around the particular misinformation and portion of the forum it intends to correct, and then revise all the incorrect information within that defined boundary, which should include also correcting positive misinformation or exaggerations. Following corrective action, while Draft Guidance #1 does not hold companies responsible for monitoring the communication, it does recommend that companies keep records that include (i) the date, location, and content of the misinformation; (ii) when the wrongful information was discovered; and (iii) a description of the corrective information provided, including the date it was furnished.

Finally, Draft Guidance #1 suggests that the FDA does not intend to object if a firm voluntarily corrects misinformation and the voluntarily provided corrective information does not satisfy otherwise applicable regulatory labeling or advertising requirements, so long as the corrective information is not non-truthful, misleading, or in a manner other than recommended by Draft Guidance #1. However, companies should take heed that any corrective action that goes beyond merely providing accurate information that is specifically tailored to the misinformation it is addressing (i.e., including slogans or promotional information) must comply with applicable regulatory requirements related to labeling or advertising.

While helpful for establishing clearly both the parameters for correctly responding to misinformation as well as for clearly limiting a company’s obligation to respond to any or all misinformation posted by an independent third party, the Guidance on Correcting Third Party Misinterpretation also reminds companies to take caution when doing so to ensure that their responses are narrowly tailored enough to fall under the purview of the guidance and outside regulatory requirements. That caution includes carefully considering where misinformation clearly constitutes “truly independent” information. Companies should be mindful of the reality that “truly independent” is not a concept that is well defined, and should thus be cautious before asserting that certain misinformation may fall under the purview of Draft Guidance #1 as the FDA advances a broad interpretation of when a company is responsible for taking corrective action.

Internet/Social Media Platforms with Character Space Limitations — Presenting Risk and Benefit Information for Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices

Prepared by the Office of Prescription Drug Promotion, the second guidance issued by the FDA last week, the Guidance on Presenting Risk/Benefit Information (“Draft Guidance #2”), addresses the parameters around presenting benefits and risks information on Internet and social media platforms with character spacing limitations, such as microblogs (e.g., Twitter) and online paid search (e.g., “sponsored links” on search engines such as Google). Draft Guidance #2 clearly establishes that, as a threshold matter, the character restrictions do not eliminate the company’s responsibility to ensure its promotional messaging complies with all applicable regulations related to advertising and labeling, and cautions that such forms of media may not be appropriate for promotion of certain products, such as those with complex indications or risk profiles.

For companies that choose to make product benefit claims on character-space-limited communication sites, while each may reasonably use common abbreviations (including scientific and medical abbreviations), punctuation marks, and other symbols to comply with space constraints, Draft Guidance #2 presents a broad set of rules that must be satisfied by each communication relating to both risk and benefit information.

Benefit Information

  • Benefit information should be accurate, non-misleading, and reveal material facts within each individual message or tweet.
  • Benefit information should be included with risk information in the same message. Do not spread benefit and risk information across multiple messages or tweets.

Risk Information

  • Risk information should be included with benefit information in the same message. Do not spread risk and benefit information across multiple messages or tweets.
  • Risk information should be “comparable in scope” to the benefit information, and should, at minimum, include the most serious risks, e.g., those included in a boxed warning or known to be life-threatening, among others, associated with the product. To determine whether risk information is “comparable in scope” to the benefit information, the FDA weighs (i) whether the risk information “qualifies any representations made about the product,” and (ii) whether the risk information is presented with a “prominence and readability comparable to the benefit claims about the product.” While risk disclosures may be concise when paired with benefit information, a hyperlink to a complete, and exclusive, discussion of risks should be included and appropriately titled and not promotional in nature.
  • Both the proprietary and established (generic) name for the product should be included within the character-space limited communication and on each landing page associated with each hyperlink in that initial communication. Draft Guidance #2 recommends that the landing page be devoted exclusively to the communication of risk information about the product and not to the promotional home page. Such landing page should also prominently display quantitative ingredient and dosing information for prescription drugs.

In light of the restrictions set forth by Draft Guidance #2, while companies should feel comfortable taking advantage of current social media platforms including those with character restrictions, they should also ensure that the parties responsible for drafting any such posts are aware of the parameters placed on such communications. A hypothetical example provided by Draft Guidance #2 exemplifies some of the potential disadvantages of such messaging:

NoFocus (rememberine HCl) for mild to moderate memory loss-May cause seizures in patients with a seizure disorder www.nofocus.com/risk

While the message complies with each of Draft Guidance #2’s directives, the balancing of risk and benefit information in a space restricted communication may have the unintended result of highlighting risk over benefit. Additionally, from a practical standpoint, the space constraints may prevent the inclusion of all necessary information. If a company cannot conclude that “adequate” benefit and risk information (along with other required disclosure) may be communicated in the same message or tweet — particularly at 140 characters — Draft Guidance #2 recommends that the company reconsider whether the use of the particular platform is the appropriate forum for the dissemination of such messaging before making use of such forums, once again in particular for drugs with complex indications or high risk profiles.

As a general conclusion, while the Guidance on Presenting Risk/Benefit Information is self-admittedly limited in scope, and does not address “promotion via product websites, webpages on social networking platforms (e.g., [Facebook, Twitter, YouTube]), and online web banners,” it undeniably provides helpful direction for drug and device companies’ use of social media sites for promotional messaging where communications are restricted to a limited number of characters, as well as highlighting how the FDA may intend to regulate such use. Companies should pay careful attention to the restrictions while taking advantage of the opportunities these social media platforms offer, and should take care to ensure to instill clear policies that comply with Draft Guidance #2 that are available to, and understood by, individuals tasked with producing and monitoring social media content for the company.

The FDA will be accepting comments on both Draft Guidance #1 and Draft Guidance #2 until September 16, 2014.

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