Facebook & Extramarital Affairs: Beware!

Posted on Wednesday, August 3, 2011 in the National Law Review an  article by Rebecca L. Palmer  Timothy C. Haughee of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A. regarding a growing number of married people are using Facebook to reunite with old flames or to connect with those with whom they seek a romantic relationship.

With the advent of social networking sites such as Facebook, people are now able to reconnect with long-lost friends with just the click of a mouse. While many take advantage of Facebook’s added convenience to make innocent connections with others, a growing number of people are using Facebook to reunite with old flames or to connect with those with whom they seek a romantic relationship. For a married person, this can be a real marriage disaster.

According to a 2008 report by the Pew Internet and American Life Project, one in five adults, many of whom are married, use Facebook for flirting. A British divorce website, Divorce-Online, recently reported that the term “Facebook” appeared in nearly 20% of the petitions it was handling last year, out of a case load of 7,000. Indeed, in one recent survey conducted by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, two-thirds of lawyers said Facebook was the “primary source” of evidence in divorce proceedings.

So, does Facebook cause extramarital affairs? While the statistics referenced above may lead one to conclude that Facebook can cause extramarital affairs, there has yet to be evidence of such a causal link. In fact, the divorce rate has generally been stable during the last decade, and infidelity’s role as the primary cause of around 25% of divorces has also remained stable, despite advances in the digital age. However, while there may not be a direct causal link between Facebook and extramarital affairs, it is abundantly clear that Facebook enables married individuals to cheat on their spouses in a manner that is easier than previous methods. No longer do you have to write a letter to your old flame, or obtain their phone number and place a call, hoping that an irritated spouse does not answer. Instead, an online Facebook account allows easy connectivity, fast replies, mail accounts that can be easily deleted, advanced privacy settings, and the seamless sharing of pictures and other information, at any hour of the day or night. Simply stated, Facebook can tempt a married individual to pursue an extramarital relationship that they otherwise would not have pursued. If that temptation is acted upon, the married individual can maintain the extramarital relationship online and delete the evidence at their convenience, all without the knowledge of their spouse.

Facebook’s prevalence in extramarital affairs has, in turn, also led it to become a favorite evidence tool for divorce attorneys. The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers recently reported that 81% of its members have used or faced evidence taken from Facebook or other social networking sites over the last five years. Such evidence can have dramatic consequences for a party in a divorce case. For instance, a mother’s alienation of affliction claim may be bolstered by evidence of the father forcing the couple’s son to “de-friend” his mother on Facebook. A parent going through a divorce may have their request for additional timesharing with their child denied if the court is presented with pictures from Facebook depicting the parent drinking or doing drugs when the child is in their care. A divorcing spouse seeking alimony based on a lack of earning capacity may have their request denied by the court if the requesting spouse’s Facebook account is littered with pictures of the spouse spending their free time and money at restaurants and bars.

The law is currently unsettled regarding the use of information obtained from Facebook during a family law proceeding. However, recent case law should leave Facebook users, and their family law attorneys, wary. For instance, a judge in Pennsylvania recently found that the husband in a divorce case had to provide his wife’s attorneys with his Facebook username and password, despite the husband’s objection that his Facebook information was private and thus deserving of an evidentiary privilege. The judge rejected the husband’s arguments, noting that the husband had no expectation of privacy because Facebook’s End User License Agreement (“EULA”) notes that all user accounts are subject to, and are at any time accessible by, third party administrators. Since the husband accepted Facebook’s EULA when he signed up for Facebook, the court found an implicit waiver of confidentiality regarding the information contained on his Facebook page. While the Pennsylvania decision is not binding on Florida courts, it is most assuredly instructive.

Accordingly, a person should be extremely cautious with their Facebook account when going through a divorce. Among other things, a divorcing individual should refrain from denigrating their spouse on Facebook, and should generally avoid posting comments on their Facebook accounts that they would not want a judge to read in open court. Additionally, a divorcing spouse should abstain from posting pictures or videos that may be damaging to their divorce case, including pictures or videos that are sexually explicit or show the divorcing spouse binge drinking or doing drugs and exposing their children to the same. Similarly, a divorcing spouse should take note of the information posted by their Facebook “friends,” such as pictures or videos that “tag” the divorcing spouse, and should ask such “friends” to remove the damaging information from their Facebook page. Finally, a divorcing spouse should consider changing their Facebook privacy settings so that they can limit the information that they share, and if that is not enough, a divorcing spouse should consider deleting their Facebook account during their family law case.

We continue to find technology changing human relationships. From readily accessible pornography to explicit social networking websites (including at least one aimed at assisting married individuals to enter into extramarital affairs) to Facebook, family life is no longer made up of the innocence of Ward and June Cleaver. Consequently, using good judgment and carefully monitoring your Facebook account during a family law proceeding can have a significant impact on your case.

© Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, PA, 2011. All rights reserved.

This (Retractable) Needle Is Going to Sting a Bit: Next Chapter in the Adventures of Post-Phillips Claim Construction

Posted on July 31, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by David M. Beckwith and Paul Devinsky of McDermott Will & Emery regarding how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the claim construction tension between broadly drafted claims and the written description contained in the patent specification:

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the claim construction tension between broadly drafted claims, and the written description contained in the patent specification, revealing a deep split among the panel members. Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson Co., Case No. 07-CV-0250 (Fed. Cir,. July 8, 2011) (Lourie, J.) (Plager, J., concurring) (Rader, J. dissenting-in-part).

Retractable Technologies (RT) sued Becton Dickenson (BD) for infringing three patents related to syringes with retractable needle technology. Following an adverse jury verdict, BD appealed on multiple grounds, including a challenge to the claim construction of the term “body,” which the district court had determined could include a multi-part structure.

The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, specifically rejecting the district court’s broad claim construction the term “body.”  BD argued that the district court erred in ruling the syringe “body” is not limited to a one-piece structure, noting the specifications describes “the invention” as including a one-piece body.  In addition, the background section of the patent criticized prior art syringes that contain a two-piece body.  Finally, BD argued that claim differentiation does not apply in light of the written description’s limiting statements concerning the nature of the invention and the structure of the syringe body.

RT responded that the ordinary meaning of the term “body” should apply and is not limited to a one-piece body.  RT also argued application of the claim differentiation canon based on a dependent claim that included the limitation of a one-piece body.

Judge Lourie wrote for the majority of the panel, agreeing with BD that the claim term “body” is limited to a one-piece structure as described in the specifications. The majority noted that the specification indicates what was invented, holding that the claim language should not be interpreted to extend the invention beyond that set forth in the written description.  The majority also rejected RT’s claim differentiation argument as “weak” in the face of the language of the specification.  The majority noted that no dependent claim recited a non-one piece structure and concluded that the language of the specification that criticized two-piece structures was of greater significance than the dependent claim to a one-piece body.

Judge Plager, concurring, warned courts to turn a deaf ear to the siren song of giving claims wide scope.  In Judge Plager’s opinion, the written description requirement imposes an obligation to make full disclosure of what is actually invented and to claim that and nothing more.  As Judge Plager noted, “I have written elsewhere about the curse of indefinite and ambiguous claims, divorced from the written description, that we are regularly are asked to construe, and the need for more stringent rules to control the curse.”

In dissent, Judge Rader focused on the ordinary meaning of the term “body” and explained that since there was no special meaning provided by the patent specification to supplant the ordinary meaning of the term “body,” it was error to limit the construction to only a one-piece structure.  Rader wrote,  “In this case, neither party contends that ‘body’ has a special, technical meaning in the field of art, and thus claim construction requires ‘little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly used words.’”

Practice Note:  This decision reflects a fundamental division within the Federal Circuit on the importance of the written description as a limitation on claim scope, as compared to the view that the claim language itself should be of paramount importance in construction. Until there is either some post-Phillips en bancclarification or Supreme Court consideration of the issue, the outcome of contested constructions in such a circumstance may demand on the panel hearing the appeal.

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

Unsecured Creditors Beware! The Western District of Texas Bankruptcy Court Declares an Unsecured Creditor Cannot Have Its Cake (Unsecured Claim) and Eat It Too (Post-Petition Legal Fees)

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Evan D. FlaschenRenée M. DaileyMark E. Dendinger of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP about the issue of whether an unsecured creditor can recover post-petition legal fees under the Bankruptcy Code:

Bankruptcy courts have long debated the issue of whether an unsecured creditor can recover post-petition legal fees under the Bankruptcy Code. In the recent decision of In re Seda France, Inc. (located here(opens in a new window)), Justice Craig A. Gargotta of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas denied an unsecured creditor’s claim for post-petition fees. In doing so, the Court has once again left the unsecured creditor with a bad taste in its mouth by declaring that an unsecured creditor seeking post-petition fees is asking permission to have its cake (a claim for principal, interest and pre-petition legal fees under applicable loan documents) and eat it too (a claim for post-petition legal fees).

Proponents of the view that an unsecured creditor cannot recover post-petition legal fees point to section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows as part of a creditor’s secured claim the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred during the post-petition period, and note the Bankruptcy Code is silent on anunsecured creditor’s right to post-petition legal fees. Essentially, the argument is since Congress provided for post-petition fees for secured creditors, it could have explicitly provided for post-petition fees for unsecured creditors but chose not to. Proponents of the alternative view cite the Second Circuit decision United Merchants and its progeny, where those courts refused to read the plain language of section 506(b) as a limitation on an unsecured creditor’s claim for recovery of post-petition legal expenses. The theory is that while the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly permit the recovery of an unsecured creditor’s claim for post-petition attorneys’ fees, it does not expressly exclude them either. The basic tenant is that if Congress intended to disallow an unsecured creditor’s claim for post-petition legal fees it could have done so explicitly.

In Seda, Aegis Texas Venture Fund II, LP (“Aegis”) timely filed a proof of claim in Seda’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case claiming its entitlement to principal, interest and pre-petition attorneys’ fees under its loan documents with Seda as well as post-petition attorneys’ fees for the duration of the case. Aegis made various arguments in support of the allowance of its post-petition legal expenses including: (1) the explicit award of post-petition fees to secured creditors under section 506(b) does not mean that such a provision should not be implicitly read into section 502(b) (i.e., unim est exclusion alterius (“the express mention of one thing excludes all others”) does not apply), (2) the United States Supreme Court decision in Timbers does not control as Timbers denied claims of anundersecured creditor for unmatured interest caused by a delay in foreclosing on its collateral, (3) the right to payment of attorneys’ fees and costs exists pre-petition and it should be irrelevant to the analysis that such fees are technically incurred post-petition, (4) because the Bankruptcy Code is silent on the disallowance of an unsecured creditor’s post-petition attorneys’ fees, these claims should remain intact, and (5) recovery of post-petition attorneys’ fees and costs is particularly appropriate where, as in Seda, the debtor’s estate is solvent and all unsecured creditors are to be paid in full as part of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan.

The Seda Court rejected Aegis’ arguments and held that an unsecured creditor is not entitled to post-petition attorneys’ fees even where there is an underlying contractual right to such fees and unsecured creditors are being paid in full. With respect to Aegis’ argument on the proper interpretation of sections 506(b) and 502(b), the Court cited the many instances in the Bankruptcy Code where Congress expressed its desire to award post-petition attorneys’ fees (e.g., section 506(b)), and found that Congress could have easily provided for the recovery of attorneys’ fees for unsecured creditors had that been its intent. Regarding Aegis’ argument that Timbers does not control, the Court held that in reaching its decision on the disallowance of a claim for unmatured interest the Timbers Court found support in the notion that section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly permit post-petition interest to be paid to unsecured creditors. The SedaCourt held this ruling should apply equally to attorneys’ fees to prohibit recovery of post-petition fees and expenses by unsecured creditors. The Court further held that section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a court should determine claim amounts “as of the date of the filing of the petition,” and therefore attorneys’ fees incurred after the petition date would not be recoverable by an unsecured creditor. In response to Aegis’ argument that non-bankruptcy rights, including the right to recover post-petition attorneys’ fees should be protected, the Seda Court noted that the central purpose of the bankruptcy system is “to secure equality among creditors of a bankrupt” and that an unsecured creditor’s recovery of post-petition legal fees, even based on a contractual right, would prejudice other unsecured creditors. The Court held this is true even in the case where the debtor was solvent and paying all unsecured creditors in full. The Court noted that a debtor’s right to seek protection under the Bankruptcy Code is not premised on the solvency or insolvency of the debtor and, therefore, the solvency of the debtor has no bearing on the allowance of unsecured creditors’ post-petition legal fees.

Seda is the latest installment in the continued debate among the courts whether to allow an unsecured creditor’s post-petition attorneys’ fees. The Seda Court is of the view that an unsecured creditor cannot recover post-petition legal fees for the foregoing reasons, most notably that the Bankruptcy Code is silent on their provision and public policy disfavors the recovery of one unsecured creditor’s legal expenses incurred during the post-petition period to the prejudice of other unsecured creditors. Depending on the venue of the case, there will undoubtedly be many more instances of unsecured creditors seeking recovery of their post-petition attorneys’ fees in a bankruptcy case until the Supreme Court definitively rules on the issue. Until then, keep asking for that cake . . . .

© 2011 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

Entrepreneur’s Guide to Litigation – Blog Series: Discovery

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by  Joseph D. Brydges of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP regarding the Discovery is a pre-trial phase of litigation.

 

Discovery is a pre-trial phase of litigation during which a party to a lawsuit seeks to “discover” information from the opposing party. Discovery is meant to facilitate the truth-finding function of the courts and, as such, parties to a lawsuit have an automatic right to discovery. From a strategic standpoint, discovery is used to gather and preserve evidence in support or defense of the claims made in the complaint. Further, discovery often helps parties narrow the focus of the litigation in preparation for trial and, in some cases, may lead to a pre-trial settlement. Discovery is an extremely important phase of litigation because the evidence gathered during discovery will serve as the foundation of a motion for summary judgment and/or strategy at trial.

Discovery proceedings are typically governed by state statutes in state court and by the federal rules of civil procedure in federal court. Generally, the scope of discovery permitted under these rules is very broad. Discoverable information may include any material which is reasonably calculated to produce evidence that may later be admitted at trial. However, certain information, including information protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product of an opposing party, is generally protected from discovery. During the discovery period, parties may serve discovery requests upon one another. These discovery requests are made through one of several available discovery mechanisms including interrogatories, requests for admission, document requests and depositions.

Interrogatories are written discovery requests often utilized to obtain basic information such as names and dates. Any party served with written interrogatories must answer the questions contained therein in writing and under oath. Similarly, requests for admission consist of written statements directed towards an opposing party for the purpose of having the opposing party “admit” or “deny” the statements. Often, these statements seek to establish undisputed facts, authenticate documents and pin an opposing party to a particular position. Document requests are an important component of discovery in which a party may be required to make any relevant and nonprivileged documents available for inspection by the opposing party. Document production will be covered in greater detail in the following section entitled “Document Production.”

The lynchpin of discovery proceedings is the deposition. Depositions are used to obtain the out-of-court testimony of a witness with knowledge relevant to the litigation. They allow a party to discover any relevant information known to a witness and are often the only method of discovery available with regard to obtaining information from witnesses that are not a party to the litigation. During a deposition, the witness is questioned under oath and must answer the questions asked truthfully to the extent that the answer would not lead to the disclosure of privileged information. The rules governing depositions also allow for the deposition of an organization or corporation where a party is unable to identify the particular witness within the organization that may have knowledge of the information sought. In that instance, a party may identify the information sought and the organization will be required to designate a representative to testify on its behalf.

A party served with a discovery request must respond to the request within the specified time period or object to the requested discovery and state reasons for its objection. If, for some reason, a party refuses to respond to a discovery request, the party serving the request may move the court to compel a response. It is within the court’s power to compel a response to a discovery request and impose penalties on a party refusing to comply with a discovery request.

Click Below for previous posts from the Entrepreneur’s Guide to Litigation Blog Series:

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

ALJ Upholds OIG’s Eight-Year Exclusion of Company Owner

Posted recently in the National Law Review an article by Meghan C. O’Connor of von Briesen & Roper, S.C. regarding OIG’s use of its exclusionary authority against individuals:

 

In yet another example of the OIG’s use of its exclusionary authority against individuals, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld the OIG’s exclusion ofMichael D. Dinkel, the owner and President of a diagnostic imaging company. Dinkel has been excluded from participation in all Federal health care programs for a period of eight years.

The OIG has the authority to exclude individuals and entities from Federal health care programs for presenting or causing to be presented claims for items or services that the individual or entity knows or should know where not provided as claimed, or are otherwise false or fraudulent.

According to the OIG’s press release, Dinkel and his company, Drew Medical, Inc., submitted approximately 9,500 false claims worth $1.6 million to theMedicare and Medicaid programs for services related to venography, a radiology procedure. The OIG found that no venography services had actually been performed. Instead, claims were submitted to Medicare and Medicaid for a corresponding procedural code for MRI and CT procedures with contrast. Prior to Dinkel’s exclusion, a $1,147,564 civil False Claims Act settlement had been entered into with Dinkel and his company.

The ALJ found that Dinkel had a duty “to understand Medicare and Medicaid billing requirements and apply them scrupulously to the claims that he caused to be presented.” Furthermore, Dinkel’s failure to ensure his company properly claimed reimbursement “constituted reckless indifference to the propriety of the claims he cause to be presented.”

The ALJ’s full decision is available by request from the OIG.

©2011 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

D.C. Circuit Invalidates SEC's Proxy Access Rules

Posted on Sunday, July 24, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by John D. Tishler  and Evan Mendelsohn of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP regarding the  United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision invalidating the SEC’s proxy access rules adopted in August 2010:

July 22, in Business Roundtable v. Securities & Exchange Commission, No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued its decision invalidating the SEC’s proxy access rules adopted in August 2010 with the intention that they be effective for the 2011 proxy season (see our blog here). The Business Roundtable and U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed the lawsuit in September 2010 challenging the SEC’s adoption of proxy access rules and separately requesting for the SEC to stay implementation of the rules pending the outcome of the lawsuit. The SEC granted the request for stay in October 2010 and issuers were relieved of the burdens of proxy access for the 2011 proxy season. (See our blog posts here and here.)

The Court found that the Commission “neglected its statutory responsibility to determine the likely economic consequences of Rule 14a-11 and to connect those consequences to efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” The Court also criticized the SEC’s reliance on empirical data that purported to demonstrate that proxy access would improve board performance and increase shareholder value by facilitating the election of dissident nominees, pointing out numerous studies submitted in the rule comment process that reached the opposite result.

The SEC’s proxy access rules also included an amendment to Rule 14a-8 that would authorize stockholder proposals to establish a procedure for stockholders to nominate directors. The SEC stayed implementation of the changes to Rule 14a-8 at the same time it stayed implementation of Rule 14a-11; however, the changes to Rule 14a-8 were not affected by the Court’s decision.

The SEC will now need to decide whether to propose new regulations for proxy access and whether to permit Rule 14a-8 to go effective.  However the SEC decides to proceed, it seems unlikely that public companies will face mandatory proxy access for the 2012 proxy season. 

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

U.S. Supreme Court Stresses Importance of Commonality in Decertifying Massive Sex Discrimination Class of 1.5 Million Wal-Mart Employees

 Barnes & Thornburg LLP‘s Labor and Employment Law Department recently posted in the National Law Review an article about the U.S. Supreme Court’s reversing the largest employment class certification in history

In Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Dukes, reversing the largest employment class certification in history, the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have limited the circumstances in which federal courts can certify class actions – and not just in employment cases. The Court held that the lower federal courts had erred by certifying a class that included 1.5 million female employees from virtually every part of the country. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages, and backpay as a result of alleged discrimination by Wal-Mart against female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

The Supreme Court held that class certification was improper because the class failed to meet the “commonality” requirement of Federal Rule 23(a)(3), which provides that a class can be certified “only if…there are questions of law or fact common to the class…” The Court noted that the mere allegation of “common questions” is insufficient under Rule 23. “Th[e] common contention… must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the [individual class members’] claims in one stroke.” 

The Court held that the Wal-Mart class did not meet the standard for commonality, because the evidence showed that Wal-Mart gave discretion to its supervisors in making employment decisions. The named plaintiffs “have not identified a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company… In a company of Wal-Mart’s size and geographical scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way without some common direction.” The Court concluded that, “Because [the named plaintiffs] provide no convincing proof of a company-wide discriminatory pay and promotion policy, we have concluded that they have not established the existence of any common question.”

The lack of commonality found in Wal-Mart can arise in class actions of many kinds. Under Wal-Mart, a question is “common” under Rule 23(a)(3) only if it can be decided on a class-wide basis. In the past, many named plaintiffs, and some lower courts, have overlooked this essential point. And, as in Wal-Mart, in many cases a claim of commonality will fail precisely because there is no way to rule on the question without addressing the individual facts relating to each purported class member. Wal-Mart makes clear that such a lack of commonality is sufficient to defeat class certification.

In addition to meeting all of the requirements of Rule 23(a), a class must comply with one of the three subparts in Rule 23(b). The trial court in Wal-Mart had certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2), which allows a class where the defendant’s alleged conduct “appl[ied] generally to the class, so that final injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole…”   Another issue before the Supreme Court was whether such certification was proper where the class sought recovery of substantial backpay based on Wal-Mart’s alleged discrimination.

The Court ruled that the purported class could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2),  holding that “claims for individualized relief (like the backpay at issue here) do not satisfy the Rule.” The Court said that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.”

Under the analysis in Wal-Mart , in the vast majority of class actions seeking a monetary recovery, the class can be certified (if at all) only under Rule 23(b)(3). Class certification under that provision is often more difficult, because a class plaintiff must prove that common questions “predominate” over individual questions and that a class action is “superior” to individual actions.  In addition, under Rule 23(c)(2)(A), individual notice must be given to all members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class at plaintiff’s expense, while such notice is optional, within the trial court’s discretion, if the class is certified under Rule 23(b)(2).

Wal-Mart is an important case in the area of employment law; but the Supreme Court’s holdings on the requirements of Rule 23 are likely to be helpful in defending class actions of all kinds

© 2011 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Evaluating Insurance Policies After Japan’s Earthquake

Posted on July 14, 2011 in the National Law Review by Risk Management Magazine of Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. (RIMS) information about an essential first step is to review insurance coverages for losses caused by natural catastrophes.

Shock and tragedy were the emotions most felt throughout Japan when the March earthquake and tsunami ravaged the nation. But companies doing business there have since moved on to planning mode, looking for ways to mitigate their losses, both those already suffered and the inevitable ones to come from similar exposures in the future.

An essential first step is to review insurance coverages for losses caused by natural catastrophes. Of particular importance is the potential availability ofcontingent business interruption insurance coverage for lost sales to Japanese customers or lost supplies from Japanese producers.

Property insurance policies obviously cover direct property damage caused by natural disasters. But those same policies also cover other types of business losses. Time element coverage pays for the lost profits when damaged property affects a policyholder’s day-to-day operations. The amount covered generally depends on the time it takes to resume normal business operations. Time element coverage can be triggered by damage either to the policyholder’s property or a third party’s property, and the most common kinds are business interruption, extra expense and contingent business interruption.

Business Interruption

The purpose of business interruption coverage is to restore the policyholder to the financial position it was in before the property damage occurred. To recover these losses, the lost profits, at a minimum, must relate to the event that caused the policyholder’s property damage. Once the insured demonstrates covered property damage, the measure of the loss generally is the difference between expected profits during the recovery period after the event and actual profits during that period, less any unrelated losses.

Perhaps the only recent U.S. event comparable to Japan’s earthquake is Hurricane Katrina. In Consolidated Cos. v. Lexington Ins. Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that business interruption losses resulting from Hurricane Katrina were covered without requiring proof to a level of specificity that the loss stemmed solely from damage to the policyholder’s property as a result of the hurricane. The insurance carrier argued that the policyholder had to prove what its likely performance would have been had Katrina taken place but not damaged the policyholder’s property, reasoning that, even absent damage to the policyholder’s property, profits would have been reduced because of the generally depressed economic conditions following the hurricane. Instead, the court concluded that the loss should be calculated as if Katrina had not struck at all.

Coverage for this interdependent business interruption loss can extend to locations that are distant from the damaged property if the policyholder can show that the undamaged facility operated in concert with the damaged one. An example would be a policyholder’s remote facility outside of Japan that cannot receive inventory because of damage to the policyholder’s manufacturing plant in Japan.

Extra Expense

Extra expense coverage aims to cover additional costs the policyholder incurs to minimize or avoid interruption of its business. Examples of such coverage are: additional utility costs needed to resume business operations; additional costs to store business equipment; moving costs to relocate to temporary facilities; and costs expended for the temporary repair or replacement of property. Most policies also contain a related coverage, similar to extra expense, typically called expense to reduce loss coverage, to reimburse additional costs incurred to mitigate property damage.

Contingent Business Interruption

Many policies protect against profits lost when a policyholder’s supplier or customer cannot conduct business because of property damage “of the type” covered under the policyholder’s policy. This coverage would provide, for example, recovery to a manufacturer of computers outside of Japan that suffers lost profits as a result of a supplier’s inability to provide required components because of damage to the supplier’s Japanese facility. Similarly, a policyholders’ profits affected by property damage to the facilities of a Japanese customer are recoverable. Covered costs also include losses incurred when a civil authority prevents access to the policyholder’s facilities, or when damage to property in the vicinity of the insured property prevents ingress to, or egress from, the policyholder’s facility.

John Banister, Erica Dominitz, Barry Fleishman, Helen Michael, Carl Salisbury and Caroline Spangenberg are all partners at Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton.

Risk Management Magazine and Risk Management Monitor.  Copyright 2011 Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. All rights reserved.

eDiscovery for Pharma, Biotech & Medical Device Industries

The National Law Review is pleased to inform you of IQPC’s e-Discovery for Pharma, Biotech & Medial Device Industries Conference in Philadelphia on October 24-25, 2011.  We’ve provided some information on the conference for your convenience:

Mastering eDiscovery and Information management strategies and best practices fit for life sciences industries

Why attend eDiscovery for Pharma?

  • Learn from industry leaders who have successfully implemented technology solutions that have reduced cost and errors in eDiscovery production. Network with government and industry leaders who are influencing the practice and procedure of eDiscovery in the Pharmaceutical, Biotech and Medical Device Industries.
  • Prepare your organization with defensible information management techniques specifically geared toward global pharmaceutical data.
  • Join peer discussions on industry hot topics such as predictive coding, cloud computing and legal holds.
  • Avoid mistakes and costly sanctions for eDiscovery misconduct and Federal Corrupt Practices Act investigations.
  • Benchmark your internal processes and evaluate their effectiveness in practical scenarios.

Hear Perspectives from:

  • Edward Gramling, Senior Corporate Counsel at Pfizer
  • John O’Tuel, Assistant General Counsel at GlaxoSmithKline
  • Chris Garber, eDiscovery Manager atAllergan, Inc
  • HB Gordon, eDiscovery Analyst, Legal Affairs, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA
  • David Kessler, Partner at Fulbright & Jaworski
  • Phil Yannella, Partner at Ballard & Spahr

View Full Speaker List

Entrepreneur’s Guide to Litigation – Blog Series: Complaints and Answers

Recently posted at the  National Law Review  by John C. Scheller of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP an entrepreneur’s guide to the litigation process.

A.  The Complaint

Litigation begins with a Complaint. “Complaint” is capitalized because it is a specific legal document, rather than a garden-variety complaint about something. The Complaint lays out the plaintiff’s specific legal claims against the defendant. It needs to contain enough facts that, if everything stated is true and there are no extenuating circumstances, a judge and jury could find in favor of the plaintiff.

As an example, Paul Plaintiff is suing Diana Defendant for violating a contract. Paul files a Complaint with a court claiming several facts: 1) Diana signed a contract to buy widgets; 2) Paul delivered the widgets; and 3) Diana did not pay the agreed-upon amount. If the court finds that these facts are true, then, unless there were extenuating circumstances, Diana probably breached a contract with Paul and should pay damages.

Paul’s Complaint also needs to allege facts showing that he has a right to be in that court. For example, if Paul wants to sue Diana inTexas, he has to show that the case and the parties have some connection toTexas. If he wants to sue her in a federal court, he has to meet a number of other criteria. (Federal court is generally only available if the parties are based in different states and the damages are relatively substantial or if the legal question is one of federal law.)

B.  Response to a Complaint

Once the defendant officially learns of the Complaint, she has a certain limited time to file some sort of response with the court. The time to respond, however, does not run from when the plaintiff filed the lawsuit, but generally when he officially delivered notice of the Complaint to the defendant. (There is a timeline that starts ticking when the defendant becomes aware of a state court lawsuit she wants to “remove” to federal court.) The amount of time for the defendant to respond varies by what court the case is in, but is generally a short period of time.

After receiving the complaint, the defendant has three options: 1) Ignore the Complaint and have the court grant judgment in favor of the plaintiff; 2) Tell the court that the Complaint is defective and ask for dismissal; or 3) Answer the Complaint. Option one is usually not a good plan; courts do not look favorably on defendants who ignore the legal process, and this option prevents a defendant from fighting the plaintiff’s claims.

Option two does not deal with the merits of the plaintiff’s issue. It is simply telling the court that the Complaint is defective for a variety of reasons including, for instance, how it was served, who the parties are (or are not), which court the case is in, or simply that, even if everything is true, the plaintiff cannot win. For example, if Paul sues Diana, but never tells Diana about the suit, Diana can then ask the court to dismiss the case. Also, if Diana works for DefendCo and Paul’s contract was actually with DefendCo and not with Diana, personally, she may be able to have the case dismissed because Paul sued the wrong party. If Paul sued Diana in a federal court inTexaswhen both parties are residents ofCaliforniaand neither has ever been to or done business in Texas, then Diana may be able to get the case dismissed, at least from theTexascourt.

Finally, there is the “So, what?” defense. If the Complaint doesn’t actually allege a cause of action, the defendant can ask the court to dismiss it. This usually happens because the plaintiff simply assumes a fact, but does not include it in the Complaint. If, for example, Paul alleges only that Diana failed to pay him a certain amount of money, but does not allege that a contract existed between them, then Diana can essentially say “So, what?” and ask the court to dismiss the case. She would ask the court to dismiss the case because, even if true (she really did not pay him any money), he did not plead any facts showing that she was supposed to pay him money. The defendant is not admitting the truth of the allegation; she is just saying that even if true, the plaintiff cannot win.

Finally, a defendant can file an Answer. Again, “Answer” is capitalized because it is a specific legal document. In an Answer, the defendant responds, paragraph by paragraph, to each of the plaintiff’s allegations. The defendant must admit, deny, or say that she does not know the answer to each specific allegation. Saying “I don’t know” functions as a denial.

For example, Paul’s Complaint probably alleges that Diana lives at a certain address. Assuming Diana actually lives there, she has to admit that fact. Paul may allege that he delivered the correct number of working widgets to Diana. If the widgets were not what she actually ordered or did not work, Diana would deny that allegation. Finally, Paul may claim that those widgets cost him a certain amount of money. Diana likely has no way to know how much Paul paid for the widgets, so she would say she does not know – thus leaving Paul to prove that allegation.

Also in the Answer, the defendant can claim affirmative defenses. Those tell the court that there were extenuating circumstances so that, even if everything the plaintiff says is true, the court should not find in favor of the plaintiff.

For example, if Paul told Diana not to worry about paying him for the widgets for six months but then turned around and immediately sued her, she would claim that as an affirmative defense.

Finally, the Answer may contain counterclaims. These claims are the defendant counter-suing the plaintiff for something. The counterclaims may be related to the original suit or not. Usually they are related, but they do not have to be. This section follows the same rules as if the defendant were filing a complaint.

For example, Diana may counterclaim against Paul because he sent her the wrong widgets and, perhaps, add a claim that when Paul delivered the widgets to her warehouse, he backed his truck into her building and caused damage. She would then counterclaim for breach of contract and property damage. The court would then sort out the whole mess to decide who owed whom how much.

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