Tag: Litigation

Information Governance in Legal – The Real Payoff is Litigation, E-Discovery, and Audit Readiness

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Information governance (IG) in the modern day legal landscape addresses multiple functions from cyber threats, to compliance, to interdepartmental communication to document retention to e-discovery. Affecting businesses across the legal, compliance and IT realms, the ideal IG framework will insert processes and procedures into place that will allow law firms and businesses to consistently manage and asses the flow of information. Browning Marean, co-chair of the Electronic Discovery Readiness and Response Group at DLA Piper and speaker at the ARMA International 2013 Conference and Expo, offers his expertise on law firm IG and why data can and should be controlled in the legal field.

Q: What is the impact an IG framework can have on a law firm and business?

A: The impact of IG on a business in momentous. Legislation like the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 requires that businesses have controls in place.  Law firms must keep up with the ever-increasing number of compliance regulations for their clients. In addition, the average Fortune 500 companies have 125 lawsuits at any given point. If law firms and compliance departments have control of the information, they will know where to look and be able to preserve the information during discovery. IG can therefore also serve as an organizational tool during litigation.

Q: How would you describe the relationship among technology, the law & IG?

A: There is a complicated relationship among the three entities. I believe that the computer revolution yields two classes of people, both the foot soldiers and the victims. It is the same with the practice of law– technology can cause disruption but if attorneys take advantage of technology and use it to guide their IG, they will flourish.

Q: Can you cover the top risk associated with governance gaps in litigation and e-discovery?

A:In a lawsuit, parties must produce documents during discovery. When litigation is reasonably anticipated parties will have to put a legal hold on discovery documents in electronic form, also known as e-data. If parties are unable to do so or unable to preserve the documents, they will suffer the consequences, including losing the case outright and monetary sanctions and adverse interference instructions from the courts. In that way, IG can mitigate the problems associated with the identification, preservation, collection and production of e-data.

Q: What would be some of the solutions you would recommend for this risk?

A: The amount of data that is available will be multiplied by 50 by the year 2020. The only way to accommodate all of that information is to have proper practices and policies in place. I believe law firms and business should prepare an “IT readiness program.” Organizations must look at themselves from the top-down to see what resources are available to help at each level. There is a great checklist from the Department of Justice (DOJ) that covers may aspects of how law firms and businesses can ensure that there their discovery material will remain intact, from document management systems to disaster recovery backup. In addition, I recommend that law firms and businesses maintain a record retention policy.

Q: E-discovery is one of the hot topics in the legal world. Why do you think it has become so widely covered and debated?

A: About 95% of all data is viewed in electronic form.  This means that in order to prove your side in a lawsuit, we will have to see where the evidence is based, which is usually in some kind of electronic format. We are going from an analogue world to a digital world so we must create and preserve electronically stored information (ESI) to evaluate the evidence. The pervasiveness of e-discovery has resulted in several additions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as state laws.

Q: Can you provide a background on the evolution of e-discovery?

A: In the modern era, a series of cases in the early 2000s from federal courts established the beginning of modern e-discovery litigation.  In particular, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York paved the way. Judge Shira Scheindlin presided over the case and made several ruling effectively establishing the duty of businesses and their counsel to preserve documents and refrain from practices that may result in the destruction of documents.. Through an effective IG framework, law firms and compliance departments will be able to keep up with ESI in litigation and e-discovery.

The False Claims Act During Times of War: Is There Any Time Limit For Bringing Suit

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A federal appellate court recently ruled that, at least for the moment, claims under the False Claims Act (“FCA”) are not subject to any statute of limitations. The United States Circuit Court for the Fourth Circuit, in U.S. ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2013), relied on an obscure federal statute, the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (“WSLA”), to hold that the FCA’s general six-year statute of limitations, 31 U.S.C. §3287, was tolled due to the ongoing conflict in Iraq. The Fourth Circuit’s decision is ground-breaking, as it is the first federal appellate court to weigh in on this issue and takes a broad view of the tolling question, effectively removing any limitations bar to FCA violations committed during times of war.

The WSLA, originally enacted in 1942 and amended as recently as 2008, generally suspends statutes of limitations in actions related to fraud against the United States until 5 years after the termination of a war. 18 U.S.C. §3287. In Carter, the qui tam whistleblower alleged that his employer, well-known government contractor Kellogg Brown Root Services, Inc. (“KBR”), was defrauding the government by inflating its employees’ work hours on a water purification contract as well as misrepresenting to the United States that it was actually purifying water for servicemen and servicewomen deployed in Iraq. The trial court dismissed Carter’s complaint on the grounds that, among other things, Carter’s case was not tolled by the WSLA because the government did not intervene in the action. Carter, 710 F.3d at 176. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the armed conflict in Iraq suspended the statute of limitations in Carter’s case, regardless of whether the case was being prosecuted by Carter, as the FCA relator, or by the United States. According to the court, “whether the suit is brought by the United States or a relator is irrelevant . . . because the suspension of limitations in the WSLA depends on whether the country is at war and not who brings the case.” Id. at 180.

In addition to explicitly extending the scope of the WSLA to non-intervened cases, the Fourth Circuit made two other important WSLA-related holdings. First, the court ruled that the phrase “at war” in the WSLA is not limited to formally declared wars but, instead, applies to modern military engagements such as the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan and Iraq. Id. at 179. Although none of these conflicts were formally declared wars, they occupied much of the government’s attention and resources such that the purpose of the WSLA-allowing the government more time to act during the fog of war-would not be served if an unnecessarily formalistic approach were required.

Second, the Fourth Circuit-consistent with several district courts before it-ruled that the WSLA applies to both criminal and civil cases. Id. at 179-180. The question of WSLA’s application to civil matters arose out of the use of the word “offense” in the statute. The original version of the WSLA applied to “offenses involving the defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States . . . and now indictable under any existing statutes.” In 1944, however, the Act was amended, deleting the “now indictable” language. With that change, the court concluded, the “WSLA was then applicable to all actions involving fraud against the United States,” including civil actions. Id.

In light of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Carter, the limitations period for FCA actions may be indefinitely extended. Indeed, in Carter, the court indicated that it is not clear that the war in Iraq is over for purposes of the WSLA. Tolling under the WSLA ends 5 years after the termination of hostilities “as proclaimed by a Presidential proclamation, with notice to Congress, or by a concurrent resolution of Congress.” Wartime Enforcement of Fraud Act, Pub. L. No. 110-417 §855, codified at 18 U.S.C. §3287. According to the Fourth Circuit, because “it is not clear” that President Obama has proclaimed the war in Iraq as over and provided notice of the same to Congress, as required by the WSLA, the limitations period may still be tolled.

Some commentators have argued that the FCA statute of repose, which sets the outside deadline for bringing claims at either “3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known” by the government, “but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed, whichever occurs last.” This mandates that the statute of limitations for FCA cases cannot be tolled for more than 10 years. Although Carter did not reach that specific issue, it seems unlikely-based on the Fourth Circuit’s language and analysis-that it would endorse such a position. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit noted, in a footnote, that “tolling will indeed extend indefinitely” absent a formal Presidential proclamation with notice to Congress. Carter, 710 F.3d at n.5.

If the Fourth Circuit’s analysis is adopted by its sister circuits, there will be profound benefits for whistleblowers seeking to expose fraud against the Government. For instance, defendants may be discouraged from proffering hyper-technical, confused or convoluted statute of limitations defenses in order to avoid responsibility for their fraud. It would also open up the possibility of bringing qui tam claims under the FCA for conduct dating farther back in the past.

Department of Justice (DOJ) Intervenes in Qui Tam Action Against Lance Armstrong

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The Department of Justice announced in February that it would intervene in a False Claims Act suit filed against former Tour de France winner Lance Armstrong and others by former teammate Floyd Landis. Reports indicate that in 2010, Landis filed a lawsuit, captioned United States ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind Sports Corporation, et al., in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The lawsuit alleges that Armstrong and his teammates violated the terms of a $30 million sponsorship contract he and his cycling team had with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) by taking drugs to enhance their performances.

USPS sponsored Armstrong’s Tailwind cycling team from 1996 through 2004. During that time, Armstrong and his team took more than $30 million in sponsorship fees. The USPS claims Armstrong violated a contractual promise by regularly employing banned substances and methods to enhance their performance, in violation of the USPS sponsorship agreements. Those sponsorship agreements gave USPS the right to place its logo prominently on the cycling team’s uniform, among other promotional opportunities. However, the agreement also required the cycling team to comply with all rules of cycling’s governing bodies. Those rules prohibited the use of performance enhancing substances and methods.

For years Armstrong and others denied that the team used performance enhancing drugs, but in October, 2012, the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) issued a report concluding that Armstrong used banned performance enhancing substances, starting in at least 1998 and continuing throughout his career. The time Armstrong and teammates were alleged to have been “doping” overlaps significantly with the term of Armstrong’s USPS sponsorship.

After the USADA report, Armstrong admitted in an interview with Oprah Winfrey that he used banned substances and methods throughout his career, starting in the mid-1990s. He admitted having used banned substances during each of his seven Tour de France victories, including the six he won while sponsored by USPS.

The U.S. Government’s intervention complaint alleges that riders on the USPS-sponsored team “knowingly caused violations of the sponsorship agreements by regularly and systematically employing substances and methods to enhance their performance” and, as a result, “submitted to the United States false or fraudulent invoices for payment.” In addition, the complaint alleges that the Defendants “made false statements, both publicly and to the USPS, that were intended to hide the team’s misconduct so that those invoices would be paid.” All in all, according to the government, “[b]ecause the Defendants’ misconduct undermined the value of the sponsorship to the USPS, the United States suffered damage in that it did not receive the value of the services for which it bargained.” In support of its allegations, the government details the prohibited substances used by the Armstrong team, including erythropoietin, human growth hormone, anabolic steroids, and corticosteroids. It also details delivery methods used, including blood re-injections and “the oil,” a mixture of testosterone and olive oil. In addition, the government complaint contains a litany of Armstrong’s denials of banned substances use over a ten-year period.

While the Government notified the court that it was joining the lawsuit’s allegations as to Armstrong, the Tailwind cycling team, and the team’s manager, it advised the court that it was not intervening in the case as to several other defendants named in Landis’s complaint.

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Cloning Decision Could Lead to Copycat Litigation in the World of Racing

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Owners of elite American Quarter Horses may soon be ponying up to create clones of their champions.

On July 31, 2013 a North Texas District Court jury decided that the American Quarter Horse Association’s (“AQHA”) rule prohibiting the registration of cloned American Quarter Horses violates federal and Texas antitrust laws. The AQHA, located in Amarillo, Texas, is the world’s largest equine breed registry and membership organization, with more than 5 million American Quarter Horses registered to nearly 350,000 members.

The American Quarter Horse excels at sprinting short distances and racing of these animals is the third most popular form of horse racing, generating more than $300 million in bets at U.S. racetracks in 2012. American Quarter Horses are bred to run in races of under a quarter-mile and have been clocked at speeds up to 55 mph.

Plaintiffs Jason Abraham and Gregg Veneklasen sued the AQHA for $6 million in damages, arguing that Rule 227(a) of the AQHA, which prohibits the registration of clones, violated both the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Texas Free Enterprise Act, which reflects federal antitrust law.

Plaintiffs alleged that the association’s prohibition of clones violates Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act because the AQHA acted as a conspiracy that unreasonably restrained interstate or foreign trade. In response, the AQHA argued that the association is a single body and that the Board of Directors acted with a single interest, and therefore cannot be a conspiracy. Plaintiffs further alleged that the rule violated Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act because the AQHA acted to maintain its monopoly power in the industry by enacting the rule. In response, the AQHA argued that the rule did not maintain monopoly power, but instead narrowed the association’s reach by reducing the potential universe of its registered horses.

On July 31, the jury found that the AQHA’s Rule 227(a) violated Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, as well as the equivalent Texas laws. In their decision, the jury awarded no damages, but could lead to the reversal of Rule 227(a) following an order the District Court Judge.

Johne Dobbs, the President of the AQHA’s Executive Committee, is reported as saying that the AQHA will appeal the North Texas District Court decision to the 5th Circuit, though it may be a year before a decision is made on the appeal.

A decision in favor of the AQHA by the 5th Circuit could have a reversing effect on a number of changes to AQHA rules since 2000, while a decision against could further cement the trend toward the AQHA being more inclusive. In 2000, a breeder sued the AQHA regarding the association’s rule that limited one registeredhorse per breeding pair per year, which thereby prohibited the use of embryo transplants to create multiple foals per breeding pair. The court held in an interlocutory order that the rule was an anticompetitive restraint of trade, adopted for the purposes of limiting the supply of registered quarter horses. Before a final order was written, the two parties settled and the AQHA changed its rules to allow for the registration of all embryo transfer foals. Since then, the AQHA has changed its rules to also register horses considered perlinos and cremellos to register, as well as horses deemed to be excessively white. The AQHA may be interested in pursuing a reversal to these changes if the 5th Circuit rules in their favor.

A decision against the AQHA could also lead to other breeder associations, including the American Kennel Club and American Paint Horse Association, to change their rules prohibiting the registration of clones.

An industry able to support quarter horse clones is likely ready to go if the courts side with the plaintiffs. Texas company ViaGen owns the patent that created the infamous cloned sheep, Dolly. The company has already cloned a number of horses, including Royal Blue Boon, the all-time leading dam of cutting horses with personal lifetime earnings of $381,764 and produce earnings of over $2.6 million. Hundreds of American Quarter Horse owners have already gene banked their horses in anticipation of the AQHA changing Rule 227(a).

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Alleged STOLI Producers Found Guilty of Fraud and Other Criminal Charges

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Earlier today, a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found independent insurance producers Michael Binday, James Kergil, and Mark Resnick guilty of mail and wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit those offenses.  The jury also convicted Kergil and Resnick of conspiracy to obstruct justice.  Sentencing has been scheduled for January 15, 2014.  The convicted defendants may face up to 80 years in prison.

During the 12 day trial, federal prosecutors argued that Binday, Kergil, and Resnick lied to insurers to perpetrate the scheme and then lied again to cover it up.  Based on the testimony of insiders and insureds, along with the defendants’ own emails and other documents, prosecutors specifically argued that the defendants:

  • recruited brokers to solicit elderly clients to serve as straw-buyers for the policies, with promises of large commissions to the brokers and payments to the clients upon the sale of the policies;
  • submitted applications to insurers for more than $100 million in life insurance, which grossly misrepresented the insureds’ income and net worth and lied about the intent to sell the policies, the fact that the premium would be financed by third-parties, and that multiple policies were being applied for or had been issued in the name of the insured;
  • recruited accountants and other professionals to submit bogus inspection reports and other documents purporting to verify the insureds’ financials;
  • conspired to thwart insurers’ attempts to investigate the representations made in the policy applications and to disguise the source of premiums paid for the policies by wiring funds into insureds’ accounts; and
  • earned millions of dollars through commissions and in some cases by arranging to cash in themselves on the death benefits upon an insured’s death.

Insurance industry leaders Jim Avery, the former Vice Chairman and President of Individual Life Insurance for Prudential, and Mike Burns, a Senior Vice President at Lincoln Financial Group, also testified during the government’s case in chief.  Both testified about their companies’ anti-STOLI policies, the harm to insurers that STOLI caused, and the measures the companies took to try to screen it out.

The evidence relating to the conspiracy to obstruct justice charges against Kergil and Resnick included alleged recorded calls that a scheme insider, who testified under a plea agreement, had with Kergil and Resnick, and testimony from an employee of the Apple computer store where Resnick allegedly had taken his computer to have the hard drive wiped clean.  The alleged calls, which were recorded in cooperation with the FBI, involved discussions about Kergil’s instruction to Resnick and the insider to destroy all records with Binday’s name on them and to wipe their computer hard drives clean.

Each of the defendants was separately represented by his own counsel, and none of the defendants took the stand in his defense.  Instead, the defendants presented excerpts from approximately a dozen files for policies that the defendants submitted to the insurers and that supposedly contained STOLI red flags.  Based on these documents, the defendants argued that the insurers were not deceived by the defendants’ lies and that the scheme was profitable for all involved and not criminal activity.  On rebuttal, the prosecutors introduced additional evidence from the insurer files showing that the insurers’ attempts to investigate the STOLI red flags were met with more lies on the part of the defendants and their associates.

This criminal prosecution has already spawned at least one civil action by an insurer seeking to have a STOLI policy allegedly involving Resnick and Binday declared null and void.

Recent Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Decision Might Signal Broadening of the ADA’s Accommodation Provisions

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) are not limited to job modifications that enable an employee to perform essential job functions.  In Feist v. Louisiana, a former assistant attorney general for the Louisiana Department of Justice (LDOJ) sued the LDOJ claiming that it discriminated against her in violation of the ADA by declining to provide her with a free on-site parking space to accommodate her disability (osteoarthritis of the knee).  Siding with the employer, the trial court dismissed the case holding that the plaintiff failed to explain how the denial of on-site parking limited her ability to perform “the essential functions” of her job.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the text of the ADA does not indicate that an accommodation must facilitate the essential functions of an employee’s position.  The court also relied on federal regulations (which the LDOJ argued were not entitled to deference) which provide that reasonable accommodations may include modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity’s employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other employees without disabilities.  The court did not express an opinion on whether the employee’s request for a free on-site parking space was “reasonable” under the ADA, but left that determination to the trial court on remand.

This case may indicate a willingness of courts in future cases to broaden the scope of accommodations beyond what employers currently believe are required by the ADA.  Until more courts weigh in on the question, employers should tread carefully and seek legal counsel when responding to requests for accommodations that seem unrelated to an employee’s ability to perform his or her job functions.

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Google Must Face Most Claims in Keyword Wiretap Class Action

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If you were on Google’s home page yesterday at the office, you probably spent more time than you care to admit playing the “help the letter ‘g’ hit the piñata” game that Google created for its 15th birthday.

For Google, that might be a welcome distraction from very bad news it received from the Northern District of California.  U.S. District Court Judge Lucy Koh denied in part Google’s motion to dismiss a 2010 claim in which users accuse Google of violating various state and federal laws by scanning the content of user emails for purposes of creating user profiles and directing targeted advertising, thus allowing a putative class action suit against the search (and everything else online) giant to proceed.

Judge Koh’s order (full text can be found here), is significant in its handling of a number of Google’s arguments, but the rejection of a particular line of argument is understandably receiving much of the attention. In its Motion to Dismiss, Google argued that its practice of scanning emails is not a violation of the Federal Wiretap Act because, among other reasons, Gmail users and non-Gmail users have consented to the interception of emails.   Google’s consent argument was two-fold.  First, it argued that Gmail users had “expressly consented” to having their emails scanned by agreeing to its Terms of Service and Privacy Policies, which every Gmail users is required to do.  Second, it argued that non-Gmail users have “impliedly consented” to the practice by sending an email to a Gmail user, because at that time those non-users understood how Gmail services operate.

Judge Koh rejected both of Google’s consent arguments, holding that the Court “cannot conclude that any party – Gmail users or non-Gmail users – has consented to Google’s reading of email for the purposes of creating user profiles or providing targeted advertising.”  The Court dug into the multiple iterations of Google’s Terms of Service and Privacy Policies that have been in place since 2007, and found that the policies did not explicitly notify users that Google would intercept emails for the purposes or creating user profiles and targeting advertisements.  The Court discussed a number of sections of Google’s policies where users allegedly consented to the practice of scanning emails for advertising purposes, and in each case found that the policies either described a different purpose for scanning emails (such as filtering out objectionable content) or were unclear when describing what kind of information would be intercepted (using descriptions like “information stored on the Services” or “information you provide”).  The Court further held that Google’s current policies (which were put in place on March 1, 2012) are equally ineffective at establishing consent.  Finally, the Court rejected the argument that non-Gmail users had impliedly consented to the interception of emails, noting that accepting Google’s theory of implied consent would “eviscerate” laws prohibiting interception of communications.

Judge Koh’s denial of Google’s Motion to Dismiss is the latest reminder that when it comes to privacy policies and terms of use, how you write something can be as important as what you write.  We will have more on the various issues discussed in Judge Koh’s order over the next few days.

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Your Facebook “Like” May Be Constitutionally-Protected Speech

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According to a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pressing the “like” button on your Facebook page constitutes substantive speech that may be protected by the First Amendment.

Six employees of the Hampton, Virginia Sheriff’s Office were dismissed because they showed support for Sheriff B.J. Roberts’ electoral opponent. They filed suit against Sheriff Roberts, claiming in part that their terminations violated the First Amendment. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to Sheriff Roberts, in part because the court found that the employees failed to allege that they had engaged in protected speech.

The plaintiff of significance in this matter, Roy Carter, Jr., claimed his protected speech in support for Sheriff Roberts’ opponent came in the form of a Facebook “like” for the opponent’s page. The Eastern District of Virginia held that the thumbs-up button by itself did not constitute sufficient speech to merit First Amendment protection. Not so, ruled the Fourth Circuit – when Carter pressed “like,” he caused to be published on his Facebook profile and on his friends’ news feeds that he liked Sheriff Roberts’ opponent’s campaign, which is a substantive statement.

“That a user may use a single mouse click to produce the message that he likes the page instead of typing the same message with several individual key strokes is of no constitutional significance,” held the court. Further, the Court stated that hitting the “like” button is the internet equivalent of displaying a political sign in one’s front yard, which the Supreme Court has held constitutes substantive speech.

The district court’s ruling was reversed for Carter and two other plaintiffs and the matter was remanded. Although the three remaining plaintiffs may not recover monetary damages because of the sheriff’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, they may have an opportunity to be reinstated.

The full text of Bland v. Roberts may be found here.

Diagnostic Laboratories Settles for $17.5 Million After Healthcare Whistleblowers’ Allegations of Medicare Fraud

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The Department of Justice announced yesterday that Diagnostic Laboratories and Radiology, the West Coast’s largest supplier of laboratory and X-ray services to nursing homes, will pay $17.5 million to settle whistleblower allegations that the California-based company violated the False Claims Act by giving kickbacks for referral of mobile lab and radiology services, which were subsequently billed to Medicare and Medi-Cal (California’s Medicaid program).  Diagnostic Labs allegedly took advantage of Medicare’s and Medi-Cal’s reimbursement systems by billing them at standard rates while secretly giving discounted fees to the participating nursing homes. According to the lawsuit, those fees were as much as 80 percent below the lab’s normal rates.

For inpatients, Medicare pays a fixed rate based on the patient’s diagnosis, regardless of specific services provided.  For outpatients, Medicare pays for each service separately.  Diagnostic Labs’ scheme supposedly enabled the nursing homes to maximize their profits for providing inpatient services by decreasing the cost of them.  It also allegedly allowed Diagnostic Labs to obtain a steady stream of lucrative, outpatient referrals that it could directly bill to Medicare and Medi-Cal.  This provision of inducements, including giving discounted rates to generate referrals, is prohibited by both federal and state law. By law, the discounts should have been passed along to the government programs.

The Medicare whistleblowers in this case were two former Diagnostic Lab employees, Jon Pasqua and Jeff Hauser, who said they were fired after reporting the secret discounts and kickbacks to the authorities. Hauser and Pasqua worked in the company’s sales office and said they tried to report the questionable discount practices to supervisors first, but were ignored. They then provided information to state and federal officials, and were subsequently fired from their jobs shortly before filing the healthcare fraud case in February 2010, according to their lawyers.

This settlement will resolve Hauser and Pasqua’s lawsuit, which was filed under the qui tam, or whistleblower, provisions of the federal and state False Claims Act. This act allows private citizens with knowledge of fraud to bring qui tam lawsuits on behalf of the US government. The individual filing the lawsuit is known as the relator, or whistleblower.  Healthcare whistleblowers, such as Hauser and Pasqua, serve an important role in exposing and eliminating healthcare fraud.

While it is true that whistleblowers take on a personal risk in these cases, it is still worthwhile for them to come forward with their information. Because qui tam whistleblowers help to eliminate government fraud, they receive a significant proportion of the lawsuit’s settlement for their efforts.

Together, Pasqua and Hauser will receive a total $3,755,500 as their share of the federal government’s recovery.

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Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) New Rules Target Veterans and Individuals with Disabilities

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Familiar with this?  It’s time to update your affirmative action plans.  For the women and minorities plan, you gather your applicant data, prepare spreadsheets and update your written materials to reflect new goals and changes in your recruiting sources.  For the veterans and individuals with disabilities plan, you update a bit and you’re done.  Starting early next year, however, the rules will change making updates more onerous for employers.  On August 27, 2013, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs announced final rules for federal contractors regarding hiring and employment of disabled individuals and protected veterans and imposing new data retention and affirmative action obligations on contractors.  The rules are expected to be published in the Federal Register shortly and will become effective 180 days later.

The key changes include:

  • Benchmarks.  Contractors must establish benchmarks, using one of two methods approved by the OFCCP, to measure progress in hiring veterans.  Likewise, contractors must strive to hire individuals with disabilities to comprise at least seven percent of employees in each job group.  The OFCCP says these are meant to be aspirational, and are not designed to be quotas.
  • Data Analysis and Retention.  Contractors must document and update annually several quantitative comparisons for the number of veterans who apply for jobs and the number of veterans that they hire.  Likewise, for individuals with disabilities, contractors are required to conduct analyses of disabled applicants and those hired.  Such data must be retained for three years.
  • Invitation to Self-Identify.  Contractors must invite applicants to self-identify as protected veterans and as an individual with a disability at both the pre-offer and post-offer phases of the application process, using language to be provided by the OFCCP.  This particular requirement worries employers who know that the less demographic information they have about applicants, the better – especially when the application is denied.  Contractors must also invite their employees to self-identify as individuals with a disability every five years, using language to be provided by the OFCCP.

Additional information, including with respect new requirements such as incorporating the equal opportunity clause into contracts, job listings, and records access, can be found here (http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/vevraa.htm) and here (http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/section503.htm).

Contractors with an Affirmative Action Plan already in place on the effective date of the regulations will have additional time, until they create their next plans, to bring their plan into compliance.  However, whether they have a current Affirmative Action Plan or not, federal contractors should begin looking at these new rules now and take steps to ensure they are in compliance.

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