Tag: Litigation

Is the SCOTUS Rule of Reason Unreasonable?

“Not too hard, not too soft,” says the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).  The majority tries to reach middle ground by rejecting both the FTC’s argument that any reverse payment in settlement of a patent claim is presumptively unlawful and Actavis’ argument that any settlement within the scope of the patent is permissible, but is the court’s new “rule of reason” approach really “just right?” Let’s see how this plays out in a simple scenario using a product whose success everyone loves to hate—the Snuggie.

Meet Peter.  He has a pug with whom he likes to spend his evenings, wrapped up in a Snuggie, watching movies and sharing popcorn.  Peter was quite dismayed, though, to see his poor little pug shivering and cold without a Snuggie of his own.  So, Peter invented the Puggie.  He used special fibers formulated specifically to maintain heat while resisting odors because no one likes a smelly dog blanket.  Peter even obtained a patent on his Puggie and began producing more to sell around his neighborhood, the Franklin Terrace Community.  Once word spread of Peter’s success, however, several of Peter’s neighbors began producing competing products—the Pug Pelt, the Schnauzzie, and so on–which boasted the same odor-resistant properties as Peter’s Puggie.

Outraged, Peter publicly accused his competitors of patent infringement and demanded that they stop producing their “piddly dog pelts.” But they refused, claiming their fibers were different.  Knowing how costly an extensive fiber dispute could be, Peter offered his competitors $1,000 to stop producing their competing pelts for a period of two years.  The other pelt producers agreed, took the money, and stopped production immediately.  The Franklin Terrace Community, however, was not pleased.  Peter had not only run off the competition, but he had also bumped the Puggie price up afterward, making a killing during the chilly winter as the sole pelt producer.  Community members petitioned the homeowners’ board for some guidance on whether Peter’s payment constituted an unfair trade practice.  Peter opposed the petition and claimed that he had the right to pay whatever amount he deemed fit to protect his patent.

The board found the community’s argument that any “reverse settlement” payment by a patent holder is presumptively unlawful to be too harsh.  Peter’s assertion, however, that any payment is immune from attack so long as it remains within the scope of the patent was believed to be too soft.  Peter complained that the money and time he would have to commit to an extensive patent lawsuit over his odor-resistant fibers would put him out of business, but the board believed that his willingness to drop a grand to keep his competitors at bay was a much more accurate representation of Peter’s confidence in his patent.  Specifically, the board found Peter’s payment of $1,000 to be a “strong indicator of power.”  In an effort to come up with a more “middle of the road” approach, the board created the “rule of reason” to determine the legality of reverse settlement payments.  No real guidance was provided, though, on how to apply the new rule—just not too hard, not too soft.

Without any elaboration on how this new “rule of reason” is to be applied in antitrust lawsuits, did the board cause more confusion than clarity?  And, how large must a reverse settlement payment be to stand as an “indicator of power” and “lack of confidence” in the patent?  If Peter’s patent was iron-clad and his competitors were infringing, should he have had the right to pay any amount he deemed fit to protect his patent, or was $1,000 too much for some piddly pooch pelts?  Does this unfairly prohibit Peter from settling litigation that he may see as too costly or damaging?  Or, does the need to protect consumers from the Puggie monopoly Peter created outweigh Peter’s patent rights?

It is hard to say exactly what effect the Supreme Court’s “rule of reason” decision in FTC v. Actavis will have on future antitrust litigation.  We are likely to see an increase in the number of antitrust suits that are tried as opposed to settled. What do you make of this amorphous, middle-of-the-road approach?

ARTICLE BY Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices
© Copyright 2002-2015 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

Do’s and Don’ts of Documentation – Employment Litigation

As many of you know, proper documentation is critical in almost every aspect of managing your employees. Documentation is often the difference between a defense verdict and a multi-million dollar jury award. But don’t just document to document – poor documentation is worse than no documentation at all. Instead, document with purpose. Here are my top five do’s and don’ts of documentation.

The Do’s

1. Do Establish Clear Performance Expectations. I like to start out formal documentation with a clear statement of what the employer’s performance expectations are for the employee. This statement of the performance expectations will guide every aspect of the documentation and set the standards upon which current deficiencies are noted and future performance will be measured. It should be obvious, but make sure an employee is not hearing these performance expectancies for the first time in formal documentation of a performance problem. If that is the case, you have bigger problems than poor documentation. Instead, the performance expectancies need to be consistent with the employee’s job description and the tasks actually assigned to the employee. Consistent, clear and well-written performance expectations are critical if you want an employee to succeed in changing his performance.

2. Do Focus on the Facts. Provide the employee with a clear statement of the facts. A clear statement of the facts focuses solely on what you know happened, and does not include any speculation or unverified information. For the purpose of a disciplinary action, the fact that an employee reported to work two hours late is sufficient. You do not need to include the speculation that the employee had been out drinking the night before because he has a weekly poker game at the local watering hole. Stick to the facts because this might have been the one night the employee missed the poker game to care for his sick child.

3. Do Review Patterns of Problem Behavior. When an employer takes the time to actually perform written documentation of a performance or behavior problem, it typically is not the first time the employee has had the problem. Instead of ignoring all of the previous instances, list in detail every occasion when the employee has exhibited the problem behavior. Be sure to include what steps were taken each time these problems came to light – did the supervisor talk to the employee, was the employee reprimanded (formally or informally), was the employee warned or suspended. Include the pattern to show that you considered these previous instances when taking the current action.

4. Do Write a Specific Plan. Include in your documentation a specific plan for the employee to improve. List out the criteria the employee must meet, and a time frame for meeting each expectancy. The more specific and objective the criteria, the easier it is to measure improvement. Be sure to include in your documentation that failure to meet the criteria will result in further disciplinary action, up to and including termination. 

5. Do Follow-up. Documentation is only valuable if you follow-up. For example, if you place an employee on a formal 6-month corrective action plan, but never follow-up, the corrective action plan is void. The best practice is to have specific criteria with specific time frames, and have a formal review during those exact timeframes. Don’t delay!

The Don’ts 

1. Don’t Generalize. The most difficult cases to defend are those in which the employee is terminated for “not being a team player” or any other trendy cliché. Such generalizations have no place in formal documentation. You must provide specific examples of problematic behavior. Fail to do so, and you may “be left holding the bag.” 

2. Don’t Diagnose Why the Employee Is Performing Poorly. New lawyers are taught to focus on the what, when, where, and why when asking a witness questions. When documenting poor performance, don’t diagnose the “why.” Even if you suspect the employee’s divorce, financial situation or social life is affecting his performance, avoid the urge to put such a diagnosis in the formal documentation. Understand that it is entirely proper to offer employee assistance or other benefits to employees that have personal problems, but it is not appropriate to include such personal problems in formal documentation.

3. Don’t Include Your Mental Impressions and Editorial Comments. A common mistake made by inexperienced supervisors is to include their mental impressions in the performance documentation. What do I mean?  Say an employee is written up for failure to follow supervisor’s instructions. Instead of simply stating exactly what the supervisor told the employee, the supervisor will state something like “I thought my directions were clear.”  If you have to editorialize what was said, it probably was not as clear as you thought. State the facts, and avoid commenting on those facts. 

4. Don’t Embellish, Stretch the Truth or Call It Something It is Not. There is nothing worse than documentation where an employer overstates what took place. Minor embellishments tend to take on a life of their own, often becoming the driving force behind the disciplinary action when the truth was sufficient. Now you are left defending a lie. Worse yet, don’t call “dishonesty” a “fraud” and don’t accuse an employee of “stealing” when they made a mistake. Call it as you see it and nothing more.

5. Don’t Apologize. I cringe reading a disciplinary document where a supervisor says, “I am sorry I have to do this.” No, you’re not! You are doing your job, and you are doing the documentation because the employee is not doing their job. If you have to apologize for something, then formal documentation is obviously not warranted.

Practical Take Away

Documentation is an important aspect of managing relationships with your employees.  You will be much better served by shifting your approach to documentation from quantity to quality. Trust me, you would much rather defend one or two well-written documents than twenty-five poorly written ones. So, go forward and document with purpose.

ARTICLE BY Jason S. Ritchie of Holland & Hart LLP

Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2015.

Sunlight is the best disinfectant: SEC charges oil company for fraud on EB-5 investors

In a recent action, SEC v. Luca International Group, LLC et al. (“SEC v. Luca“), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has charged a California-based oil and gas company and its CEO with violations of securities laws in connection with a $68 million Ponzi scheme and affinity fraud. The target of the fraud was the Chinese American community. Additionally, a portion of the funds raised by the defendants came from EB-5 investors seeking green cards through the EB-5 Program. The SEC issued both a press release and cease and desist order this week in connection with this most recent action. We think that this case highlights two important and relevant points for our readership, and that the SEC exposing the defendant schemers/fraudsters in SEC v. Luca is good for the EB-5 industry and integrity of the EB-5 program.

Prosecution efforts are going global– government agencies in Hong Kong and China assisted the SEC’s efforts 

Now more than ever before, the SEC is on the path to closing down actors in the EB-5 context that engage in deception and fraud. We are in a new era of enforcement, with the SEC becoming more familiar with the EB-5 Program. We think that this enforcement trend will move at an even faster clip as the SEC and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) become more agile in cooperating and responding to credible allegations of fraud.

EB-5 regional centers and issuers need to put into place sound and workable policies to ensure that marketing practices are in line with securities laws. Note that in SEC v. Luca, there was cooperation with the SEC and two foreign agencies, namely the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and the China Securities and Regulatory Commission. Enforcement and prosecution efforts in this context are going global. Regional centers and issuers should ensure that any offshore sales efforts are in compliance with the laws of the countries in which sales activities are performed.

Overlooked federal and state investment adviser registration requirements  

SEC v. Luca is a reminder that investment adviser requirements may apply broadly in EB-5 transactions and require federal or state registration by regional centers, issuers and/or EB-5 deal facilitators. In SEC v. Luca, the SEC asserted that the defendants acted as “investment advisers” within the meaning of Section 202(a)(11) of the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisors Act”) [15 U.S.C. Section 80(b)-2(a)(11), but had no registrations with the Commission. Confusion over investment adviser registration requirements is a commonplace problem in the EB-5 space. In SEC v. Luca, the defendants were in the business of providing investment advice concerning securities for compensation. According to the SEC, these key facts triggered registration requirements under the Advisers Act.

We will soon be providing an extensive alert with regulatory advice to EB-5 regional centers and issuers on the applicability of both federal and state investment adviser registration requirements. The applicability of such requirements should be made on a case-by-case with qualified securities counsel. There is no “one size fits all” advice. States have their own considerations in interpreting investment adviser registration requirements. And the SEC has its own interpretive guidance on the parameters of the registration requirements of the Advisers Act apply.

Conclusion

The egregious pattern of unlawful behavior by the defendants in SEC v. Luca included deceit in the marketing process, fraud in offering materials, comingling and misappropriation of funds, and violation of registration requirements. These are issues not just in the EB-5 context, but with private placements generally. Affinity fraud is also common in private placements.

EB-5 stakeholders should be aware that we are seeing a visible uptick in securities related prosecutions. No issuer, regional center or deal facilitator is immune from scrutiny. The SEC and USCIS are also working together more nimbly with foreign securities agencies. Sound policies, securities compliance and meaningful due diligence by experts are important in EB-5 offerings.

Sunlight is the best disinfectant. This adage is true for the EB-5 program. Stakeholders who promote a transparent and strong EB-5 program should applaud the SEC’s efforts.

ARTICLE BY Douglas Hauer of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
©1994-2015 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

U.S. Supreme Court Finds a Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage: Implications for Employee Benefit Plan Sponsors

On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a historic decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses require states to allow same-sex marriage and to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.  The decision comes exactly two years to the day from the Court’s decision in Windsor defining “spouse” to include same-sex spouses for purposes of federal law.

As a result of the Court’s decision, the existing 14 state bans on same-sex marriage are invalid, and same-sex spouses are entitled to all of the rights extended to opposite-sex spouses under both federal and state law.

From an employee benefits perspective, it appears thatObergefell may most significantly impact sponsors ofinsured health and welfare plans in states that currently ban same-sex marriage.  Employers and other plan sponsors in those states will be required to offer insured benefits to same-sex spouses because state insurance law will require that the term “spouse” be interpreted to include them.  Based on government guidance issued following the Windsor decision, it seems unlikely that the decision would have retroactive effect, though such claims are possible.

For sponsors of self-insured benefit plans, a question may exist as to whether Obergefell directly impacts a sponsor’s decision not to provide health coverage to same-sex spouses (because state law does not apply to such plans).  However, it would appear that there would be heightened risks under federal and state discrimination laws for plans that define “spouse” in a manner that is inconsistent with the federal and state definitions, particularly since the Court held that marriage is a fundamental right under the Constitution, and an ERISA preemption defense likely would be weaker in this new climate.

It is also noteworthy that, as a result of the Court’s decision, there will no longer be imputed income for state tax purposes with respect to employer-provided health coverage for same-sex spouses, allowing for consistent administration in all states in which an employer operates.  Since Windsor, there have not been federal tax consequences with respect to these benefits, but some states continued to impute income for state tax purposes.

Finally, with respect to federally-regulated benefits such as qualified retirement plans and Code Section 125 benefits (for example, flexible spending accounts), the Court’s decision does not necessarily warrant any change, since those plans have been required, since Windsor, to recognize same-sex spouses.  Of course, plan language should be reviewed for consistency with the decision, and employers in some states may find that there are new spouses seeking benefits under those plans.  There also will be some administrative and enrollment issues, similar to when Windsor was decided.

Employers, particularly those operating in states that currently ban same-sex marriage, should review their benefit plans and policies and consider whether any changes need to be made in light of Obergefell.  Some employers may also reconsider their domestic partner benefits programs now that same-sex couples have the right to marry and have their marriage recognized across the entire country.

We expect that there will be guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service regarding the employee benefit plan issues that emanate from Obergefell, so stay tuned.

ARTICLE BY Roberta K Chevlowe of Proskauer Rose LLP

© 2015 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Kimble v. Marvel – Supreme Court Sticks With Brulotte Rule on Royalty Payments

In a rather breezy opinion filled with Spiderman puns and references, Justice Kagan, writing for a 6/3 Court, affirmed that Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) controlled the outcome of this dispute over Marvel’s decision to halt royalty payments on a web-slinger toy that it had apparently agreed to make “for as long as kids want to imitate Spider-Man (doing whatever a spider can).” Slip op. at 2. (A copy of the opinion is found at the end of this post.)

The toy was patented by Kimble, and the patent expired in 2010. The ninth circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of S.J. confirming that, in accord with Brulotte, a patentee cannot receive royalties for sales made after his/her patent’s expiration. Cert. was granted and the Court affirmed that stare decisis was operable to keep Brulotte as controlling law, particularly since the dispute involved statutory interpretation – [as opposed to, e.g., first amendment rights?] – and that Congress had rejected attempts to amend the law.

I posted on the “back-story” earlier – see here– so a lot of repetition seems unnecessary, but the Court spent some time discussing various work-arounds to the Brulotte bar. These include deferred royalty payments, licensing non-patent rights and alternative “business arrangements,” that universities and other developers of early stage technology might use to temper the loss of patent protection prior to the generation of maximum income from the patented technology. Slip op. at 5-6. Nonetheless, as Justice Kagan wrote: “Patents endow their holders with certain superpowers but only for a limited time.”

Click here to read the Supreme Court Decision in Kimble v. Marvel

ARTICLE BY Warren Woessner of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.
© 2015 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Register for the 9th Annual National Institute on E-Discovery – May 15th in New York City

ABA Nat Inst E Discov May 15

Remaining current is critical to successful litigation. This program is relevant for both in-house and outside counsel who are involved in litigation and the discovery process. E-Discovery is a rapidly evolving field with laws and regulations that are constantly changing.  Attendees of this program will gain practical knowledge that may be implemented immediately in day-to-day operations.

Additional Information Institute Brochure

  • Noted practitioners and jurists will address:
  • Practical tips for managing litigation holds
  • Preserving personal data devices in light of the varying interpretations of “possession, custody, and control”
  • Judges’ perspectives on the Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure amendments
  • Recent court decisions, as reviewed by one of the industry’s leading authorities on E-Discovery case law
  • Meeting ethical obligations related to securing clients’ E-Discovery data
  • The unique aspects of cross-border E-Discovery between the U.S., and the European Union, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and Canada

Register now!

May 15th in NYC: Attend the ABA’s Ninth Annual National Institute on E-Discovery

ABA Nat Inst E Discov May 15

Remaining current is critical to successful litigation. This program is relevant for both in-house and outside counsel who are involved in litigation and the discovery process. E-Discovery is a rapidly evolving field with laws and regulations that are constantly changing.  Attendees of this program will gain practical knowledge that may be implemented immediately in day-to-day operations.

Additional Information Institute Brochure

  • Noted practitioners and jurists will address:
  • Practical tips for managing litigation holds
  • Preserving personal data devices in light of the varying interpretations of “possession, custody, and control”
  • Judges’ perspectives on the Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure amendments
  • Recent court decisions, as reviewed by one of the industry’s leading authorities on E-Discovery case law
  • Meeting ethical obligations related to securing clients’ E-Discovery data
  • The unique aspects of cross-border E-Discovery between the U.S., and the European Union, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and Canada

Register now!

May 15th in NYC: Attend the ABA's Ninth Annual National Institute on E-Discovery

ABA Nat Inst E Discov May 15

Remaining current is critical to successful litigation. This program is relevant for both in-house and outside counsel who are involved in litigation and the discovery process. E-Discovery is a rapidly evolving field with laws and regulations that are constantly changing.  Attendees of this program will gain practical knowledge that may be implemented immediately in day-to-day operations.

Additional Information Institute Brochure

  • Noted practitioners and jurists will address:
  • Practical tips for managing litigation holds
  • Preserving personal data devices in light of the varying interpretations of “possession, custody, and control”
  • Judges’ perspectives on the Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure amendments
  • Recent court decisions, as reviewed by one of the industry’s leading authorities on E-Discovery case law
  • Meeting ethical obligations related to securing clients’ E-Discovery data
  • The unique aspects of cross-border E-Discovery between the U.S., and the European Union, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and Canada

Register now!

B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.: Trademark Litigation Might Get Simpler

Vedder Price

Trademark litigation includes two similar types of proceedings. First, and most common, issues of trademark infringement and cancellation of a mark may be raised in a trial (i.e., a traditional fight in either State Court or Federal District Court before a judge or jury involving oral testimony). Second, and less common, issues of trademark registration may be raised in a trademark opposition or cancellation proceeding before the Trademark Office. These proceedings are primarily conducted in writing and are governed by administrative rules published in the Federal Register based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While a trial may result in monetary damages or an injunction preventing a party from using a mark, the Trademark Office merely has the authority to grant or cancel federal trademark registrations.

Since the Trademark Office’s process does not allow for litigants to receive monetary awards, injunctions, or even a determination of infringement, entering the Trademark Office for a cancellation or opposition simplifies the proceedings to focus on a limited number of key issues, such as whether a likelihood of confusion exists between a registered mark and another mark. Along with their limited focus and less formal nature, litigants often found comfort in a the lower costs involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office. Generally, once a trademark registration was cancelled, the owner of the mark that was cancelled would understand that a claim for infringement in court was not likely to succeed and would stop using the mark.

In B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., the United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of “[w]hether the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (the “TTAB” or the “Board”) finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes Hargis from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element.” The long-standing dispute (almost 20 years) between the parties involved in the decision regarded the trademarks SEALTIGHT and SEALTITE. In 1996, Hargis applied for registration of its mark, SEALTITE. B&B opposed the registration based on an alleged likelihood of confusion of Hargis’s trademark with B&B’s own federally registered mark, SEALTIGHT. After applying the standard multi-factor likelihood of confusion test, the TTAB decided in favor of B&B and held that a likelihood of confusion existed between the marks.

At the same time as the proceedings before the TTAB, B&B sued Hargis for trademark infringement in Federal District Court. After receiving a favorable outcome in the proceeding before the TTAB, B&B argued in District Court that Hargis could not contest the TTAB’s determination that a likelihood of confusion existed due to the preclusive effect of the TTAB’s decision. The District Court disagreed with B&B and allowed the jury to hear the evidence and decide on the issue of confusion. The jury returned a verdict for Hargis, finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks. The parties appealed the verdict, including the issue of the preclusive effect of the TTAB decision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court. The parties then petitioned for, and were granted, certiorari on the issue by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that as long as the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met and the usages of the marks are materially the same, a finding that a likelihood of confusion exists by the TTAB should have preclusive effect in District Court proceedings.

The doctrine of “res judicata” or “issue preclusion” states that litigants should not get two bites at the same apple, or two chances to argue over the same issue. Thus, if the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found overlap (i.e., likelihood of confusion) between two marks (despite using the simplified tools involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office), then a District Court should honor the TTAB’s determination and not force the parties to relitigate the issue.

Prior to this decision, if a case was simultaneously pending in District Court and before the TTAB, the TTAB would readily stay its determination until the litigation in District Court was resolved. Because of this, any time one of the parties to an opposition or cancellation proceeding became agitated, they would file a concurrent action before a District Court. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, it is unclear if the TTAB will continue to grant this courtesy.

Trademark oppositions and cancellations must now be taken very seriously. While the TTAB cannot award damages or find infringement, its decisions could now be used as grounds for finding infringement in District Court. For example, a party who defaults in a cancellation proceeding may well lose the right to defend itself properly in District Court if a subsequent action is filed. Going forward, mark owners with proceedings before the TTAB must consider whether to intentionally abandon a trademark application or registration in order to avoid an adverse decision that could have far-reaching effects.

ARTICLE BY

John E. Munro
Alain Villeneuve
Vedder Price

B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.: Trademark Litigation Might Get Simpler

Vedder Price

Trademark litigation includes two similar types of proceedings. First, and most common, issues of trademark infringement and cancellation of a mark may be raised in a trial (i.e., a traditional fight in either State Court or Federal District Court before a judge or jury involving oral testimony). Second, and less common, issues of trademark registration may be raised in a trademark opposition or cancellation proceeding before the Trademark Office. These proceedings are primarily conducted in writing and are governed by administrative rules published in the Federal Register based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While a trial may result in monetary damages or an injunction preventing a party from using a mark, the Trademark Office merely has the authority to grant or cancel federal trademark registrations.

Since the Trademark Office’s process does not allow for litigants to receive monetary awards, injunctions, or even a determination of infringement, entering the Trademark Office for a cancellation or opposition simplifies the proceedings to focus on a limited number of key issues, such as whether a likelihood of confusion exists between a registered mark and another mark. Along with their limited focus and less formal nature, litigants often found comfort in a the lower costs involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office. Generally, once a trademark registration was cancelled, the owner of the mark that was cancelled would understand that a claim for infringement in court was not likely to succeed and would stop using the mark.

In B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., the United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of “[w]hether the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (the “TTAB” or the “Board”) finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes Hargis from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element.” The long-standing dispute (almost 20 years) between the parties involved in the decision regarded the trademarks SEALTIGHT and SEALTITE. In 1996, Hargis applied for registration of its mark, SEALTITE. B&B opposed the registration based on an alleged likelihood of confusion of Hargis’s trademark with B&B’s own federally registered mark, SEALTIGHT. After applying the standard multi-factor likelihood of confusion test, the TTAB decided in favor of B&B and held that a likelihood of confusion existed between the marks.

At the same time as the proceedings before the TTAB, B&B sued Hargis for trademark infringement in Federal District Court. After receiving a favorable outcome in the proceeding before the TTAB, B&B argued in District Court that Hargis could not contest the TTAB’s determination that a likelihood of confusion existed due to the preclusive effect of the TTAB’s decision. The District Court disagreed with B&B and allowed the jury to hear the evidence and decide on the issue of confusion. The jury returned a verdict for Hargis, finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks. The parties appealed the verdict, including the issue of the preclusive effect of the TTAB decision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court. The parties then petitioned for, and were granted, certiorari on the issue by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that as long as the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met and the usages of the marks are materially the same, a finding that a likelihood of confusion exists by the TTAB should have preclusive effect in District Court proceedings.

The doctrine of “res judicata” or “issue preclusion” states that litigants should not get two bites at the same apple, or two chances to argue over the same issue. Thus, if the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found overlap (i.e., likelihood of confusion) between two marks (despite using the simplified tools involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office), then a District Court should honor the TTAB’s determination and not force the parties to relitigate the issue.

Prior to this decision, if a case was simultaneously pending in District Court and before the TTAB, the TTAB would readily stay its determination until the litigation in District Court was resolved. Because of this, any time one of the parties to an opposition or cancellation proceeding became agitated, they would file a concurrent action before a District Court. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, it is unclear if the TTAB will continue to grant this courtesy.

Trademark oppositions and cancellations must now be taken very seriously. While the TTAB cannot award damages or find infringement, its decisions could now be used as grounds for finding infringement in District Court. For example, a party who defaults in a cancellation proceeding may well lose the right to defend itself properly in District Court if a subsequent action is filed. Going forward, mark owners with proceedings before the TTAB must consider whether to intentionally abandon a trademark application or registration in order to avoid an adverse decision that could have far-reaching effects.

ARTICLE BY

John E. Munro
Alain Villeneuve
Vedder Price