Tag: Litigation

Lyft Sexual Assault Claims Consolidated for Pre-Trial Proceedings

Lyft and other companies have become a part of life and people look to them for a safe ride home at the end of a night out.   However, ridesharing companies, like Lyft and Uber, have been under fire for passenger safety concerns, and the stories of women being sexually assaulted by their drivers are prolific, harrowing and terrifying.  In response to this disturbing trend, a wave of lawsuits in California are addressing the company’s responsibility when a passenger is assaulted.

Lyft Sexual Assault Claims Consolidated in San Francisco Superior Court

Recently,  California Superior Court Judge Hon. Kenneth Freeman granted a petition to consolidate multiple Lyft sexual assault cases in California recommending the Superior Court of California San Francisco County as the appropriate venue for the “complex” coordinated matters to be heard.

The Lyft passenger lawsuits claim the plaintiffs were sexually assaulted by sexual predators driving for Lyft after Lyft had been on actual notice of ongoing, sexual assaults by its drivers. According to the complaints, Lyft failed to respond to the sexual assaults by adopting and implementing adequate driver hiring or monitoring systems and procedures to protect riders. This failure to respond to an identified, systemic issue of sexual assault put more riders at risk.

The Lyft plaintiffs filed a motion to coordinate the cases, as most of the cases included in the ruling had been filed in San Francisco Superior Court.  The court agreed with the Lyft plaintiffs that: Lyft’s corporate headquarters are in San Francisco, as are the majority of corporate witnesses and documents.   The court added, the San Francisco Superior Court uses e-filing, which could potentially save the parties significant costs.  Additionally, only cases that are “complex” as defined by California’s Judicial Council standards may be coordinated.

Need for ESI (Electronically Stored Information)  Orders, Are Lyft Drivers are Independent Contractors or Employees, Additional Plaintiffs Joining Requires Complex Case Management

Co-Counsel for the Lyft Sexual Assault Plaintiffs, Brooks Cutter of Cutter Law argued that there are likely to be thousands of documents, studies, e-mails, and memoranda that are relevant to the claims and defenses in this case and discovery will inevitably require a complex ESI (Electronically Stored Information) order and accordingly a court like San Francisco Superior Court is well-equipped to handle such issues, including staying discovery, staying portions of the case, obtaining stipulations that apply to the entire coordinated case, and selecting bellwether plaintiffs.

Many of the underlying cases in the consolidation action allege vicarious liability or the liability of Lyft for the torts or wrongful actions of their drivers whether or not Lyft classifies them as an employee or independent contractor.  Lyft, Uber, and Doordash are actively fighting California Assembly Bill 5 Pledging over $90 Million To Fund Voter Initiative To Overturn AB-5  which went into effect January 1, 2020.  AB-5 profoundly alters the legal standard applied in evaluating whether a worker is classified as an employee or an independent contractor.   Furthermore,  Uber and Postmates on December 31st  filed a legal challenge in Federal Court alleging AB-5 violates individuals’ constitutional rights, seeking declaratory and injunctive remedies claiming the law unfairly discriminates against technology platforms and those who make a living through them.

Lyft has also been accused of stalling and slowing down discovery. Coordinated proceedings could help plaintiffs’ attorneys combat Lyft’s delays, and it could be beneficial to have one judge see how Lyft has conducted itself in discovery.

Attorney Cutter stated he is aware of five more related sexual assault cases that have been filed in the time since that petition was filed.   According to attorney Cutter, “There are definitely victims who have not yet come forward.”

Lyft Fought Against Sexual Assault Lawsuit Consolidation

Lyft, represent by Williams & Connolly, argued that the consolidation of  Lyft Sexual assault cases “would make in San Francisco Superior Court a national clearinghouse for claims against San Francisco-based companies.”    Furthermore, Lyft contended that:

“all claims against a California based-company —wherever the underlying incidents arise, and however much the disputed facts occurred elsewhere and other states’ laws govern the contested legal issues — could be brought in California courts and coordinated.”

Lyft’s two main objections to consolidation are that “the allegations of misconduct are not the same and that the majority of the cases did not occur in California.”

Judge Freeman, however, disagreed with the company, focusing instead on Lyft’s actions or inactions as an organization to protect rider’s safety. “To the contrary, the predominating legal and factual issues will examine Lyft’s liability for allegedly failing to institute a system to have prevented the assaults in these cases and potential future assaults.” Judge Freeman said. “The court agrees with plaintiffs that this is not a case against the drivers; it is fundamentally a case against Lyft.”

Significance of Lyft Consolidation Ruling

Judge Freeman also found that coordination of the suits would make the most efficient use of court resources and avoid duplicative testimony. In giving his ruling he further noted that there is a risk of duplicative and inconsistent rulings if the cases were not coordinated, which would create confusion, and it would hinder the Court of Appeal’s ability to hear challenges to inconsistent rulings, orders, and judgments, which would inevitably cause significant delays.

“This is an important ruling for victims as it means the claims will be heard in a single court in California,” plaintiff’s co-counsel Brooks Cutter said. “Lyft opposed our motion and wanted to force victims to undergo litigation in separate courts across the country. As a California company, it is appropriate for these Lyft claims to be heard in California.”

The Lyft sexual assault and rape claims each allege that the company did not adequately address the issue of sexual misconduct committed by sexual predators who drove for the ride-sharing company. Furthermore, they allege Lyft owed that duty to its riders, who believed it offered a safe form of transportation.  Attorney Cutter says, “The occurrence of sexual assault in the vast majority of these lawsuits is undisputed. The focus of these lawsuits is Lyft’s accountability for the assaults, which plaintiffs contend were enabled by Lyft’s lax background checks and failure to enact reasonable in-app monitoring to help ensure rider safety.”

Alexandra LaManna, a spokeswoman for Lyft, disclosed to the New York Times: in 2019 nearly one in five employees at the company had been dedicated to initiatives strengthening the rideshare platform’s safety, and that in recent months Lyft had introduced more than 15 new safety features.  Lyft announced in September of 2019 some of these safety features: access to 911 through the app and monitoring and offers of support from Lyft personnel to the driver and passenger if a trip is experiencing an unexpected delay.  These are on top of the company’s criminal background checks, steps to prevent fraudulent use of the app and identify driver identity, and harassment prevention programs.

However, despite these steps, more Lyft lawsuits are being filed, alleging the ride-sharing company has not taken adequate steps to protect riders from sexual assault.

Lyft has not Released a Safety Report – Lyft Victims Can Still File Lawsuits

In December 2019, Lyft competitor Uber released a safety report.  Uber reported that in 2017 and 2018 it received reports of 5,981 incidents of sexual abuse.  In 2018, this included 235 rapes and 280 reports of attempted rape, 1,560 reports of groping, 376 reports of unwanted kissing to breast, buttocks or mouth and 594 reports of unwanted kissing to another body part.  Because Uber’s figures are based on the information it received, the actual numbers could in fact be higher than reported.

Lyft has not released its safety report regarding sexual assaults, rapes, and accidents. Attorney Cutter finds the lack of safety report from Lyft to be problematic.  He says, “It is important for Lyft to issue a safety report so the public has a better understanding of the significant risk of sexual assault in rideshare vehicles.”

Victims who suffered sexual assault committed by a Lyft driver are still eligible to file a lawsuit. Consolidation of the current lawsuits does not prevent future lawsuits from being filed, and it is likely there are many more victims who have yet to come forward about their experiences.

Copyright ©2020 National Law Forum, LLC

More on consolidated case litigation in the National Law Review Litigation and Trial Practice section.

Securities Class Action Filings Reach Record Levels in 2019

Securities fraud class action filings accelerated in 2019, according to a report released today by Cornerstone Research and the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. The report, Securities Class Action Filings—2019 Year in Review, finds that filing activity remains elevated well above historical levels by several key measures.

For the third year in a row, plaintiffs filed more than 400 securities class actions. In 2019, there were 428 securities class actions across federal and state courts—the highest number on record—with 268 core filings and 160 M&A filings. This marks a historic high for core filings, surpassing even 2008 when class actions peaked in response to financial market volatility. Market capitalization losses in 2019 eclipsed $1 trillion for the second consecutive year.

The combined number of filings with 1933 Act claims in federal and state courts reached unprecedented levels.

The likelihood of core filings targeting companies listed on U.S. exchanges was also at its highest in 2019. This measure reached new levels due to the record number of filings, as well as an extended decline in the number of public companies over the last 15 years.

The impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Cyan Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund continues to reverberate. The report, which includes expanded data on state court filings from 2010 to 2019, found that Securities Act of 1933 claims in state courts rose to 49 in 2019, a 40% increase from the previous year. Almost half of these had parallel actions in federal court.

“The increase in state court Section 11 filings under the 1933 Act has caused a sharp jump in the cost of D&O insurance for companies going public,” said Joseph A. Grundfest, director of the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. “Many IPO issuers have adopted rules that would move this litigation back to federal courts where these claims have traditionally been resolved. The enforceability of these provisions, however, has been challenged, and the IPO market is awaiting a decision by the Delaware Supreme Court that will likely define the contours of federal securities fraud litigation for years to come. That decision will likely be handed down before the end of April.”

Key Trends

  • Both Disclosure Dollar Loss (DDL) and Maximum Dollar Loss (MDL) decreased in 2019. DDL fell by 14% to $285 billion, and MDL by 9% to $1,199 billion as the size of the typical filing decreased.
  • Combined core federal filings in the Technology and Communication sectors grew by almost a third from 2018 and have more than doubled since 2017.
  • Second Circuit core federal filings increased to 103, the highest number on record. The Ninth Circuit’s core federal filings decreased by 25% to 52 filings.
  • Core federal filings against companies headquartered outside the United States increased to 57, the highest total on record. The likelihood of a core federal filing against a non-U.S. company increased from 4.8% to 5.6% from 2018 to 2019.
  • Beginning in the latter part of 2018, companies with connections to the cannabis industry were increasingly the target of federal class action filings. There were six such filings in 2018 and 13 in 2019.

Cyan Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund

In March 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion allowing plaintiffs to assert claims under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) in state courts. Under the 1933 Act, Section 11 allows investors to pursue damages for alleged misrepresentations or omissions in securities registration statements. It is generally believed that the ruling will lead to more securities class action filings in state courts based on this claim.

Read an excerpt of the report on 1933 Act Filings.

Read the report, Securities Class Action Filings—2019 Year in Review.

Figure 4 Securities Class Action Cornerstone Research

Copyright ©2020 Cornerstone Research

For more SEC litigation & regulation, see the National Law Review Securities & SEC section.

Million-Dollar Settlement of Billion-Dollar Claim Found Reasonable in Light of Due Process Problems Posed By Disproportionate Damages

Another court has observed that a billion-dollar aggregate liability under the TCPA likely would violate due process, adopting the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that such a “shockingly large amount” of statutory damages would be “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportionate[] to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”

In Larson v. Harman-Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:16-cv-00219-DAD-SKO, 2019 WL 7038399 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2019),  the Eastern District of California preliminarily approved a settlement proposal that represents less than 0.1% of potential statutory damages. Like the Eighth Circuit decision that we discussed previously, both courts observed that several uncertainties exist as to whether the plaintiffs can succeed in proving certain legal issues, such as whether consent was provided and whether an ATDS was used.

The Larson case exposed the defendants to TCPA liability for allegedly sending 13.5 million text messages without prior express consent as part of a marketing program called the “A&W Text Club.” After extensive discovery and motion practice, the parties proposed a settlement that would have the defendants deposit $4 million into a settlement fund that in turn distributes $2.4 million to class members who submit a timely, valid claim.

The court preliminarily approved the proposed settlement, observing that its terms demonstrated “substantive fairness and adequacy.” As a preliminary matter, it found, “[i]t is well-settled law that a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not per se render the settlement inadequate or unfair.” Concerned that calculating damages based on $500 per message under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) would violate the Due Process Clause, it agreed that the conduct of the defendant (sending over 13.5 million messages) was not persistent or severely harmful to the 232,602 recipients to warrant the billion-dollar judgment.

While $4 million represents less than 0.1% of the theoretical aggregate damages, “the value of the settlement is intertwined with the risks of litigation.” Here, in addition to the uncertainty about whether the “A&T Text Club” program uses an ATDS, “several risks are present, including . . . whether the plaintiff can maintain the action as a class action, . . . and whether the plaintiff’s theories of individual and vicarious liability can succeed.” The proposed settlement amount was found to strike the appropriate balance as it would likely result in each class member receiving $52 to $210 for each message if 5% to 20% of the class submit timely claims.

Although the case was only at the preliminary approval stage, this decision again illustrates that at least some courts recognize the due process problem posed by disproportionate aggregate damages and do not reject settlements simply because they provide some fraction of the theoretical aggregate damages available under a given statute.

©2020 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

Three Ways Litigation Finance Can Help Corporate Legal Departments

Corporate legal departments are generally measured by their ability to control legal costs, manage risk, and deputize external litigation resources, especially when their company is involved in litigation. Although a common feature of modern business, litigation is an increasingly costly proposition that is fraught with risk. In recent years, commercial litigation finance has emerged as an effective means of shouldering case costs and redistributing risk. While the number of law firms that have seized the advantages of this type of financing has grown exponentially, general counsels (“GCs”) and corporate legal departments have been slower to recognize the many benefits that it can offer, which has handicapped their companies by keeping a potent tool needlessly out of reach. Here are three things every GC should know about litigation finance.

Litigation Finance Offsets Risk

Litigation costs and other financial risks inherent to the legal process pose a daunting challenge to GCs. As a result, companies often forgo bringing lawsuits due to their impact on financial performance. Yet even when legal departments decide to forge ahead with legal claims, their outcome is often far from certain. The decision to bring a lawsuit, therefore, has the power to make or break entire companies. This risk is even more acute for smaller companies and those facing financial headwinds. A victory could revive a company’s fortunes, while a poorly conceived effort might precipitate the firm’s demise. Litigation finance mitigates that risk through funding “without recourse,” which allows a company to shift costs to a third party and only share an agreed-upon portion of proceeds with the funder at the successful conclusion of the claim. If a case is lost and no proceeds are recovered, the company is under no obligation to repay the funding amount.

Consider the following example: Suppose a small tech startup sues an industry giant for theft of its trade secrets relating to a revolutionary new product. The startup’s case against its unscrupulous competitor is seemingly strong as the brazen theft greatly damaged the fledgling company. Unfortunately, the lawsuit comes with a steep price tag, forcing the startup to spend more than $100,000 each month on attorneys’ fees and associated costs. Small and vulnerable, the startup is quickly exhausting its cash reserves as its better-capitalized opponent employs a panoply of defensive tactics designed to delay and frustrate plaintiff’s efforts at all stages of litigation. As legal bills continue to mount, the startup may need to abandon its lawsuit or accept a paltry settlement far below the actual value of its claim.

Faced with an existential threat, what the startup really needs is a cash injection from a litigation finance provider to pay for the escalating litigation costs while also providing a much-needed insurance policy against unforeseen financial difficulties that can result from litigation. The startup’s GC is surprised to learn that this type of funding is an increasingly common financing option that is available to companies large and small. In a typical transaction, a third-party funder can finance most, or all of the legal expenses associated with the lawsuit in return for a portion of any recovery. The funds may be used to hire top legal talent or procure additional expert resources. Essentially a corporate finance transaction, this type of funding can even be used to supplement the company’s working capital or clean up arrears to legal service providers.

The example above is just one of the ways that litigation finance can be used to hedge litigation risk. More creative GCs have been able to offset their institution’s litigation costs entirely by using a portfolio-based approach to finance all of their legal claims.  This type of structure typically provides a much larger financing commitment but requires cross-collateralization of several litigation matters. Where portfolio financing is utilized, it may provide a greater degree of certainty about long-term future litigation spend.  If the funding amount is substantial enough, GCs may no longer need to allocate for litigation budgets on an annual basis and take a longer-term approach instead.

Litigation Finance Can Transform Legal Departments into Profit Centers Through Balance Sheet Management

Under GAAP, litigation costs are reflected as expenses, which can negatively impact a company’s financials and quarterly performance. This is especially troublesome for public companies that are valued on earnings or cash flow or require certain financial criteria to be met to comply with credit covenants. For such companies, litigation costs paid from company funds must be recorded as expenses immediately when incurred, thereby diminishing reportable earnings. Worse yet, recoveries from successful legal matters may not offset the adverse impact of lawsuit-related costs because such recoveries are generally treated as below-the-line items that do not increase earnings. Moreover, some actions may result in favorable judgments which then take months or years to enforce, leaving a temporary hole in a company’s cash flows despite a successful ruling.

It is no surprise then that corporate legal departments are frequently perceived by management as cost centers, necessary to put out fires or navigate the laws applicable to a particular industry, but not as potential revenue generators. Traditionally, GCs who have identified a roster of affirmative litigation likely to yield significant recoveries will still need to convince their c-suite to take on the risk and immediate financial burden of funding lawsuits from the company’s own balance sheet. Enter litigation finance. When both the risk and burden are shifted to litigation finance providers in exchange for a portion of any recoveries, a company’s legal department can focus on unlocking the hidden value of its legal matters without the risk of negatively impacting its financials, becoming a potential profit generator for the company.

An Experienced Litigation Funder Can Help Optimize Litigation Outcomes

The quality and breadth of resources that litigants are able to deploy can greatly impact outcomes in legal disputes.  For example, the skill of the legal team, the quality of expert witnesses and other litigation consultants are important drivers of how courts and juries perceive the merits of legal claims. With litigation financing mitigating the burden of paying for legal costs, GCs have greater flexibility in assembling a first-rate litigation team. A legal department buttressed by litigation finance can focus on the skill and effectiveness of its team without worrying about negotiating for the lowest possible fees. Access to the support of top-quality counsel and litigation consultants can improve a company’s overall likelihood of success and the magnitude of any recovery.

Experienced litigation funders can provide access to these top litigation support channels by leveraging their network.  In addition, they can provide an invaluable outside perspective on the merits of a case during the due diligence process and throughout the pendency of the claim. When choosing a litigation funder, consider the expertise of the funder’s team and if there are any practice areas which they target in their investment strategy.

A trusted litigation finance firm should demonstrate the highest professionalism, abide by the explicit understanding that a third-party funder should have no involvement in the litigation or strategy, and should protect attorney-client privilege and confidentiality at all times.  When these essential confidences are met, engaging with a third-party funder can be enormously helpful in assessing the merits and risk of a case, budgeting litigation spend, and providing access to first-rate litigation support.

Conclusion

As litigation finance continues to gain popularity among law firms, GCs should also take notice. As businesses continuously seek to gain a competitive advantage over their peers, the ability to mitigate the risks associated with litigation should be an important consideration, especially since poorly conceived strategies can often carry existential consequences.  GCs, therefore, should recognize litigation finance as an indispensable asset that has the potential to offset the risk of litigation, provide effective balance sheet management while unlocking the hidden value of prospective legal claims, and improve outcomes for meritorious cases.

 

© 2019 LexShares, Inc. All rights reserved.

ARTICLE BY Matthew Oxman of LexShares.

Reinsurance and the Death Master File

In a traditional life insurance and reinsurance relationship, a life insurance company issues a policy to a policyholder and reinsures the policy (usually via a block of business consisting of the same or similar policies) with its reinsurer either by coinsurance or on a yearly renewable term basis (or otherwise).  When the insured person dies, a death certificate is presented to the policy issuing company and the policy benefits are paid to the beneficiary.  That triggers an indemnity claim under the reinsurance contract and the reinsurer is obligated to pay its share of the policy benefits to the ceding company. Simple.

But what happens if the insured person dies, but no one files a death certificate and makes a claim against the policy?  Who gets the policy benefits?  Does the insurer get to avoid paying any benefits out on the policy or does the state have an interest in this abandoned property?  This has been a huge issue over the past several years, with regulators entering into settlements with life insurance companies about searching the Social Security Administration’s Death Master File or using some other method to determine death.  Of course, all these abandoned life insurance benefits escheat to the state when no one claims the benefits, which is why state regulators were so keen to press this issue.

In a recent case, a New York federal court had to address these issues in a petition to confirm a reinsurance arbitration award.

In Park Avenue Life Ins. Co. v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N.A., No. 19-cv-1089 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2019), the dispute was over a life reinsurer’s obligations to pay for costs and claims arising out of an agreement with regulators to pay death benefits that would be escheated to the government after a Death Master File search indicated that the insured person died.  By majority, the arbitration panel mostly found for the reinsurer (the award, which is now public on PACER, found that the reinsurer was not responsible under the coinsurance agreement for the costs and expenses associated with the Death Master File searches or regulatory dispute).  In a paragraph addressing the reinsurer’s continuing obligations, the majority made the following pronouncement:

[The reinsurer] shall continue to be obligated to indemnify [the cedent] for all death benefits paid under the terms of the [policies] covered by the Coinsurance Agreement.  Notice of any deaths can arise pursuant to claims made by Policy owners or beneficiaries, or by way of periodic searches of the Death Master File or any other death data base search tool by [either party].

The reinsurer argued that the award required reimbursement of only those death benefit payments that arise from claims made by beneficiaries.  The cedent argued that the award continued to require the reinsurer to reimburse payments that arise from claims made either by designated beneficiaries or by escheatment. Both asked the court to confirm the award based on each side’s different interpretation.

The court found that the award was susceptible of two meanings and was unable to say that one or the other of the two interpretations presented was definitively correct.  The court remanded the matter back to the arbitration panel to clarify certain questions addressing escheatment claims, but suggested that the panel should “broadly aim to underscore the meaning and effect of the award so that the court will know exactly what it is being asked to enforce.”

Notably, and consistent with the recent trend in many courts, the court denied the parties’ request to keep the arbitration award and related materials under seal.

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more on the topic, see the Insurance, Reinsurance & Surety law page on the National Law Review.

Two Ways Technology Has Changed How Lawyers Practice

Technology has changed all of our day-to-day lives. It also has impacted how lawyers practice. While having the internet at our fingertips is a convenience for most of us, it can cause headaches for judges and lawyers when jurors use the internet during trial to post or search online about the case. This means that lawyers must be more tech-competent than ever before. Here are two ways that technology has changed how lawyers practice:

  1. Litigants Face the Challenge of Jurors’ Social Media and Internet Use

Imagine years of preparation, costly investigations, and hundreds or thousands of hours of work by attorneys and clients being shattered in a moment by a juror’s single click on his or her phone, tablet, or computer. Whether by posting 280 characters on Twitter discussing deliberations or punching a few words into Google to search for more information on a legal concept or a fact central to a case, jurors have the power to radically disrupt the judicial process at their fingertips.

Jurors’ use of the internet and social media during trial and deliberations can create a real toll on lawyers, litigants, and the judiciary. In fact, online activity by jurors recently has led to a mistrial in a $13 million police shooting case, a thrown-out fraud conviction, and a potential retrial for a notorious drug lord.

Judges often employ explicit instructions and the threat of contempt to dissuade jurors from googling the parties or trial lawyers, conducting independent research online, or posting about the trial or their deliberations on social media. Many then hold jurors in contempt when they deliberately disobey instructions. Judges have fined jurors anywhere from $500 to $1,200 for their online activity that disrupts a trial or verdict, and some states have flirted with legislation to increase penalties. In the United Kingdom, judges may jail jurors based on their internet use, in one case for two months when a juror googled additional information about the victims in a fraud case and shared it with fellow jurors.

Because more than 80 percent of Americans own smart phones and the average American spends at least 3 hours a day online, it is a tall order to prevent jurors from googling or tweeting. As a result, attorneys should vigorously monitor jurors’ social media from voir dire through the final verdict. As noted below, it even may be part of attorneys’ professional duty of competence to ensure that they are keeping a close eye on jurors’ Twitter feeds.

  1. Attorneys Must Be More Tech-Competent Than Before

Lawyers also must keep up with other technological changes that impact the practice of law.

Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the American Bar Association (ABA), a version of which has been adopted in 49 states, lawyers have a duty to provide competent representation to their clients and to maintain the knowledge and skills that their practice requires. In 2012, the ABA took the significant step of formally updating the rule to clarify that lawyers also have a duty to be competent in technology.

The new comment to the rules states that, “to maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.” Since that change, 37 states have adopted the ABA’s Duty of Technology Competence as part of their version of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Illinois, Michigan, New York, and Texas.

While the duty is clear, it’s not clear just what technology the rule refers to. While most agree that the duty includes basic competence in everyday technologies like e-mail and Microsoft Office, it has been left to individual jurisdictions and professional organizations to provide further guidance.

For example, the New York City Bar Association has suggested that attorneys have an affirmative duty to research potential jurors’ public social media information (see New York City Bar Association Formal Opinion 2012-02). While the research can help identify biases harmful to a client’s interests, lawyers must carefully avoid any direct contact with potential jurors online (via message or friend request) lest they violate other ethical rules. Juror consulting firms have stepped in with advanced tools to search and compile potential juror’s publicly available posts. But the onus is ultimately on the lawyer to ensure they are protecting their client’s interests by doing all they can to identify biased jurors.

Further, the duty of technology competence may affect an attorney’s obligation to protect clients’ confidential information from cybersecurity risk and to use appropriate electronic discovery practices and technology. These duties were at the center of a recent data breach, where lawyers disclosed confidential customer information in an e-discovery production because the lawyer did not understand the review process or the scope of the third-party vendor’s work. Further, in California, a state that has not adopted the ABA’s Duty of Technology Competence, the state bar has issued an ethics opinion stating that an attorney’s duty of competence requires, “at a minimum, a basic understanding of, and facility with, issues related to e-discovery.”

As technology continues to change at a rapid pace and impact the practice of law, clients will expect their lawyers to pay attention. To that end, lawyers must be competent in a range of technologies directly related to the practice of law.

These are just some of the most notable ways that technology is changing the practice of law. As technology continues to advance, the practice will continue to evolve with it. Lawyers should – and may be ethically obligated – to stay abreast of and develop competence in these technologies.

© 2019 Schiff Hardin LLP

For more on legal field developments, see the National Law Review Law Office Management page.

New York Times v. Sullivan Supreme Court Decision and its Impact on Libel Law: the Case, the Context and the Consequences

Aimee Edmondson, Ph.D. and Associate Professor and Director for Graduate Studies at Ohio University, has recently published a new book, In Sullivan’s Shadow on the landmark libel US Supreme Court case New York Times v. Sullivan. In the current contentious climate where even the weather has become a political topic, and with President Trump courting a combative relationship with the news media, this case from the Civil Rights Era (1964) has a new resonance. It seems appropriate to re-examine the case, the historical context surrounding it, and why it still matters today.

The following are the facts of this case. In the early ’60s, the New York Times (NYT) published a full-page advertisement by the supporters of Martin Luther King, Jr, criticizing the Montgomery Alabama police, and specifically L.B. Sullivan, the Montgomery Police commissioner, for the department’s mistreatment of Civil Rights protesters. Sullivan sued the paper for defamation, and the trial court ruled in his favor. The NYT appealed to the Supreme Court in Alabama, which affirmed, and then the NYT appealed to the U.S Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case and returned a unanimous decision 9-0, that the underlying decisions violated the First Amendment. This 1964 Supreme Court landmark decision is foundational in support of the First Amendment’s right of freedom of the press and ultimately demonstrates that the freedom of speech protections in the First Amendment restrict the ability of public officials to sue for defamation. This decision also created the “actual malice” standard, which required that the publication of false or erroneous information had to be done with actual intent to harm the public figure.

Libel litigation has really kicked up in recent years. While the “actual malice” standard is still firmly in place, a few high-profile libel actions have pressed forward. A few examples are the following: Sarah Palin suing the NYT; the Covington Catholic students, specifically Nicholas Sandmann and his ultimately dismissed lawsuit against the Washington Post (WP); and former Sheriff Joseph Arpaio’s lawsuit against the NYT and editorial writer Michelle Cottle which was also dismissed. Additionally, Trump frequently uses his Twitter feed to proclaim that libel suits “are out of reach” but continues to threaten libel action when unflattering press is published. To be clear, his threats have remained threats; to this date, he has not filed lawsuits regarding libel.

With this history and cultural context in mind, I am very grateful that Professor Edmondson took the time to speak with me regarding the state of libel litigation in the United States.

The NLR: The Sullivan case dates back to the ’60s and came out of the Civil Rights Movement when the NYT was sued by the Montgomery, Alabama police commissioner, L.B. Sullivan. Why is this precedent especially relevant now?

Sullivan is relevant for at least these three reasons.

First, journalism faces tough challenges. Local print journalism is withering. The president of the United States has launched an assault on news media. And manipulators, some of them foreign, are abusing technology with fakery and confusion. As the free press struggles, our Republic is well served by existing protection again libel abuse.

Second, we as a nation go to great lengths to protect free speech, even unpopular and hateful expression. The Supreme Court recently ruled that the government could not deny vulgar trademarks citing the First Amendment (Iancu v. Brunetti, decided June 24, 2019). Citizens who chant “send her back” at a Trump rally are protected. Journalists who cover controversy likewise should be protected from libel abuse.

When the nation’s Founders gathered to amend the Constitution through the Bill of Rights, they positioned freedom of speech and the free press side-by-side, as complementary. As we protect free speech, we also should protect the free press.

Third, the abuse of libel is an instinctive default position of authority facing criticism. When authority is irritated by the message, it can seek ways to injure or chill the messenger. America should guard against abuse of libel. Justice William Brennan wrote in the 1964 landmark Sullivan case that, left unchecked, abuse of libel can “threaten the very existence of an American press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold enough to criticize the conduct of public officials.”

In this era of divided citizenry, profound technological changes, and nervousness about the future, Sullivan is perhaps more relevant because it checks the misuse of libel.

The NLR:  Based on your research of libel prior to Sullivan, what can you tell us about the use and abuse of libel before Sullivan?

In the Jim Crow South, libel was weaponized against the press and individuals who challenged the racial status quo. The Sullivan case was the culmination of an onslaught of libel claims designed to brake progress, silence criticism, and bankrupt agents of change as the civil rights movement was gaining momentum.

The intersection of libel, race, and journalism can be tracked to the early years of our nation. In 1830, abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison was indicted in Baltimore for publishing a newspaper report of 75 enslaved people shipped from Baltimore to New Orleans. He was locked up for 49 days in part for criticizing the institution of slavery. Garrison’s lawyer, Charles Mitchell of Baltimore, described libel abuse as an “engine of tyranny.”

My book primarily focuses on civil rights-era libel litigation, mainly, but not exclusively, in the South. Chapter One is set in Los Angeles. The local Klan sued the African American editor-publisher of the California Eagle in 1925 after the newspaper published a Klan strategy memo on how to manipulate black voters in Watts. The judge ruled in favor of the paper, concluding that the Klan document, which had been handed over to police and then to journalists, was privileged. (In court, the Klan said the paper was fake.)

The win-loss record of libel cases was mixed before Sullivan was taken up by the nation’s high court. Defendants settled some cases to avoid expense and exposure. Some judges ruled that truth was a defense against libel claims.

Regardless of the legal outcomes, the pile-on of libel lawsuits against the press and civil rights leaders was draining financially. For example, Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth was a named defendant in the Sullivan case, even though he didn’t know that his name appeared in the full-page ad in NYT that prompted Sullivan’s lawsuit. Alabama courts awarded Commissioner Sullivan $500,000, a record-high judgment at the time. While the case was on appeal, authorities seized Reverend Shuttlesworth’s Plymouth, which brought $400 at auction to help pay the judgment. Land owned by three other ministers who also were defendants was sold at auction for $4,350.

By the time the U.S. Supreme Court heard the Sullivan case, there was plenty of evidence in multiple jurisdictions showing that libel abuse was weighing on the First Amendment.

The NLR: After the Sullivan ruling in 1964, the press went on to break some fairly fantastic stories. I am thinking about Watergate, in the early ’70s, specifically. What were the implications of Sullivan regarding press coverage of civil rights, Vietnam, Watergate, and other contentious news?

Yes. My colleague Christopher B. Daly at Boston University (author of “Covering America”) makes the profound point that Americans need a free and robust press in wartime and peacetime. He cites coverage of the Pentagon Papers, the My Lai Massacre, and the Abu Ghraib torture scandal.

I close my book by pointing out that Sullivan freed the press to ramp up its watchdog reporting on a wide range of issues. The press’ scrutiny must continue as a cornerstone of our democratic tradition.

Balancing police authority/public safety with respect for individual freedoms and free expression was at the core of much of the libel litigation before and after Sullivan. The Sullivan case at its heart was about criticism of police brutality against civil rights protesters in Montgomery, Alabama, which was a cradle of the Confederacy during the Civil War. As a result of Sullivan, today’s public criticism of law enforcement, such as press coverage of  “Hands up, don’t shoot,” and “I can’t breathe” are not actionable libel claims.

The NLR: Earlier this year, Justice Clarence Thomas suggested that the Supreme Court should take a look at Sullivan, after 55 years, to modify the standard on actual malice. The rest of the Court did not voice similar sentiments. What point is Justice Thomas making/what is on his mind, and do you think the Court will revisit libel anytime soon?

Justice Thomas often treads his own path in the area of First Amendment law. He is a noted defender of advertising (commercial speech), questioning why it should be more heavily regulated than other types of speech, even political speech. He has questioned laws that regulate political contributions, and strongly supported less government regulation of street and lawn signs. However, he has opposed free speech protections for high school students and prisoners.

I see Sullivan as a civil rights case as well as a libel case. How ironic that Justice Thomas, the only African-American on the Supreme Court, is calling for a retreat on civil rights-era protections in Sullivan. He made this remark in a concurring opinion released early this year when the court turned down an appeal from Kathrine McKee, who accused Bill Cosby of sexual assault. She sued Cosby for libel after his lawyers called her dishonest (McKee v. Cosby). As Justice Thomas says:

New York Times and the Court’s decisions extending it were policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law. Instead of simply applying the First Amendment as it was understood by the people who ratified it, the Court fashioned its own “‘federal rule[s]’” by balancing the “competing values at stake in defamation suits.” (quoting Gertz v. Welch and Sullivan). We should not continue to reflexively apply this policy-driven approach to the Constitution. Instead, we should carefully examine the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. If the Constitution does not require public figures to satisfy an actual-malice standard in state-law defamation suits, then neither should we.

As you noted in your question, Thomas’ colleagues on the Supreme Court have not publicly joined his push to roll back Sullivan. I do not expect that Court will revisit Sullivan immediately. But predicting what the Court will do is virtually impossible. Sometimes, the seeds planted by a single justice, like Thomas’ remarks about Sullivan, yield results later.

Generally, critics say Sullivan stacks the deck against the plaintiff, that actual malice is an impossible standard, and the press should not have license to run amuck.

The NLR: Sullivan set the standard pretty high for public officials seeking to win libel claims, they have to show “actual malice.” Does this, and other existing protections of the press, make it virtually impossible to win a libel claim?

Journalists are not totally protected from libel suits, nor should they be. Truth is the ultimate defense in a libel suit. If reporters get it wrong, certainly there can be ramifications.

If reporters get it wrong and the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the reporters may lose a libel case if actual malice is proven in court. Actual malice is publishing content that is knowingly wrong, or journalists should have known it was incorrect.

After a 15-day trial, a jury in New York awarded $75,000 in damages to Barry Goldwater, the Republican nominee for president in 1964 (Goldwater v. Ginzburg). A federal appeals court affirmed the outcome in 1969, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. Ralph Ginzburg, publisher of Fact magazine, ran an article that said Goldwater was paranoid, unfit for office, and troubled by “intense anxiety about his manhood.” This unflattering claim was based on a survey mailed to psychiatrists. Some of the respondents had warned that psychological evaluations must take place in clinical settings, but Ginzburg published anyway. He cited the Sullivan case when Goldwater took him to court, to no avail.

Rolling Stone settled multiple libel claims after retracting its 2014 story of gang rape at a University of Virginia fraternity. The flawed 9,000-word article portrayed an associate dean as “chief villain” of the incident. She won a $3 million verdict in court and then settled. Rolling Stone settled with the fraternity for $1.65 million, and also settled with members of the fraternity.

In June, a jury in Ohio awarded $44.4 million in punitive and compensatory damages to family-owned Gibson’s Bakery to be paid by Oberlin College (Gibson’s Bakery v. Oberlin College). Bakery owners said the college defamed and harmed their business after a shoplifting incident. “Even a college as influential as Oberlin,” noted conservative blogger Cornell Law Professor William Jacobson, “may be held accountable for its actions in a court of law.”

The NLR: What has candidate Donald Trump/President Trump said about libel?

In 2016 in Fort Worth, Texas, then-candidate Trump took aim at libel laws directly: “One of the things I’m going to do if I win, and I hope we do and we’re certainly leading. I’m going to open up our libel laws so when they write purposely negative and horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money. We’re going to open up those libel laws. So when The New York Times and Washington Post . . . writes a hit piece, we can sue them and win money instead of having no chance of winning because they are totally protected.”

President Trump lamented in 2018 that “totally false” reports are out of reach of libel law:

Trump Tweet

Trump has threatened libel action against both the media and individuals. For example, candidate Trump threatened to sue NYT in 2016 after NYT’S publication containing claims by women of his alleged inappropriate touching. In response, a NYT attorney said if Trump thinks “the law of this land forces us and those who would dare to criticize him to stand silent or be punished, we welcome the opportunity to have a court set him straight.”

Trump did not sue.

Threatening libel action is part of Trump’s broader effort, aimed at his voter base and the electorate, to de-legitimize the press.

The NLR: Defamation-libel litigation is very active lately. What are today’s courts saying about libel?

Legal outcomes vary because circumstances vary. There is significant activity on libel, in state and federal courts, showcasing the durability of the legal standard set more than a half-century ago in Sullivan.

The Sullivan standard resonates throughout the 11-page opinion dismissing former Sheriff Joseph Arpaio’s lawsuit against NYT and editorial writer Michelle Cottle. “Because plaintiff has failed to plead actual malice, his false light claim must fail as well,” wrote US District Court Judge Amit P. Mehta (District of Columbia) in a decision issued August 9, 2019. Arpaio was longtime sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, before running for Congress in 2018. After Arpaio lost in the primary, NYT published an opinion piece by Cottle criticizing the sheriff’s treatment of immigrants (“he was so much more than a run-of-the-mill immigrant basher”). Arpaio, a public figure, claimed the column harmed his reputation and his chances to run for the U.S. Senate in 2020. The judge said Arpaio’s complaint “comes nowhere close to pleading sufficient facts that plausible establish ‘actual malice.’” (Arpaio v Cottle, August 9, 2019). This case is remarkably similar to the multiple libel suits filed by legendary southern lawman Lawrence Rainey, a former Neshoba County, Mississippi sheriff who sued multiple journalists and even Orion Pictures for his depiction in the film, Mississippi Burning, in 1989.

Current libel claims highlight the inflation in the amount of damages sought by plaintiffs. In the early 1960s, Sullivan (as well as then Alabama Governor John Patterson) sued NYT for $500,000. In 1982, General William Westmoreland sued CBS for $120 million regarding a Vietnam documentary (Westmoreland settled during the trial, ending the case without payment, retraction, or apology from CBS).

This year, a high school student from Kentucky sued WP for $250 million, the purchase price of the newspaper when Amazon founder Jeff Bezos bought it in 2013. On July 26, U.S. District Court Judge William O. Bertelsman (Eastern District of Kentucky) dismissed the case (Nicholas Sandmann v. The Washington Post). Publication of opinion is not actionable libel, the judge concluded. This case involved coverage of Sandmann’s encounter with Native American activist Nathan Phillips on the National Mall on January 19, 2019.

“The Court accepts Sandmann’s statement that, when he was standing motionless in the confrontation with Phillips, his intent was to calm the situation and to not impede or block anyone”, the judge said. “However, Phillips did not see it that way. He concluded that he was being ‘blocked’ and not allowed to ‘retreat.’ He passed these conclusions on to The Post. They may have been erroneous, but . . . they are opinion protected by the First Amendment. The Post is not liable for publishing these opinions.”

Days after the Sandmann case was dismissed in federal court, eight of Sandmann’s classmates (“John Does 1 through 8”) from Covington Catholic High School in Park Hills, Kentucky, filed a defamation suit in state court against 12 individuals. Defendants include two members of Congress, comic Kathy Griffin, and a batch of commentators and journalists.

Also, in August, a federal appeals court reinstated Sarah Palin’s defamation suit against NYT. Therefore, a court will consider whether a NYT editorial on gun violence exhibited “actual malice” against Palin, a former vice presidential candidate.

The NLR: You’ve raised some excellent points. How does all of this fit together?  What are we to make of this landscape in today’s contentious and media-saturated environment?

Truth-seeking is a primary mission of journalism. News reporting inspires debate. Reporting controversy does not constitute libel. Publication of malicious, reckless, falsehood is actionable libel.

Newsgathering is an ongoing process, as events evolve. Courts appear to understand this dynamic, with the media’s constant deadlines, and do not view updating as a story evolves as actual malice. It’s quite the opposite. We write what we know to be the truth as we know it.

It’s important to note that Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Sullivan protected even false information, as long as that information was published by accident (without actual malice). Later libel cases built on Sullivan with the U.S. Supreme Court declaring that “pure opinion” is also constitutionally protected speech (Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Company). The First Amendment, then, ensures that free speech isn’t “chilled” and thus clears the way for journalists to write about fast-moving and-or controversial issues without fear of costly libel litigation.

As we ponder the big picture, let’s remember Justice Louis Brandeis’ time-honored advice: “the answer to bad speech is more speech, not ‘enforced silence.’”

The NLR: Many thanks to Dr. Edmondson for her insights and useful examples on this important and timely matter.

Copyright ©2019 National Law Forum, LLC

For more freedom of speech issues, see the Constitutional Law page on the National Law Review.

What are Consumers Claiming in Juul Lawsuits?

Within the past decade, regular tobacco users have turned to electronic cigarettes in an effort to wean off of traditional cigarettes, believing them to be a safer option for human health. E-cigarettes, also known as nicotine vaporizers, vaporizer cigarettes, or simply vape pens, have grown in popularity over the past several years, partially driven by the debut of Juul’s e-cig devices in 2015. Now, Juul Labs is a leading manufacturer of e-cigarette devices and e-liquid flavors nationwide. Despite its growing popularity, especially among teens and young adults, Juul has been at the center of several consumer legal battles, most of which allege that Juul’s e-cig devices are extremely detrimental to users’ health. Several suits have been filed by parents or guardians on behalf of teenage children.

Several consumers have accused Juul Labs of deliberately marketing its products to appeal to the younger generation. A lawsuit recently filed by the father of a Carmel, Indiana teen in the U.S. District Court in Indianapolis alleged that his son was enticed by the rainbow colors and fruity flavors of Juul’s e-cigarette products, which contained excessive levels of nicotine. The teen later developed an intense nicotine addiction and fears that his addiction may lead to health problems throughout his life.

Other suits have similarly claimed that Juul specifically targets underage markets with its presence on several social media platforms and use of online influencers to attract teen users.

This is not the first attack against Juul’s advertising practices. Stanford University researchers evaluated Juul’s marketing campaigns over its first three years on the market, and the resulting impact on teens and young adults, in a January 2019 study.

By analyzing Juul’s website, social media platforms, hashtags, and customer campaign emails, the researchers concluded that, “Juul’s advertising imagery in its first [six] months on the market was patently youth oriented.” Though Juul representatives have repeatedly denied that the company intentionally targets a younger generation in its marketing, the study revealed how Juul, “continued to engage in advertising either targeted to youth…or by placing its promotional material preferentially in youth consumed media channels…”

Juul lawsuits have also been filed in response to defective vape batteries and device explosions. Juul’s e-cigarette products are operated by lithium-ion batteries, which can allegedly overheat and explode. In several instances, vape explosions have damaged users’ mouths, hands, and other body parts, causing burns, broken jaws, and even deaths. Treacy Gangi, for example, filed a lawsuit in November 2017 on behalf of her husband who was killed by an exploding e-cigarette, similar to a Juul device.

Another lawsuit recently filed by an Ohio mother on behalf of her two teen daughters claimed that Juul failed to warn its customers of the high levels of nicotine in its devices. The complaint stated that the two twin daughters, who are now 16 years old, began vaping in 2016 and initially purchased the devices in a store that “knowingly sold e-cigarettes to underage customers.” The teens quickly became addicted to their e-cigarettes and were eventually vaping two Juul pods a day. According to the lawsuit, one Juul pod contains the same amount of nicotine as two packs of cigarettes.

Similar lawsuits have claimed that in addition to containing excessive levels of nicotine, Juul products are advertised as being a healthier alternative to traditional cigarettes. Recent cases, however, have shown that vaping Juul e-cigarettes is linked to a number of health conditions, including heart disease, lung damage, and seizures. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is inspecting the recent hospitalizations of more than 149 individuals whose health problems are linked to vaping. The patients, who are predominantly teens and young adults, reportedly developed severe lung illnesses that have been associated with vaping.

According to recent cases, vaping also puts users at risk of experiencing seizures, which is a known symptom of nicotine poisoning. The FDA has received about 127 reports of seizures linked to vaping since 2010, and issued a warning about the potential correlation between vaping and seizures (convulsions) in April 2019.

Amid a lack of research and information on the health risks of using e-cigarettes, an Illinois patient was reportedly the first to die of a lung illness that was associated with vaping. Health experts say that more research needs to be done in order to understand the health implications of vaping, before other users face a similar fate.

Copyright © 2019 Katy Moncivais, Ph.D.

For more on vaping related litigation see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

New York’s New Child Victims Act Expands Opportunity for Filing Abuse Claims and The Path for Victims’ Justice

This week, a one-year “revival” period of statute of limitations began for individuals who assert civil claims of child abuse to file claims against institutions and individuals pursuant to New York’s Child Victims Act, even if those claims had already expired and/or were dismissed because they were filed late. The premise behind the Child Victims Act is that children are often prevented from disclosing abuse due to the social, psychological and emotional trauma they experience.

Additionally, the  Child Victims Act, also expands the statute of limitations for bringing criminal claims against alleged perpetrators of child sexual abuse, and  permits alleged victims of these crimes to file civil lawsuits up until they reach age 55. This aspect of the legislation will have a significant impact on the volume of criminal cases, and even more so civil lawsuits, 385 of which were filed in the first hours of the revival period, with hundreds more geared up for filing in the upcoming weeks and months. Indeed, the New York State court system has set aside 45 judges specifically to handle the expected crush of cases.

Institutional Changes Following the New Child Victim’s Act

Religious, educational and other institutions that are committed to providing a safe environment for children should be thinking about how they can implement safeguards against child abuse within their institutions. An important step is keeping internal lines of communication with staff and families open, as well as educating staff and leadership as to their reporting obligations under New York law and on how to provide appropriate support if child abuse is suspected.

The Child Victims Act joins the Sex Harassment Bill also signed into law by Gov. Cuomo as significant changes by New York Legislators involving sexual abuse and harassment in New York State.

©2019 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Case Closed?: Not Quite Yet, But Serial TCPA Litigator Testing Court’s Patience

Well, no one can say that he did not get his day in Court.

Plaintiff Ewing, a serial TCPA litigator who filed yet another case assigned to Judge Battaglia, narrowly escaped dismissal of all his claims, and was permitted leave to amend for a second time.  See Stark v. Stall, Case No. 19-CV-00366-AJB-NLS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132814 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2019).  But in the process, the Judge called attention to the Plaintiff’s unprofessional conduct in an earlier case, ruled that he failed to name a necessary party, and found that he inadequately plead the existence of an agency relationship between the defendant and the necessary party that he had failed to join in the lawsuit.

At the outset, the court dismissed the claim brought by co-plaintiff Stark, as the Complaint contained no allegations that any wrongful telephone calls were placed to that particular individual.

In 2015, Ewing had already been put on notice of the local rules of professionalism and their applicability to him, despite his status as a pro se litigator.  Thus, the Court easily granted defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s allegations to the effect that defendant had made a “derogatory remark” simply by pointing out that he was designated as a vexatious litigator.

The two most important pieces of the case for TCPAWorld are the Court’s rulings about Plaintiff’s failure to join a necessary defendant and his insufficient allegations to establish vicarious liability.

Plaintiff had failed to name as a defendant the entity (US Global) that allegedly made the calls to him.  The court determined that this company is a necessary party that must be added in order for the court to afford complete relief among the parties.  We often see situations where only a caller but not a seller, creditor, employer, franchisor, etc. are named, or vice versa, so it is encouraging to see courts strictly enforce Federal Rule 15 in the TCPA context.

The court further held that the relationship between Defendant and US Global was not such that Defendant could be held liable for violations of the TCPA that were committed by US Global.  While Plaintiff made unsubstantiated allegations that an agency relationship existed, the Court treated these as merely legal conclusions and granted dismissal based on insufficient allegations of facts to establish a plausible claim that there is a common-law agency relationship between Defendant and US Global.  Simply stated, the bare allegation that Defendant had the ability to control some aspects of the caller’s activity was insufficient to establish control for purposes of TCPA vicarious liability principles.

Plaintiff’s amended pleading is due on August 31—anticipating another round of motion practice, we will track any further developments in this case.

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more TCPA cases, see the Communications, Media & Internet law page on the National Law Review.