Tag: legal

Mass. Appeals Court Declares Winner in Longstanding Land-Use Dispute Between Northeastern University and Town of Nahant

The Nahant Preservation Trust, the town of Nahant, and certain Nahant residents have suffered another loss in their years-long legal battle to stop Northeastern University from expanding its Marine Science Center, located on East Point in Nahant. The Massachusetts Appeals Court recently affirmed the dismissal of the legal actions, finding that the plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of proving that Northeastern dedicated the 12 acres of land at issue to the public for use as an ecological preserve.

The dispute – and the Appeals Court decision – required an analysis of the “public dedication doctrine” to determine whether the land was subject to Article 97 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. Art. 97 provides, in part, that property “taken or acquired” for conservation purposes “shall not be used for other purposes” without approval by a two-thirds vote of each branch of the state legislature. In Nahant Preservation Trust v. Northeastern University (pdf), the Appeals Court concluded that the land at issue is not subject to Art. 97.

Land is dedicated to a public purpose when the landowner’s intent to do so is clear and unequivocal, and when the public accepts the dedication by actually using the land for the public purpose. In 2017, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), in Smith v. City of Westfield, expanded the reach of Art. 97 by concluding that municipal parkland may be protected even if not officially taken or acquired, as long as it was “designated” for an Art. 97 purpose.

The Nahant dispute arose when Northeastern announced plans to expand its Marine Science Center located on a peninsula known as East Point. The plaintiffs contended that Northeastern had permanently dedicated the 12 undeveloped acres of its land to the public for use as an ecological preserve and for passive recreation. Therefore, they argued, the land was subject to Art. 97 and the project could not proceed without legislative approval. The plaintiffs compiled and presented to the superior court judge a substantial record, including historical documents concerning Northeastern’s acquisition of the land, which had been used for military purposes by the United States Army and Navy in the 1940s and 1050s. The evidence also included documents that reflected the Town of Nahant’s decision in 1964 not to acquire the property, despite the conservation commission’s desire to have at least a scenic pathway along the shoreline of the property.

Although the summary judgment record contained conflicting evidence regarding the extent of public access and use of Northeastern’s property by town residents, the courts accepted that some town residents had used the area for general recreation over the years. There was evidence that Northeastern had permitted some recreational use of the land. The Appeals Court noted in its decision, however, that the plaintiffs must prove that the disputed land was actually dedicated to the public.

In rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments, the Appeals Court stated that the public dedication doctrine requires a property owner’s acts and declarations to be “deliberate, unequivocal and decisive, manifesting a clear intention permanently to abandon his property to the specific public use.” The Court noted that the SJC’s finding in Smith that there had been a dedication was based on an acceptance of Federal funds to rehabilitate a playground with the proviso that the city was surrendering its ability to convert the playground to a use other than public outdoor recreation.

The Appeals Court parsed the evidence on which the plaintiffs relied to demonstrate that Northeastern had “clearly and unequivocally” intended to dedicate the disputed land to the public. The plaintiffs pointed to the public’s use of the land as evidence of Northeastern’s intent to dedicate the property. Citing precedent from 1873 to Smith, the Appeals Court stated that “public use, alone, is not enough to prove a public dedication, particularly in circumstances like those present [in Nahant].”

Based on its review of the extensive summary judgment record, in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Appeals Court concluded that the plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of proving that Northeastern dedicated the 12 acres at issue to the public for use as an ecological preserve. It appears that Northeastern may finally proceed with its plans announced in 2018 to build a new research facility at its Marine Science Center in Nahant.

©2024 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.

by: Michelle N. O’Brien of Pierce Atwood LLP

For more news on Environmental Land Dedication Disputes , visit the NLR Environmental, Energy, & Resources section.

Prayers for Religious Holiday Time Off May Need to be Accommodated by Employers

Knowing several religious holidays are coming up soon, employers can take steps to avoid triggering religious discrimination and reasonable accommodation lawsuits. Consistently applying paid time off rules can help to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and religious reasonable accommodation claims.

Quick Hits

  • Private and public employers with fifteen or more workers must accommodate reasonable requests from workers to observe religious holidays (pursuant to federal law; however, state law coverage varies and might only require one or more workers).
  • Employers may avoid confusion by clearly stating leave policies and company holidays in the employee handbook.
  • Employers can use online systems or software to detect patterns in approving or denying requests for leave on religious holidays.

With many religious holidays taking place in the next two months, employers are likely to see many requests for time off for religious celebrations.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against workers for practicing their religion unless the worker’s religious practice cannot reasonably be accommodated without an undue hardship to the business. If a manager approves holiday leave requests from Christian employees, but rejects holiday leave requests from Muslim or Jewish employees, that could raise the risk of religious discrimination lawsuits. Additionally, some states, including California, also prohibit religious discrimination and require reasonable accommodation.

In June 2023, in Groff v. DeJoy, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that employers cannot legally deny a valid religious accommodation request, unless they can show a substantial burden from a proposed religious accommodation. In Groff, an evangelical Christian postal worker sued the U.S. Postal Service for failing to accommodate his request to not work on Sundays for religious reasons. The Supreme Court held in favor of the postal worker and remanded the case to lower courts.

This decision raised the bar for employers to invoke an undue hardship defense. A de minimiscost is no longer enough to demonstrate an undue burden. If an employee holds a sincere religious belief or practice that conflicts with a workplace policy or staffing schedule, then the employer must engage in an interactive process to see whether an accommodation can be made without substantially interfering with its overall business operations.

Some workplaces, including in the healthcare, hospitality, and transportation industries, require staffing 24/7 every day. In that situation, it may be possible to coordinate schedules so that leave requests can be honored for religious holidays. For example, non-Jewish employees may agree to work during Jewish holidays, and non-Muslim workers may agree to work during Muslim holidays. And, then, those employees might cover gaps in staffing caused by time off for Christian holidays. Compliance with the religious accommodation laws contemplates this type of interactive process and teamwork to find an appropriate solution.

If this type of shift-swapping is not possible or practical, it may be helpful for an employer to document why that is the case.

Next Steps

Employers may wish to review their religious accommodation request procedures, leave policies, scheduling process, and related practices to ensure that managers do not engage in religious discrimination when they approve or deny leave requests. In addition, employers may wish to train managers to apply all of the time off rules consistently.

These holidays are upcoming:

  • The Jewish holidays Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur fall on October 3, 2024, and October 12, 2024, respectively. Hanukkah will be celebrated December 25 through January 2, 2025.
  • The Hindu holiday Diwali falls on November 4, 2024.
  • The Buddhist holiday Bodhi Day falls on December 8, 2024.
  • The Christian holiday Christmas Day falls on December 25, 2024.
© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

Recent Federal Strike Force Prosecutions Serve as Warning to U.S. Manufacturers and Other Exporters

The recent enforcement activities of the newest federal strike force serve as a warning to U.S. manufacturers and other businesses involved in the export of products that the government is doubling down on prosecuting trade violations. The expressed mission of the multi-agency Disruptive Technology Strike Force (Strike Force) is “to counter efforts by hostile nation states to illicitly acquire sensitive U.S. technology to advance their authoritarian regimes and facilitate human rights abuses.” The latest Strike Force criminal indictments focus on technology such as:

  • Aerospace and defense source code,
  • Aircraft components,
  • Microelectronic components used in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
  • Laser welding machinery.

There is every reason to expect that the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) future targets will extend beyond the kind of individual defendants who have been the focus of the 24 criminal indictments to date and include legitimate companies whose compliance program deficiencies allow the illicit exports to occur. Ensuring that a company’s trade compliance program meets or exceeds the expressed standards of the DOJ and the Department of Commerce (DOC) is now more essential than ever.

Compliance Keys

  • Exposure Risk for Manufacturers and Distributors. The export-diversion schemes prosecuted to date share a common element—a bad actor sought to exploit innocent U.S. manufacturers and distributors by misrepresenting their identity and end-use plans or by seeking to compromise the manufacturer’s computer systems. As U.S. export controls (particularly those aimed at Russia and China) have expanded over the past several years, schemes like those alleged in these indictments have proliferated. Failing to be alert for the warning signs of such schemes may expose a company to becoming a victim of sanctions evaders or, worse, an enforcement target for ignoring red flags. The Export Administration Regulations prohibit companies from engaging in a transaction with the knowledge that a violation has occurred or will occur. “Knowledge” is not limited to actual knowledge; it can also be inferred from turning a blind eye to red flags in a transaction. As a result, having personnel trained to identify and respond appropriately to red flags suggesting that diversion could be occurring can be crucial to avoiding export violations.
  • Precautions to Detect and Prevent Imposter Schemes.
    • First, a written risk-based export control compliance plan can be a valuable aid in detecting diversion schemes and other illicit behavior. Such plans detail procedures employees must follow for conducting diligence on new and existing customers and transactions, evaluating when export licenses are required for a transaction, and detecting and responding to red flags. They provide clear guidance on when and how to escalate potential issues. Such a compliance plan gives employees the tools to help them identify when their company may be facing a diversion scheme and how to respond appropriately before a transaction is executed.
    • Second, companies can emphasize conducting “know your customer” (KYC) diligence on transactions. The importance of such diligence is heightened when new customers are involved, when business with an existing company is expanding to new products, or to involve new product destinations. The DOC has published extensive guidance on KYC diligence (often in conjunction with other U.S. government agencies and with enforcement authorities in allied countries). This week, the DOC and export control authorities from the other G7 countries issued new guidance that identifies items most likely to be the subject of diversion efforts by Russia, lists common red flags suggesting potential export control and sanctions evasion in a transaction, and suggests some diligence best practices to prevent diversion and evasion. This new guidance echoes similar guidance issued by U.S. and allied government agencies over the last two years for detecting diversion schemes in the current environment of export controls and sanctions regarding Russia and China. (For example, our summary of the joint guidance issued last year by export-control authorities in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand addressing 45 types of goods at high risk for diversion and recommended KYC diligence steps can be found here.) Companies should be tracking and incorporating, as appropriate, these guidance updates
    • Third, companies can be knowledgeable about the potential uses of their products and technology. This knowledge informs when and where a company may face diversion risk. Products and technology with permissible uses could be a target for diversion where they can be used for purposes the U.S. government restricts. For example, in one of the recent Strike Force cases, U.S. v. Postovoy, the alleged diversion scheme targeted a company whose microelectronic components could be used in drones and UAVs. Keeping U.S.-origin components out of such vehicles used by Russia in the war with Ukraine has been a major U.S. export control policy priority. Similarly, in another Strike Force case, U.S. v. Teslenko, the alleged diversion scheme targeted a company whose laser welders had applications that could aid Russia’s nuclear weapons program. Knowing the market for illicit uses for a company’s products and technology helps a company tailor its compliance efforts by identifying what products may be attractive to bad actors and what specific red flags may be of most concern regarding the company’s products and technology.
  • Cybersecurity Vigilance to Prevent Technology Theft. Another case announced alongside the Strike Force cases, U.S. v. Wei, is a reminder that U.S. manufacturers of sensitive technology face a multifront effort by foreign malign actors to gain access to that technology. In addition to ensuring up-to-date export controls and sanctions compliance programs, U.S. manufacturers should consider measures to protect their technology from misappropriation through cyber intrusion by implementing appropriate processes and tools to prevent and detect such activity by these actors. These processes and tools can include:
    • Regularly sharing cyber hygiene tips and training on current phishing schemes and conducting phishing tests to increase employee awareness of these risks,
    • Maintaining system hygiene by regularly scanning systems for vulnerabilities and unauthorized accounts, monitoring access logs for suspicious activity, and prohibiting automatic email forwarding to external addresses to prevent data leakage,
    • Installing a secure email gateway to filter out spam, malware, and phishing attempts and employing email authentication techniques (e.g., SPF, DKIM, and DMARC),
    • Tracking and monitoring all endpoints and mobile devices to detect suspicious activities and regularly auditing access logs to identify violations or attempted violations of access policies, and
    • Restricting administrative and privileged account access to minimize potential damage and limiting remote access to critical data and functions.

The Indictments

The six most recent indictments relating to the Strike Force’s efforts confirm that export control and sanctions compliance, particularly concerning Russia, China, and Iran, is a significant enforcement priority for the DOJ and other government agencies. As one Strike Force member stated, the DOJ, “through the work of the Strike Force, will continue to do all [it] can to prevent advanced technologies from falling into the hands of our adversaries and protect our national security.” These indictments and a related indictment announced simultaneously highlight the risks of manufacturers and distributors falling victim to schemes like those alleged in the indictments or becoming the focus of enforcement efforts for committing export control violations.

U.S. v. Postovoy. A Russian citizen living in the United States was indicted for conspiring to violate the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), to smuggle, launder money, and defraud the United States. After Russia invaded Ukraine, the individual used a series of companies he owned around the world to obtain and unlawfully export microelectronic components that could be used in drones and UAVs from the United States to Russia. The individual concealed and misstated end-user and destination information in communications with U.S.-based distributors.

U.S. v. Song. A Chinese national was indicted for wire fraud and aggravated identity theft in connection with attempts to obtain software and source code from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), research universities, and private companies. Over several years, the individual “spear phished” individuals at NASA, the Air Force, Navy, Army, and Federal Aviation Administration; research universities; and aerospace companies in an attempt to obtain code to which the individual suspected the victims had access. At all relevant times, the individual, who assumed the identities of persons known to the victims, was an employee of a Chinese state-owned aerospace and defense contractor.

U.S. v. Teslenko. A U.S. resident and a Russian national were indicted for smuggling and conspiracy to violate the ECRA, smuggle, and defraud the United States. For approximately six years, the individuals exported laser welding machines from one’s employer in the United States to a Russian company involved in Russia’s nuclear weapons program. The individuals falsified export documentation to conceal the end user.

U.S. v. Goodarzi. A dual U.S. and Iranian citizen was charged with smuggling UAV components to Iran from the United States. For four years, the individual obtained U.S.-originated parts and either transshipped them, typically through the United Arab Emirates or transported them in his own checked luggage during trips to Iran. The individual had acknowledged in numerous emails with U.S. suppliers that the parts could not be transferred to Iran because of sanctions. The individual also lacked the proper export license to send these items to a sanctioned country like Iran.

U.S. v. Nader. A dual U.S. and Iranian citizen was indicted for violating U.S. economic sanctions and other federal laws in connection with procuring U.S.-originated aircraft components for Iran’s armed forces. Customers in Iran placed orders with the individual, who, in turn, directly or through others, contacted U.S. companies for the components. The individual falsely identified himself or his U.S.-based company as the end user of the components. The individual attempted to export the components, including transshipment to Iran, on several occasions; however, DOC agents detained each export.

U.S. v. Wei. In addition to the above criminal cases brought through the work of the Strike Force, the DOJ announced the indictment of a Chinese national on charges of fraud, conspiracy, computer intrusion, and aggravated identity theft for unlawfully accessing the computer network of a U.S. telecommunications company. The individual—a member of the People’s Liberation Army—and co-conspirators accessed the company’s systems in 2017 and stole documents relating to communications devices, product development, testing plans, internal product evaluations, and competitive intelligence. The individual attempted to install malicious software to maintain access to the company’s systems; his access continued for approximately three months.

Copyright © 2024 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.
For more news on Export Regulations, visit the NLR Antitrust, Trade, & Regulation

Missouri Cannabis Regulators Show Me a Well-Considered Clarification of Earlier Rule Essentially Banning Hemp Products

I can only assume that being a cannabis regulator is a challenging and usually thankless job. The laws are relatively new and constantly evolving. Operators are always pushing the science faster than regulators can promulgate thoughtful new rules. And of course, there is no shortage of bad actors in the cannabis business.

That said, Budding Trends has been tough on cannabis regulators when it seemed warranted. And we’ve had no shortage of material.

We wanted to take this occasion to applaud the recent letter from the Missouri Department of Health & Senior Services announcing a substantial rollback of Gov. Mike Parson’s Executive Order that appeared to ban all “psychoactive cannabis products.”

The governor’s order would, by its terms, essentially destroy the state’s market for products containing hemp-derived THC. To be fair, the stated purpose of the order – to keep psychoactive cannabis products out of the hands of children – is a noble goal and one shared by any responsible operator in the hemp-derived THC business. Unfortunately, the plain language of the order goes much further and threatens to end the sale of most hemp products in Missouri.

In comes Missouri Department of Health & Senior Service Deputy Director and General Counsel Richard Moore to the rescue. In a recent letter, Moore “clarify[ied] any misunderstandings about the Department’s efforts to keep Missourians and their children safe from psychoactive cannabis products, sometimes called intoxicating cannabis products.” As part of this clarification, and in furtherance of the department’s commitment to “transparency in its enforcement efforts,” the department will limit its focus to (1) hemp-derived THC products targeting children and (2) “any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of [hemp-derived THC products].”

The department does not have any intention, however, of initiating enforcement actions against other hemp-derived THC products. Specifically, “[h]emp or cannabidiol (CBD) products which are collected by extraction and have not been changed into a new substance, such as hemp protein powders, hemp milk, hemp flower, hemp teas or other drinks, CBD gummies, CBD drink additives, or foods with CBD” are not the focus of the department’s enforcement efforts.

I believe this represents a fair compromise that accomplishes both the governor’s stated and worthwhile goals of eliminating deceptive hemp operators and those who would sell hemp-derived THC products to children, as well as keeping the hemp regime implemented by the Missouri Legislature in place.

More states would do well to consider this approach. For an example of the opposite approach, consider our recent post on Mississippi’s potential ban on hemp beverages. Consider, too, a much different approach taken by the solicitor general of South Carolina, which we will write about in the coming days.

And perhaps most importantly, consider whether Congress can fashion a similar compromise as it considers federal hemp policy in the next Farm Bill in the coming months.

© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more news on Hemp Derived THC Regulation, visit the NLR Biotech, Food & Drug.

Non-Compete Associated with Partial Sale of Business Must Be “Reasonable” To Be Enforced

Samuelian v. Life Generations Healthcare, LLC, 104 Cal. App. 5th 331 (2024)

Robert and Stephen Samuelian co-founded Life Generations Healthcare, LLC. When they sold a portion of the business, the company adopted a new operating agreement that restrained its members (including the Samuelians) from competing with the company. The Samuelians later filed a dispute in arbitration challenging the enforceability of the non-compete, contending that it was per se unenforceable pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600; in response, the company contended that the “reasonableness standard” (as set forth in Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 1130 (2020)) should be applied to determine the enforceability of the non-compete.

The arbitrator and the trial court agreed with the Samuelians and held that the agreement was per se unenforceable pursuant to Section 16600. In this opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Section 16600 only applies if the restrained party sells its entire business interest and that the statute does not apply “to partial sales after which an individual retains a significant interest in the business.” In the case of a partial sale, the Ixchel reasonableness standard applies to determine the enforceability of the noncompete. The court also held that the “sale of the business” exception to Section 16600 (Sections 16601, et seq.) only applies if there has been: (1) a sale of the entire business interest; and (2) a transfer of “some goodwill” as part of the transaction. The opinion also contains a detailed discussion of members’ fiduciary duties in a manager-managed company under the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA) and holds that an operating agreement can impose reasonable non-compete restrictions on members of a manager-managed company.

© 2024 Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more news on the Enforceability of Non-competes, visit the NLR Antitrust Trade Regulation section.

The Fifth Circuit Confirms the DOL’s Authority to Use Salary Basis Test for FLSA Overtime Exemptions

On September 11, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mayfield v. U.S. Department of Labor confirmed that the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) has the authority to use a salary basis to define its white-collar overtime exemptions. This is a significant win for the DOL as it is presently defending its latest increase to the minimum salary thresholds for executive, administrative, and professional exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), also known as the FLSA’s “white-collar exemptions,” in litigation pending in the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern and Northern Districts of Texas.

The Mayfield Decision

In Mayfield, a unanimous three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit provided that the DOL has the authority to “define and delimit” an exemption from overtime pay under the FLSA. In so ruling, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit initiated by a Texas fast-food operator, Robert Mayfield, who claimed Congress never authorized the DOL to use salaries as a test for whether workers have managerial duties.

The Court rejected Mayfield’s argument. In response, the Fifth Circuit wrote that “[d]istinctions based on salary level are… consistent with the FLSA’s broader structure, which sets out a series of salary protections for workers that common sense indicates are unnecessary for highly paid employees.” Upon issuing the Mayfield decision, the Fifth Circuit joined the four other federal appeals courts that have considered this issue previously (including the D.C. Circuit, Second Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit).

2024 DOL Rule

The 2024 DOL rule effectively focused on three main points. First, it raised the minimum weekly salary to qualify for the FLSA’s white-collar exemptions from $684 per week to $844 per week (equivalent to a $43,888 annual salary) on July 1, 2024. Second, it called for another increase of the minimum weekly salary to $1,128 per week (equivalent of a $58,656 annual salary) on January 1, 2025. Third, under the 2024 DOL rule, the above salary threshold would increase every three years based on recent wage data.

As mentioned above, the Mayfield decision comes at a time when the DOL is defending its recent 2024 rule increasing the salary thresholds for white-collar exemptions in both the Eastern and Northern Districts of Texas. Indeed, the Mayfield decision’s timing could not have come at a more opportune time for the DOL because it supplies these Texas federal judges with new direction from the Fifth Circuit to consider when making their rulings.

What Does This Mean for Employers?

The Mayfield decision bolsters the DOL in its bid to set and increase the minimum salary requirements for its white-collar overtime exemptions, which will certainly pose challenges for employers in creating compliant employee compensation structures. In short, if the 2024 DOL rule goes into effect, employers will have to substantially raise their employees’ salaries to ensure they remain properly exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

by: Derek A. McKee of Polsinelli PC

For more news on Overtime Exemption Litigation, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

The Corporate Transparency Act Requires Reporting of Beneficial Owners

The Corporate Transparency Act (the “CTA”) became effective on January 1, 2024, requiring many corporations, limited liability companies, limited partnerships, and other entities to register with and report certain information to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) of the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”). The CTA marks a substantial increase in the reporting obligations for many U.S. companies, as well as for non-U.S. companies doing business in the United States.

IN SHORT:
Most corporate entities are now required to file a beneficial ownership information report (“BOI Report”) with FinCEN disclosing certain information about the entity and those persons who are “beneficial owners” or who have “substantial control.” BOI Reports for companies owned by trusts and estates may require significant analysis to determine beneficial ownership and substantial control.

The CTA imposes potential penalties on entities that fail to file BOI Reports with FinCEN by the prescribed deadline. For entities formed prior to January 1, 2024, a BOI Report must be filed by January 1, 2025. For entities formed on or after January 1, 2024, but prior to January 1, 2025, a BOI Report must be filed within 90 days of the entity’s formation. For entities formed on or after January 1, 2025, a BOI Report must be filed within 30 days of the entity’s formation.

Entities formed after January 1, 2024, must also report information regarding “company applicants” to FinCEN. If certain information within a BOI Report changes, entities are required to file a supplemental BOI Report within 30 days of such change.

While Winstead’s Wealth Preservation Practice Group will not be directly filing BOI Reports with FinCEN, our attorneys and staff will be available this year, by appointment, to answer questions regarding reporting requirements if scheduled by Friday, November 22, 2024. We strongly recommend that company owners begin analyzing what reporting obligations they may have under the CTA and schedule appointments with their professional advisors now to ensure availability.

BACKGROUND:
Congress passed the CTA in an effort to combat money laundering, fraud, and other illicit activities accomplished through anonymous shell companies. To achieve this objective, most entities operating in the United States will now be required to file BOI Reports with FinCEN.

The CTA applies to U.S. companies and non-U.S. companies registered to operate in the United States that fall within the definition of a “reporting company.” There are certain exceptions specifically enumerated in the CTA, which generally cover entities that are already subject to anti-money laundering requirements, entities registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or other federal regulatory bodies, and entities that pose a low risk of the illicit activities targeted by the CTA.

REPORTING OBLIGATIONS:
Entity Information. Each reporting company is required to provide FinCEN with the following information:

  1. the legal name of the reporting company;
  2. the mailing address of the reporting company;
  3. the state of formation (or foreign country in which the entity was formed, if applicable) of the reporting company; and
  4. the employer identification number of the reporting company.

Beneficial Owner and Applicant Information. Absent an exemption, each reporting company is also required to provide FinCEN with the following information regarding each beneficial owner and each company applicant:

  1. full legal name;
  2. date of birth;
  3. current residential or business address; and
  4. unique identifying number from a U.S. passport or U.S. state identification (e.g., state-issued driver’s license), a foreign passport, or a FinCEN identifier (i.e., the unique number issued by FinCEN to an individual).

DEFINITIONS:
Reporting Company. A “reporting company” is defined as any corporation, limited liability company, or any other entity created by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or any similar office under the law of a State. Certain entities are exempt from these filing requirements, including, but not limited to:

  1. financial institutions and regulated investment entities;
  2. utility companies;
  3. entities that are described in Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code;
  4. inactive, non-foreign owned entities with no assets; and
  5. sizeable operating companies that employ more than 20 full-time employees in the United States that have filed a United States federal income tax return in the previous year demonstrating more than $5,000,000 in gross receipts or sales.

A reporting company that is not exempt must register with and report all required information to FinCEN by the applicable deadline.

Beneficial Owner. A “beneficial owner” is defined as any individual who, directly or indirectly, (i) exercises substantial control over such reporting company or (ii) owns or controls at least 25% of the ownership interests of such reporting company.

Substantial Control. An individual exercises “substantial control” over a reporting company if the individual (i) serves as a senior officer of the reporting company, (ii) has authority over the appointment or removal of any senior officer or a majority of the board of directors (or the similar body governing such reporting company), or (iii) directs, determines, or has substantial influence over important decisions made by the reporting company, including by reason of such individual’s representation on the board (or other governing body of the reporting company) or control of a majority of the reporting company’s voting power.

Company Applicant. A “company applicant” is any individual who (i) files an application to form the reporting company under U.S. law or (ii) registers or files an application to register the reporting company under the laws of a foreign country to do business in the United States by filing a document with the secretary of state or similar office under U.S. law.

DEADLINES:
Entities Formed Before January 1, 2024. A reporting company that was formed prior to the effective date of the CTA (January 1, 2024) is required to register with FinCEN and file its initial BOI Report by January 1, 2025.

Entities Formed After January 1, 2024, but Before January 1, 2025. A reporting company that was formed after the effective date of the CTA (January 1, 2024), but before January 1, 2025, must register with FinCEN and file its initial BOI Report within 90 calendar days of formation.
Entities Formed After January 1, 2025. A reporting company formed after January 1, 2025, will be required to register with FinCEN and file its initial BOI Report within 30 calendar days of formation.

Supplemental BOI Reports. If any information included in a BOI Report changes, a reporting company must file a supplemental report with FinCEN within 30 days of such change. This includes minor changes, such as an address change or an updated driver’s license for a beneficial owner or someone who has substantial control over the reporting company.

PENALTIES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE:
The CTA and Treasury regulations impose potential civil and criminal liability on reporting companies and company applicants that fail to comply with the CTA’s reporting requirements. Civil penalties for reporting violations include a monetary fine of up to $500 per day that the violation continues unresolved, adjusted for inflation. Criminal penalties include a fine of up to $10,000 and/or two years in prison.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES:
When a trust or estate owns at least 25% of a reporting company or exercises substantial control over the reporting company, the BOI Report must generally include (i) the fiduciaries of the trust or estate (i.e., the trustee or executor), (ii) certain individual beneficiaries, and (iii) the settlor or creator of the trust. If the trust agreement gives other individuals certain rights and powers, however, such as a distribution advisor, trust protector, or trust committee member, the reporting company may also be required to disclose such individuals’ information in the BOI Report. Similarly, if a corporate trustee or executor is serving, the BOI Report must contain the names and information of the employees who actually administer the trust or estate on behalf of the corporation. Due to these nuances, it is often necessary to engage in additional analysis when a trust or estate is a beneficial owner of or has substantial control over a reporting company.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:
The CTA and its BOI Report filing requirement are still relatively new, and although FinCEN continues to publish additional guidance, many open questions remain. All companies formed or operating in the United States should carefully review whether they are required to file an initial BOI Report in accordance with the CTA, and take further steps to identify all individuals who must be included in such BOI Report.

© 2024 Winstead PC.
For more news on Corporate Transparency Act Reporting Requirements, visit the NLR Financial Institutions Banking section.

Sixth Circuit Explicitly Sidesteps the NLRB’s McLaren Macomb Decision

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently declined to comment on the National Labor Relations Board’s (the “Board”) McLaren Macomb decision which took aim at overbroad non-disparagement and non-disclosure agreements.

We first reported in February 2023, on the significant decision by the Board in McLaren Macomb, 372 NLRB No. 58 (Feb. 21, 2023), which concluded, among other things, that proffering a severance agreement with broad confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions could violate Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) – a decision and rationale we wrote about in depth here. The decision drove employers to reevaluate existing severance agreements with such provisions.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit sidestepped the most salient aspects of the Board’s McLaren Macomb decision, namely those portions addressing the lawfulness of confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions in severance agreements, writing, “we do not address [the Board’s] decision to reverse Baylor [Univ. Med. Ctr., 369 NLRB No. 43 (2020)] and IGT[, 370 NLRB No. 50 (Nov. 4, 2020)], or whether it correctly interpreted the NLRA in doing so.” In other words, the Sixth Circuit did not offer any insight or pass judgment one way or another on the Board’s ruling that broad-based non-disparagement and confidentiality provisions are unlawful under NLRA. Indeed, while the Sixth Circuit did find the specific severance agreements at issue unlawful, it did so under previous Board precedent (not for the reasons articulated in McLaren Macomb), further reinforcing the Court’s unwillingness to address this critical issue directly.

What does this mean for employers? While there is lingering uncertainty for employers, it reinforces, at least for now, that the Board may continue to find severance agreements offered to non-supervisory employees that include broad-based confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions as unlawful. Consequently, employers should continue to review their existing severance agreements with the assistance of employment counsel to determine whether, when, and to what extent they may include appropriately crafted non-disparagement and confidentiality clauses.

©1994-2024 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
 For more news on the Sixth Circuit NLRB Ruling, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Temporary Injunctive Relief for Nondebtors in Bankruptcy Court Post-Purdue Pharma

In June, in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not, as part of a bankruptcy plan, allow nondebtors to receive permanent injunctive relief through nonconsensual releases. Less than a month later, two U.S. bankruptcy courts addressed whether Purdue Pharma bars bankruptcy courts from issuing temporary injunctive relief for the protection of nondebtors, and both courts determined that it does not. And just a couple of weeks ago, a third U.S. bankruptcy court reached the same conclusion.

The Supreme Court clearly limited the scope of its Purdue Pharma ruling to the permanent releases before it. In July, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware tackled a precise question left unresolved by Purdue Pharma: Can a bankruptcy court issue a preliminary injunction to stay claims against nondebtors? Yes, the court held in  Parlement Technologies.

The facts of Parlement Technologies are straightforward. The debtor, Parlement Technologies, and several of its former officers were sued in Nevada state court. While section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code automatically stayed the Nevada action against Parlement Technologies, it did not stay claims against the former officers, and Parlement Technologies therefore sought a temporary stay of those claims. Faced with whether it could temporarily stay an action against nondebtors in light of the Supreme Court’s Purdue Pharma ruling, the court concluded: “Purdue Pharma does not preclude the entry of such a preliminary injunction.” In re Parlement Techs., 24-10755 (CTG) (Bankr. D. Del. Jul. 15, 2024).

The court went on to describe the four-factor test for granting a preliminary injunction: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury to plaintiff or movant absent an injunction, (3) harm to defendant or nonmoving party brought about by the injunction, and (4) public interest. In addressing the likelihood of success on the merits, the court considered how Purdue Pharma altered the traditional “success on the merits” calculation. Given the Purdue Pharma holding – that nondebtors may not receive permanent injunctive relief in the form of nonconsensual third-party releases – success on the merits in a temporary stay determination cannot be based on the likelihood that the nondebtors would be entitled to a nonconsensual third-party release. Clearly, that factor would never be met.

Instead, a court should find a likelihood of success on the merits when it concludes that (1) a preliminary injunction is necessary to permit debtors to focus on reorganization, or (2) the parties may ultimately negotiate a plan that includes resolution of the claims against nondebtors. After focusing primarily on the debtor’s failure to meet this first element of the four-factor test – success on the merits – the court declined to issue the preliminary injunction.

The same week that the Parlement Technologies court denied the temporary injunction, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois – in Coast to Coast Leasing – granted a preliminary injunction staying state court litigation against nondebtors. Coast To Coast Leasing, LLC v. M&T Equip. Fin. Corp. (In re Coast to Coast Leasing), No. 24-03056 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jul. 17, 2024). The Illinois court addressed both the Purdue Pharma and Parlement Technologies decisions, and relied on a three-factor Seventh Circuit test used to determine whether a bankruptcy court may enjoin proceedings in another court: (1) those proceedings defeat or impair its jurisdiction over the case before it, (2) the moving party established likelihood of success on the merits, and (3) public interest.

The Coast to Coast court issued the temporary injunction. The court stressed that unlike Purdue Pharma, where the nondebtors sought to release and enjoin claims, the case before it involved only a temporary injunction (of two weeks). And unlike in Parlement Technologies, there was a likelihood of success on the merits based on both of the above-noted measures set forth in the Parlement Technologies decision ((1) a preliminary injunction is necessary to permit debtors to focus on reorganization, or (2) the parties may ultimately negotiate a plan that includes resolution of the claims against nondebtors).

These two cases point to the conclusion that Purdue Pharma does not preclude bankruptcy courts from temporarily staying claims against nondebtors. On September 13, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana similarly stated, “under certain circumstances, a bankruptcy court may issue a preliminary injunction that operates to stay actions against nondebtors.” La. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Tidewater Landfill, LLC (In re Tidewater Landfill LLC), No. 20-11646 (Bankr. E.D. La. Sep. 13, 2024). That court cited both Parlement Technologies and a pre-Purdue Pharma Fifth Circuit case, Feld v. Zale Corp. (In Re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995), suggesting that preliminary relief should not be treated differently after Purdue Pharma.

That court did not reach the relevant motion, but its clear statement of the law is instructive. Together this trio of cases provides guidance to debtors seeking temporary stays for nondebtors in the wake of Purdue Pharma.

© 2024 Binder & Schwartz LLP. All Rights Reserved
For more news on Purdue Pharma and Bankruptcy, visit the NLR Bankruptcy Restructuring section.

A Study in THC-O: Unpacking the Recent Anderson Case

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit handed the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) a big loss when it comes to hemp. In Anderson v. Diamondback Investment Group, LLC, the court ruled that the DEA’s interpretation, which classified a host of hemp-derived products as illegal, was incorrect.

I’ve previously written about the impact of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo on cannabis and hemp in this blog, and Anderson is one of the first cases to show how courts will handle cannabis law post-Chevron. In Loper, the Supreme Court ended the long-standing doctrine of Chevron deference. That doctrine required federal courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, so long as it was “reasonable,” even if the court didn’t agree with it. Now, courts don’t have to give the DEA (or any agency) that kind of leeway. If the agency’s interpretation isn’t the best reading of the statute, it is merely persuasive material at best.

This reminds me of my days of clerking on the Court of Common Pleas. Oftentimes, lawyers would cite other non-binding Common Pleas decisions, and the judge would merely say he would consider them but did not view them as binding. It’s almost like déjà vu for me now with Loper, on a grander scale.

Since Loper was decided, everyone has had theories about how it could impact things like cannabis rescheduling or the legality of hemp-derived cannabinoids. In particular, the DEA has been flexing its muscles with opinion letters about what it considers to be legal or illegal cannabinoids. This is where Loper comes into play. In theory, the DEA can still issue its opinions, but the courts aren’t going to roll over and accept those interpretations without question anymore. That’s exactly what happened in Anderson.

Without getting into the weeds of the case too much, here’s the gist: an employee was fired after drug tests allegedly showed cannabis use. She sued her employer, claiming she was using legal hemp-derived products. The court said she didn’t provide enough evidence to prove those products contained less than 0.3% Delta-9 THC—the magic number that separates hemp from cannabis under federal law. So, in the district court’s view, she did not have a case.

But the important part for us is what the court said about the 2018 Farm Bill and the DEA’s interpretation of cannabinoids like THC-O. THC-O is a synthetic compound made from hemp derivatives, and there’s been a long debate about whether products like THC-O or Delta-8 THC fall under the “hemp” umbrella.

The DEA considers synthetic cannabinoid-controlled substances, and they’ve argued that products like THC-O are illegal. The Ninth Circuit took on this issue a few years ago in AK Futures LLC v. Boyd Street Distro, LLC, where they ruled that Delta-8 THC products derived from hemp with less than 0.3% Delta-9 THC were legal under the 2018 Farm Bill.

In Anderson, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s logic, holding that “we think the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the 2018 Farm Act is the better of the two.” The court went even further, rejecting the DEA’s argument outright, thanks to the post-Loper world we now live in, where the DEA’s interpretation no longer gets automatic deference.

Here’s the key takeaway: according to the Fourth Circuit, if a product is derived from hemp and doesn’t contain more than 0.3% Delta-9 THC, it’s legal—even if it’s been processed into something like Delta-8 THC. But if a cannabinoid is made entirely from synthetic materials, it’s not hemp, and it’s not protected by the 2018 Farm Bill.

Now, before anyone starts thinking this is an all-clear for hemp products, there’s still a lot to unpack. While Anderson pushes back against the DEA’s overreach, it doesn’t mean every hemp-derived product is automatically legal. The 0.3% Delta-9 THC threshold is still critical, and businesses need to make sure they’re playing by the rules. Plus, this ruling doesn’t mean states won’t have their own say about what’s legal within their borders.

To sum it all up, the Anderson decision is important because it reinforces that courts are not bound by the DEA’s interpretations, especially post-Loper. This decision helps the hemp-derived cannabinoid market. As always, businesses must stay compliant with both federal and state laws to avoid legal headaches.

©2024 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved
For more news on Hemp Classification Litigation, visit the NLR Biotech, Food, and Drug section.