Tag: labor

Working Through Lunch: An Update on the Legal Risks

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Regular readers of this blog know that we’ve previously alerted you to the risks of using timekeeping software that automatically deducts the lunch hour from employees’ paychecks.  As we’ve explained before, such software can expose employers to liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act because, for one reason or another, employees sometimes work through lunch. And, even if an employer has a system in place for employees to request pay for lunchtime work, that is no “get out of jail free card,” because employees who bring FLSA lawsuits commonly argue that they did not use – or were discouraged from using – the system.

A lawsuit that was filed earlier this month in Texas federal court gives us another reason to sound the alert.  In Corcione v. Houston Methodist, the plaintiff alleges that she – and a class of some 5,000 nurses, nurses assistants, patient care assistants and other employees at seven different medical facilities – were required to keep their cellphones on hand during their meal breaks in case they were needed to respond to emergencies. And, even though the employers had systems in place for requesting pay for lunchtime work, the plaintiff claims that managers discouraged employees from making such requests. The plaintiff seeks to recover the unpaid wages (for the time claimed to have been worked, including overtime pay), liquidated damages, and legal fees.  In other words, the plaintiff wants tens of millions of dollars.

A policy requiring nurses (and similar employees) to be available so that they can respond to emergencies probably seems reasonable to you, and we feel the same way. Work “emergencies” aren’t limited to the medical field, of course, and many other types of employers have similar policies – written or unwritten. If you’re one of them, just remember that the ramifications of such policies can land you on the wrong side of the FLSA if you’re not careful. We’ve said it before, and we’ll say it again:  Work time must be compensated.  Even if that “work time” comes during what – on a normal day – would have been “lunch time.”

Article By:

James F. Ehrenberg
Of:
Barnes & Thornburg LLP

Flextime Consideration Is Now Law In Some Places

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The pros and cons of implementing “flextime” policies have long been debated. Two laws – one state and one municipal – went into effect at the beginning of this year, however, that made it mandatory for some employers in those jurisdictions to consider flexible working arrangements for their eligible employees.

Vermont passed a “flexible working arrangements” law, which grants employees the right to request a flexible working arrangement for any reason and requires employers to discuss and consider such requests at least twice per calendar year. “Flexible working arrangement” is defined to including changes in the number of days or hours worked, changes in the employee’s start or stop time, work from home, or job-sharing. The law identifies several factors the employer may consider in choosing to grant or deny the request, including costs, effect on employee morale, ability to meet demand, and effect on schedules and staff.

San Francisco passed the “Family Friendly Workplace Ordinance,” which applies to employers with 20 or more employees. It grants certain employees with caregiving responsibilities the right to request  a schedule, location, or assignment change in order to care for children, persons with a serious health condition with whom the employee is in a family relationship, or parents who are 65 or older. Employers must meet with the employee within 21 days of the request and provide a written response. In the case of a denial, the employer must set out a bona fide business reason for the denial.

These laws require conversations that many companies have already been having with their employees. If flextime arrangements are something your company is considering, it is important to remember that such policies require very careful drafting and execution. For example, policies should explain the jobs for which flextime arrangements are and are not possible to avoid potential discrimination claims. Further, FLSA considerations such as overtime and exempt/non-exempt distinctions must be kept in mind when rearranging schedules and tracking hours. Workers’ compensation claims from telecommuting employees injured at home will also require special attention.

Vermont’s law can be found here. More information and a link to the San Francisco ordinance is here.

Article By:

Kaitlyn N. Jakubowski
Of:
Barnes & Thornburg LLP

Unpaid Employer Contributions as Plan Assets: Expansion Of Liability Under ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act)

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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), requires trustees of multiemployer pension and benefit funds to collect contributions required to be made by contributing employers under their collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) with the labor union sponsoring the plans. This is not always an easy task—often, an employer is an incorporated entity with limited assets or financial resources to satisfy its contractual obligations. In some instances, an employer will resort to filing for bankruptcy to obtain a discharge of its debts to the pension or benefit funds.

In a distinct trend, federal courts have found that, depending on the text of the underlying plan documents, unpaid employer contributions due under a CBA may be viewed as plan assets, such that the representatives of an employer who exercise fiduciary control over those plan assets can be held individually liable for the unpaid amounts (together with interest and penalties) under ERISA. These cases will no doubt help plan trustees and administrators collect monies owed to the plan. They also should serve as cautionary warnings to contributing employers to ensure that they fully understand the obligations that they are undertaking when they agree to contribute to ERISA funds pursuant to CBAs.

Background

In the typical scenario, an employer will agree under one or more of its CBAs to make specified contributions to fund the pension and health and welfare benefits promised to plan participants under the trust fund’s plan of benefits. If an employer fails to timely remit those payments in violation of the CBA and the plan’s rules, the trustees of the fund have a legal duty to attempt to recover the unpaid contributions unless, after fully examining the facts and circumstances, the trustees conclude that the likelihood of recovery is outweighed by its costs. What happens if the trustees expend the fund’s resources to seek to collect the unpaid obligations and obtain a judgment against the employer, only to find the company’s coffers empty? Or what if the company files for bankruptcy?

Unlike employee contributions, which under U.S. Department of Labor regulations are explicitly deemed to be plan assets, employer contributions are typically found to be contractual obligations that do not become plan assets until such amounts are paid by the employer to the trust fund. Hence, while an employer’s failure to remit an employee contribution relegates the employer to the status of an ERISA plan fiduciary because it is has authority and control over plan assets, employer contributions have generally been held not to constitute plan assets. As a result, an employer who fails to make its contributions due under the CBA may have committed a contractual violation but has not breached an ERISA fiduciary duty.

The Potential for Individual Fiduciary Liability

Recently, courts have regularly carved out an exception to the general rule that unpaid contributions are not plan assets by finding that employer contributions are plan assets where the CBA explicitly defines them as such. In such cases, these courts will then proceed to consider the next question of whether the officers, directors or other representatives of such employer exercised a level of control over corporate assets sufficient to make them an ERISA plan fiduciary and thus individually liable for the contributions—effectively stripping them of the protections of the corporate form. Furthermore, if elevated to the status of a fiduciary breach, the debt may not be dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, the plan could proceed to collect the unpaid contributions against the principals of the debtor personally.

For over a decade, some federal district courts in the Second Circuit have applied a two-part test in delinquent employer contribution cases to find that: (i) such contributions are plan assets when so specified by the CBA; and (ii) the principals of the employer are an ERISA plan fiduciary. More recently, the Second Circuit concluded that delinquent contributions were not plan assets where there were no provisions in the relevant plan documents that stated that unpaid contributions are assets of the plan. See In re Halpin, 566 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court expressly stated, however, that “the trustees were free to contractually provide for some other result.” It further noted that merely finding that delinquent contributions constitute plan assets does not end the inquiry. A court must also determine whether an individual defendant has exercised sufficient fiduciary conduct over the unpaid contributions to be found to be a plan fiduciary under ERISA.

While the Court’s statements were extraneous to the holding of the case, some district courts within the Second Circuit have seized upon this language and have cited In re Halpin for the proposition that employer contributions can be plan assets where the plan documents so provide. See, e.g., Trustees of Sheet Metalworkers Int’l Assoc. v. Hopwood, 09-cv-5088, 2012 WL 4462048 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012); Sullivan v. Marble Unique Corp., 10-cv-3582, 2011 WL 5401987, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011).

Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011 (11th Cir. 2003), held that delinquent contributions can constitute plan assets when explicitly provided for in the plan documents and corporate officers are plan fiduciaries with respect to those assets. The Court demanded a high level of clarity in the plan documents, however, regarding the delinquent contribution’s status as plan assets. It explained that when a corporation is delinquent in its contributions, the fund “has a sufficient priority on the corporation’s available resources that individuals controlling corporate resources are controlling fund assets. This in effect places heavy responsibilities on employers, but only to the extent that . . . an employer freely accepts those responsibilities in collective bargaining.”

In addition, district courts in the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have found that employer contributions constitute plan assets when the plan documents so provide. See, e.g., Trustees of Construction Industry and Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Archie, No. 2:12-cv-00225 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2014) (holding that unpaid contributions were plan assets based upon the CBA’s language and finding that the company principals’ acts and responsibilities demonstrated sufficient control and authority over the company’s operations and financials to qualify as ERISA fiduciaries); Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295, 301 (M.D. Penn. 1987) (refusing to dismiss fiduciary breach claims for alleged failure to pay delinquent contributions based upon the “clear and undisputed language [of the agreement] stating that title to all monies ‘due and owing’ the plaintiff fund is ‘vested’ in the fund,” rendering “any delinquent employer contributions vested assets of the plaintiff fund.”; Connors v. Paybra Mining Co., 807 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.W.V. 1992) (finding company officers personally liable for delinquent contributions that were plan assets based upon CBA’s language since they breached their fiduciary duty by exercising authority over those assets by favoring other creditors over the fund); see also Secretary of Labor v. Doyle, 675 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that district court erred in failing to determine whether payments collected from various employers were plan assets subject to ERISA).

District courts in the Sixth Circuit have even signaled support for finding that contributions are plan assets as soon as they become due, “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.” See, e.g., Plumbers Local 98 Defined Benefit Funds v. M&P Master Plumbers of Michigan, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 873, 879 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding company principal personally liable for delinquent contributions since “the CBA and trust agreements . . . treat these unpaid contributions as inalienable plan assets” and signaling support for holding delinquent contributions plan assets “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.”).

In a related context, a federal bankruptcy court recently refused to discharge a debtor’s debt for delinquent contributions based upon the Bankruptcy Code’s “defalcation in the performance of fiduciary duty” exception. See In re Fahey, 494 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013). Although the court initially found that the debtor lacked the necessary discretion for fiduciary status under ERISA because the “option to breach a contract does not constitute discretion in the performance of one’s duty,” the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit reversed. The Panel ruled that “even if an ERISA fiduciary does not per se satisfy the § 523(a)(4) requirement for ‘fiduciary capacity,’ an analysis of [the Debtor’s] control and authority over the plan in functional terms nonetheless yields the conclusion that he acted as a fiduciary of a technical trust imposed by common law.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found that the debtor prioritized payments that were personally beneficial over his obligations to the ERISA funds and, consequently, committed defalcation as contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.

View from Proskauer

Although the general rule that employer contributions do not constitute plan assets until actually received by the trust fund continues, recent decisions indicate an increased willingness by courts to carve out an exception to this rule. Funds looking to protect their ability to collect contributions should explicitly define in the plan documents and agreements with employers that plan assets also include all unpaid contributions in the hands of the employer. Employers should be fully cognizant of these provisions; otherwise its officers, directors and other representatives who choose to pay other creditors rather than the trust fund might be held personally liable for the unpaid amounts and interest and penalties, and possibly be unable to escape this liability through bankruptcy.

Article By:

Neal S Schelberg
Aaron Feuer
Of:
Proskauer Rose LLP.

Detecting FMLA (Family and Medical Leave Act) Abuse

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Dealing with employees who abuse FMLA can be difficult. Letting abuse run rampant, however, can impact business productivity and put a damper on company morale (as present employees often have to pick up the slack of someone on leave). Employers who detect abuse must proceed with caution because it is very easy to run afoul of regulations.

Under the FMLA, it is unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of any right provided by the Act. Further, employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions, or disciplinary actions. Violating these provisions can lead to employee lawsuits for interference or retaliation. Having said that, an employer is not helpless in thwarting employees’ ill-intentioned leaves.

If there is suspected abuse, it should be documented in detail. Who reported it? Is the source credible? Is there evidence (i.e., photographs)? Employers should refrain from overzealously playing detective or prompting other employees to snoop on a coworker – doing so may violate privacy laws. However, if there is a reasonable belief or honest suspicion that abuse is occurring, an employer may begin a confidential investigation, perhaps with the aid of private investigator. Surveillance of an employee should only be used in the most egregious situations and should always be conducted by a professional. Be sure to allow the employee the chance to refute the allegation and present his or her side of the story before taking any adverse action against him or her.

FMLA leave is a right for covered employees, but it does not act as a shield for misconduct nor does it prohibit termination of an employee who abuses the terms of an FMLA leave. You can terminate an employee on FMLA leave, but caution must be used. If you are an employer and detect abuse, it is highly recommended you contact an employment attorney about how to proceed so as to avoid costly lawsuits alleging interference or retaliation.

Article By:

Benjamin L. Riddle
Of: 
McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie and Kirkland, PLLC

What To Look For Down The Road: France

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There is some legislation being debated in the French Parliament.  One piece of legislation would encourage fathers to take leave to care for their children.  The goal would be to curb the systemic disadvantages that women experience in their careers due to motherhood.

Another bill has been introduced with the goal of reforming the system of continuing vocational training, which could have major financial implications.  The bill provides for the creation of a so-called “individual learning account” in which rights to training hours earned each year would accumulate, within a total limit of 150 hours.  The account would not be related to the company: it would be personal and “follow” the employee throughout his/her entire working life.

 Article by:

Terese M. Connolly

Of:

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

 

Illinois Whistleblower Awarded $3 Million Following Jury Trial

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In what appears to be an alarming trend for employers, the Chicago Tribune recently reported that a former Chicago State University employee was awarded $3 million after a Cook County, Illinois jury found that the University retaliated against him for reporting alleged misconduct by top university officials in violation of the Illinois State Official and Employees Ethics Act (5 ILCS 430/15-5, et seq.) and the Illinois Whistleblower Act.  Crowley v. Chicago State University, No. 2010-L-012657.

Background

Plaintiff James Crowley (Crowley) was the Senior Legal Counsel for Chicago State University (University).  His responsibilities included reviewing contracts and processing Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests.  During his employment, the University hired a new President, Wayne Watson (Watson).  Watson did not commence his employment immediately due to a retirement benefits regulation; however, Watson allegedly made official University decisions and moved into the Presidential residence during the interim period.  Crowley received several FOIA requests inquiring about whether Watson was working unofficially in contravention of the benefits regulation.

Crowley alleged that Watson urged him to withhold certain documents from the FOIA requests, and threatened him by saying “If you read this my way, you are my friend. If you read it the other way, you are my enemy.”  Crowley refused Watson’s request, and released all documents relevant to the FOIA inquiry.  Crowley reported his concerns about the FOIA requests, as well as concerns about the University’s contracting practices, to the Illinois Attorney General’s Office.  The University subsequently terminated Crowley’s employment.  Crowley filed suit alleging that he was terminated for refusing to withhold documents from the FOIA requests and reporting the University’s alleged misconduct in violation of the Illinois State Official and Employees Ethics Act and the Illinois Whistleblower Act.

Jury Verdict

The jury found in favor of Crowley, and awarded him $480,000 in back pay and an additional $2 million in punitive damages.  The jury also concluded that Crowley should be reinstated to his prior position.  After receiving the jury’s verdict, the presiding judge doubled the jury’s back pay award, as permitted under state law, and also granted Crowley $60,000 in interest.

Implications

Multi-million dollar judgments in state court whistleblower retaliation cases are trending at an alarming rate.  We recently reported on a $6 million whistleblower verdict in California and other large verdicts in Minnesota and New Jersey.   This trend highlights the serious risks employers face under state and federal whistleblower laws, and servers as a wake-up call for employers to carefully review and refine their whistleblower policies and related practices.

© 2014 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Article By:
Steven J Pearlman
Allison Lynn Martin

Of:

Do Your Plans Include a Time Limit on a Participant’s Right to Sue?

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Some, but far from all, employee benefit plans set a limit on the amount of time a participant has to file a lawsuit claiming benefits under the plan.  Until recently, however, not all courts would recognize these plan imposed lawsuit filing deadlines.  The Supreme Court case of Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life, decided in December 2013, changed that by ruling that employee benefit plan contractual provisions that limit the time to file a lawsuit to recover benefits are enforceable, provided the time limitations are not unreasonably short or contrary to a controlling statute.

The Heimeshoff decision involved a plan that provided a participant must file a lawsuit to recover benefits within three years from the date proof of loss was due.  The Supreme Court decision found that the three year limitation period was not too short, noting the plan’s internal claims review process would be concluded in plenty of time for a participant to file a lawsuit to recover benefits. Based on the court’s reasoning, it appears likely that a shorter limitation on filing claims might also be upheld as long as there is sufficient time for the participant to file a lawsuit once the claims procedure period has ended.

While Heimeshoff involved a disability plan, the decision applies equally to all ERISA covered health and welfare plans, retirement plans, and top hat plans.

So, do your employee benefit plans include a limitation on the time a participant has to file a lawsuit to recover benefits?  Don’t assume that they do.  Many plans do not provide a time limit for filing a lawsuit, and now would be a great time to amend those plans to add the limitation.

Article by:

Of:

Poyner Spruill LLP

United Auto Workers (UAW) and Volkswagen (VW) Efforts to Establish First Works Council in the U.S. Fails

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The United Auto Workers (UAW), which already represents most of the largest carmakers in the United States, was unsuccessful in its efforts to unionizeVolkswagen’s (VW) plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee. What makes this noteworthy is that leading up to the February 14th representation election, the German company was actually campaigning for the UAW not against it in an employer-union alliance seldom seen in this country.

While the “big three” American carmakers (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) are all unionized, foreign carmakers have avoided unionization by locating their plants in Southern states with strong Right to Work laws. Volkswagen, however, considers the creation of a so-called “works council” a crucial element of its business. Works councils are common under German law, and Volkswagen has established works councils at all its foreign plants, with the exception of Chattanooga and China.

Under these works councils, all workers in a factory regardless of position and whether they are unionized or not, help decide things like staffing schedules and working conditions, while the union bargains on wages and benefits. They also have the right to review certain types of information about how the company is doing financially, which means that they tend to be more sympathetic towards management’s desire to make cutbacks during tough financial times. Each Volkswagen plant throughout the world sends its delegates to a global works council that influences which products the company makes and where. This arrangement would have represented a new experience for the UAW, unlike its relationship with Chrysler, General Motors and Ford, which would have involved sharing control with the works council.

A tough question for Volkswagen and the UAW is whether a works council would be legal in the United States without a union. There is no provision in the NLRA for the kind of German-style works council Volkswagen seeks. Volkswagen’s best option for creating a works council would have been for its workers to accept UAW representation. Volkswagen must now rethink its options in seeking a way to create a works council. Options include talking with a different union that might be more popular with its workers or encouraging workers to organize their own independent union. Another option would be moving ahead without a union and risking an NLRB challenge.

After the UAW was defeated by a 712-626 vote in its bid to represent workers at the Volkswagen plant, the UAW promptly requested a new election claiming Tennessee politicians and outside organizations coordinated and vigorously promoted a coercive campaign to sow fear and deprive Volkswagen workers of their right to join a union. Senior state officials including United States Senator Bob Corker, TennesseeGovernor William Haslam, State House Speaker Beth Harwell, and State House Majority Leader Gerald McCormick, made statements in an effort to convince the workers to reject the UAW. The UAW’s alleges this was part of an unlawful campaign which included publicly announced and widely disseminated threats by elected officials that state-financed incentives would be withheld if workers exercised their right to join the UAW’s ranks. However, on February 25, 2014, a group of Volkswagen workers sought to intervene in the UAW‘s bid, and argued that the election results should stand.

Article by:

Of:

Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

Facebook Post Breaches Confidentiality Provision of Settlement Agreement

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A Florida appellate court has ruled that a teenaged daughter’s post on Facebookmentioning her father’s confidential settlement of an age discrimination claim breached a confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement, barring the father from collecting an $80,000 settlement. Gulliver Schools, Inc. v. Snay, No. 3D13-1952 (Fla 3d DCA Feb. 26, 2014).

The plaintiff, Patrick Snay, was a headmaster of Gulliver, a private school in the Miami area. After his contract was not renewed, he sued for age discrimination. The parties reached a settlement pursuant to a written agreement, which included a detailed confidentiality provision. The provision stated in part:

13. Confidentiality . . . [T]he plaintiff shall not either directly or indirectly, disclose, discuss or communicate to any entity or person, except his attorneys or other professional advisors or spouse any information whatsoever regarding the existence or terms of this Agreement. . . A breach . . . will result in disgorgement of the Plaintiff’s portion of the Settlement Payments.

A couple of days after the agreement was signed, Snay’s daughter, who had recently been a student at Gulliver, posted the following on her Facebook page:

Mama and Papa Snay won the case against Gulliver. Gulliver is now officially paying for my vacation to Europe this summer. SUCK IT.

Snay’s daughter had about 1,200 Facebook friends, many of whom were current or former Gulliver students. Gulliver notified Snay of the breach and refused to tender the $80,000 to Snay under the terms of the settlement. (Snay’s attorneys received their portion). Snay moved to enforce the agreement. Limited discovery revealed that Snay and his wife notified their daughter “that the case was settled and they were happy with the result.” Snay denied ever discussing a trip to Europe. The district court held that Snay’s actions did not violate the terms of the agreement, but the appellate court reversed, noting that Snay was prohibited from “directly or indirectly” disclosing even the “existence” of the settlement.

The decision offers lessons for counsel, litigants, and parents. Counsel and litigants need to remember that these types of confidentiality provisions with disgorgement penalties are taken seriously by the courts and can be enforced. Parents need to remind their children to be mindful of what they post on social media, because it might have adult consequences.

Article by:

V. John Ella

Of:

Jackson Lewis P.C.

Illinois Federal Court Issues Reminder That "100% Healed" Requirements Violate ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act)

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On February 11, 2014, an Illinois Federal District Court issued a decision reminding employers that “100% healed” return-to-work requirements violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). In EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed a lawsuit alleging that United Parcel Service’s (“UPS”) “100% healed” requirement violated the ADA. UPS moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that the EEOC could not state a claim that there was a violation of the ADA. The Court denied UPS’s motion and permitted the EEOC lawsuit to proceed.

UPS maintained a leave policy requiring employees to be “administratively separated from employment” after 12 months of leave. In 2007, an employee returned from a 12-month medical leave. After returning, the employee requested certain accommodations, including a hand cart. UPS refused to provide any accommodation. Shortly thereafter, the employee injured herself and needed additional medical leave. Instead of granting leave, UPS terminated the employee under its 12-month leave policy.

The EEOC alleged that UPS’s 12-month leave policy acted as a “100% healed” requirement because it functioned as a “qualification standard” under the ADA. UPS argued that the ability to regularly attend work was an essential job function and not an impermissible “qualification standard” and, therefore, not in violation of the ADA.

Although the Court conceded that regular job attendance is an essential job requirement, the court found that the lawsuit was not based on attendance requirements, but rather on the “100% healed” requirement that an employee must satisfy before returning to work. As a prerequisite to returning to work, the 12-month policy was a “qualification standard” and not an essential job function subject to accommodation. A “qualification standard” is “the personal and professional attributes, including the skill, experience, educational, physical, medical, safety and other requirements established by a covered entity as requirements an individual must meet in order to be eligible for the position held or desired.”

The court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s previous determination that a “100% healed” policy is per se impermissible because it “prevents individualized assessments” and “necessarily operates to exclude disabled people that are qualified to work.” A “100% healed” requirement limits the ability of qualified individuals with a disability to return to work. Thus, a “100% healed” acts as a prohibited “qualification standard” because it removes the opportunity for the employee to pursue reasonable accommodation, in violation of the ADA. Accordingly, the court denied UPS’s motion to dismiss and permitted the EEOC’s lawsuit to proceed.

Although this case does not provide a definitive answer to the EEOC’s lawsuit, it does provide a strong reminder to employers that “100% healed” policies violate the ADA. Employers should review their return to work policies to ensure that they do not contain “100% healed” requirements. When dealing with leave issues, employers also should remember to enter into the interactive process when necessary and balance obligations under federal, state and local disability and leave requirements, in addition to those created by contract or agreement.

Article by:

Geoffrey S. Trotier

Of:

von Briesen & Roper, S.C.