Tag: labor

Donning & Doffing (Wage Disputes): Old Is New Again

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Our Letter of the Law series is focused on current employment law developments, anddonning and doffing wage disputes are anything but “new” to the courts.  The U.S. Supreme Court and Congress were dealing with donning and doffing work clothing and equipment in the 1940s.  (Perhaps that is obvious given that nobody really says “donning” or “doffing” in recent years other than in this context.)

Donning and Doffing

But donning and doffing, and when employees must be paid for getting dressed for work, continues as an important and tricky wage/hour law issue.  That and the 7th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals’ “novel approach” to judicial curiosity in Mitchell v. JCG Industries, Inc. merits inclusion as this week’s letter D.  The court in Mitchellrecently weighed in on the proper compensation for workers who are required to don and doff safety protective gear at work.  Union workers in a poultry processing plant brought the suit, alleging violations of state and federal wage laws for the employer’s failure to pay wages for time spent donning and doffing protective work gear.  Workers were required to put on jackets, aprons, gloves, hairnets, and other items at the start of every shift.  In addition, they had to remove and put back on the gear at the start and end of lunch breaks.  The principal issue was whether the employer had to compensate workers for the time spent changing in and out of gear.

Relying on Section 203(o) of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, the court concluded that donning and doffing time is excluded from compensable time.  In its opinion, the court noted that it took very little time to dress in the gear – and indeed noted that the court staff had done so.  Additionally, the court noted that it would be overly burdensome to require employers to track such time for every employee.

Donning and doffing remains a tricky issue, a perfect example of what lawyers call “fact specific” cases.  Compare DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., 735 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that summary judgment was improper to the employer in the case involving foundry employees who were required to shower and change after their shifts).  Employers who require safety and other equipment or clothing must, decades after the law was first passed, continue to watch cases like Mitchell that might affect their decision making on what donning and doffing time must be paid.

Article By:

William A. Nolan
Of:
Barnes & Thornburg LLP

Executive Order Extends Workplace Anti-Discrimination Protections to LGBT Workers of Federal Contractors

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Though it took longer than expected, President Barack Obama has signed an Executive Order extending protections against workplace discrimination to members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) community. Signed July 21, 2014, the Executive Order prohibits discrimination by federal contractors on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, adding to the list of protected categories. It does not contain any exemptions for religiously affiliated federal contractors, as some had hoped. Religiously affiliated federal contractors still may favor individuals of a particular religion when making employment decisions.

The President directed the Secretary of Labor to prepare regulations within 90 days (by October 19, 2014) implementing the new requirements as they relate to federal contractors under Executive Order 11246, which requires covered government contractors and subcontractors to undertake affirmative action to ensure that equal employment opportunity is afforded in all aspects of their employment processes. Executive Order 11246 is enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP).

The Executive Order will apply to federal contracts entered into on or after the effective date of the forthcoming regulations. OFCCP likely will be charged with enforcement authority.

We recommend that employers who will be impacted by this Executive Order review their equal employment opportunity and harassment policies for compliance with the Executive Order. For example, employers who are government contractors should add both sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories under these policies and ensure that mechanisms are put in place to ensure that discrimination is not tolerated against LGBT employees.

We will provide additional information and insights into the proposed regulations when they are available.

Article By:

Eric J. Felsberg
Michelle E. Phillips
Of:
Jackson Lewis P.C.

Supreme Court Gives Second Win in Two Days to Caregivers Challenging Compulsory Union Dues

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The United States Supreme Court acted today in another case involving a scheme to siphon millions of dollars in compulsory union dues from home caregivers assisting public aid recipients.  On June 30, 2014, the Court decided Harris v. Quinn and held that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the collection of a compulsory agency fee from rehabilitation program personal assistants who do not want to join or support the union.  Today, the Court applied Harris to Schlaud v. Snyder, vacating the judgment, and remanding the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of Harris v. Quinn.  As the Schlaud case continues, look for another blow to the forced-dues arrangment perpretrated by various union officials and their friends in government.

Schlaud and other plaintiffs in the case are home childcare providers in Michigan who sought class-action certification in their First Amendment challenge to the state’s compulsory deduction of union dues from subsidies paid to home childcare providers.  In January 2009, the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) began deducting 1.15% from subsidy payments made to home childcare providers. The funds were forwarded to the union, which was a joint venture between the United Auto Workers union and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees union.  According to the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the union collected $2,000,019.09 in 2009 and at least $1,821,635.21 in 2010.

Schlaud and her co-plaintiffs sought the return of the compulsory union dues that were collected in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of the plaintiffs’ proposed class — all home childcare providers in Michigan — because it concluded a conflict of interest existed within the class: some members voted for union representation and others voted against union representation.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and Schlaud sought review by the Supreme Court.

Attorneys at the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation filed and have litigated both Shlaud and Harris on behalf of personal assistants and home childcaregivers.  In Harris, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the constitutionality generally of compelling public sector employees to pay union dues or agency fees, but it strongly signaled that the legal analysis of a 1977 Supreme Court decision, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which found compulsory agency-fee requirements to be constitutional, was “questionable.” The Harris opinion opens the door, cracked initially in Knox v. Service Employees, for the Court to revisit the constitutionality of compelling public employees to pay union dues or agency fees as a condition of employment.

Article By:

Timothy M. McConville
Of:
Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C.

 

U.S. Supreme Court Upholds D.C. Circuit Decision in Noel Canning

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In a lengthy opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, and drawing heavily on historical practice of Presidents and the Senate, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Noel Canning v. NLRB, concluding that President Obama’s three recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board in January 2012 (Sharon Block, Richard Griffin, and Terence Flynn) were invalid. The Court upheld the right of the President to make recess appointments both inter- and intra-session, but held that it is the Senate that decides when it is in session by retaining the power to conduct business pursuant to its own rules. The Court also found that a recess of less than ten days “is presumptively too short” to permit the President to make a recess appointment, except in “unusual circumstances”, such as a “national catastrophe”. (The recess here was three days.) The Court also decided that the recess appointment power applies to appointments that first come into existence during a recess and to those that initially occur before a recess but continue to exist during a recess.

As a result of the decision, over 1,000 Board decisions likely are now invalid. According to the National Right to Work Foundation, 999 unpublished decisions and 719 published decisions (totaling 1,718) could be affected. The Chamber of Commerce estimates 1,302 decisions from August 27, 2011 through July 17, 2013 to be suspect.

Article By:

Howard M. Bloom
Of:
Jackson Lewis P.C

Michigan Minimum Wage Increases Enacted

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Michigan Governor Rick Snyder has signed the Workforce Opportunity Wage Act, mandating gradual increases in the state’s minimum wage to $9.25 an hour by January 1, 2018. The Act ties increases to the rate of inflation beginning 2019.

The first of four raises mandated by Senate Bill 934 (Public Act 138), to $8.15 an hour, occurs September 1, 2014. Michigan’s minimum wage since 2008 has been $7.40 an hour for workers who do not receive a tip and $2.65 an hour for workers earning tips, such as waiters.

Also beginning September 1, 2014, tipped employees would have a minimum rate that is 38 percent of the minimum for non-tipped workers, or about $3.51 an hour.

The state’s hourly minimum for non-tipped workers will increase as follows:

  • Beginning September 1, 2014, to $8.15.
  • Beginning January 1, 2016, to $8.50.
  • Beginning January 1, 2017, to $8.90.
  • Beginning January 1, 2018, to $9.25.

Starting in 2019, minimum wage increases will be tied to the rate of inflation, but any increase will be capped at 3.5 percent a year. The rate will adjust annually based on a five-year rolling average of inflation for the Midwest. Annual increases would take effect on April 1 of each year. No increase would occur if the state’s unemployment rate for the preceding year was 8.5 percent or higher.

Several other states, including Delaware and Minnesota, also have adopted increases this year, and the minimum wage for workers on new federal contracts has been raised to $10.10 per hour.

Article By:

Maurice G. Jenkins
Matthew Scott Disbrow
Of:
Jackson Lewis P.C.

The Affordable Care Act—Countdown to Compliance for Employers, Week 29: Wellness Programs, Smoking Cessation and e-Cigarettes

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The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) generally prohibits discrimination in eligibility, benefits, or premiums based on a health factor, except in the case of certain wellness programs. Final regulations issued in 2006 established rules implementing these nondiscrimination and wellness provisions. TheAffordable Care Act largely incorporates the provisions of the 2006 final regulations (with a few clarifications), and it changes the maximum reward that can be provided under a “health-contingent” wellness program from 20 percent to 30 percent. But in the case of smoking cessation programs, the maximum reward is increased to 50 percent. Comprehensive final regulations issued in June 2013 fleshed out the particulars of the new wellness program regime.

Health-contingent wellness programs require an individual to satisfy a standard related to a health factor to obtain a reward. The final rules divide health-contingent wellness programs into the following two categories: activity-only programs, and outcome-based programs. As applied to smoking cessation, an “activity-only program” might require an individual to attend a class to obtain the reward. In contrast, an outcome-based program would require an individual to quit smoking, or least take steps to do so under complex rules governing alternative standards.

Nowhere do the final regulations address the role of electronic cigarettes (or “e-cigarettes”). Simply put, the issue is whether an e-cigarette user is a smoker or a nonsmoker? (According to Wikipedia, an electronic cigarette (e-cig or e-cigarette), “is a battery-powered vaporizer which simulates tobacco smoking by producing a vapor that resembles smoke. It generally uses a heating element known as an atomizer that vaporizes a liquid solution.”) But questions relating to e-cigarettes are starting to surface in the context of wellness program administration. Specifically:

  1. Is an individual who uses e-cigarettes a “smoker” for purposes of qualifying, or not qualifying, for a wellness program reward, and
  2. May a wellness program offer e-cigarettes as an alternative standard, i.e., one that if satisfied would qualify an individual as a non-smoker?

Is an individual who uses e-cigarettes a “smoker” for purposes of qualifying, or not qualifying, for a wellness program reward?

While the final rules don’t mention or otherwise refer to e-cigarettes, they do provide ample clues to support the proposition that smoking cessation involves tobacco use. Here is the opening paragraph of the preamble:

SUMMARY: This document contains final regulations, consistent with the Affordable Care Act, regarding nondiscriminatory wellness programs in group health coverage. Specifically, these final regulations increase the maximum permissible reward under a health-contingent wellness program offered in connection with a group health plan (and any related health insurance coverage) from 20 percent to 30 percent of the cost of coverage. The final regulations further increase the maximum permissible reward to 50 percent for wellness programs designed to prevent or reduce tobacco use. (Emphasis added.)

There is also a discussion in the preamble about alternative standards (79 Fed Reg. p. 33,164 (middle column)), which reads in relevant part:

The Departments continue to maintain that, with respect to tobacco cessation, ‘‘overcoming an addiction sometimes requires a cycle of failure and renewed effort,’’ as stated in the preamble to the proposed regulations. For plans with an initial outcome-based standard that an individual not use tobacco, a reasonable alternative standard in Year 1 may be to try an educational seminar. (Footnotes omitted.)

In addition, the final regulations’ Economic Impact and Paperwork Burden section is replete with references to tobacco use, as are the examples (see Treas. Reg. § 54.9802-1(f)(4)(vi), examples 6 and 7).

On the other hand, the definition of what constitutes a participatory wellness program refers simply to “smoking cessation” (Treas. Reg. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(ii)(D)), and the definition of an outcome-based wellness program (Treas. Reg. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(v)) simply refers to “not smoking.” In neither case is there any reference to tobacco.

The Affordable Care Act’s rules governing wellness programs are included in the Act’s insurance market reforms, which take the form of amendments to the Public Health Service Act that are also incorporated by reference in the Internal Revenue Code and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). By virtue of being included in ERISA, participants have a private right of action to enforce these rules. So an employer that wanted to treat the use of e-cigarettes as smoking in order to deny access to a wellness reward would likely confront arguments similar to those set out above in the event of a challenge.

May a wellness program offer e-cigarettes as an alternative standard, i.e., one that if satisfied would qualify an individual as a non-smoker?

This is perhaps a more difficult question. May an employer designate e-cigarette use as an alternative standard? Anecdotal evidence suggests that employers are not doing so, at least not yet. But could they do so? And would it make a difference whether the e-cigarette in question used a nicotine-based solution as opposed to some other chemical? (According to Wikipedia, “solutions usually contain a mixture of propylene glycol, vegetable glycerin, nicotine, and flavorings, while others release a flavored vapor without nicotine.”) The answer in each case is, it’s too soon to tell.

The benefits and risks of electronic cigarette use are uncertain, with evidence going both ways. Better evidence would certainly give the regulators the basis for further rulemaking in the area. In the meantime, the final regulations’ multiple references to tobacco, and by implication, nicotine, seem to furnish as good a starting point as any. This approach would require a wellness plan sponsor to distinguish between nicotine-based and non-nicotine-based solutions, which may prove administratively burdensome.

The larger question, which may take some time to settle, is whether e-cigarettes advance or retard the cause of wellness. Absent reliable clinical evidence, regulators and wellness plan sponsors have little to guide their efforts or inform their decisions as to how to integrate e-cigarettes into responsible wellness plan designs. Complicating matters, the market for e-cigarettes is potentially large, which means that reliable (read: unbiased) clinical evidence may be hard to come by. For now, all plan sponsors can do is to answer the questions set out above in good faith and in accordance with their best understanding of the final regulations.

Article By:

Alden J. Bianchi
Of:
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

 

Settlement Between U.S. Department of Labor and Oregon Blueberry Growers Vacated

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In 2012, the Department of Labor accused Oregon blueberry growers of employing “ghost workers” resulting in minimum wage violations. The DOL then issued what is known as a “hot goods order” to block shipment of their product to market until the violations were remedied.  This, of course, created an untenable situation for the blueberry producers as their products were highly perishable. With no real alternative, the blueberry growers signed consent agreements with the DOL, in which they agreed to substantial fines and waived their rights to contest the allegations.

The blueberry growers later challenged the consent judgment and in January a federal magistrate judge agreed with the growers finding that “the tactic of putting millions of dollars of perishable goods in lock up was unlawfully coercive.” That decision was upheld just last week by the United States district judge. Invaliding consent judgments, particularly those with the federal government, is extremely difficult and rarely happens. But in this case, the combination of over-the-top, coercive of tactics by the DOL, as well as the court’s view that there was little or no evidence of underlying labor violations to begin with, paved the way for the growers in this case.

Article By:

Aaron M. Phelps
Of:
Varnum LLP

Rights of Job Applicants in Germany

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The German Federal Labor Court made a very clear ruling regarding job applicants in Germany who are not offered the position for which such applicants applied.  In the Federal Labor Court’s view, a rejected applicant has no right to know whether another applicant was offered or accepted the position.  (Federal Labor Court, verdict dated April 25, 2013, case number 8 AZR 287/08)

This case concerned a plaintiff who was born in the former Soviet Union in 1961.  She applied for a position that was advertised by a German company, the defendant in this case.  Even though the plaintiff fulfilled all required qualifications, she was rejected and did not receive a job offer.  The plaintiff presumed that this decision was based on discrimination for her gender, age and origin.  The Federal Labor Court submitted the case to the European Court of Justice to determine whether the job applicant had a right to information regarding why she was not selected, or if another applicant was selected for the position.  The European Court of Justice rendered its verdict on April 19, 2012 (case number C415/10), and stated that rejected job applicants had no right to this information under European law.

The German Federal Labor Court dismissed the case because it could not detect any evidence of discrimination.  The mere refusal of the defendant to disclose any information related to the application process and/or the hiring could not establish the presumption of an inadmissible discrimination, according to Section 7 of the German General Equal Treatment Act.

However, this ruling has to be viewed with great caution.  The German decision is not in line with the aforementioned ruling in the same matter of the European Court of Justice.  The European judges, in contrast to the German Court, stressed that the complete refusal to give out any information regarding the hiring could actually be evaluated as a presumption of possible discrimination.  This remarkable difference in the two verdicts was not explained by the German judges and as long as their reasoning remains unclear, German employers should provide a short explanation to rejected applicants when they ask the reason why they have been rejected for an open position (e.g., the other candidate better satisfies the qualification profile, made a better impression at the job interview, seems to be a more motivated and energetic person, etc.).

Article By:

Dr. Sandra Urban-Crell
Gudrun Germakowski
Of:
McDermott Will & Emery

 

Working Through Lunch: An Update on the Legal Risks

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Regular readers of this blog know that we’ve previously alerted you to the risks of using timekeeping software that automatically deducts the lunch hour from employees’ paychecks.  As we’ve explained before, such software can expose employers to liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act because, for one reason or another, employees sometimes work through lunch. And, even if an employer has a system in place for employees to request pay for lunchtime work, that is no “get out of jail free card,” because employees who bring FLSA lawsuits commonly argue that they did not use – or were discouraged from using – the system.

A lawsuit that was filed earlier this month in Texas federal court gives us another reason to sound the alert.  In Corcione v. Houston Methodist, the plaintiff alleges that she – and a class of some 5,000 nurses, nurses assistants, patient care assistants and other employees at seven different medical facilities – were required to keep their cellphones on hand during their meal breaks in case they were needed to respond to emergencies. And, even though the employers had systems in place for requesting pay for lunchtime work, the plaintiff claims that managers discouraged employees from making such requests. The plaintiff seeks to recover the unpaid wages (for the time claimed to have been worked, including overtime pay), liquidated damages, and legal fees.  In other words, the plaintiff wants tens of millions of dollars.

A policy requiring nurses (and similar employees) to be available so that they can respond to emergencies probably seems reasonable to you, and we feel the same way. Work “emergencies” aren’t limited to the medical field, of course, and many other types of employers have similar policies – written or unwritten. If you’re one of them, just remember that the ramifications of such policies can land you on the wrong side of the FLSA if you’re not careful. We’ve said it before, and we’ll say it again:  Work time must be compensated.  Even if that “work time” comes during what – on a normal day – would have been “lunch time.”

Article By:

James F. Ehrenberg
Of:
Barnes & Thornburg LLP

Flextime Consideration Is Now Law In Some Places

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The pros and cons of implementing “flextime” policies have long been debated. Two laws – one state and one municipal – went into effect at the beginning of this year, however, that made it mandatory for some employers in those jurisdictions to consider flexible working arrangements for their eligible employees.

Vermont passed a “flexible working arrangements” law, which grants employees the right to request a flexible working arrangement for any reason and requires employers to discuss and consider such requests at least twice per calendar year. “Flexible working arrangement” is defined to including changes in the number of days or hours worked, changes in the employee’s start or stop time, work from home, or job-sharing. The law identifies several factors the employer may consider in choosing to grant or deny the request, including costs, effect on employee morale, ability to meet demand, and effect on schedules and staff.

San Francisco passed the “Family Friendly Workplace Ordinance,” which applies to employers with 20 or more employees. It grants certain employees with caregiving responsibilities the right to request  a schedule, location, or assignment change in order to care for children, persons with a serious health condition with whom the employee is in a family relationship, or parents who are 65 or older. Employers must meet with the employee within 21 days of the request and provide a written response. In the case of a denial, the employer must set out a bona fide business reason for the denial.

These laws require conversations that many companies have already been having with their employees. If flextime arrangements are something your company is considering, it is important to remember that such policies require very careful drafting and execution. For example, policies should explain the jobs for which flextime arrangements are and are not possible to avoid potential discrimination claims. Further, FLSA considerations such as overtime and exempt/non-exempt distinctions must be kept in mind when rearranging schedules and tracking hours. Workers’ compensation claims from telecommuting employees injured at home will also require special attention.

Vermont’s law can be found here. More information and a link to the San Francisco ordinance is here.

Article By:

Kaitlyn N. Jakubowski
Of:
Barnes & Thornburg LLP