Tag: Iran

Escalated Tension with Iran Heightens Cybersecurity Threat Despite Military De-Escalation

The recent conflict between the United States and Iran has heightened America’s long-time concern of an imminent, potentially lethal Iranian cyber-attack on critical infrastructure in America.   Below, is the latest information including the United States Government’s analysis on the current standing of these threats as of January 8, 2020. 

CISA Alert

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued Alert (AA20-006A) in light of “Iran’s historic use of cyber offensive activities to retaliate against perceived harm.”  In general, CISA’s Alert recommends two courses of action in the face of potential threats from Iranian actors: vulnerability mitigation and incident preparation.  The Alert specifically instructs organizations to increase awareness and vigilance, confirm reporting processes and exercise organizational response plans to prepare for a potential cyber incident.  CISA also suggests ensuring facilities are appropriately staffed with well-trained security personnel who are privy to the tactics of Iranian cyber-attacks.  Lastly, CISA recommends disabling unnecessary computer ports, monitoring network, and email traffic, patching externally facing equipment, and ensuring that backups are up to date.

Iranian Threat Profile

CISA asserts that Iranian cyber actors continually improve their offensive cyber capabilities. These actors are also increasingly willing to engage in destructive, kinetic, and even lethal cyber-attacks.  In the recent past, such threats have included disruptive cyber operations against strategic targets, including energy and telecommunications organizations. There has also been an increased interest in industrial control systems (such as SCADA) and operational technology (OT).  Refer to CISA’s Alert and the Agency’s “Increased Geopolitical Tensions and Threats” publication for specific Iranian advanced persistent threats to the nation’s cybersecurity.

Imminence of an Iranian Cyber-attack

While CISA urges vigilance and heightened prudence as it pertains to cybersecurity, DHS has been clear that there is “no information indicating a specific, credible threat to the Homeland.”  Nevertheless, the same National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin publication (dated January 4, 2020) warns that Iran maintains a robust cyber program. This program can carry out attacks with varying degrees of disruption against U.S. critical infrastructure. The bulletin further states that “an attack in the homeland may come with little to no warning.”  There is also a concern that homegrown violent extremists could capitalize on the heightened tensions to launch individual attacks.  With the ongoing tension, it is unlikely that the imminence of an Iranian cyber-attack will dissipate in the near term.

Implications

It is vital for businesses, especially those deemed critical infrastructure, to stay apprised of new advances on these matters.  Given that the Alert calls for organizations to take heightened preventative measures, it is imperative that critical infrastructure entities revisit their cybersecurity protocols and practices and adjust them accordingly.  A deeper understanding of the organizational vulnerabilities in relation to this particular threat will be imperative.

© 2020 Van Ness Feldman LLP

For more on cybersecurity, see the Communications, Media & Internet section of the National Law Review.

US State Department Clarifies Implementation of Travel Ban Exemptions

The diplomatic cable instructs consulates on how to interpret the US Supreme Court’s direction to enforce the restriction only against foreign nationals who lack a “bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”

This Immigration Alert serves as an addendum to our prior summary of the Supreme Court decision partially granting the government’s request to stay enforcement of two preliminary injunctions that temporarily halted enforcement of Executive Order (EO) No. 13780. As a result of this decision, foreign nationals from six countries (Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Iran, and Yemen) who cannot show bona fide ties to the United States may be denied visas or entry for 90 days starting Thursday, June 29 at 8:00 p.m. EDT.

The communication from the US Secretary of State’s office enumerates the following situations where the EO’s travel restrictions will not apply:

  • When the applicant has a close familial relationship in the United States, which is defined as a parent (including parent-in-law), spouse, fiancé, child, adult son or daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, or sibling, whether whole or half. This includes step relationships, but does not include grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins, brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, or any other “extended” family members.

  • When the applicant has a formal, documented relationship with an entity formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading the EO. This includes established eligibility for a nonimmigrant visa in any classification other than a B, C-1, D, I, or K, as a bona fide relationship to a person or entity is inherent in the visa classification.

  • When there are eligible derivative family members of any exempt applicant.

  • When the applicant has established eligibility for an immigrant visa in the immediate relative, family-based, or employment-based classification (other than certain self-petitioning and special immigrant applicants).

  • When the applicant is traveling on an A-1, A-2, NATO-1 through NATO-6, C-2 for travel to the United Nations, C-3, G-1, G-2, G-3, or G-4 visa, or a diplomatic-type visa of any classification.

  • When the applicant has been granted asylum, is a refugee who has already been admitted to the United States (including derivative follow-to-join refugees and asylees), or is an individual who has been granted withholding of removal, advance parole, or protection under the Convention Against Torture.

Applicants admitted or paroled into the United States on or after the date of the Supreme Court decision are also exempted, as are those currently in the United States who can present a visa with a validity period that includes either January 27, 2017 (the day the EO was signed) or June 29, 2017. Any document other than a visa, such as an advance parole document, valid on or after June 29 will also exempt the holder.

As described in the prior alert, any lawful permanent resident or dual foreign national of one of the six named countries who can present a valid passport from a country not on the list is not impacted by the EO. The EO also permits consular officers to grant case-by-case waivers to otherwise affected applicants who can demonstrate that being denied entry during the 90-day period would cause undue hardship, that entry would not pose a threat to national security, and that their admission would be in the national interest.

This post was written by Eric S. Bord and Eleanor Pelta of  Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.

Considerations for Travel to Iran to Explore Relaxed Trade Opportunities

travel trade opportunities IranBefore booking your airfare, be mindful of these potential issues.

In light of liberalized trade with Iran made possible by the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC’s) General License H and the relaxation of US secondary sanctions, personnel of a non-US company, whether or not owned or controlled by a US parent, may be considering travelling to Iran to explore potential business opportunities. Here are some key points to consider as you make your plans.

Travel to Iran by US Persons Is Permitted

An OFAC General License provided in 31 CFR § 560.210(d) authorizes travel to Iran from the United States or by US Persons (US citizens and US permanent resident aliens]) from outside the United States to do market research or gather business opportunity information. This authorization includes

  • importation or exportation of accompanied baggage for personal use;

  • maintenance within Iran, including payment of living expenses;

  • acquisition of goods or services for personal use in Iran; and

  • arrangement or facilitation of such travel, including air, sea, or land voyages.

US State Department Warning for Travel to Iran

On August 22, the US Department of State (State Department) reissued a travel warning for Iran that reiterates and highlights US citizens’ risk of arrest and detention, particularly dual national Iranian Americans. Iranian officials continue to detain or prevent foreigners (in particular, dual nationals of Iran and western countries, including the United States) from leaving Iran. The State Department says US citizens traveling to Iran should very carefully weigh the risks of doing so and consider postponing their travel. The State Department additionally instructs US citizens who reside in Iran to closely follow media reports, monitor local conditions, and evaluate the risks of remaining in the country.

The State Department advises that Iranian authorities continue to unjustly detain and imprison US citizens, including students, journalists, business travelers, and academics, on charges that include espionage and posing a threat to national security. Iranian authorities have also prevented a number of Iranian American citizens who traveled to Iran for personal or professional reasons from departing, in some cases for months.

The US government does not have diplomatic or consular relations with Iran, and therefore cannot provide protection or routine consular services to US citizens in Iran. The Swiss government, acting through its embassy in Tehran, serves as a protecting power for US interests in Iran. The Foreign Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy provides a limited range of consular services that may require significantly more processing time than at US embassies or consulates.

The Iranian government does not recognize dual citizenship and will not allow the Swiss to provide protective services for US citizens who are also Iranian nationals. The Iranian authorities determine a dual national’s Iranian citizenship without regard to the dual national’s personal wishes. Consular access to detained US citizens without dual nationality is often denied as well.

Loss of Visa Waiver Privileges for Entry into the United States by Non-US Citizens

The US Visa Waiver Program (VWP) Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 (the Act), which took effect in January 2016, has adversely affected some travelers to Iran who wish to enter the United States. Under the Act, travelers in the following categories are no longer eligible to travel or be admitted to the United States under the VWP:

  • Nationals of VWP countries who have traveled to or been present in Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria on or after March 1, 2011 (with limited exceptions for travel for diplomatic or military purposes in the service of a VWP country)

  • Nationals of VWP countries who are also nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria

These individuals will still be able to apply for a visa using the regular immigration process at US embassies or consulates.

As of January 21, 2016, travelers who currently have valid Electronic System for Travel Authorizations (ESTAs) and who have previously indicated that they hold dual nationality with one of the four countries listed above on their ESTA applications will have their current ESTAs revoked.

The US Department of Homeland Security’s secretary may waive these restrictions if he determines that such a waiver is in the law enforcement or national security interests of the United States. Such waivers will be granted only on a case-by-case basis. As a general matter, categories of travelers who may be eligible for a waiver include

  • individuals who traveled to Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria on behalf of international organizations, regional organizations, and subnational governments on official duty;

  • individuals who traveled to Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria on behalf of a humanitarian nongovernmental organization on official duty;

  • individuals who traveled to Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria as a journalist for reporting purposes;

  • individuals who traveled to Iran for legitimate business-related purposes following the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (July 14, 2015); and

  • individuals who traveled to Iraq for legitimate business-related purposes.

The Department of Homeland Security does not specifically define what travel to Iran for “legitimate business-related purposes” means, how the department applies the definition, or what evidence is necessary to sustain such a claim and successfully receive relief. Anecdotal evidence suggests that administrative avenues for relief from the Act’s provisions to enter the United States after travel to Iran for “legitimate business-related purposes” are obscure. Travelers to Iran who want to enter the United States and require a visa to do so should apply through the routine visa application process at their appropriate US embassy or consulate and not expect rapid administrative agency relief for the effects of the Act.

ARTICLE BY Louis Rothberg, Margaret M. Gatti & Marynell DeVaughn of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
Copyright © 2016 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Switzerland Is the First Country to Lift Some Sanctions on Iran

Certain US sanctions on Iran may be lifted mid to late 2016 or even later.badge_button_switzerland_flag_800_2222

On August 13, Switzerland became the first country to formally lift certain sanctions on Iran, following the announcement of the Iran nuclear deal this past July. Switzerland is not a party to the Iran nuclear deal.

The Swiss Federal Council made the decision, which is a seven-member executive council that constitutes the federal government of Switzerland and serves as the Swiss collective head of government and state. This action nullifies a ban on precious metals transactions with Iranian governmental bodies and the requirement to report trade in Iranian petrochemical products to the Swiss government. It also eliminates an obligation to report to the Swiss government the transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products and certain rules on insurance and reinsurance policies linked to such transactions. In the financial sector, threshold values for reporting and licensing obligations in relation to money transfers from and to Iranian nationals were increased tenfold.

These Swiss measures had already been suspended since January 2014, but by lifting them on an apparently more formal or permanent basis, the Swiss government patently appears to be sending a far larger political message to sanctions compliance personnel. The Swiss government’s announcement stated, in part, the following:

Today’s decision by the Federal Council underlines its support for the ongoing process to implement the nuclear agreement, and its confidence in the constructive intentions of the negotiating parties. The Federal Council also wishes to signal that Switzerland’s positioning with respect to Iran, which was developed and maintained over a number of years, should be used to promote a broad political and economic exchange with Iran. In recent decades, Switzerland has pursued a consistent, neutral and balanced policy with regard to Iran . . . . Should implementation of the agreement fail, the Federal Council reserves the right to reintroduce the lifted measures.

It seems clear that the Swiss Federal Council is signaling that Switzerland is eager to resume normal business with Iran. Meanwhile, however, US Department of State spokesman Mark Toner said US sanctions continue to remain in place and penalties would still apply to any country or company that violates them. He told reporters that the United States wasn’t informed in advance of the Swiss move to drop its sanctions before Iran has taken the promised steps to curb its nuclear program and before the United States, European Union, and United Nations have removed their penalties.

It is also important to remember that for now, US secondary Iran sanctions will continue to remain in effect against foreign companies for probably the next 12 months or until the implementation day, no matter the consequence of this Swiss Federal Council action.

Moreover, “US Persons” are prohibited from entering into executory contracts for Iran-related transactions until US sanctions are lifted after implementation day. The US Department of State has recently suggested that that day may fall in summer or autumn of 2016, depending if and whether the International Atomic Energy Agency can certify that Iran has taken the required steps under the Iran nuclear deal.

“US persons” means US nationals, US permanent resident aliens (“Green Card holders”), entities incorporated in the United States, individuals or entities in the United States, or entities established or maintained outside the United States that are owned or controlled by a US person. For a US person to sign such an executory contract before implementation day would be a dealing in property or an interest in property involving Iran or a Specially Designated National, which is prohibited by current US regulations as applicable to US persons. The current Iran sanctions regulations expressly state that such executory contracts are property or an interest in property because they involve “contracts of any nature whatsoever, and any other property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or interest or interests therein, present, future, or contingent.”

On the other hand, it appears that non–US persons (as defined above) that have no US nexus (e.g., not incorporated in the United States or owned or controlled by a US person), that do not act in or through the United States or a US person and that otherwise are not generally subject to US jurisdiction may enter into executory contracts with Iran without risk of exposure of an Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) enforcement case for so doing. Even in these cases, potential non–US person investors in Iran are well advised to seek clearance from the relevant regulators that these contracts do not violate United Nations, European Union, or other non–US sanctions.

At this time, it is unclear to what extent entities established or maintained outside the United States that are owned or controlled by a “US person” will be able to engage in trade with Iran after implementation day occurs. OFAC has indicated that it will resolve this question in due course, and at that time, it will issue appropriate guidance.

ARTICLE BY Louis Rothberg & Margaret M. Gatti of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
Copyright © 2015 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Negotiators Have Reached Deal with Iran – U.S. Persons Should Not Expect Quick Relief From Sanctions

On July 14, 2015, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany (the “P5 + 1”) announced a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran intended to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. The agreement builds on the JCPOA framework announced on April 2, 2015, and is intended to provide Iran with phased sanctions relief based on verification that Iran has implemented key nuclear commitments.

Under the JCPOA, Iran agrees to cap its uranium enrichment capability for 10 years and to accept international monitoring of its nuclear program. In exchange, the United States, European Union, and United Nations will relax sanctions on Iran in stages. Once international nuclear inspectors verify that Iran has implemented the agreed to nuclear-related restrictions, the United Nations will pass a new resolution that will terminate various resolutions currently in place. If, at any time, Iran is determined to be out of compliance with its obligations, those resolutions will “snapback” or be re-imposed against Iran. The EU further agreed to terminate its regulations implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions at the time the inspectors verify Iran is in compliance.

U.S. sanctions relief will initially be limited to the suspension of secondary sanctions that target the commercial activities of non-U.S. companies in key sectors of the Iranian economy, such as oil, gas and petrochemical industries, as well as companies in the shipping and shipbuilding and automotive sectors. In other words, the sanctions relief that was provided to non-U.S. persons earlier in the negotiations will continue. Eventually, these secondary sanctions may be eliminated (rather than suspended) but only if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies that Iran has implemented key nuclear-related measures described in the JCPOA.

It is anticipated that the United Nations Security Council will endorse the Agreement over the new few days. The JCPOA and its commitments will come into effect 90 days after the Security Council’s endorsement, which will be known as “Adoption Day.” Beginning on Adoption Day, the P5+1 and Iran will prepare for implementation of the agreement, but no sanctions relief will be granted until inspectors have verified Iran is in compliance with its commitments.

What changes, if any, will be made in primary U.S. sanctions, such as the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), is less certain. Under the Iran Nuclear Review Act, passed into law in May 2015, the president must transmit the agreement to Congress, which then has 60 days to review it. During Congress’ review period, the president may not waive, suspend, reduce, or provide relief from statutory sanctions or refrain from applying existing sanctions. In other words, there will be no sanctions relief for U.S. persons in the immediate future. If, as some members of Congress have threatened, Congress issues a joint resolution of disapproval, which the president in turn has threatened to veto, there is another waiting period during which the president may take no action to reduce sanctions.

Thus, the status quo will likely continue for quite some time, and from the perspective of U.S. primary sanctions – those that apply to U.S. individuals and entities, as well as entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons – no changes are imminent.

ARTICLE BY Joan Koenig & Mollie D. Sitkowski of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

©2015 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

Congress Scrutinizes Iran, as the Deadline for a Final Deal Approaches; Ceasefire Violations in Ukraine Continue; Congress to Hold Hearings on ISIL; The House is Expected to Turn to Trade Measures At Some Point in June

Vice President Mourns Death of Son

Late on Saturday, 30 May, the White House informed the public that Vice President Joseph Biden’s son, Joseph R. “Beau” Biden III , passed away after a two-year battle with brain cancer. He was 46 years old.

Iran

Despite media reports last week that yet another delay may be necessary, the State Department denied another extension may be needed beyond 30 June to conclude a final deal with Iran regarding its nuclear facilities. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman, who leads the U.S. negotiators in the discussions with Iran, announced her resignation last Wednesday. She will continue to lead the U.S. negotiators in the discussions with Iran until a final deal is reached.

Secretary of State John Kerry is returning to Washington early, after concluding a round of talks with Iran and after breaking his leg during a bicycle ride over the weekend in Europe.

On Wednesday 3 June, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to hold a hearing titled, “Implications Of The Iran Nuclear Agreement For U.S. Policy In The Middle East.” The day before, the Committee will receive a closed briefing on Iran’s nuclear program.

On Tuesday, 2 June, the House Foreign Affairs Committee will hold a hearing titled, “Americans Detained In Iran.”

Russia/Ukraine Crisis

Last Thursday, the State Department criticized reports that the Russian government plans to classify military deaths during special operations in peacetime. Spokesperson Jeff Rathke alleged that the law is a misplaced effort to cover up Russian active duty military personnel fighting and dying in eastern Ukraine, and further serves as a blow to freedom of the press. The United States continues to urge Russia to fully implement the Minsk agreements, warning that otherwise “the costs will continue to rise.” While the media is reporting on a Russian military build-up along eastern Ukraine’s border, the State Department declined to confirm whether the Obama Administration believes that Russia is preparing for a new offensive against Ukraine.

On Wednesday, 27 May, Vice President Biden asserted that U.S. sanctions on Russia must and will remain in place until the Minsk agreements are fully implemented. He expressed hope that European leaders will renew the existing sanctions when they meet at the end of June until the Minsk agreements are fully implemented. He emphasized that in the interim, the United States will continue to expose the truth about Russia’s actions and will coordinate closely with its partners to ensure that further Russian aggression is met with further costs if Russia again moves beyond the line of contact.

Also last Wednesday, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that he was deeply troubled by Russia’s escalating rhetoric about its nuclear weapons, as well as increased flights by its nuclear-capable bombers. The Secretary General said that if Russia places nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, near Poland, or in Crimea, the balance of security in Europe would fundamentally change. President Barack Obama met with Secretary General Stoltenberg last Tuesday and discussed Russia’s increasingly aggressive posture in eastern Ukraine, among other topics.

FIFA

One day after Senators Robert Menendez (D-New Jersey) and John McCain (R-Arizona) sent a letter to the International Federation of Association Football (“FIFA”) Congress encouraging the international soccer governing body reconsider granting a fifth term to President Sepp Blatter, Swiss law enforcement agents arrested top FIFA authorities last week in connection with a U.S. Department of Justice investigation. Nine FIFA officials and several corporate executives have been indicted in New York on charges involving a racketeering conspiracy, as well as wire fraud and money laundering. Much of the attention is focused on Qatar being named host of the 2022 World Cup, but Senators Menendez and McCain were critical of Mr. Blatter for his support of Russia’s successful bid for the event in 2018.

Last Thursday, State Department Spokesperson Rathke denied that a recent U.S. Department of Justice investigation against FIFA leadership is an attempt by the US to influence the organization’s internal processes, including its selection of Russia as host of the 2018 World Cup. He emphasized that the investigation and its associated indictments are focused on addressing corruption allegations within the organization. While more arrests are expected, Mr. Blatter was re-elected – reportedly without U.S. support – on Friday.

Syria/Iraq Crisis

The U.S. military has started training Syrian opposition fighters in Turkey to combat ISIL, an expected expansion of the program first launched in Jordan several weeks ago.  Secretary Kerry is expected to join by teleconference a meeting in Paris this Tuesday of Foreign Ministers who are part of the coalition against ISIL.

On Wednesday, 3 June, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East will hold a hearing titled, “U.S. Policy Towards ISIL After Terror Group Seizes Ramadi and Palmyra.”

On Tuesday, 2 June, the House Foreign Affairs Terrorism Subcommittee will hold a hearing to review the State Department’s Counterterrorism Bureau.

Africa

On Thursday, 4 June, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa will hold a hearing entitled, “Security Assistance in Africa.”

On Wednesday, 3 June, the House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee will hold a hearing titled, “The Future of U.S.-Zimbabwe Relations.”

South China Sea

At the International Institute for Strategic Studies Summit in Singapore over the weekend, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said about China’s activities in the South China Sea:

“Turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit.”

House June Agenda – Trade Measures Ahead

House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-California) released a Memorandum last Friday outlining his chamber’s June agenda. While the agenda does not definitively state when, the House is expected to consider: (1) Trade Promotion Authority (TPA); (2) Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA); (3) a trade preferences measure (AGOA/GSP/Haiti program); and (4) a customs measure.

House Majority Leader McCarthy notes in the “Additional Items” section of the Memorandum:

“To preserve American interests abroad, grow our economy, and increase commerce, the House will likely consider H.R. 1314, The Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (as amended by the Senate), which reauthorizes Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and strengthens Congress’ role in trade policy. When TPA is considered, the House will also consider the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 and the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015.” (Emphasis added).

Customs Measure

In a letter dated 22 May to Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Ranking Member Ron Wyden (D-Oregon), House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Paul Ryan (R-Wisconsin) said he intends to include four amendments in the House version of a customs and enforcement bill (H.R. 1907) that failed to advance in the Senate’s version of the TPA bill. These changes include:

  1. Trade remedy law changes championed by Senators Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) and Rob Portman (R-Ohio), currently pending in the House as H.R. 2523.

  2. Compromise language on human trafficking originally offered by Senator Robert Menendez (D-New Jersey).

  3. An immigration-related amendment originally offered by Senators Ted Cruz (R-Texas) and Hatch.

  4. An amendment championed by Senator Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska) that would create a principal negotiating objective regarding opportunities for U.S. exports in fish, seafood and shellfish.

Despite an International Monetary Fund assessment that China’s currency is no longer undervalued, some argue a provision to address foreign currency manipulation is still needed.

Trans-Pacific Partnership

Chief negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) continued negotiations in Guam last week, though a lack of TPA remains a significant obstacle to concluding some of the agreement’s more complex chapters. Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russell said on 27 May that the United States welcomes the Republic of Korea’s interest in joining the TPP in the future. On 26 May, the White House announced that President Barack Obama would welcome Korean President Park Geun-hye to the White House on 16 June.

Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership

Last Thursday, the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee passed a non-binding resolution that endorsed inclusion of an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism in the Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement and also called on the United States to adopt higher labor standards.

Cuba

Last Friday, the Obama Administration formally removed Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. State Department Spokesperson Rathke said,

“The rescission of Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism reflects our assessment that Cuba meets the statutory criteria for rescission.”

Cuba has been on the list for nearly 30 years.

2015 Climate Investment Reports Released

Last Friday, the State Department began a staggered released of its 2015 Investment Climate Statements. These reports cover more than 175 foreign markets and provide country-specific information and assessments on investment-related laws and other pertinent factors for doing business abroad. U.S. embassies and consulates prepared the statements to assist U.S. companies with making informed decisions regarding investment in foreign markets.

Looking Ahead

Washington will likely focus on the following upcoming matters:

  • 7-8 June: G-7 Summit in Schloss Elmau, Germany

  • 16 June: President Obama will host President Park Geun-hye of the Republic of Korea

  • 24-24 June: NATO Defense Ministerial in Brussels

  • 30 June: US Export-Import Bank charter expires

  • 30 June: P5+1 Talks with Iran deadline to reach a deal

  • 13 July: President Obama to host Conference on Aging

  • [TBD] July: President Obama to travel to Kenya attend the Global Entrepreneurship Summit

  • 15 September: 70th Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) opens in New York City

  • 24 September: Pope Francis to address Congress and meet with President Obama

  • 28 September: General debate of the UNGA begins

ARTICLE BY Stacy A. Swanson of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
© Copyright 2015 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP