Tag: IP Law

Copyright Dispute Over Andy Warhol’s Portraits of Prince Heading to U.S. Supreme Court

The U.S. Supreme Court will review the standard for a “transformative” work as “fair use” under the Copyright Act.   Specifically, whether a second work of art is “transformative” when it conveys a different meaning or message from its source material, or not where it recognizably derives from and retains the essential elements of its source material.

The Court agreed to review the Second Circuit’s decision that Andy Warhol’s Prince Series portraits of the musician Prince did not make fair use of celebrity photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph of Prince.  Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, No. 21-869 (petition granted Mar. 28, 2022).

The Warhol Foundation’s (AWF) petition argues that the Second Circuit’s decision contradicts Supreme Court precedent that a new work is “transformative” if it has a new “meaning or message” citing Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1202-03 (2021) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).  AWF also argued that the Second Circuit’s decision creates a circuit split where the Ninth Circuit has held that even with few physical changes a work can be transformative if new expressive content or a new message is apparent.  As a result, this decision “threatens massive restrictions on First Amendment expression” that would create a “sea-change in the law of copyright.”

Goldsmith’s opposition brief asserts that the AWF mischaracterizes Supreme Court precedent.  And that the Second Circuit “faithfully applied” the proper test for transformativeness in determining Warhol’s series of silkscreen prints were not fair use.  Goldsmith also argues petitioner has manufactured a circuit split that does not exist.

This dispute stems from a a declaratory judgment action filed in 2017 by the Andy Warhol Foundation in the Southern District of New York seeking that Warhol’s portraits of Prince did not infringe photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph.  In 2019, the district court granted summary judgment to the Warhol Foundation, holding that the Prince Series was “transformative” because it incorporated a new meaning and message different from Goldsmith’s photograph.

In 2021, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that Warhol’s portraits were not fair use as a matter of law.  The Second Circuit held that Warhol’s use was not “transformative,” even though Warhol’s use included some visual differences from Goldsmith’s photograph, because Warhol’s use “retains the essential elements of the Goldsmith Photograph without significantly adding to or altering those elements.”

Multiple amicus briefs supporting the Warhol Foundation were filed including by a group of 12 copyright law professors; a group of 13 art law professors; artists and art professors Barbara Kruger and Robert Storr; and the Robert Rauschenberg Foundation, Roy Lichtenstein Foundation, and Brooklyn Museum.  The visual arts community and content creators in every industry will heavily watch this case.

The Supreme Court will hear the Warhol case in its new term, which begins in October.

Article By Susan M. Kayser and Eric W. Lee of K&L Gates

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates

The Time Has Come for Trademark Modernization Act Regulations

On Dec. 18, 2021, regulations implementing the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (TMA) went into effect. Trademark owners and practitioners should be aware of the new procedures and ensure they are ready for the changes.

Trademark Modernization Act Regulations

Our posts “Three Things to Know About the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020” and “The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020: New Rules and Procedures” from March and May 2021, respectively, gave an overview of the changes that will be implemented with the act. Most notably, the TMA provides for new procedures to challenge trademark registrations based on nonuse – expungement, and reexamination. It is intended that the new ex parte expungement and reexamination proceedings will be faster and more efficient alternatives to cancellation procedures before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. You can read the final rule here.

Another significant change is the requirement for filers to verify their identity with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). This is part of the USPTO’s efforts to protect the integrity of the register and combat fraudulent filings, which have been on the uptick. Beginning in early 2022, the following must verify their identity with the USPTO using one of the verification options that includes an electronic process by ID.me

Trademark owners and corporate officers not represented by an attorney, US-licensed attorneys (including in-house counsel), and Canadian attorneys or agents are required to verify their identity. Paralegals and other support staff working for an attorney must be sponsored by a verified attorney. Trademark owners who are represented by an attorney do not currently need to verify their identities to sign electronic forms sent by their attorney; however, if the representation by that attorney ends, the owners will need to submit to the verification process.

It is important that trademark holders and practitioners prepare for these new policies and procedures to ensure they can complete filings on a timely basis.

Article By Danielle M. DeFilippis of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2021 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

Disclaiming Patent Claims Leads PTAB to Grant a Request for Adverse Judgment

In Arsus, LLC v. Unified Patents, LLC, (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2021), the Federal Circuit affirmed, through a Rule 36 judgment, the PTAB’s ruling granting a Request for Adverse Judgment After Institution of Trial.

Arsus initially sued Tesla Motors, Inc. for patent infringement in the Northern District of California asserting U.S. Patent No. 10,259,494. The ’494 patent is directed to a “rollover prevention apparatus.” The patent describes an “adaptive steering range limiting device,” which “prevents the steering wheel of the vehicle from being turned beyond the threshold of vehicle rollover, but otherwise does not restrict the rotational range of motion of the steering wheel of the vehicle.”

Unified Patents filed for inter partes review, challenging Arsus’ claims as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Arsus then filed for statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims with the USPTO under 37 C.F.R. 1.321(a), and subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss with the Board. In doing so, Arsus argued that because all of the claims at issue were disclaimed, there was no longer any case or controversy, and thus the Board had no jurisdiction to do anything other than to dismiss the IPR. However, the Board construed Arsus’s disclaimer as a Request for Adverse Judgment under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), and terminated the IPR in favor of Unified Patents.

Arsus responded by filing a Motion to Vacate Judgment and, relying on Federal Circuit precedent from Sanofi-Aventis U.S. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Inc., 933 F.3d 1367, 1373-75 (Fed. Cir. 2019), argued that the Board did not have jurisdiction to enter the Judgment because the disclaimer mooted the IPR petition and “deprived the Board of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Unified Patents, LLC v. Arsus, LLC, IPR2020-00948, Paper 19, 3 (PTAB Jan. 29, 2021). The Board, however, pointed out that Sanofi-Aventis concerned a district court’s jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution, and determined that Arsus failed to show that the same requirements applied to administrative proceedings.

Arsus subsequently appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed without opinion by issuing a Rule 36 judgment.

© 2021 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP

Article By Andrew N. Schneider, Shannon M. Patrick and Amanda K. Murphy, Ph.D. of Finnegan

For more articles on the PTAB, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

Intellectual Property Consolidation in the Agriculture Industry

Ever since agencies around the world such as the USPTO, USDA, and Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) have started recognizing and enforcing intellectual property rights relating to plants, there has been a slow yet massive consolidation in global seed markets.  This article discusses a brief history of how intellectual property rights and lax antitrust enforcement in the seed industry created one of the largest industry consolidations and how the current Administration seems to be taking steps in the right direction.

Intellectual Property in the Agriculture Industry

In 1930, the United States began granting plant patents and the USPTO issued the first plant patent in 1931 for a rose.  The UPOV is an international organization that was founded in 1961 to acknowledge and make available exclusive property rights for breeders of new plant varieties in all member states to the UPOV Convention. The U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) was enacted by Congress in 1970 to encourage the development of new varieties and to make them available to the public.  The Plant Variety Protection Act established in the Department of Agriculture an office to be known as the Plant Variety Protection Office.  These regulations are all very important for the protection and continued innovation of certain varieties of crops and plants.  However, when genetically modified seeds were introduced in 1996, seed companies began to take advantage of these protections and began to invest heavily in amassing as many seed-related IP rights as they could.  As these companies have merged and acquired smaller businesses, they remove competition from the industry, harming farmers, families, and consumers.

There are many ways that companies protect intellectual property in the agricultural industry.  For example, companies file for utility patents to protect a wide variety of plant-related inventions, such as breeding methods, plant-based chemicals, plant parts, and plant products. Plant patents are unique to the United States and provide protection to any distinct and new variety of plant that has been asexually reproduced, other than a tuber-propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state.  Plant Variety Protection certificates, which are similar to plant patents, provide certain exclusive rights to breeders of any new, distinct, uniform, and stable sexually or asexually reproduced or tuber-propagated plant varieties.  Other rights, known as Breeders’ Rights, exist in other countries outside the United States and are very similar to the Plant Variety Protection regulations.  These protections generally last for 20 years from the date of filing and, according to the World Intellectual Property Organization, the patent owner has the right to decide who may – or may not – use the patented invention for the period in which the invention is protected.

The Key Players in the Agriculture Industry

Monsanto was a multinational agricultural biotechnology corporation founded in 1901 and based in the United States.  In 1970, Monsanto scientist John Franz discovered that glyphosate was an herbicide and quickly patented it as such.  In 1974, Monsanto brought the patented glyphosate herbicide to the market using the tradename “Roundup.”  In 1996, Monsanto created the first genetically engineered (GE), glyphosate-resistant crop, causing Roundup-resistant soybeans to be planted commercially throughout the United States.  By 1998, glyphosate-resistant corn was available on the market, and Monsanto became the largest supplier of these new GE, “Roundup-Ready” seeds.  This was such a breakthrough in the agriculture industry that in 2003, Roundup-Ready seeds accounted for about 90% of the genetically modified seeds planted around the globe.

As with many industries, the agriculture industry has those companies that are at the top and those that are not.  The agriculture industry’s “Big Six” companies—Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Dow, Bayer, and BASF—turned into the “Big Four”—ChemChina, Corteva, Bayer, and BASF— after a series of mergers and acquisitions that took place in the last decade with very little oversight from some of the antitrust authorities in the United States and around the world.  As a result of these mergers, the “Big Four” companies now control around 60% of the proprietary seed in the world market.

The Consolidation of the Seed Industry

Dr. Phil Howard from Michigan State University discussed the tremendous consolidation of the commercial seed industry in one of his first publications, 2009’s Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996-2008.  Dr. Howard describes how the hybrid-seed corn industry of 1930, the enforcement of patent-like protections, and especially the commercialization of fully patent-protected transgenic, genetically engineered seeds in the mid-late 1990s triggered a wave of consolidation in the agricultural industry.  To make matters worse, when these companies consolidated and amassed massive intellectual property portfolios, it was not uncommon for seed rights to be bundled with other inputs to protect profits in other, agrochemical divisions.  For example, as Dr. Howard details in Visualizing Consolidation, in order to use Monsanto’s herbicide-tolerant transgenic seed, farmers are required to also use Monsanto’s proprietary glyphosate herbicide, rather than a generic herbicide.  Essentially, if you were buying Roundup-Ready seed, you were buying Roundup herbicide, and if you were using Roundup herbicide, it was probably a good idea to buy Roundup-Ready seed.  This type of competitive business practice is one that eventually creates a multitude of problems for smaller, independent businesses, breeders, and farmers.

Antitrust and Anti-Competition in America

Antitrust laws are not a new concept in American society.  Antitrust laws are statutes and regulations that are designed to promote the overall competition in the market by promoting free, open, and competitive markets.  Congress passed the first antitrust law in 1890 when it wrote the Sherman Act, which made it illegal for companies to enter into agreements to compete with one another, resulting in price fixing and monopoly power.  Several years later, in 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act to protect American consumers by giving the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) the authority to oversee and review mergers and acquisitions that are likely to stifle competition.  Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the FTC and DOJ review most of the proposed transactions that affect commerce in the United States and either agency can take legal action to block deals that it believes would “substantially lessen competition.”

While these laws are all beneficial in theory, their implementation in the agricultural industry has been lacking to say the least.  According to a study in 2018, Bayer alone is estimated to control 35% of corn seed, 28% of soybean seed, and 70% of cottonseed in the global market!  Even more alarming may be the USDA’s 2014 report citing concerns that glyphosate-resistant crops have become ubiquitous with American agriculture with 93% of soybeans, 85% of corn, and 82% of cotton planted being genetically modified to be glyphosate-resistant.  The herbicides that are used to combat the weeds surrounding the crops, in many cases, are supplied by the same company that provides the seeds.

Promoting Competition in the Agriculture Industry

It has been almost a century since the first antitrust laws were enacted, and yet the problem of corporate consolidations remains in many industries across America.  On July 9, 2021, the Biden Administration signed an executive order aimed to promote competition within various industries in the United States.  The order includes 72 initiatives by more than a dozen federal agencies to promptly tackle some of the most pressing competition problems across our economy.  According to the Administration, this order is a “whole-of-government” approach to drive down prices for consumers, increase wages for workers, and facilitate innovation. This was a major step in the right direction to weaken the power that major businesses have obtained as a result of corporate consolidation in industries like healthcare, technology, transportation, and especially agriculture.

This Executive Order also established the White House Competition Council to drive forward the Administration’s whole-of-government effort to promote competition.  On September 10, 2021, the Competition Council held its inaugural meeting to discuss promoting pro-competitive policies and new ways of delivering concrete benefits to America’s consumers, workers, farmers, and small businesses.  During the meeting, the heads of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Justice, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Trade Commission briefed the council members on their efforts to implement the directives of the Executive Order.

The Challenge of Facing the Consolidated Agriculture Industry

According to an October 20, 2021 report by Thomson Reuters, Tom Vilsack, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, said that the Biden Administration plans to take a hard look at the consolidation of the seed industry and figure out “why it’s structured the way it’s structured” and “whether these long patents make sense.”  The White House Competition Council is certainly faced with a difficult challenge to parse through both anti-competition law and intellectual property law.  For centuries these bodies of law have caused great debate.  One body of law restricts monopolization wherein the later grants monopolistic opportunities.

There is no doubt that any changes to the current seed industry scene would shake things up.  But what exactly would that look like?  Are we going to see the “Big-4” morph into another, new identity?  Are changes to the patent law system likely?  Whatever happens, the agriculture industry will likely pay close attention to the actions of the White House Competition Council over the next couple months.

Article By Reinier R. Smit of Summa PLLC

Copyright 2021 Summa PLLC All Rights Reserved

Oh the Horror: No Work for Hire in Friday the 13th Screenplay

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a summary judgment grant, ruling that an author was an independent contractor when writing the screenplay for a horror film and entitled to authorship rights, and therefore entitled to exercise his copyright § 203 termination right. Horror Inc. v. Miller, Case No. 18-3123 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (Carney, J.)

Victor Miller is an author who has written numerous novels, screenplays and teleplays. Sean Cunningham is a producer, director and writer of feature films and is the general partner of Manny Company. Miller and Cunningham were close friends who began working together around 1976 and collaborated on five motion pictures in their first five years working together. Miller was a member of the Writers Guild of America, East (WGA) and was a signatory of their Minimum Basic Agreement (MBA), which was the collective bargaining agreement at the time.

In 1979, the success of the horror film Halloween inspired Cunningham to produce a horror film. Cunningham reached out to Miller and they orally agreed that Miller would write the screenplay for their upcoming project. The two came to an agreement using the WGA standard form. Miller then began developing the screenplay and the two worked closely together in discussing ideas for the film. Miller picked his working hours but was responsible for completing drafts based on the production schedule of the film. Cunningham had no right to assign additional works to Miller beyond the screenplay.

The dispute concerns whether, for Copyright Act purposes, Miller was an employee or independent contractor of Manny Company, of which Cunningham was the general partner. Cunningham argued that he taught Miller the key elements of a successful horror film, that he gave significant contributions and that he had final authority over what ended up in the screenplay. Miller agreed that Cunningham gave notes but stated that Cunningham never dictated what he wrote. The parties agreed that Cunningham did provide the ideas for making the movie killings “personal,” that the killer remain masked and that they kill a major character early. Miller received “sole ‘written by’ credit” as the screenwriter.

Horror Inc. (successor to Georgetown Horror) financed the project and was given complete control over the screenplay and film. Manny assigned its rights in the film and screenplay to Horror, which registered the copyrights. In the registration, Horror was listed as the film’s work made for hire author with a credit given to Miller for the screenplay. The initial film was a huge hit and has spawned 11 sequels.

In 2016, Miller attempted to reclaim his copyright ownership by invoking his termination rights under 17 U.S.C. § 203 and served notices of termination to Manny and Horror. The two responded by suing Miller and seeking a declaration that the screenplay was a “work for hire,” and therefore Miller could not give a valid termination notice. The district court granted summary judgment to Miller, stating that Miller was the author as he did not prepare the screenplay as a work for hire and that Miller’s termination notice was not untimely. Manny and Horror appealed.

In its de novo review, the Second Circuit considered the district court’s determination as to whether Miller was an employee or an independent contractor based on its balancing of the 13 factors established by the Supreme Court in its 1987 ruling in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. Because a “work made for hire” is a statutory exception to the general rule of author ownership of a copyright, the party claiming the exception bears the burden of proving that the exception applies.

Manny and Horror argued that the screenplay was a work for hire as Miller was an employee under his WGA membership, that the district court erred for not considering the WGA collective bargaining agreement within the Reid factors and that the court incorrectly balanced the Reid factors by not giving more weight to Miller’s membership in the WGA or his collective bargaining agreement.

The Second Circuit found that Miller was not an employee, explaining that a finding of employment status for copyright claims is determined under copyright law and not labor law. The Court determined that Miller’s employment status under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the terms of his membership in the WGA do not remove the determination of employment status under the Copyright Act and principles of agency. The Court found that the district court correctly declined to consider NLRA arguments and was correct to focus on common law principles and the Reid factors.

After finding that the WGA membership was not dispositive, the Second Circuit determined that the WGA collective bargaining agreement should not be considered as an additional Reid factor. The Court found that although Miller’s WGA membership could play a role in how the relationship between the parties played out, membership itself would not alter the Reid factors analysis.

The Second Circuit approved the district court’s application of the Reid factors and its refusal to accord “great weight” to Miller’s union membership. Rather, the Court rejected the proposition that the WGA membership should be given “great weight,” explaining that the membership was not to be treated as a separate factor and that union membership was relevant only to the extent it played into the analysis of the Reid factors. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Miller was an independent contractor and had sufficiently rebutted the statutory presumption given to Georgetown’s copyright registration listing the work as for hire.

© 2021 McDermott Will & Emery

Article By Joshua Revilla of McDermott Will & Emery

For more articles on IP law, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

 

Don’t Count Your Lamborghinis Before Your Trademark is in Use

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment, finding that a trademark registrant had alleged infringement of its trademark without having engaged in bona fide use of the trademark in commerce, as required by the Lanham Act. The Court found no material issue of fact as to whether the registrant had used the mark in commerce in a manner to properly secure registration, and the alleged infringer therefore was entitled to cancellation of the registration. Social Technologies LLC v. Apple Inc., Case No. 320-15241 (9th Cir. July 13, 2021) (Restani, J., sitting by designation)

This dispute traces back to a 2016 intent-to-use US trademark application filed by Social Technologies for the mark MEMOJI in connection with a mobile phone software application. After filing its application, Social Technologies engaged in some early-stage activities to develop a business plan and seek investors. On June 4, 2018, Apple announced its own MEMOJI software, acquired from a third party, that allowed users to transform images of themselves into emoji-style characters. At that date, Social Technologies had not yet written any code for its own app and had engaged only in promotional activities for the planned software.

Apple’s MEMOJI announcement triggered Social Technologies to rush to develop its MEMOJI app, which it launched three weeks later (although system bugs caused the app to be removed promptly from the Google Play Store). Social Technologies then used that app launch to submit a statement of use for its trademark application in order to secure registration of the MEMOJI trademark. The record also showed that over the course of those three weeks, Social Technologies’ co-founder and president sent several internal emails urging acceleration of the software development in preparation to file a trademark infringement lawsuit against Apple, writing to the company’s developers that it was “[t]ime to get paid, gentlemen,” and to “[g]et your Lamborghini picked out!”

By September 2018, Apple had initiated a petition before the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board to cancel Social Technologies’ MEMOJI registration. Social Technologies responded by filing a lawsuit for trademark infringement and seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and validity of its MEMOJI registration. When both parties moved for summary judgement, the district court determined that Social Technologies had not engaged in bona fide use of the MEMOJI trademark and held that Apple was entitled to cancellation of Social Technologies’ registration. Social Technologies appealed.

Reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, the Ninth Circuit framed its analysis under the Lanham Act’s use in commerce requirement, which requires bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade and “not merely to reserve a right” in the mark. The issue on appeal was whether Social Technologies used the MEMOJI mark in commerce in such a manner to render its trademark registration valid.

The Ninth Circuit then explained the Lanham Act’s use in commerce requirement, which requires “use of a genuine character” determined by the totality of the circumstances (including “non-sales activity”), and explained that mere adoption of a trademark, without bona fide use in commerce, in an attempt to reserve rights for the future, is insufficient to establish rights in the mark. The Court reviewed supporting case law, distinguishing between cases where mere promotional activities or internal sales were determined not to constitute use in commerce, and cases where continuous use of a mark as a business name, in public relations campaigns, in sales presentations and in media coverage together sufficiently established bona fide use in commerce. The Court explained that looks for “external manifestation” and “sufficiently public use” to warrant trademark protection.

On the facts of the case before it, the Ninth Circuit found that the record evidence clearly demonstrated that Social Technologies’ use of the MEMOJI mark had not been bona fide use in commerce. With respect to its activities prior to Apple’s June 2018 MEMOJI announcement (which included no software code, the unsuccessful solicitation of investors, and no “association among consumers between the mark and the mark’s owner”), there was not sufficient use to entitle Social Technologies to trademark protection. The Court found that Social Technologies failed to put forward evidence that its admittedly rushed release of the software following Apple’s 2018 announcement was for a genuine commercial purpose warranting trademark protection, rather than mere “token use” in an attempt to reserve a right in the mark.

Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Social Technologies did not engage in bona fide use of the MEMOJI trademark in commerce, that its registration was invalid, and that Apple was entitled to cancellation of Social Technologies’ MEMOJI registration.

© 2021 McDermott Will & Emery
For more articles on IP law, visit the NLR

Do What You Learned in Kindergarten: Fight Fair and Play by the Rules—Avoiding Litigation Misconduct

Holding

In Performance Chemical Company v. True Chemical Solutions, LLC, No. W-21-CV-00222-ADA (W.D. Tex. May 21, 2021), Judge Albright of the Western District of Texas found that True Chemical Solutions (“True Chem”) violated the Court’s discovery order in bad faith and caused substantial prejudice to Performance Chemical Company (“PCC”). The district court granted PCC’s motion for sanctions against True Chem and dismissed the case.

Background

PCC filed suit alleging that True Chem infringed PCC’s patented Automated Water Treatment Trailers, or frac trailers. Id. at 2. Throughout the litigation, a key issue was whether True Chem automated its frac trailer by using a programmable logic controller (“PLC”) to automate the pumps within the trailer.

During discovery, PCC requested that its expert be allowed to inspect a True Chem frac trailer, which True Chem resisted. Id. The Court ordered True Chem to allow the inspection. When PCC expressed concern that True Chem would present an incomplete trailer for inspection, the Court specifically ordered that the inspection be of a trailer that was complete and included all relevant components. Id. at 3.

In response to the Court’s order, True Chem produced trailers for inspection. However, when PCC inspected the trailers, it found no PLC automation device, even though the trailers were manufactured to be capable of automation. Id.

PCC also tried to ascertain from True Chem’s employees in depositions whether True Chem’s frac trailers were automated. Under oath, True Chem employees repeatedly testified that True Chem did not automate frac trailers by installing a PLC. Id. Due to these representations, PCC could only rely on circumstantial evidence to prove its infringement theories regarding automation. Id. at 4.

After the close of discovery and in response to a court-ordered document search, True Chem produced more than 50,000 new documents. Id. Those documents contained information appearing to show that third-party automation companies had been retained by True Chem to automate its frac trailers. Id.  PCC deposed representatives of these third-party companies, which confirmed that, in 2019, True Chem had hired a third party to install a PLC on frac trailersand that those PLC devices were still mounted the last time the third-party company interacted with the trailer. Id. at 5.  The PLC device in question was large and would have required considerable effort to install and maintain. Id. PCC argued, and the Court agreed, that removing it from a trailer would have required considerable effort. Id.

True Chem did not dispute that the third-party company installed a PLC on frac trailers but, unsurprisingly, disputed the implication that it removed the PLC device specifically to dodge discovery.

Legal Standard

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court may issue sanctions against a party who “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). One of the sanctions allowed by Rule 37 is “rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party.”

The Fifth Circuit requires a finding of bad faith or willful conduct for the severest sanctions under Rule 37, such as striking pleadings, dismissing a case, or rendering default judgment. Additionally, before dismissing a case for discovery abuse, the Fifth Circuit requires that several factors be met. The factors include: (1) that the violation of the discovery order be attributable to the client instead of the attorney; (2) that the violating party’s misconduct must cause substantial prejudice to the opposing party; and (3) a finding that less drastic sanctions would not be appropriate. Performance Chemical Co., No. W-21-CV-00222-ADA (W.D. Tex. May 21, 2021), at 2 (citing FDIC v. Conner, 20 F. 3d 1376, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1994)).

First Factor: Violation of the Discovery Order be Attributable to the Client Instead of the Attorney

The Court found that True Chem committed discovery violations with a pattern of “contumacious conduct and delay.” The Court issued a specific order that True Chem make all components in its custody or control, whether attached to trailers or not, available for inspection.

A True Chem employee testified that the company did not employ automation—even though True Chem had received an invoice for the automation project. Id. at 6. True Chem had not produced the PLC, or even notified counsel of the PLC’s existence, or taken steps to amend pleadings, supplement interrogatories, or notify opposing counsel or the Court, until a year later. Id. at 7. In fact, it was only after PCC subpoenaed a third-party company that it could determine the nature of the invoices and discover the PLC device.  It was only 154 days after the close of discovery as part of a 50,000-piece document dump that True Chem produced invoices pertaining to the allegedly non-existent automation. Id. at 4, 7.  Even then, True Chem still had not turned over the PLC device for inspection.

The Court found that, for a full year, True Chem stonewalled production of the PLC device. This led the Court to determine that the first factor, violation of the discovery order, was attributable to True Chem.[1]

Second Factor: Violating Party’s Misconduct Must Cause Substantial Prejudice to the Opposing Party

The Court found that PCC was forced to incur unnecessary attorneys’ fees and discovery costs as a result of the misconduct of True Chem and its counsel. Specifically, PCC was forced to engage in thorough and extensive third-party discovery, including up to the week before trial, when True Chem finally disclosed the PLC device. Id. at 8.

True Chem tried to use its failure for its own gain by arguing that, since PCC forced disclosure by True Chem of the PLC project, PCC had to limit its timeframe for damages. Id. at 8-9. The Court rejected that argument, stating that it “cannot understand why any attorney would attempt to use its own blatant discovery violations as a sword to argue that the opposition must limit its properly pleaded claims.” Id. at 9.

The Court found that True Chem’s actions caused substantial prejudice to PCC, preventing PCC’s “timely and appropriate preparation for trial.” Therefore, the Court found that the second factor was satisfied.

Third Factor: Less Drastic Sanctions Would Not be Appropriate

The Court held that the third factor was satisfied because True Chem demonstrated “flagrant bad faith and callous disregard of its responsibilities.” Id. at 9.  Specifically, the Court found that had it not been for the diligent comb through of 50,000 documents at the eleventh hour, the continuous and lengthy egregious conduct of the case would have gone undiscovered. Id. at 10.

Since all three prongs were satisfied, the Court held that it was only adequate to sanction True Chem with a “death-penalty sanction,” and that anything less would not provide sufficient deterrence from similar behavior in other cases. Id. at 10.

The Court granted PCC’s motion for sanctions and struck True Chem’s non-infringement defense and invalidity counterclaims. The Court further found that True Chem willfully infringed the asserted patents, ordered that True Chem be permanently enjoined from continuing its infringing activity, and that PCC be awarded its attorneys’ fees.

Further Developments

On June 7, 2021, PCC moved for entry of a damages award of $16.9M (representing treble lost profits through 2019 ($5.6M) plus prejudgment interest ($0.6M)) and attorneys’ fees. PCC argued no damages trial was necessary for a number of reasons: the Court’s inherent powers in connection with its sanctions ruling, the status as a default case with no party entitled to a jury trial on damages, the fact that PCC’s evidence conclusively established lost profits, and the fact that True Chem’s damages expert’s opinions had been struck “in their entirety.”

On June 15, 2021, Judge Albright granted True Chem’s attorneys’ motion to withdraw from the case.

Takeaways

While this case may seem like an outlier, it is important to remember that litigation is supposed to be a fair fight. Each side should timely disclose any relevant documents during discovery and adhere to any Court orders to allow trial to proceed in a timely manner and to prevent undue burden on the opposing party. Flagrantly disrespecting these principles may lead to an unforgiving response by the court.

The same is true in patent prosecution. The duty of good faith and candor set forth in Rule 56 is supposed to guarantee that patents are procured in a fair and timely proceeding that avoids placing an undue burden on the USPTO. As prosecution counsel, you should ask hard questions, which here would have involved questions regarding possible public use or sale. The prosecutor should consider asking those questions in writing. And if the patent prosecutor has suspicions of untruthful statements or other misconduct by the applicant, withdrawal from prosecution may be the best move.

[1]Note that on March 25, 2021, PCC seems to have argued TrueChem’s counsel was also complicit.  According to a Law360 article, in PCC’s Response in Opposition to True Chemical Solutions LLC’s Motion to Strike Scott Weingust’s Expert Report (sealed), “PCC replied that True Chem’s response highlighted for the first time that True Chem’s former attorneys . . . were ‘complicit’ and that they made things worse in the two months since they were informed of the misconduct.” Hu, Tiffany, “Chemical Co. Wants to Skip IP Damages Trial After Sanctions,” Law360, June 16, 2021. Although Judge Albright only assigned responsibility to True Chem and not its counsel, in the sanction order he commented, “it is worth noting that True Chem’s counsel . . . knew of the existence of the automation project on January 20, 2021, two months before such information was revealed to PCC.” See Order, FN1, (emphasis in original). Also, “PCC located invoices that were either concealed or overlooked as the result of willful incompetence on the part of the attorneys and then had to engage in third-party discovery to determine the nature of the invoices. Id. at 7.

© 2021 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP
For more articles on IP law, visit the NLR Litigation / Trial Practice section.

Yu v. Apple – Transubstantiation of a Camera into an Abstract Idea

Every time the courts re-define a mechanical device as an abstract idea, I struggle with the rationale that is applied to evaluate the claimed subject matter for patent eligibility under s. 101. I am not a computer scientist so the Alice/Bilski notion that a computer programmed to perform a function more quickly than it can be performed by a human sitting at a desk with a pencil and paper is not a technological advance has some appeal. After all, the idea of patents being granted for computerized versions of hoary business practices threatened to overwhelm the PTO. One the other hand, Diehr warned that all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known make their implementation obvious. Recently, Yu v Apple , Appeal No. 2020-1760  (Fed. Cir., June 11, 2021) exemplifies the dangers of this oversimplification when it is used to render a specialized camera claimed in U.S. Pat. No. 6,611,289 patent-ineligible. This was a split panel decision, with Judge Prost writing for Judge Taranto and Judge Newman dissenting.

Transubstantiation is, of course, a religious doctrine that is the change—though not the appearance—of the bread and wine used in the Eucharist to become Christ’s real presence. I do not intend to discuss religion, but only to provide an example of a big leap of faith. Applying this definition so that the wine and the bread are concrete compositions while the presence of Christ is necessarily an abstract or intangible idea, it becomes apparent that a majority on the Yu panel held that it is appropriate to convert a concrete machine into an abstract idea which, in this case, is defined as its purpose:

          “Claim 1. An improved digital camera comprising:

A first and a second image sensor closely positioned with respect to a common plane…

Two lenses, each being mounted in front of one of said two image sensors:

said first image sensor producing a first image and said second image sensor producing a second image;

an analog-to-digital converting circuitry coupled to said first and said second image sensor and

digitalizing said first and said intensity images to produce correspondingly a first digital image and a second digital image;

an image memory…for storing [the digital images]; and

a digital image processor…producing a resultant digital image from the first digital image enhanced with said second digital image.”

I have compressed the claim somewhat. The panel agreed with the district court that the claims were directed to “the abstract idea of taking two pictures and using these pictures to enhance each other in some way.” The majority continues its Mayo/Alice Step 1 analysis:

“Given the claim language and the specification, we conclude that claim 1 ‘is directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke[s] generic processes and machinery’ rather than ‘a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology.’”

I have written in earlier posts that whether or not a claimed invention is an improvement over the prior art is now a requirement to get past both steps of the Mayo/Alice test. This “improvement test” has not historically been used in patent eligibility analyses. In other words, the fact that a claim provides no more than an alternative route to the same outcome found in the prior art should not be a factor given weight in determining if the claim is a patent-eligible “machine”. That is the task of s.101. Furthermore, once the claim has been simplified to a broad abstract idea, the majority applies a “generic environment” test to the mechanical components recited in the claim. Although the Yu claim recited very concrete components, such as lenses and sensors, because these components were well-known and conventional, they merely “provide a generic environment in order to carry out the abstract idea”  [citing In re TLI Comm. LLC Patent Litigation, 823 Fed. Cir. 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016)]. This is a slippery slope since, if the machine—the camera—does not add up to a technological advance—and the components are, at least, individually described in terms of their “basic functions”, the Mayo/Alice inquiry is over. Almost by definition, there can be no inventive step, and the majority certainly agrees that Step 2 fails to make the abstract idea inventive:

“Here, the claimed hardware configuration itself is not an advance and does not itself produce the asserted advance of enhancement of one image by another, which, as explained, is an abstract idea. The claimed configuration does not add sufficient substance to the underlying abstract idea of enhancement—the generic hardware limitations of claim 1 merely serve as a “conduit for the abstract idea.”[citing TLI again.]

Judge Newman’s dissent gets right down to first principles: “This camera is a mechanical and electronic device of defined structure and mechanism; it is not an ‘abstract idea’… The ‘289 patent specification states that the digital camera achieves superior image definition. A statement of purpose or advantage does not convert a device into an abstract idea…A device that uses known components does not thereby become an abstract idea, and is not on that ground ineligible for access to patenting.” Judge Newman sees the majority’s opinion as “enlarging this instability [of technological development] in all fields, for the court holds that the question of whether the components of a new device are well-known and conventional affects Section 101 eligibility, without reaching the patentability criteria of novelty and nonobviousness.”

© 2021 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

ARTICLE BY Warren Woessner of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.
For more articles on IP law, visit the NLRIntellectual Property section.

Hello Again, Worlds: A Failed Gaming IPR Leads to § 101 Success

The tides have turned again in the litigation campaign against gaming companies by Worlds, Inc., who many may recognize as one of the named parties in often-cited Federal Circuit case law on real-parties in interest (“RPI”). In 2018, the Federal Circuit shook up the IPR landscape with a series of RPI decisions, starting with Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., which held that the PTAB’s time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable. A series of frequently-cited Federal Circuit decisions followed, including Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp. and Worlds, Inc. v. Bungie, Inc.

In Worlds, Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., the PTAB issued final written decisions holding 34 out of 40 challenged claims unpatentable. On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the petitioner bears the burden of persuasion for proving that the petition is not time-barred under § 315(b), meaning Bungie had the burden of persuasion to show that Activision—which had been served with a complaint more than one year before Bungie filed its petition—was not an RPI. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, and on remand, the PTAB vacated its final written decisions.

Those vacated IPR decisions laid the groundwork for invalidating Worlds’ patents. Recently, a U.S. District Court (D. Mass.) invalidated the asserted patents under § 101, based in part on the PTAB’s substantive analysis. See Worlds, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., et al., No. 12-cv-10576-DJC, Dkt. 358 (D. Mass. Apr. 30, 2021) (“Decision”). The Court noted that the PTAB decisions were vacated on procedural grounds and considered the PTAB findings as persuasive authority. “Although now vacated, the substance of the PTAB’s prior rulings serves to support the Court’s analysis below that the client-side and server-side filtering of position information is not inventive.” Decision at 7-8.

The parties focused on four representative claims, including claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,945,856 (the “’856 patent”).

For Step 1, World’s prior arguments, including in the IPR, were used against it. Worlds had argued that its patents were directed at a method of “crowd control” and that these claims are the filtering function to do so. Citing to those characterizations, the Court held the claims to be directed to “the abstract idea of ‘filtering’ (here of ‘position’ information”) which amounts to ‘crowd control.’” Decision at 14.

Activision argued that such filtering is “a fundamental and well-known concept for organizing human activity,” and that the claims do nothing more than recite a general client-server computer architecture to perform routine functions of filtering information to address the generic problem of crowd control. See Decision at 14 (citing BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The Court agreed that this conclusion was consistent with Mayo, Alice, and other cases.

For Step 2, Worlds’ briefing relied heavily on BASCOM’s holding that an inventive concept “may arise … in the ordered combination of the limitations.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1349 (emphasis added). Worlds argued that the claims teach an inventive ordered combination of steps: “a multistep process whereby a server receives position information of avatars associated with network clients; the server filters the received positions and then sends selected packets to each client,” whereby a client can then further determine which avatars to display.” See Decision at 17.

However, the Court held that “there is nothing in the ordering of the steps in the claims (i.e., receiving, determining, comparing) that make them inventive; the ‘steps are organized in a completely conventional way.’” Decision at 18. “The steps of the claims here use only ‘generic functional language to achieve the purported solution’ of filtering of position information for crowd control.” Id. (citing Two-way Media, Ltd. V. Comcast Cable Comms. LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). “None of the remaining claims are limited to ‘any specific form or implementation of filtering . . . .” Id.

While Worlds emphasized technical-sounding terminologies, such as clients, servers, avatars, networks, and packets, the Court noted that “[c]lient-server networks, virtual worlds, avatars, or position and orientation information are not inventions of Worlds but rather, their patents seek to demonstrate their use in a technological environment.” Decision at 19. “That is, Worlds’ asserted claims use a general-purpose computer to employ well-known filtering or crowd control methods and means that ultimately use same to display graphical results and generate a view of the virtual world, none of which is inherently inventive or sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Id.

Notably, the briefing and the Court’s decision did not appear to rely on expert testimony or evidence in the district court litigation. Therefore, the PTAB’s technical analysis from its vacated decisions played an important role, providing the foundation for the Court’s conclusion that “client-side and server-side filtering of position information is not inventive.” Decision at 7-8.

While gaming companies must be mindful of the many potential procedural pitfalls in PTAB challenges, this recent decision shows the importance of attacking non-inventive patents using both § 101 and IPRs.

Copyright © 2021, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

ARTICLE BY Harper Batts and Jeffrey Liang of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
For more articles on gaming IPR, visit the NLRIntellectual Property section.

The Do’s and Don’ts of Videoconference Oral Proceedings

As many will be aware, there is a challenge to the legality of videoconference Oral Proceedings pending at the EPO’s Enlarged Board of Appeal (G 1/21).[1] In particular, the Enlarged Board has been asked to consider whether such proceedings can go ahead if the parties do not consent to use of the videoconference format. Although the question referred to the Board encompassed Examination, Opposition and Appeal proceedings, the EPO has decided to continue with videoconference Oral Proceedings for both Examination and Opposition matters irrespective of whether or not the parties involved consent to do so.[2]

A Decision from the Enlarged Board is expected to issue relatively quickly, but unlike most referrals to be Enlarged Board, there does not appear to be much confusion about the direction the EPO will take. The EPO is generally keen to embrace the digital format and recent case law from the Boards of Appeal seems to suggest that the EPO will continue with videoconference Oral Proceedings as the “new normal”.[3] In anticipation that the Enlarged Board agrees, we have compiled our top tips for videoconference Oral Proceedings.

DO ask for a test call. Even though we are all now familiar with the format, a test call is a good opportunity to confirm that the audio is clear, and the video is working correctly. The test call will also allow you to practice screen sharing and joining/leaving breakout rooms. Test calls need to be requested at least six weeks in advance of the hearing, as only limited time slots are available.

DON’T assume your laptop speaker and camera will be adequate. If translators are involved, the EPO requires participants to have a headset, and even an inexpensive microphone can be a significant improvement to the in-built one found on most laptops. If the proceedings use Zoom, check in advance that your screen name is appropriate, the brightness settings are adequate for where you plan to sit, and check that any filters/backgrounds are turned off.

DO have your ID ready. It’s easy to forget when the only travel involved is into your home office, but it will speed up proceedings on the day.

DON’T assume things will be the same as an “in-person” hearing. Videoconference Oral Proceedings do generally seem to take a little longer than in person hearings, and some nuances of body language can be lost. How you communicate with your team during the hearing will also be different if you are in separate locations. Have you thought about a virtual alternative to passing notes during the hearing?

DO ask for breaks if needed. Everyone now recognizes that screen fatigue can be a problem. Chances are that if you need a break, someone else in the proceedings will be glad you asked.

DON’T put up with technical issues. If you can’t hear or see the proceedings adequately, the EPO advises that you attract the attention of the chair by waving. Proceedings will then be paused while the technical issues are resolved.

DO have a backup plan in case of a loss of connectivity. The EPO will ask for a telephone number, but it is worth seeing if you could use a WiFi hotspot (e.g., from a mobile phone) if the internet connection drops.

DO think about how you will prepare and submit any amendments on the day. If you are the Applicant or Patentee, there is a chance your case may be upheld on the basis of amended claims, and therefore an amended description could be required. The amended description pages need to be signed and sent to the EPO in an EPO-compatible pdf format. Since most of us do not have printer/scanners at home, it is worth thinking in advance about how to do this.

Finally, DO remember that, everyone is in the same situation, with the same fears that the internet connection will drop at a critical time, the neighbors will choose that day to begin renovation work, or that a cat filter will appear out of nowhere.[4] Consequently, we have found the EPO to be understanding of any technical concerns and ready to work with us to resolve these.

[1] https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/eba/pending.html

[2] https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2021/20210324a.html

[3] https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t162320eu1.html

[4] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/09/texas-lawyer-zoom-cat-fi…

© 2021 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP
For more articles on virtual proceedings, visit the NLR Litigation / Trial Practice section.