Tag: IP Law

Tillis Bill Tries to Fix Section 101

This recently introduced bill would replace section 101 with a lot of text. The commentators are all commentating, but I have yet to read whether or not the “outlaw” status of claims to diagnostic methods—led by varying interpretations of Mayo v. Prometheus—has been clearly lifted by this bill. Here are the relevant parts, at least setting up the discussion on this point.

Section 101. Patent Eligibility

(a) IN GENERAL—Whoever [post- Thaler v. Vidal, we know that this must be a human being] invents or discovers any useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject only to the exclusions in section (b) and to the further conditions and requirements of this title.

(b) ELIGIBILITY EXCLUSIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), a person may not obtain a patent for any of the following, if claimed as such:

***

(B) A process that—

          ***

(iii) occurs in nature wholly independent of, and prior to, any human activity.

(C) An unmodified human gene, as that gene exists in the human body.

(D) An unmodified natural material, as that material exists in nature.

(2)  CONDITIONS.—

 ***

(B) HUMAN GENES AND NATURAL MATERIALS.—For the purposes of subparagraphs (C) and (D) of paragraph (1), a human gene or natural material that is isolated, purified, enriched, or otherwise altered by human activity, or that is otherwise employed in a useful invention or discovery, shall not be considered to be unmodified.

(c) ELIGIBILITY

(1) IN GENERAL.—In determining whether, under this section, a claimed invention is eligible for a patent, eligibility shall be determined

(A) By considering the claimed invention as a whole and without discounting or disregarding any claim element; and

(B) Without regard to—

***

(ii) whether a claim element is known, conventional, routine, or naturally occurring

***

Well now, does this bill abrogate Mayo v. Prometheus and permit patents on diagnostic assays as simple as “If A, then B” (If assay indicates high homocysteine then diagnostic conclusion is low cobalamin)? Let’s start with a simple “If A, then B” claim, like the one in Athena (If autoantibodies to MuSK are detected, subject may be afflicted with MG). The presence of antibodies that bind to MuSK occurs in nature wholly independently and prior to any human activity. See, section I (B) (iii). So to be patentable, a process comprising the detection of the antibodies or of a MuSK-antibody complex in order to diagnose MG must fall within one of the “conditions” of the statute as set forth in 2(B).

The problem, and I hope it is not a big one, is that 2(B) does not mention “processes” employing “natural materials.” Applicants are left to argue that the anti-MuSK antibodies per se are altered by human activity, e.g., by binding to MuSK, and so are “modified.” They can also argue that the antibodies are employed in a useful discovery since they are the biomarker for MG. But, of course, the applicants wanted to claim a process, not just the biomarker detected by the assay.

Regarding diagnostics, is the key phrase “otherwise employed in a useful invention or discovery”? Of course, the argument is that the useful invention or discovery is the diagnostic process, from initial sampling to drawing a diagnostic conclusion. For years I have proposed that s. 101 bills on diagnostic clams need a sentence like, “A process includes recognition of the utility of a naturally occurring correlation.” In other words, you are not trying to patent the correlation itself, like “blood containing antibodies that bind to MuSK”. The necessary steps include both isolation and detection of the antibodies and recognition that their presence indicates something about the patient. (Note that Mayo did not invent the correlation between the level of the metabolites of the administered drug and the need to adjust the dose of the drug. Mayo took a known correlation and refined the optimal range of metabolite concentration that arose after administration of the “parent drug”. One could call this the recognition that an improved correlation could be reached, but nothing in the Tillis bill says that, apart from novelty, the invention needs to be improved over any earlier version or alternative. This draft of the bill needs some work but it is a valuable start to ending the s. 101 nightmare.

Article By Warren Woessner of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

In the Weeds? Humira “Patent Thicket” Isn’t an Antitrust Violation

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that welfare benefit plans that bought the drug Humira did not have valid antitrust claims against the patent owner. The Court found that amassing patents by itself is not enough to give rise to an antitrust claim, and that the welfare benefit plans would need to prove that the patents were invalid. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al. v. AbbVie Inc., et al., Case No. 20-2402 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2022) (Easterbrook, Wood, Kirsch, JJ.)

AbbVie owns a patent covering Humira, which is a drug used to treat arthritic and inflammatory diseases. Humira is not covered by the Hatch-Waxman Act because it is a biologic drug, rather than a synthetic drug. Biologics are covered by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), under which a competitor must ask the US Food and Drug Administration for permission to sell a “biosimilar” drug based on certain guidelines. From the first sale of the original drug, the competitor must wait 12 years to enter the market. If the original drug seller believes that a patent blocks competition and initiates litigation, the competitor is still free to sell its biosimilar drug. The competitor sells at risk of an adverse outcome in the litigation.

The original Humira patent expired in 2016, but AbbVie obtained 132 additional patents related to the drug. After the 12-year BPCIA requirement passed, none of AbbVie’s competitors chose to launch a biosimilar. Instead, competitors settled with AbbVie on terms to enter the US market in 2023. In exchange, AbbVie agreed that enforcement of all 132 of its patents would end in 2023 even if they were not set to expire.

Welfare benefit plans that pay for Humira on behalf of covered beneficiaries accused AbbVie of violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The payors argued that AbbVie’s settlements with potential competitors established a conspiracy that restrained competition in violation of Section 1, and that AbbVie’s “patent thicket” allowed AbbVie to reap unlawful monopoly profits from Humira after expiration of the original patent in violation of Section 2. The district court dismissed the complaint. The payors appealed.

The issue on appeal with respect to Section 2 was whether the payors had to prove that all of AbbVie’s Humira-related patents were invalid. Under the Walker Process antitrust doctrine, a party may be liable for an antitrust violation if it knowingly asserts a fraudulently procured patent in an attempt to monopolize a market. The payors did not argue that all 132 of AbbVie’s patents were fraudulent. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the patent laws do not set a cap on the number of patents a person (or company) can hold, the payors would need to prove that each of AbbVie’s 132 Humira-related patents were invalid to succeed in showing a violation under Section 2. Not only did the payors fail to prove that all 132 patents were invalid, but they did not even offer to do so. The Court thus agreed with the district court that AbbVie did not amass a patent thicket to maintain monopoly profits from Humira.

The issue on appeal with respect to Section 1 was whether AbbVie’s settlements with potential biosimilar competitors were anticompetitive. The Seventh Circuit found that the payors could have a Section 1 claim if they were injured by the terms of AbbVie’s settlements with its competitors (for example, by showing that AbbVie overpaid a competitor to defer entry). The terms of AbbVie’s settlements allowed the competitors immediate entry to the European market, and AbbVie agreed to US market entry before its last Humira-related patents expired. The Court found that those terms, as well as the payors’ failure to show that AbbVie overpaid the competitors to delay their entry, rendered the settlements lawful.

The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal.

Article By Alexandra Lewis of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

CareDx v. Natera – The Broad Road to Patent Ineligibility

In CareDx v Natera, Appeal No. 2022-1027, (Fed. Cir., July 18, 2022), a three judge panel of Judges Lourie, Bryson and Hughes, affirmed the district court’s finding that the claims of U. S. patent nos. 8703652, 9845497 and 10329607 are invalid for failing to survive the Alice/Mayo test for patent eligibility. I subtitled this post using Mathew 7:13-14: “Enter through the narrow gate. For wide is the gate and broad is the road, that leads to destruction.” The appeal to the Federal Circuit, which I wrote about on October 15, 2021, never got on the narrow road that leads to viable diagnostic claims. It may not have been possible to overcome the obstacles that blocked the road, but CareDx managed to hit them all, and ended up with three invalid patents on natural phenomena.

The claims were directed to a method for detecting transplant rejection or organ failure by isolating and genotyping a sample from the subject who received the donation, quantifying the cfDNA, and diagnosing the transplant status for an increase in donor cfDNA over time. An increase indicates possible transplant failure.

Judge Lourie summarized the claims, some of which are more than a page long, this way:

“Here, as in Ariosa, the claims boil down to collecting a bodily sample, analyzing the cfDNA  using conventional techniques, including PCR, identifying naturally occurring DNA from the donor organ, and then using the natural correlation between heightened cfDNA levels and transplant health, to identify a potential rejection, none of which was inventive. The claims here are equally as ineligible as those in Ariosa.”

Let’s take a quick look at how CareDx got onto the broad road. CareRx hoped to avoid Ariosa by arguing that it was doing more than just measuring a biomarker correlated to an existing phenomenon. Problem 1 is that CareDx did not discover the correlation; it just improved on it (or did it?). Louie writes:

“CareDx argues that the patents’ claims are directed not to natural phenomena, but to improved laboratory techniques. CareDx contends that the ‘claimed advance’ is an ‘improved, human-designed method for measuring increases in donor cfDNA in a recipient’s body to identify organ rejection.’ … In particular, CareDx identifies the use of digital PCR, NGS, and selective amplification to more accurately measure the donor SNPs of cfDNA transplant recipients. However, CareDx does not actually claim any improvements in laboratory techniques … Furthermore the specification admits that the laboratory techniques disclosed in the claims require only conventional techniques and off-the-shelf technology.”

In fact, CareDx had at least one claim in the ‘497 patent that recites that the assay detects the donor-specific circulating cfDNA from the organ transplant when the donor-specific circulating cfDNA [makes] up at least 0.3% of the total circulating cfDNA in the biological sample. I presume that this claim limitation was put into the claim so that “improvement”  could be argued, but the limitation is not mentioned in the opinion.

Let’s look at a few other things CareDx encountered on its broad road to legal destruction. The panel looked at every step of the method in isolation. In other words, once CareDx argued “improvement” it was forced to admit that the specification disclosed that all those analytical techniques, such as PCR, NGS and “selective amplification”, would be considered as conventional in the art. CareDx might have relied on some of the decisions finding patent eligibility where physical equipment was necessarily involved, such as XL LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics or Illumina v Ariosa.

The finding of conventionality of individual steps permitted the court and the panel to effectively rule that the method was directed to a natural product, since the devices used to carry it out were given no weight. Therefore, the patents failed to pass Step 1 of Mayo/Alice. Could it have been argued, if that was the case, that the equipment used to carry out the method was arranged in a novel sequence? (Also, is someone going to argue that PCR involves replicating small amounts of DNA to afford useful amounts? – This is accomplished by the hand of man.)

These are minor thoughts, CareDX should left the word “diagnostic” out of the claims and the specification. This is certainly no more of a diagnostic test than the Mayo range-finding step was. It is presently clear that in the life sciences, recognition of the utility of a naturally occurring correlation is not enough to avoid patent ineligibility. Of course, and this is cold comfort to CareDx, would it have helped to get this method into the safe harbor of methods of medical treatment? In other words, the first step could recite the actual transplantation step and/or the final step of the process could recite some sort of medical intervention. Narrower claims might have returned CareDx to the narrow path of patent life.

Article By Warren Woessner of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Patent Infringement Verdict Nixed over Judge’s Stock Ownership

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s opinions and orders and remanded the case for further proceedings before a different district court judge because the original judge had failed to divest all financial interests in the case. Centripetal Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., Case No. 21-1888 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Cunningham, JJ.)

Centripetal sued Cisco for patent infringement. The original district court judge presided over a 22-day bench trial, which included a more than 3,500-page record, 26 witnesses and more than 300 exhibits. The court heard final arguments on June 25, 2020. While the case was still pending before the district court, the judge learned that his wife owned Cisco stock, valued at $4,687.99. The district court judge notified the parties on August 12, 2020, that he had discovered that his wife owned 100 shares of Cisco stock. He stated that his wife purchased the stock in October 2019 and had no independent recollection of the purchase. He explained that at the time he learned of the stock, he had already drafted a 130-page draft of his opinion on the bench trial, and virtually every issue had been decided. He further stated that the stock did not—and could not have—influenced his opinion on any of the issues in the case. Instead of selling the stock, which might have implied insider trading given his knowledge of the forthcoming order, the judge placed it in a blind trust. Under the terms of the trust, the judge was to be notified when the trust assets had been completely disposed of or when their value became less than $1,000.

Centripetal had no objections. Cisco, however, filed a motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(4). The judge ordered Centripetal to file a response. On October 2, 2020, the court denied Cisco’s motion for recusal. On October 5, 2020, the court issued a 167-page opinion and order containing the judge’s findings that Cisco willfully infringed the asserted claims of the patents-at-issue and awarded Centripetal damages of more than $755 million, pre-judgment interest of more than $13 million and a running royalty of 10%. Cisco moved for amended findings and judgment under Rule 52(b) or a new trial under Rule 59(a)(2). The court denied both motions. Cisco appealed the district court’s findings and asserted that the judge was required to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) absent divestiture under § 455(f) (the only exception to the bright line rule that a federal judge is disqualified based on a known financial interest in a party).

On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed two issues: whether the district court judge was relieved of his duty to recuse under § 455(b)(4) because his wife had divested herself of her interest in Cisco under § 455(f), and, if the requirements of § 455(f) were not satisfied, a determination as to the proper remedy.

The Federal Circuit analyzed whether placement of the stock in a blind trust satisfied the divesture requirement of § 455(f). The Court explained that a blind trust is “an arrangement whereby a person, in an effort to avoid conflicts of interest, places certain personal assets under the control of an independent trustee with the provision that the person is to have no knowledge of how those assets are managed.” Centripetal admitted that there are no cases holding that placement of stock in a blind trust constitutes divestment. The Court next turned to the intent of Congress when it drafted the statute. The Court reasoned that to “divest” was understood at the time to mean “dispossess or deprive,” which is only possible when an interest is sold or given away. The Court also noted that Congress used the present tense—that a judge should not sit when he or she has a financial interest in a party. The Court concluded that while placing the stock in a blind trust removed the judge’s wife from control over the stock, it did not eliminate her beneficial interest in Cisco. The Court also found that the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct had previously ruled that a judge’s use of a blind trust does not obviate the judge’s recusal obligations. Accordingly, the Court found that placing assets in a blind trust is not divestment under § 455(f) and, thus, the district court judge was disqualified from further proceedings in the case.

As for the appropriate remedy, the Federal Circuit considered whether rulings made after August 11, 2020, when the district court judge became aware of his wife’s financial interest in Cisco, should be vacated as a remedy for his failure to recuse. The Court determined that the risk of injustice to the parties weighed against a finding of harmless error and in favor of vacatur. The Court reversed the district court’s opinion and order denying Cisco’s motion for recusal; vacated the opinion and order regarding infringement, damages and post-judgment motions and remanded for further proceedings before a new judge.

Article By Jodi Benassi of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

A Primer on Practice at the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board

In a precedential decision rendered in an opposition proceeding, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) took the lawyers for each side to task for ignoring Board rules in presentation of their case, but ultimately decided the case on a likelihood of confusion analysis. The Board found that the parties’ marks and goods were “highly similar” and sustained the opposition. Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, Opposition Nos. 91223352; 91223683; 91227387 (June 15, 2022, TTAB) (Wellington, Heasley and Hudis, ALJs) (precedential).

Pharmavite sought registration of the standard character mark NATURE MADE for various foods and beverages based on allegations of bone fide intent to use in commerce. Made in Nature (MIN) opposed on the ground that Pharmavite’s mark so resembled MIN’s registered and common law “Made In Nature” marks as to cause a likelihood of confusion when used on the goods for which registration was sought.

In its brief to the Board, Pharmavite raised, for the first time, the Morehouse (or prior registration) defense. MIN objected to the Morehouse defense as untimely. The Board agreed, noting that defense is “an equitable defense, to the effect that if the opposer cannot be further injured because there already exists an injurious registration, the opposer cannot object to an additional registration that does not add to the injury.” The party asserting a Morehouse defense must show that it “has an existing registration [or registrations] of the same mark[s] for the same goods” (emphasis in original).

Here, the Board found that this defense was not tried by the parties’ express consent and that implied consent “can be found only where the non-offering party (1) raised no objection to the introduction of evidence on the issue, and (2) was fairly apprised that the evidence was being offered in support of the issue.” In this case, Pharmavite did introduce into the record its prior NATURE MADE registrations but only for the purpose of supporting Pharmavite’s “[r]ight to exclude; use and strength of Applicant’s mark.” The Board found that this inclusion did not provide notice of reliance on the Morehouse or prior registration defense at trial.

In sustaining the opposition, the Board commented extensively on the record and how it was used, “[s]o that the parties, their counsel and perhaps other parties in future proceedings can benefit and possibly reduce their litigation costs.”

Over-Designation of the Record as Confidential

The Board criticized the parties for over-designating as confidential large portions of the record, warning that only the specific “exhibits, declaration passages or deposition transcript pages that truly disclosed confidential information should have been filed under seal under a protective order.” If a party over-designates material as confidential, “the Board will not be bound by the party’s designation.”

Duplicative Evidence

The Board criticized the parties for filing “duplicative evidence by different methods of introduction; for example, once by Notice of Reliance and again by way of an exhibit to a testimony declaration or testimony deposition.” The Board noted that such practice is viewed “with disfavor.”

Overuse of Deposition Designations

The Board criticized both parties for over-designating extensive excerpts of discovery deposition testimony of their own witnesses under Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(4), which provides:

If only part of a discovery deposition is submitted and made part of the record by a party, an adverse party may introduce under a notice of reliance any other part of the deposition which should in fairness be considered so as to make not misleading what was offered by the submitting party. A notice of reliance filed by an adverse party must be supported by a written statement explaining why the adverse party needs to rely upon each additional part listed in the adverse party’s notice, failing which the Board, in its discretion, may refuse to consider the additional parts.

As the Board explained, “[i]t is not an appropriate use of Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(4) to introduce unrelated testimony, rather than just the additional necessary portions of discovery deposition excerpts that clarify the passages originally submitted.” In this case, the Board stated that both parties “are equally guilty of abusing Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(4), and [we] trust that the parties and their counsel will not repeat this practice in future matters before the Board.”

Limiting the Record to Pertinent Evidence

The Board noted that “sizeable portions of each party’s evidentiary materials were not pertinent to the issues involved in this rather straightforward priority and likelihood of confusion opposition proceeding, such that the Board was forced to spend needless time sifting through an inappropriately large record in search of germane proofs.” The Board pointedly noted that “[t]his is not productive. ‘Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in [the record].’”

Record Citations

The Board advised the parties to adhere to its Manual of Procedure at § 801.03. As to how evidence should be cited:

For each significant fact recited, the recitation of facts should include a citation to the portion of the evidentiary record where supporting evidence may be found. When referring to the record in an inter partes proceeding before the Board, parties should include a citation to the TTABVUE entry and page number (e.g., 1 TTABVUE 2) to allow the reader to easily locate the cited materials.

In this case, the Board criticized the parties for using their own exhibit numbering system rather than the TTABVUE docket number and, for testimony submitted by deposition transcripts, using the page and line numbers provided by the court reporters rather than the TTABVUE citations. As the Board noted, this encumbered the Board in its efforts “to provide evidentiary references for use in this opinion; lengthening the time for review of the record, drafting of the decision and ultimately for issuance of this opinion.”

Likelihood of Confusion

After its chapter and verse critique of the presentation by the parties, the Board embarked on an exhaustive Trademark Act § 2(d) analysis, considering and balancing each of the DuPont factors, and ultimately concluded that MIN had sustained its opposition.

Article By Paul Devinsky of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

The Way to Protect Your Business? What You Need to Know About Trade Secrets

What do Coca-Cola’s secret formula, McDonalds’ special sauce, and Google’s search algorithm have in common? Each is a protected trade secret. In other words, they are proprietary information vital to these companies’ survival and are among their most valuable corporate secrets.

A trade secret can be anything of value to your company that is unique and not known to persons outside the company. For example, a trade secret can be a recipe, process, formula, strategy, technique, or device that your competitors do not know, do not have, and cannot use.

Trade secret law can be less risky in some respects than other forms of intellectual property like patents, copyrights, and trademarks. The application process for a patent requires that a company disclose the secret itself. With that comes an inherent risk—should the application be denied, the secret is no longer a secret. While the protection afforded by trade secret law may be considered fragile, meaning constant vigilance is required to maintain secrecy, the secret remains a secret; while a patent, even after issuance, carries some risk of post-grant invalidation. By contrast, a trade secret owner may ultimately enjoy greater certainty by maintaining protection, potentially forever. However, a trade secret is entitled to protection only for as long as it is kept a secret. If the information is lawfully disclosed to the public, it is no longer confidential and loses its trade secret protection forever.

Governing Law: Both federal and state law recognize the time and money invested to gain competitive advantages like trade secrets and protect those advantages. Federal Law: Under the controlling federal legislation passed by Congress in 2016, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) defines a trade secret as something used in a company’s business that (a) is not known or readily accessible by competitors, (b) has commercial value or that provides a competitive advantage in the marketplace, and (c) the owner of the information protects from disclosure through reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. Prior to the DTSA’s enactment in 2016, no federal statute promulgated a federal trade secret private right of action.

In addition to the DTSA’s rules regarding trade secrets, additional federal rules apply. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 makes the theft of trade secrets a federal crime. The Act prohibits the theft of a trade secret by a person intending or knowing that the offense will injure a trade secret owner. The Act also makes it a federal crime to receive, buy, or possess trade secret information knowing it to have been stolen. The Act allows the government to punish thefts of trade secrets by imprisonment up to 15 years and/or fines up to $5 million, depending on whether the defendant is an individual or a corporation. A private party can still sue for trade secret theft even if the federal government files a criminal case under the Economic Espionage Act.

New York State Law: Prior to federal law, most states had some form of trade secret law that varied state to state. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) was published in 1979 and amended in 1985 to provide a uniform trade secret law. Many states, including Pennsylvania in 2004 and New Jersey in 2012, adopted the UTSA. Notably, New York did not adopt the UTSA and does not have its own state trade secret statute, and thus relies on the common law.

Under New York common law, “misappropriation” refers to the acquisition of a trade secret by someone who knows that the trade secret was acquired by improper means—theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach, or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy. The New York statute of limitations requires that any action for misappropriation be filed three years from the date the misappropriation is discovered. Further, New York law requires that the use of the trade secret be continuous in the operation of a business, rather than one-time use.

Cartier v. Tiffany: Cartier recently filed suit against its luxury rival Tiffany & Co. in New York state court. Cartier v. Tiffany & Co., et al.,650925/2022 (N.Y. Sup.). Richemont-owned Cartier sets out claims against LVMH’s Tiffany & Co. for various contractual and tort claims and trade secret misappropriation against both defendants [Who is the other defendant?]. Cartier seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to require defendants to refrain from using the allegedly misappropriated information and return it to Cartier, as well as a judgment for any “compensatory damages that may be caused by [Tiffany’s] wrongful conduct.”

The complaint states that Tiffany & Co. lured former Cartier employee Megan Marino away from her role as its Assistant Manager for Jewelry Merchandising to learn more about Cartier’s “High Jewelry” collection, where pieces typically cost $50,000 to $10 million.

Cartier claims Marino was bound by non-disclosure and non-solicitation agreements she had signed as part of her role at Cartier and that she breached those agreements by using Cartier’s confidential business information to benefit Tiffany. This information includes Cartier’s “very sensitive and valuable” internal company documents that Marino forwarded to her personal email. Specifically, Marino “referenced a [Cartier] Excel spreadsheet” that “detailed Cartier’s confidential, High Jewelry assortment information.” Based on that spreadsheet, Cartier alleges, Marino “created a new Excel document, derived entirely from Cartier’s confidential information,” including “the total number of High Jewelry pieces at various Cartier locations in the U.S.” Cartier maintains this information is “only accessible by a limited number of Cartier employees [and] not known outside of Cartier” and “allow[s] a sophisticated competitor to replicate key strategies and, with relative ease, to reverse engineer how Cartier allocates, merchandises, and prices its High Jewelry stock.” Cartier claims the proprietary and confidential nature of this information amounts to a trade secret-protected asset.

Cartier further claims Tiffany has a history of poaching employees and maintains a “disturbing culture of misappropriating competitive information.” Given the alleged pattern, Cartier asserts that Tiffany now possesses “a substantial amount of [its] confidential and trade secret information that it obtained from Marino and other former Cartier employees” as a result of their “unlawful taking of Cartier’s valuable confidential information and trade secrets.”

Even if Cartier successfully establishes that it maintains trade secret information that Tiffany misappropriated, the case is hardly straightforward. Establishing damages in cases like this is particularly challenging, as it is difficult to assign a dollar value to trade secret information that will compensate the plaintiff for the economic loss caused by the defendant’s misappropriation. As a result, courts generally have quite a bit of discretion in fashioning damages awards.

Article By David H. Siegel of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

Green Innovation Being Fast Tracked by USPTO

The USPTO now fast tracks applications involving greenhouse gas reduction technologies. The new Climate Change Mitigation Pilot Program targets impact on the climate by accelerating examination of patent applications for innovations that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Qualifying applications may be advanced out of turn for examination (granted special status) until a first action on the merits—typically the first substantive examination—is complete. Advantageously, qualifying applications do not incur the petition to make special fee and is not required to satisfy the other requirements of the accelerated examination program.

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) accept petitions to make special under this program until June 5, 2023, or the date when 1,000 applications have been granted special status under this program, whichever occurs earlier. “This program aligns with and supports Executive Order 14008, dated January 27, 2021, and supports the USPTO’s efforts to secure an equitable economic future, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and mitigate the effects of climate change.” The new program takes steps toward working to incentivize and expedite clean energy technologies that will help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate the effects of climate change.

To qualify for the Program:

  • Patent Applications must contain one or more claims to a product or process that mitigates climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and be: (a) a non-continuing original utility non-provisional application; and (b) an original utility non-provisional application that claims the benefit of the filing date under 35 U.S.C. 120, 121, 365(c), or 386(c) of only one prior application that is either a non-provisional application or an international application designating the United States. Note: Claiming the benefit under 35 U.S.C. 119(e) of one or more prior provisional applications or claiming a right of foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. 119(a)-(d) or (f) to one or more foreign applications will not affect eligibility for this pilot program.

  • The application or national stage entry and the requisite petition form must be electronically filed by use of the Patent Center of the USPTO, and the specification, claims, and abstract must be submitted in DOCX format.

  • Applicants must file the petition to make special with the application or entry into the national stage under 35 U.S.C. 371 or within 30 days of the filing date or entry date of the application. The fee for the petition to make special under 37 CFR 1.102(d) has been waived for this program.

  • Applicants must use Form PTO/SB/457—which contains the petition and requisite certifications—to request participation in this program.

  • Petition filing limitations: Applicants may not file a petition to participate in this pilot program if the inventor or any joint inventor has been named as the inventor or a joint inventor on more than four other non-provisional applications in which a petition to make special under this program has been filed.

In a recent blog post announcing the Climate Change Mitigation Pilot Program, USPTO Director Kathi Vidal said, “It’s essential to protect these transformative energy innovations with intellectual property (IP). Innovation is a primary driver of the U.S. economy, and IP is the bridge between an idea and bringing that innovation to market. Industries based on innovation and the protection of intellectual property generate almost $8 trillion ($7.8 trillion) in GDP, and account for 44% of all U.S. jobs. Workers in patent-intensive industries earn almost $1,900 per week. That is 97% higher than the average weekly wage of workers in non-IP intensive industries.”

Vidal also said, “Startup companies that have a patent are far more likely to be successful in raising funding than those that have not secured intellectual property protection. When used as collateral, a patent increases venture capital funding by 76% over three years, and increases funding from an initial public offering by 128%, the approval of a startup’s first patent application increases its employee growth by 36% over the next five years, and after five years, a new company with a patent increase its sales by a cumulative 80% more than companies that do not have a patent.”

Moving forward to protect essential green energy transition technology can be helpful for future corporate and strategic goals. This new Climate Change Mitigation Pilot Program opens the door to accelerating potential patent protection for many of these developing technological fields.

Article By Jeffrey S. Whittle,  Karthika Perumal, Ph.D., Christopher Kent, Kevin J. Davis, Ph.D., and Samuel A. Savanich of  Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP

For more environmental, energy, and resources news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.

Trade Mark Infringement – Muslim Dating App Meets its Match [.com]

A recent Intellectual Property Enterprise Court Decision (IPEC) on 20 April 2022 has decided that ‘Muzmatch’, an online matchmaking service to the Muslim Community has infringed Match.com’s registered trade marks.

The decision by Nicholas Caddick Q.C was that Muzmatch’s use of signs and its name amounted to trade mark infringement and/or passing off of Match.com’s trade marks. This case follows successful oppositions by Match.com to Muzmatch’s registration of its marks in 2018, and unsuccessful attempts by Match.com to purchase Muzmatch between 2017 and 2019.

Match.com is one of the largest and most recognisable dating platforms in the UK. It first registered a word mark ‘MATCH.COM’ in 1996 and also owns other dating-related brands including Tinder and Hinge with other marks including the word mark ‘TINDER’. Match.com used a 2012 TNS report to illustrate its goodwill and reputation and 70% of people surveyed would be able to recall Match.com if prompted, 44% unprompted and 31% of people would name Match.com as the first dating brand off the ‘top of their head.’

Muzmatch is a comparatively niche but growing dating platform, which aims to provide a halal (i.e. in compliance with Islamic law) way for single Muslim men and women to meet a partner. Muzmatch is comparatively much smaller and was founded in 2011 by Mr Shahzad Younas and now has had around 666,069 sign-ups in the UK alone.

The Court considered that the marks ‘Muzmatch’ and ‘MATCH.COM’ and each company’s graphical marks, had a high degree of similarity in the services provided. The marks were also similar in nature orally and conceptually and the addition of the prefix ‘Muz’ did not distinguish the two marks, nor could the lack of the suffix ‘.com’ or stylistic fonts/devices.

The key issue of the case relates to the idea of the term ‘Match’ which is used by both marks to describe the nature of the business: match[ing]. Muzmatch argued that as both marks share this descriptive common element, so it is difficult to conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion between the two marks as the term just describes what each business does.

 The Court found that finding that there is a likelihood of confusion for a common descriptive element is not impossible, as the descriptive element can be used distinctively. The average consumer would conclude that the portion ‘Match’ is the badge of origin for Match.com due to its reputation as a brand and the very substantial degree of distinctiveness in the dating industry. An average consumer would have seen the word ‘Match’ as the dominant element in the Match.com trade marks and Match.com is often referred to as just ‘Match’ in advertisements.

Aside from its marks, Muzmatch utilised a Search Engine Optimisation strategy from January 2012 whereby it utilised a list of around 5000 keywords which would take a user to a landing page on the its website. In the list of the keywords used, Muzmatch used the words ‘muslim-tinder’, ‘tinder’ and ‘halal-tinder’ which were accepted by Muzmatch during the litigation to have infringed Match’s trade marks of the Tinder brand including the word mark ‘TINDER’. Muzmatch’s SEO use was also found to cause confusion based on some of its keywords including ‘UK Muslim Match’, which again uses the term Match distinctively, therefore a consumer may confuse a link to ‘UK Muslim Match’ with ‘Match.com’.

Therefore, the Court found that there was likely to be confusion between Muzmatch and Match.com because of the distinctive nature of the term ‘Match’ in the world of dating platforms.  An average consumer would conclude that Muzmatch was connected in a material way with the Match.com marks, as if it was targeted at Muslim users as a sub-brand, so this confusion would be trade mark infringement under S10(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994.

The Court also considered that Muzmatch had taken unfair advantage of Match.com’s trade marks and had therefore infringed those marks under S10(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994. This was due to the reputation of Match.com’s trade marks and because a consumer would believe that Muzmatch was a sub-brand of Match.com.

The Court rejected Muzmatch’s defence of honest concurrent use and found that Match.com would also have an alternative claim in the tort of passing off.

Key Points:

  • The Court found that a common descriptive element can acquire distinctiveness in an area, solely because of a company’s reputation and influence in that market.
  • The use of Search Engine Optimisation strategies can also constitute a trade mark infringement.
  • The lack of the suffix ‘.com’ in a mark is not sufficient to distinguish use from a household brand such as Match.com, so care should be taken with brands such as ‘Match.com’, ‘Booking.com’[1]

Source:

[1] Match Group, LLC, Meetic SAS, Match.Com International Limited v Muzmatch Limited, Shahzad Younas [2022] EWHC 941 (IPEC)

[1] Note- Blog Post of July 6 2020 Relating to Booking.com- https://www.iptechblog.com/2020/07/us-supreme-court-opens-doors-to-generic-com-trademarks/

Article By Connor Sargeant and the Intellectual Property and Technology Practice Group at Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP ​.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Intellectual Property: Understand It to Protect What You Own, Drive Value to Your Business and Positively Impact Your Bottom Line

Intellectual Property (or “IP”) is commonly defined as a group of legal rights that provide protection over things people and businesses create or invent. It might sound straightforward, but there is a lot of confusion over what can actually be protected and what cannot.

Who needs to be concerned with IP Protection?

We’ve all heard the phrase, “hindsight is 20/20”. That’s especially true when it comes to IP protection. So often people and businesses do not realize a new creation or innovation should be protected until it is too late. If you are creating or developing within your space, you need to have an IP strategy to avoid any unintentional disclosure missteps. And, when you are creating, be careful to:

  • Make records. They should be accurate, dated, and corroborated.
  • Research the competitive landscape early and identify both opportunities for protection and risks of infringement.
  • Use a non-disclosure agreement or contract before collaborating with another business or other people, such as consultants.

What are some of the biggest IP challenges business owners and employers need to overcome?

The goal for your IP strategy needs to be: Identify, Protect, Monetize.  The question business owners need to answer is how they can most effectively achieve this. The first step is understanding the applicable types of IP that are protectible and the steps needed to secure protection  of each.

Intellectual Property Type The Value

Trade Secret

 No registration fees or costs. Goes into effect upon creation and can last forever. Protection available at the state and federal levels.

Non-Disclosure Agreement/Contract (or “NDA”)

 Very affordable and flexible but, it only binds the contracting parties. An NDA should be used with your employees and other businesses you deal with concerning sensitive business information.

 

Copyright

 

 Free and automatic upon creation, register for significant added value. Protection available only at the federal level and registration is required to enforce protection.

Trademark/Service

 Commercial differentiation, quality identifier and price enhancement. Low cost and can last forever but must police others’ misuse.

How can an IP strategy affect your bottom line?

It’s important to understand there is no “one-size fits all” approach to IP. The correct IP strategy must be tailored to your unique business. While some businesses may be overspending on a scattered approach to protecting IP, other businesses may not be investing enough and potential losing out on what could have been an important revenue stream.

© 2022 Davis|Kuelthau, s.c. All Rights Reserved
For more articles about IP Law, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

The Misapplication & Legal Deficiencies of the TRIPS Agreement for COVID-19 Patents

Guest Commentary

Last year, the Biden Administration announced its support for a waiver of intellectual property rights to help fight the COVID-19 pandemic. Recently, the European Union, India, South Africa, and the United States have reached a tentative compromise on a proposed TRIPS waiver of intellectual property (IP) rights, meaning we are quickly approaching a collective refrain enforcing intellectual property rights related to fighting COVID by these countries within their borders. Ultimately, it is the opinion of Wen Xie, Partner at Global IP Counselors, that any attempt to waive IP will be ineffective in its application. COVID patents will probably still be enforced in the US nonetheless, and the TRIPs Waiver only destabilizes the innovative ecosystem by rendering intellectual property rights unpredictable on a global scale. The NLR asks Xie to go into more depth about the various legal questions raised by the prospective waiver.

1. NLR: Can you explain the TRIPS agreement considering the COVID pandemic? How will a non-uniform enforcement of the waiver affect companies and what should they know about it?

XIE: Right now we are working off of a leaked WTO ‘solution’ for waiving COVID patents1; nothing has been formalized or voted on at this stage. The document basically says that Member countries have the option to make, use, sell or import COVID-19 vaccines without the authorization of the patent holder, which is saying that the vaccine makers can’t (cannot) raise a big fuss and take anyone to court on the grounds that their patents are being infringed. One of the most important things to note is that there is a great degree of optionality to this proposal – the proposal repeatedly states that Member countries “may” do any of the actions that are permitted if this proposal ends up being adopted.

This means that the implementation of this TRIPS waiver will look different from country to country depending on how much they want to do in terms of waiving patent rights within their national jurisdictions. Countries that fervently advocated for this measure (namely India and South Africa2) will probably go to the whole extent of what they are allowed to do. They might even build manufacturing facilities for mRNA vaccines that are right now protected by the Pfizer and Moderna patents.  I don’t the US or Europe will go this far, if at all.  The US might choose to not waive COVID-19 vaccine patents in the US at all because the laws governing the conferring of patent rights is under Title 35 of the United States Code and has nothing to do with TRIPS or any other international agreement.  Any kind of implementation of this waiver brokered under the President’s Treaty Powers will ultimately need legislative sanction.  It’s highly doubtful the Administration will end up pushing for something like that.

What seems to be really happening with this so-called “waiver” is a multi-lateral agreement that some developing nations are going to not enforce COVID vaccine patents within their borders and the WTO is not going to retaliate.  It’s sort of like the US and Europe are saying to the countries that pushed for this, “Go ahead, you’re off the hook.” But since the tentative agreement allows Member countries the option to implement the provisions, the US will probably not choose to adopt it within its borders.

2. Given the global economic and human toll of the COVID pandemic, why is maintaining intellectual property rights for COVID-19 treatments important?

In the field of biomedical sciences, the period of exclusivity granted by patents is critical for recouping costs used for reinvestment into the next round of research and development. The major pharma companies spend as much as 25% of their revenue on R&D. Here’s a breakdown of some of the major companies in terms of their R&D spending in 2020:

  • Johnson & Johnson (14.8% of revenue)3
  • Roche (24.1% of revenue)4
  • Novartis (18.5% of revenue)5
  • Merck (28.3% of revenue)6
  • Pfizer (22.4% of revenue)7
  • AstraZeneca (22% of revenue)8
  • Eli Lilly (24.7% of revenue).9

Compare that to Apple which spent 5.99% of its revenue on R&D in 2021, and Microsoft which spent 12.32%.10

The vaccine makers are for-profit companies whether we like it or not. Pfizer, Moderna, and J&J each received governmental funding through Operation Warp Speed to incentivize them to develop the COVID vaccines in the time span that it occurred. We must examine how much suppressing IP and thereby suppressing the investment incentive to continue ongoing innovation will end up costing us as a society.

3.  What are the legal deficiencies of the TRIPS agreement?

One of the truly bizarre aspects of the TRIPS “waiver” is that there is no such thing as a “TRIPS patent.”  All patents have national jurisdictions.  US patents are issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office under Title 35.  The same goes for the process of filing for patents at all the other national patent offices – TRIPS plays no role in the whole process.  In terms of legal deficiencies, we should be rigorously examining what kind of jurisdiction the TRIPS Agreement will have to render patents unenforceable or useless.

When it comes to patent rights, the TRIPS Agreement obligates its signatories to comply with the Paris Convention which is a treaty that was signed in 1883.  The Paris Convention was one of the first attempts to harmonize the patent system worldwide.  The reason for doing this was to create a system for claiming priority and to harmonize the standards of patentability across nations so that applications can claim priority and get the benefit of an earlier priority date of a related application that was filed in a different country.  Priority dates are used to determine the scope of the prior art that can be used against the application when examining for novelty and obviousness, which is why these dates are important.

For example, the US and Japan are both signatories to the Paris Convention treaty.  An applicant filing at the USPTO can claim priority to an earlier-filed Japanese patent application that was filed at the Japan Patent Office under the Paris Convention.  And the same can occur in reverse.

What authority does the TRIPS Agreement have in terms of patents?  I think TRIPS can possibly do away with the system of priority claiming under the Paris Convention and subject patents to reexamination as they lose their priority dates.  But neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the Paris Convention should have anything to do with domestic patent applications that are filed directly with the national patent offices.  And more likely than not, the COVID vaccine patents were filed directly at domestic patent offices around the world, which should be completely beyond the jurisdiction of the TRIPS Agreement or any other international agreement on patent rights.  The priority system is mostly utilized by companies who are constrained by their IP budget and does not yet have the budget to file in several patent offices internationally at once, so they stagger these filings over time and claim priority to the original patent application.  I doubt that this is what Pfizer, Moderna, and J&J did with the COVID vaccine patents.

4. What are the practical deficiencies of the TRIPS agreement related to COVID?

The TRIPS waiver probably won’t help the developing nations that much in terms of getting access to cheaper COVID vaccines.  Practically speaking, developing nations could have always ignored Pfizer and Moderna’s patents for their vaccines without the need for a worldwide agreement to render patents useless.  Again, patents have national jurisdiction.  So, India can just ignore Pfizer’s Indian patent, for example.  A lot of countries have fallen short of a robust assertion of patent rights in their domestic courts as agreed under the international treaties without facing WTO sanctions or penalties (see China).11 So these countries could have unilaterally treated patents however they wanted, which is already what has been happening for a long time. It is very unclear why such a drastic, coordinated course is necessary and why the US needs to be complicit in destabilizing the innovative landscape for IP stakeholders.

Another issue is that say a developing nation decides to build manufacturing facilities to produce mRNA vaccines.  Waiving patent rights does not provide them with access to manufacturing processes, test data, medical formulas, cell lines, and other critical data that they will need.  So waiving IP rights still does effectively very little in terms of improving developing nations’ access to vaccines, nor will it enhance their ability to make or produce these vaccines on their own.

5. What are the potential long-term impacts of the TRIPS agreement related to COVID, and how should companies prepare?

Both the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention have provisions obligating its signatories to recognize the domestic patent rights of foreign entities and to receive the same treatment as if the patents were owned by nationals.  I think this is what it really comes down to – the TRIPS waiver is meant to give free rein to some countries who do not want to recognize the patent rights of foreign companies over products that they want more of. If this proposal is adopted, the WTO will be a collection of nations agreeing to no longer recognize that foreign entities enjoy the same property rights as nationals, which is a dangerous precedent.

In the US, we’ve never had to make a law to say foreigners can enjoy the same property rights as nationals – that was just a given under the Equal Protection Clause which entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which they reside. You need sanctions in the US to seize a Russian oligarch’s yacht.

Intellectual property may not physical or tangible, but it is a right.  Patentees sought out this right in reliance on the government’s promise that it would be protected in return for a full, enabling disclosure of their inventions. There were so many alternatives that could provide developing nations with greater access to vaccines, such as purchasing the vaccines directly for them.  But instead, the government has effectively reneged on a promise, and the end result is that developing nations in need of vaccines will still face the same hardships and barriers as they did before.

The opinions expressed herein are those exclusively of Wen Xie and any commentary should be directed to the interviewee at E‐mail: wxie@giplaw.com.

Copyright (C) GLOBAL IP Counselors, LLP

Article By Wen Xie of Global IP Counselors

For more articles on IP law, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.