Year in Review: The Most Popular IP Posts of 2023

As 2024 begins and intellectual property (IP) strategies are being developed for the new year, it is a good time to reflect on what IP issues were prominent in 2023. According to many readers, hot IP topics included patent litigation strategies, artificial intelligence (AI), and pharmaceutical-related patent applications.

  1. An Overview of Shotgun Pleadings in the Federal Courts– This article explores types of shotgun pleadings identified by courts and outlines potential responses to a shotgun pleading.
  2. Lensa: Are AI Art Generators Copyright Infringers?– The ability of an AI tool, such as Lensa, to create near-replicas of other artists’ works leads to the question of whether AI-generated art can be considered derivative of other artworks. This article explores the answer to this question.
  3. Supreme Court Unanimously Affirms Amgen Repatha® Antibody Patents Invalid for Lack of Enablement– In their May 2023 decision in Amgen v. Sanofi, the U.S. Supreme Court held claims of patents, directed to a genus of potentially millions of antibodies, to be invalid because the patents failed to sufficiently enable one skilled in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed inventions as required by 35 U.S.C. §112(a). This article explains the decision and its possible effect going forward.
  4. Why Pharma Companies Should File Patents Later In The R&D Process – This article discusses clinical trial related patent applications and best practices for maximizing patent term while minimizing risk of invalidation by public use.
  5. Federal Circuit Resolves District Court Split, Holds Foreign Defendant Cannot Defeat Rule 4(k)(2) Personal Jurisdiction by Unilateral Post-suit Consent to Jurisdiction in Alternative Forum – This article provides provide additional context regarding the Federal Circuit’s January 2023 decision in In re Stingray IP Solutions, LLC.

Using AI to Replicate or Replace Human Creativity May Violate Intellectual Property Law

As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes better and more prevalent, people will increasingly use its computing power to supplement or replace human creativity. Film director Gareth Edwards attempted to do just that  in his new movie, The Creator, about artificial intelligence. Edwards used an AI algorithm to attempt to replicate the musical style of composer Hans Zimmer.  Ultimately, Edwards abandoned this effort and hired Zimmer to compose the score because although the AI-generated track was convincing, Edwards believed it still felt short of human Zimmer’s work.

Because AI generates new content through a database of existing content, the model’s output can convincingly replicate existing artists. However, the AI-generated content may be simplistic and lack a human’s creativity. In an interview with the MIT Technology Review, Edwards stated his belief that generative AI should be embraced like Photoshop and treated like a tool for improving the creative process.

Although there may be similar creative benefits between generative AI and Photoshop, using AI to replicate or replace human creativity may violate intellectual property laws. Writers, including Game of Thrones author George R.R. Martin, are currently suing OpenAI alleging that the company violated the authors’ copyrights by using their collective works to train its model. The results of this case and similar cases may determine the future viability of generative AI as a creative tool for mass consumer entertainment.

For more articles on AI, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

To AI or Not to AI: U.S. Copyright Office Clarifies Options

The U.S. Copyright Office has weighed in with formal guidance on the copyrightability of works whose generation included the use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools. The good news for technology-oriented human creative types: using AI doesn’t automatically disqualify your work from copyright protection. The bad news for independent-minded AI’s: you still don’t qualify for copyright protection in the United States.

On March 16, 2023, the Copyright Office issued a statement of policy (“Policy”) to clarify its practices for examining and registering works that contain material generated by the use of AI and how copyright law’s human authorship requirements will be applied when AI was used. This Policy is not itself legally binding or a guarantee of a particular outcome, but many copyright applicants may breathe a sigh of relief that the Copyright Office has formally embraced AI-assisted human creativity.

The Policy is just the latest step in an ongoing debate over the copyrightability of machine-assisted products of human creativity. Nearly 150 years ago, the Supreme Court ruled at photographs are copyrightable. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). The case involved a photographer’s claim against a lithographer for 85,000 unauthorized copies of a photograph of Oscar Wilde. The photo, Sarony’s “Oscar Wilde No. 18,” is shown below:

Sarony’s “Oscar Wilde No. 18"

The argument against copyright protection was that a photograph is “a reproduction, on paper, of the exact features of some natural object or of some person” and is therefore not a product of human creativity. Id. at 56. The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that there was sufficient human creativity involved in making the photo, including posing the subject, evoking the desired expression, arranging the clothing and setting, and managing the lighting.

In the mid-1960’s, the Copyright Office rejected a musical composition, Push Button Bertha, that was created by a computer, reasoning that it lacked the “traditional elements of authorship” as they were not created by a human.

In 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Naruto, a crested macaque (represented by a group of friendly humans), lacked standing under the Copyright Act to hold a copyright in the “monkey selfie” case. See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018). The “monkey selfie” is below:

Monkey Selfie

In February 2022, the Copyright Office rejected a registration (filed by interested humans) for a visual image titled “A Recent Entrance to Paradise,” generated by DABUS, the AI whose claimed fractal-based inventions are the subject of patent applications around the world. DABUS’ image is below:

“A Recent Entrance to Paradise”

Litigation over this rejected application remains pending.

And last month, the Copyright Office ruled that a graphic novel consisting of human-authored text and images generated using the AI tool Midjourney could, as a whole, be copyrighted, but that the images, standing alone, could not. See U.S. Copyright Office, Cancellation Decision re: Zarya of the Dawn (VAu001480196) at 2 (Feb. 21, 2023).

The Copyright Office’s issuing the Policy was necessitated by the rapid and remarkable improvements in generative AI tools over even the past several months. In December 2022, generative AI tool Dall-E generated the following images in response to nothing more than the prompt, “portrait of a musician with a hat in the style of Rembrandt”:

Four portraits generated by AI tool Dall-E from the prompt, "portrait of a musician with a hat in the style of Rembrandt."

If these were human-generated paintings, or even photographs, there is no doubt that they would be copyrightable. But given that all four images were generated in mere seconds, with a single, general prompt from a human user, do they meet the Copyright Office’s criteria for copyrightability? The answer, now, is a clear “no” under the Policy.

However, the Policy opens the door to registering AI-assisted human creativity. The toggle points will be:

“…whether the ‘work’ is basically one of human authorship, with the computer [or other device] merely being an assisting instrument, or whether the traditional elements of authorship in the work (literary, artistic, or musical expression or elements of selection, arrangement, etc.) were actually conceived and executed not by man but by a machine.” 

In the case of works containing AI-generated material, the Office will consider whether the AI contributions are the result of “mechanical reproduction” or instead of an author’s “own original mental conception, to which [the author] gave visible form.” 

The answer will depend on the circumstances, particularly how the AI tool operates and how it was used to create the final work. This will necessarily be a case-by-case inquiry.” 

See Policy (citations omitted).

Machine-produced authorship alone will continue not to be registerable in the United States, but human selection and arrangement of AI-produced content could lead to a different result according to the Policy. The Policy provides select examples to help guide registrants, who are encouraged to study them carefully. The Policy, combined with near future determinations by the Copyright Office, will be critical to watch in terms of increasing likelihood a registration application will be granted as the Copyright Office continues to assess the impacts of new technology on the creative process. AI tools should not all be viewed as the “same” or fungible. The type of AI and how it is used will be specifically considered by the Copyright Office.

In the short term, the Policy provides some practical guidance to applicants on how to describe the role of AI in a new copyright application, as well as how to amend a prior application in that regard if needed. While some may view the Policy as “new” ground for the Copyright Office, it is consistent with the Copyright Office’s long-standing efforts to protect the fruits of human creativity even if the backdrop (AI technologies) may be “new.”

As a closing note, it bears observing that copyright law in the United Kingdom does permit limited copyright protection for computer-generated works – and has done so since 1988. Even under the U.K. law, substantial questions remain; the author of a computer-generated work is considered to be “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.” See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (1988) §§ 9(3), 12(7) and 178. In the case of images generated by a consumer’s interaction with a generative AI tool, would that be the consumer or the generative AI provider?

Copyright © 2023 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.

Patenting a Nice Cool Glass of Nicotinamide Riboside? Claims Covering Milk Invalid under § 101

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that claims covering a naturally occurring composition were not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 merely because one component of the composition had been “isolated.” ChromaDex, Inc. v. Elysium Health, Inc., Case No. 2022-1116 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2023) (Chen, Prost, Stoll, JJ.)

ChromaDex sued Elysium (a former ChromaDex customer) for infringement of its patent directed to dietary supplements containing nicotinamide riboside (NR). Elysium moved for summary judgment, arguing that the asserted claims were invalid under the § 101 prohibition against patenting natural phenomena. After the district court granted summary judgment, ChromaDex appealed.

The asserted claims were directed to a composition comprising:

  • Isolated NR
  • One or more of tryptophan, nicotinic acid or nicotinamide
  • One of 22 carriers
  • Increased NAD+ biosynthesis after eating.

Both parties conceded that milk satisfies every element of the asserted claims with the exception that its NR is not “isolated.” Both parties also conceded that milk is a naturally occurring material and thus not patent eligible under § 101.

On these facts, the issue presented was whether the claim limitation that the NR must be “isolated” (which does not occur in nature) was sufficient to make the claims patent eligible. The Federal Circuit responded “no.”

The Federal Circuit analyzed the asserted claims under two tests: the “markedly different characteristics” test set out in Chakrabarty, and the Alice two-step test (unsure whether Chakrabarty remains controlling precedent).

Under the Chakrabarty test, a claimed composition is not a natural phenomenon if it has “markedly different characteristics” from what occurs in nature. The Federal Circuit found that ChromaDex’s claimed composition had no markedly different characteristics from natural milk. While ChromaDex argued that isolation potentially allowed for unnaturally high concentrations of NR, the claims did not require such concentrations. The claims included compositions structurally and functionally identical to milk and therefore failed the “markedly different characteristics” Chakrabarty test.

Proceeding to the two-part Alice test, under step 1 the Federal Circuit found that the claims were directed to a product of nature because there were no structural differences between the claimed composition and natural milk. Under step two, the Court found that there was no “inventive step” because the claims were merely directed to increasing NAD+ biosynthesis, which was a natural principle that resulted from drinking milk.

Practice Note: During claim drafting, care should be taken to avoid claims that encompass all structural and functional components of a naturally occurring material.

© 2023 McDermott Will & Emery

With the US Copyright Office (USCO) continuing their stance that protection only extends to human authorship, what will this mean for artificial intelligence (AI)-generated works — and artists — in the future?

Almost overnight, the limited field of Machine Learning and AI has become nearly as accessible to use as a search engine. Apps like Midjourney, Open AI, ChatGPT, and DALL-E 2, allow users to input a prompt into these systems and a bot will generate virtually whatever the user asks for. Microsoft recently announced its decision to make a multibillion-dollar investment in OpenAI, betting on the hottest technology in the industry to transform internet as we know it.[1]

However, with accessibility of this technology growing, questions of authorship and copyright ownership are rising as well. There remain multiple open questions, such as: who is the author of the work — the user, the bot, or the software that produces it? And where is this new generative technology pulling information from?

AI and Contested Copyrights

As groundbreaking as these products are, there has been ample backlash regarding copyright infringement and artistic expression. The stock image company, Getty Images, is suing Stability AI, an artificial intelligence art tool behind Stable Diffusion. Getty Images alleges that Stability AI did not seek out a license from Getty Images to train its system. Although the founder of Stability AI argues that art makes up 0.1% of the dataset and is only created when called by the user’s prompt. In contrast, Shutterstock, one of Getty Images largest competitors, has taken an alternative approach and instead partnered with Open AI with plans to compensate artists for their contributions.

Artists and image suppliers are not the only ones unhappy about the popularity of machine learning.  Creators of open-source code have targeted Microsoft and its subsidiary GitHub, along with OpenAI,  in a proposed class-action lawsuit. The lawsuit alleges that the creation of AI-powered coding assistant GitHub Copilot is relying on software piracy on an enormous scale. Further, the complaint claims that GitHub relies on copyrighted code with no attribution and no licenses. This could be the first class-action lawsuit challenging the training and output of AI systems. Whether artists, image companies, and open-source coders choose to embrace or fight the wave of machine learning,  the question of authorship and ownership is still up for debate.

The USCO made clear last year that the copyright act only applies to human authorship; however they have recently signaled that in 2023 the office will focus on the legal grey areas surrounding the copyrightability of works generated in conjunction with AI. The USCO denied multiple applications to protect AI authored works previously, stating that the “human authorship” element was lacking. In pointing to previous decisions, such as the 2018 decision that a monkey taking a selfie could not sue for copyright infringement, the USCO reiterated that “non-human expression is ineligible for copyright protection.” While the agency is standing by its conclusion that works cannot be registered if it is exclusively created by an AI, the office is considering the issue of copyright registration for works co-created by humans and AI.

Patent Complexities  

The US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) will have to rethink fundamental patent policies with the rise of sophisticated AI systems as well. As the USPTO has yet to speak on the issue, experts are speculating alternative routes that the office could choose to take: declaring AI inventions unpatentable, which could lead to disputes and hinder the incentive to promote innovation, or concluding that the use of AI should not render otherwise patentable inventions unpatentable, but would lead to complex questions of inventorship. The latter route would require the USPTO to rethink their existing framework of determining inventorship by who conceived the invention.

Takeaway

The degree of human involvement will likely determine whether an AI work can be protected by copyright, and potentially patents. Before incorporating this type of machine learning into your business practices, companies should carefully consider the extent of human input in the AI creation and whether the final work product will be protectable. For example:

  • An apparel company that uses generative AI to create a design for new fabric may not have a protectable copyright in the resulting fabric design.

  • An advertising agency that uses generative AI to develop advertising slogans and a pitch deck for a client may not be able to protect the client from freely utilizing the AI-created work product.

  • A game studio that uses generative AI to create scenes in a video game may not be able to prevent its unlicensed distribution.

  • A logo created for a business endeavor may not be protected unless there are substantial human alterations and input.

  • Code that is edited or created by AI may be able to be freely copied and replicated.

Although the philosophical debate is only beginning regarding what “makes” an artist, 2023 may be a uniquely litigious year defining the extent in which AI artwork is protectable under existing intellectual property laws.


FOOTNOTES

[1] https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/23/tech/microsoft-invests-chatgpt-openai/index.htmlhttps://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/technology/microsoft-openai-chatgpt.html

IP Rights in Virtual Fashion: Lessons Learned in 2022 and Unanswered Questions

There was a lot of talk and much hype about the “metaverse” in 2022. While some were skeptical and stayed on the sidelines to watch, many companies began offering virtual counterparts to their real-world products for use by avatars in the metaverse, including virtual clothing and accessories. For example, Tommy Hilfiger live-streamed a virtual fashion show on Roblox as part of the New York Fashion Week, and Decentraland hosted a Metaverse Fashion Week. Many companies also introduced NFTs into fashion product lines, such as Alo’s NFT offering.

The emergence of virtual goods has generated novel questions about how to protect and enforce IP rights in virtual fashion, and how those strategies might differ from IRL (meaning “in real life”) fashion. Although many questions remain unanswered, this article sets out important considerations for how companies might use various IP laws to protect virtual fashion goods in the United States.

I. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN VIRTUAL FASHION AND IRL FASHION

Before diving into the IP discussion, it’s worth highlighting some distinctions between virtual fashion and IRL fashion outside the legal context, beyond the obvious fact that virtual fashion is worn by avatars. IRL clothing and accessories are worn primarily for protection against the elements, to conform to societal standards, to conform with a specific event’s dress requirements, to communicate via express messages on clothing or accessories, or to express oneself through the style or design of the clothing.

Virtual fashion can also serve each of those purposes for an avatar, and in some cases the person behind the avatar. But, because it is comprised of software code, the possibilities for virtual fashion utility are endless. For example, a particular piece of virtual clothing can also grant access to certain virtual spaces or events or give the avatar special powers within virtual worlds. If tied to an NFT (non-fungible token), virtual clothing can also provide benefits on and off virtual platforms, including exclusive access to sales promotions and IRL events.

Unlike IRL clothing, however, virtual fashion items currently face compatibility limitations, as the ability to use any virtual fashion item across all virtual platforms is unlikely.

To muddy the waters, as virtual and augmented reality technologies are becoming more popular, they can blur the lines between IRL and virtual fashion. For example, an IRL sweatshirt, when viewed through an appropriate lens, could feature virtual components.

II. IP PROTECTION FOR VIRTUAL FASHION

Because there are no IP laws specific to virtual fashion items, we must seek protection from laws that have traditionally applied to real-life clothing, namely, trademark, trade dress, copyright, and design patent. But the application of these laws can sometimes differ in the virtual context. Each is addressed below.

A. TRADEMARK

Trademark law protects source identifiers such as words, names, logos, and slogans. Obtaining trademark rights specifically in virtual goods, whether acquired through use in commerce or federal registration, is generally straightforward and similar to marks covering IRL fashion. This is evidenced by many marks that were registered in 2022 and specifically cover virtual goods.

That said, even if a company does not have trademark coverage specifically for its virtual goods, the owner of a trademark covering IRL fashion items should have strong arguments that such trademark rights extend to their virtual counterparts. To that point, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) has refused registration of marks covering virtual goods and services based on prior registrations for the identical marks covering the corresponding IRL goods and services. See, e.g., the refusals of Application No. 97112038 for the mark GUCCI and Application No. 97112054 for the mark PRADA, each of which were filed by parties unrelated to the famous brands.

However, for purposes of enforcement outside of the USPTO context, if a defendant’s goods are virtual, it would have a stronger argument that such goods are not commercial products, but rather expressive works protected by the First Amendment. If a court accepts such an argument, it must then weigh the plaintiff’s trademark rights against the defendant’s First Amendment right of free expression, meaning it would be more challenging for a brand owner to enforce its trademark rights.

In this regard, please see our earlier alert regarding the Hermès v. Rothschild case, in which the court deemed NFTs tied to images of bags called “MetaBirkins” subject to First Amendment protection. [1] In denying Rothschild’s motion to dismiss, the court acknowledged in a footnote that virtually wearable bags (i.e., as opposed to virtual fashion that is displayable but not wearable) might not be afforded First Amendment protection. But we suspect defendants will argue even virtually wearable items should be afforded First Amendment protection, especially given that video games have received such protection. [2]

On balance, companies should consider seeking federal trademark registration specifically for virtual goods and services, for a few reasons:

More direct coverage could help a company in an enforcement action against infringing virtual goods, even if the defendant successfully argues it should be entitled to First Amendment protection. For instance, if the plaintiff has direct coverage for virtual goods, it may be easier to prove the defendant’s use of the mark was “explicitly misleading” under the Rogers test. [3]

Certain platforms featuring virtual fashion items may only honor a takedown request if the complainant company has a federal registration covering goods that are the same or nearly identical to the allegedly infringing virtual goods.

The registration will provide a presumption of valid trademark rights nationwide, and it may serve as a deterrent to third parties wishing to use confusingly similar marks in virtual worlds.

B. TRADE DRESS

U.S. trademark law also protects certain source-identifying elements of a product’s aesthetic design, configuration/shape, and packaging, often referred to as “trade dress.” To obtain trade dress protection, such elements must be (1) non-functional and (2) distinctive (either inherently or acquired through use). There are a couple of interesting nuances with respect to acquiring trade dress protection in the virtual context.

First, although we have not yet seen any case law specifically addressing this, companies will likely have stronger arguments that virtual shape or design elements (as opposed to IRL elements) are non-functional. Specifically, the non-functionality requirement means the relevant elements must not be essential to the use or purpose or affect the cost or quality of the article. For real-life fashion items, this can be difficult to meet due to the inherently functional nature of many aspects of clothing or accessories. However, because virtual fashion items are essentially software code with endless possibilities, in many instances the fashion item will not require any particular design or shape to function.

Second, some virtual fashion items could receive more favorable treatment from a distinctiveness perspective. The distinctiveness requirement has historically been a difficult barrier for protecting IRL fashion. Specifically, case law prior to 2022 established that, while packaging can sometimes be inherently distinctive, product design and configuration/shape can never be, meaning companies must prove such elements have acquired distinctiveness. Proving acquired distinctiveness is burdensome because the company must have used the elements extensively, substantially exclusively, and continuously for a period of time. Often, by the time a company can acquire distinctiveness in the design, the design is no longer in style. Or, if a design is popular and copied by third parties, it can be difficult for the company to claim it used the design substantially exclusively.

If, however, a virtual fashion item provides the user with benefits that go beyond merely outfitting the avatar, such as by providing access to other products or services, one might argue that those items should be construed as packaging, or some new category of trade dress, for such other products or services, in which case the elements could possibly be deemed inherently distinctive with respect to those other products or services.

That said, if a company already has trade dress protection for IRL fashion goods, it should have good arguments that the protection extends to any virtual counterpart. On the flipside, given the difficulties companies typically face in seeking trade dress protection in IRL fashion, to the extent they can obtain trade dress protection in a virtual counterpart more easily, perhaps it can argue the rights in any virtual goods should also extend to the physical counterpart. Or, if a company introduces a physical design and virtual design simultaneously, it could possibly acquire distinctiveness in both sooner, as the simultaneous use would presumably create greater exposure to more customers and reinforce the source-identifying significance of the alleged elements.

With respect to enforcement, like traditional marks, defendants are more likely to raise a successful First Amendment defense for any virtual products allegedly infringing trade dress. The Hermès case is again an example of this, as Hermès alleged infringement of both its BIRKIN word mark and the trade dress rights in the design of its handbags, and the court held that the defendant’s MetaBirkin NFTs were entitled to the First Amendment protection.

Finally, although obtaining trade dress protection is typically more difficult than obtaining trademark protection for traditional marks such as words and logos, companies should also consider seeking registration for trade dress in virtual goods, particularly for important designs that are likely to carry over from season to season, for the same reasons discussed in the trademark section above.

C. COPYRIGHT

Copyright protects original works of authorship that contain at least a modicum of creativity, which is a relatively low bar. However, copyright does not protect useful articles. In effect, for IRL fashion items, copyright generally extends only to those designs that would be entitled to copyright protection if they were extracted or removed from the clothing or viewed on a different medium, and not to the shape of the fashion item itself.

Like trade dress protection, copyright protection should provide companies with greater protection for virtual fashion items than would be available for IRL items, particularly because the software behind the virtual fashion can theoretically create an infinite number of clothing shapes that are creative and not necessarily “useful.” Nonetheless, if a virtual clothing item is merely shaped like its IRL counterpart that lacks originality (e.g., a virtual t-shirt shaped like a basic real-life t-shirt), it may also fail to qualify for copyright protection based on a lack of creativity.

Unlike trade dress protection, however, copyright protection arises immediately upon creation of the work and its fixation in a tangible medium of expression, so it can be a useful tool for protecting virtual fashion without having to spend the time and resources required to seek registration as trade dress and establish acquired distinctiveness.

In addition, unlike IRL fashion, a separate copyright protects the underlying source code for virtual clothing items, which could provide owners with an additional, though likely limited, claim against unauthorized source code copycats.

A copyright registration will provide owners with the ability to sue for copyright infringement, but companies should balance:

  • the benefits of seeking potentially broader copyright protection in virtual fashion items (apart from the code) than it would for IRL items with the risks of conceding that virtual fashion items are works of art entitled to First Amendment protection, which would make trademark and trade dress enforcement more difficult; and
  • the benefits of obtaining any copyright registration for source code with the benefits of keeping the source code secret (although the Copyright Office permits some redactions, significant portions are required to be deposited into the public record).

We are unaware of any 2022 case law specifically addressing copyright in virtual fashion. However, the following cases are worth watching:

  • Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith[4]: In October 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments regarding whether Andy Warhol’s “Prince Series” silk screen prints and pencil drawings based on a photograph infringed the photographer’s copyright, or whether they were sufficiently “transformative” to constitute fair use. The outcome of this case could affect a copyright owner’s ability to enforce copyrights against unauthorized digital reproductions of its work, especially if the original work is fixed in a physical medium (e.g., enforcing copyright in a physical clothing item against a third party’s digital reproduction).
  • Thaler v. Perlmutter[5]: Filed in June 2022, the plaintiff is suing the U.S. Copyright Office for refusing registration of an AI-created image because there was no human author. The outcome of this case will necessarily implicate virtual fashion incorporating any AI-generated work.

D. DESIGN PATENT

Design patents protect the ornamental appearance or look of a unique product. Specifically, they protect any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture. Traditionally, this law was interpreted to require that the article of manufacture is a physical or tangible product. Thus, in the fashion industry for example, one can file a design patent application directed to a unique shoe, handbag, or jewelry design. Historically, an image or picture would not qualify for design patent protection.

However, the USPTO is currently assessing design patents with respect to new technologies such as projections, holograms, and virtual and augmented reality. In December 2020, the USPTO issued a request for public comment regarding a potential rule change to the “article of manufacture” requirement and whether U.S. law should be revised to protect digital designs. Public opinion was mixed, and in April 2022, the USPTO issued a summary of this requested information.

Although the USPTO has not yet formally revised the rules, it has issued guidelines over the years that provide examples of non-physical products that could be protected by a design patent, suggesting changes may ultimately be coming to U.S. design patent law. For example, in 1995, the USPTO released guidelines for design patent applications claiming computer-generated icons. In general, to be eligible for protection, the computer-generated icon must be embodied in a computer screen monitor, or other display monitor. The USPTO has also issued guidance allowing type font to be protectable by design patents. However, it is still unclear whether the USPTO will set forth design patent guidance specific to digital designs or virtual fashion.

Notwithstanding the possibility of obtaining a design patent specifically on such virtual goods, courts have been reluctant to find that a virtual product infringes the design patent for an IRL product. For example, in 2014, in P.S. Products, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.,[6] P.S. Products accused Activision of infringing its design patent directed to a stun gun by depicting a virtual weapon in its video game that P.S. Products claimed resembled its patent-protected IRL product.

The court found there was no infringement because “no ordinary observer would be deceived into purchasing a video game believing it to be plaintiffs’ patented stun gun.” This case may have come out differently if the virtual gun was sold separately from the video game and could be used across various platforms rather than being one component of a particular video game. Although there are still software compatibility restrictions for virtual goods, portability of virtual goods is likely to grow as technology evolves and companies respond to consumer demands.

While we wait for further USPTO guidance that ultimately may have application to virtual fashion, parties seeking design patent protection may consider simultaneously filing one application to protect the work as a digital design on a display screen, like a patentable computer-generated icon, and a second, traditional design patent application to protect the design as a tangible product. That said, companies should consider other options for protecting any designs created by AI, as the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held in 2022 that AI cannot qualify as an inventor for purposes of obtaining a patent.[7]

III. Virtual Fashion in Practice

Contracts relating to virtual fashion are analogous to contracts for IRL fashion and should be structured accordingly. For instance, companies should ensure that contracts with IP contributors include an assignment of all IP rights, or at least a sufficiently broad license. In the virtual context, this includes rights to the software code itself. Likewise, downstream licensing should generally address ownership, licensee rights, and if applicable, confidentiality for any trade secrets in the source code. In addition, for both IP contributors and licensees, if AI software is used in any part of the creative process, companies should give thought to allocation of ownership.

In addition, some designers or marketing teams may prefer to encourage a brand’s customer base to copy its designs or create derivative works. Although this seems counterintuitive (especially to an IP lawyer), many players in the Web3 space encourage others to build off their own designs. For example, the Bored Ape Yacht Club (BAYC), known for issuing NFTs tied to images of apes, grants owners of its NFTs the rights to use the images of apes, including for commercial purposes.[8] For example, one purchaser of a Bored Apt NFT created a Bored Ape-themed restaurant.

In the virtual fashion context, if a marketing team wants customers to build off the brand’s virtual designs but wants to retain ownership of its own designs (and perhaps derivatives), it should implement standard licensing terms relating to ownership, customer licensee rights, and other provisions. However, it’s important to consider how the terms are presented and how customers indicate assent to maximize the prospects of enforceability.

From a business perspective, companies can also now use NFTs and smart contracts to receive automatic royalties in any downstream sales or licenses. And because NFTs use blockchain technology, which provides an immutable chain of title, third parties will be able to trace such designs to the original source. This means companies can encourage the sharing of designs and receive royalties in connection with the downstream licensing of designs tied to NFTs, and third parties can confirm that the designs are legitimate by reviewing the relevant blockchain ledger. Accordingly, although encouraging customers to use the brand’s designs may not be a model for every brand, there are some steps brands can take to protect the IP rights associated with them and reap financial benefits.

As virtual fashion items become more popular, companies are faced with uncertainties and novel questions regarding how to protect and enforce their IP rights. In 2022, some questions were answered, but many more remain open. Therefore, it is important to discuss strategies for protecting innovative virtual fashion with IP counsel.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Notably, on December 30, 2022, the Hermès court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, with an opinion to follow by January 20. A jury trial is scheduled to begin on January 30, 2023. Hermès International, et al. v. Mason Rothschild, 1:22-cv-00384-JSR (S.D.N.Y.).

[2] See, e.g., AM Gen. LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 467, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

[3] If a defendant’s unauthorized use of a mark is protected by the First Amendment, many courts use the Rogers test to balance the plaintiff’s trademark rights with the defendant’s First Amendment right of expression. This test looks at whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark was artistically relevant and, if so, whether it was explicitly misleading. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).

[4] 11 F.4th 26 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1412 (2022).

[5] Case No. 1:22-cv-01564 (D.D.C.).

[6] 140 F. Supp. 3d 795, 802 (E.D. Ark. 2014).

[7] Thaler v. Vidal, 43 F.4th 1207, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

[8] We will save for another day a discussion of the recent lawsuit against BAYC and many celebrities for failing to disclose financial incentives when promoting the BAYC NFT collection, and instead focus here on IP protection. Adonis Real, et al., v. Yuga Labs, Inc., et al., 2:22-cv-08909 (C.D. Cal.). But companies should also ensure that influencers properly disclose any incentives and other material connections.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2023 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.

Legal Standing in Trademark Non-Use Cancellation Actions

In recent years the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office (IMPI) allowed the possibility that complainants credit their legal standing on trademark non-use cancellation proceedings through the existence of a trademark application without the need of initially demonstrating that such application was blocked to registration in view of the prior existence of third parties’ confusingly similar registered marks, as long as the official action citing the conflicting registration as pertinent barrier was submitted as subsequent evidence in the proceeding.

Accordingly, it started to be a common practice to file non-use cancellation actions submitting as evidence a certified copy of the trademark application serving as a basis to attack the registration not being used accompanied with the results of an availability search showing the existence of the registration subject to the proceeding.

Nonetheless, such criteria adopted by IMPI was revoked by the Federal Court of Administrative Affairs and by Federal Circuit Courts sustaining that legal standing must be credited initially along with the complaint without being possible to do it at a later stage by submitting the evidence attesting that IMPI objected the registration of complainant’s trademark application on grounds of likelihood of confusion because of the existence of defendant’s registration.

The Court’s reasonings behind the revocation of such criteria were mainly based on legal certainty arguments stating that legal standing can only born when a formal objection is raised by IMPI communicating to the applicant the existence of a citation based on likelihood of confusion.

Therefore, IMPI is now starting to analyze and solve non-use cancellation actions following the Court’s legal reasonings stating that legal standing must be credited initially along with the complaint, without enabling complainants to credit such standing subsequently.

Consequently, it is advisable that titleholders file non-use cancellation actions only after being served with the official actions communicating the existence of pertinent barriers blocking the registration.

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Names and Brand Names

A key aspect of trademarks has been at the forefront of both fiction and real-life sports news over the past few weeks: what makes a name a name and who can use a name as a trademark? While trademarks are commercial rights, trademark law also protects a person’s right to control their own identity, including well-known pseudonyms and nicknames.

Marvel’s She-Hulk: Attorney-at-Law is, like most TV shows about lawyers, often cavalier with how it represents the law, but when the question of the protagonist’s rights in her nom de guerre came up, it was more accurate than most courtroom dramas. Jen Walters (the civilian identity of the titular She-Hulk) discovers a “super-influencer” has launched a line of cosmetics under the SHE-HULK brand and based on that use, is claiming trademark rights in SHE-HULK, going so far as to sue Jen Walters for her use of the name She-Hulk. While much of the terminology is mangled, the show’s hearing on the issue reaches points that are relevant in the real world. First, does “She-Hulk” identify a living person? And second, would another’s use of SHE-HULK be “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association” (as set forth in 15 U.S. Code § 1125) of that user and the person known to the public as SHE-HULK? It being a superhero show, Jen Walters ultimately vindicates her rights to the She-Hulk name and SHE-HULK Mark.

Circumstances in the real world are rarely as cut-and-dried. In a proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, NBA player Luka Doncic is attempting to reclaim the trademark rights in his own name from his ex-manager, his mother. Doncic, born in 1999, was a basketball star from his early teens. During his meteoric rise in European basketball, his mother, with his consent at the time, registered a design trademark (consisting mainly of his name) for goods and services including soaps, recorded basketball games, apparel, sports equipment, and promotional and educational services, starting with an application in the European Union in 2015 (when Doncic was 16) and filing in the U.S. in 2018 (when he was 19).

Doncic, as stated in his petition to cancel that U.S. Registration, has since withdrawn his consent to his mother’s use and registration of his name as a trademark. Instead, he has, through his own company, Luka99, Inc., applied to register a few marks including his own name, which have been refused registration because of the existing registration owned by his mother. To clear the way for his own registrations, he is seeking to cancel hers on the basis that (as in the fictional example above) her use or registration is likely to make consumers believe the goods and services offered with her authorization are associated with or endorsed by him, and because he has withdrawn his consent, her registrations are no longer permitted to remain on the register.

As Doncic was a minor when he gave consent, he has a good chance of regaining control of his name. Not everyone is so lucky, so you should be especially careful when entering any agreement that allows someone to use your name as a trademark.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

Supreme People’s Court Upholds China’s First Patent Linkage Ruling – Decision Released

On August 28, 2022, 知识产权那点事 published the first patent linkage decision from the Supreme People’s Court (SPC). The SPC upheld the Beijing IP Court ruling that Wenzhou Haihe Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.’s application for marketing authorization for a generic form of “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule” did not fall within scope of protection of the relevant patent. China’s patent linkage system prevents marketing authorization for a generic prior to the expiration of the patent term on the branded equivalent unless the Beijing IP Court or the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) rules that the generic does not fall within the scope of the relevant patent rights or is invalid.

On November 10, 2021, the Beijing IP Court announced that the plaintiff of the case, Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Roche, claimed that it was the patentee as well as the holder of the marketing license for the patented drug “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule”, and the patent involved in the drug was CN 2005800098777.6 entitled “ED-71 preparation.” The plaintiff discovered that the defendant Wenzhou Haihe Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. had applied to the National Medical Products Administration (NMPA) for a generic drug marketing license application named “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule”. The public information on the Chinese listed drug patent information registration platform showed that the defendant had made a 4.2 category statement regarding the generic drug (the generic drugs do not fall into the scope of protection of the related patents). Therefore, the plaintiff filed a drug patent linkage lawsuit with the Beijing Intellectual Property Court in accordance with the provisions of Article 76 of the Amended Patent Law, requesting the court to confirm that the generic drug “Aidecalcidol Soft Capsule” that the defendant applied for registration fell into the scope the rights of Patent No. 2005800098777.6 enjoyed by the plaintiff.

 

The Beijing IP Court held:

The technical solution used by the generic drug involved is neither the same nor equivalent to the technical solution of claim 1 of the involved patent, so the technical solution does not fall within the protection scope of claim 1 of the involved patent. Since claims 2-6 are dependent claims of claim 1, if the technical solution of the generic drug involved does not fall within the protection scope of claim 1, it also does not fall within the protection scope of claims 2-6. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim that the involved generic drug falls within the protection scope of claims 1-6 of the involved patent cannot be established, and the court will not support it.

In the decision, the Supreme People’s Court stated there were two key points:

1. In the process of drug marketing review and approval, disputes arising from the patent rights related to the drug to be registered between the drug marketing license applicant and the relevant patentee or interested parties are only one type of the related patent rights between the two parties – often referred to as drug patent link disputes. For chemical generic drugs, the drug regulatory department of the State Council conducts drug marketing review and approval based on the application materials of the generic drug applicant, and decides whether to suspend the approval of the relevant drugs according to the effective judgment made by the people’s court [or the China National Intellectual Property Administration] on such disputes within the prescribed time limit. Therefore, when judging whether the technical solution of a generic drug falls within the scope of patent protection, in principle, it should be compared and judged on the basis of the application materials of the generic drug applicant. If the technical solution actually implemented by the generic drug applicant is inconsistent with the declared technical solution, it shall bear legal responsibility in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations on drug supervision and administration; if the patentee or interested party believes that the technical solution actually implemented by the generic drug applicant constitutes infringement, a separate lawsuit for patent infringement may also be filed. Therefore, whether the technical solution actually implemented by a generic drug applicant is the same as the application materials is generally not within the scope of examination to confirm that the dispute falls within the scope of patent protection.

2. The court of second instance held that both the donation [to the public] rule and the estoppel rule can constitute a restriction on the application of the principle of equivalence, both of which aim to achieve a reasonable balance between equitably protecting the interests of the patentee and safeguarding the interests of the public. If the conditions for limiting the application of the principle of equivalence are met, there is usually no need to judge whether the two features constitute similar means, functions, and effects, and whether those skilled in the art can conceptualize them without creative work. In this case, since Haihe Company claimed the application of the estoppel rule by virtue of the amendment of the claims by Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., and claimed the application of the donation rule by the patent text as the result of the amendment, the court of second instance first rendered a judgment on whether the rules on estoppel should be applied on the basis of the amendment of the claims by the patentee.

The case numbers are:

北京知识产权法院(2021)京73民初1438号民事判决书

最高人民法院(2022)最高法知民终905号民事判决书

The full text of the decision courtesy of 知识产权那点事 is available here (Chinese only).

© 2022 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Unfashionably Late: Seventh Circuit Rejects Misappropriation Claim Premised On Prototype Created Eleven Years Prior

The Seventh Circuit recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of a former employee and his new employer on claims for misappropriation of trade secrets relating to a prototype of an actuator created eleven years prior, holding that the inference that the defendant used his knowledge of the prototype more than a decade later was “barely conceivable” and “exceptionally unreasonable.” REXA, Inc. v. Chester, — F.4th —, 2022 WL 2981167, at *6 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In 2002, Mark Chester, an engineer at Koso America, Inc. (“Koso”), participated in a project to create a new valve for a hydraulic actuator. An actuator is a component of a machine that produces motion. While the project was unsuccessful, it did produce an experimental prototype of another actuator. Koso shelved the experimental prototype due to the improbability of commercial success. The following year, Chester left Koso.

After more than a decade had passed since Chester worked on the 2002 project for Koso, Chester and his new employer, MEA Inc. (“MEA”), built a new actuator prototype, later known as the Hawk. Chester and MEA filed a related patent application, which was approved in part. REXA, Inc. (“REXA”), a company affiliated with Koso, brought suit against Chester and MEA for misappropriation of trade secrets under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”), among other claims. REXA argued that Chester and MEA’s actuator incorporated and disclosed confidential designs contained within the prototype Koso developed in 2002. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chester and MEA. REXA appealed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants on the misappropriation claims. First, the Seventh Circuit agreed that REXA failed to identify a concrete trade secret, as the Court was unable to determine which aspects of the 2002 designs are known to the trade, and which are not. The Court explained that several aspects of the 2002 actuator prototype are widely known in the industry, which by definition, is not sufficiently secret to qualify for protection under the ITSA.

Second, the Seventh Circuit held that even if REXA had identified a trade secret, REXA had not established that defendants misappropriated trade secrets when MEA filed its patent application or developed the Hawk actuator. With respect to MEA’s patent application, the Court explained that REXA’s allegations “rest on a series of untenable inferences.” Id. Indeed, eleven years had passed since Chester worked on the actuator prototype, and it was undisputed that he never saw or took any documents with him when he left Koso. Additionally, REXA did not cite any case where a court “inferred” a misappropriation of trade secrets despite a lack of evidence that the defendant seized or possessed documents, nor could the Seventh Circuit find any such case. As such, the Court found the lack of evidence, coupled with the eleven-year gap, “renders the inferences that REXA asks us to draw exceptionally unreasonable.” Id.

Regarding the design of MEA’s Hawk actuator, the Seventh Circuit held that the 2002 prototype did not include features of the patent application that made the Hawk both a non-obvious improvement over prior art and commercially valuable. Thus, Chester and MEA could not have misappropriated trade secrets contained within the 2002 prototype.

REXA serves as an important reminder that trade secret claimants must identify with specificity the elements that distinguish the alleged trade secret from general knowledge in the field or public domain. Additionally, REXA confirms that, at least in the Seventh Circuit, courts are hesitant to draw inferences supporting misappropriation claims without any evidence the defendant seized or possessed documents from the plaintiff, particularly if a significant period of time passes before the alleged misappropriation occurs.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.