Tag: Intellectual property

UKIPO Knocks Undefeated Reds off Their Perch: The Liverpool Trademark and Lessons for Brand Owners

To the interest of many a scouser and football fan alike, Liverpool Football Club’s attempt to register as a UK trademark LIVERPOOL has been rejected by the UKIPO on the grounds that the word is of “geographical significance” to the city. Liverpool FC had filed its application in regards to various goods in relation to football and the filing had attracted significant public attention.

Other English football clubs (Everton, Chelsea and Tottenham) have managed to register several trade marks for each of their respective area names. In addition Southampton Football Club has managed to register SOUTHAMPTON as an EU trade mark. As a result, it is not surprising that Liverpool FC would seek to register a similar mark to help protect its valuable brand.

However, as a result of the filing the club received significant backlash from the people of Liverpool, including their own supporters, and – probably in a related move – Liverpool FC has said that it does not plan to appeal the refusal and it has withdrawn the application. An additional trade mark application for LIVERPOOL with different claims has also been withdrawn.

The matter presents a great case study for brand owners on balancing the need to protect their brand whilst being considerate of the potential adverse PR that will come with the application for certain trade marks.

Innovation in protecting your brand

Brand owners certainly need to adopt innovative tactics when looking to fight counterfeiters and to protect their brand and Liverpool FC has shown a keen eye to identifying new brand assets.

Liverpool FC may have been unsuccessful with this application but they recently successfully applied to trade mark the phrase “LET’S TALK ABOUT SIX BABY” in the UK. The saying was coined by Reds Manager Jürgen Klopp when he ended his run of six successive final defeats and claimed a first trophy as Liverpool FC’s manager with the UEFA Champions League triumph earlier this year. No doubt will form an important part of the club’s merchandise moving forward and is a cunning registration.

Consideration of PR implications

However, all innovative steps in brand protection must be considered in their context.

Liverpool FC argued that the trade mark application was purely “in the context of football products and services” and to stop counterfeiters from benefiting from the sale of counterfeit Liverpool FC products. However, this does raise the question as to why the existing portfolio of club name, mottos and logos would not be sufficient to defeat the majority of inauthentic products that are currently on the market.

In addition, the vitriol with which the application was greeted raises further queries concerning the club’s decision to apply to register the trade mark. The Liverpool FC supporters group ‘Spirit of Shankly’ called the UKIPO’s rejection of the application a “victory for common sense” and declared that the word LIVERPOOL belongs to the “city of Liverpool”. Supporters also took the decision to wear non-official items of clothing carrying the club’s name and logo during a match against Newcastle in protest.

As a result, the case highlights the perils brand owners face when pursuing a robust approach to protecting their brand, particularly when looking to register terms as trade marks with cultural significance. Applicants must bear in mind the negative PR that can accompany any new filing strategy.

Copyright 2019 K & L Gates

ARTICLE BY Simon Casinader and Niall J. Lavery of K&L Gates.
For more trademark law, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

WIPO Launches UDRP for .CN and .中国 ccTLD

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) launched a Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) for .CN and .中国 (China) country code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD), the first non-Chinese entity to do so. Previously, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Online Dispute Solution Center (CIETAC ODRC) or the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (HKIAC) were authorized by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) to handle domain name disputes for these domains. The .CN and .中国ccTLD is among the largest in the world with over 22 million registered domain names.

The WIPO UDRP for .CN and .中国 ccTLD is only applicable to .CN and .中国domain names that have been registered for less than three years.  In contrast to the conventional UDRP, the Chinese UDRP applies to domain names that are identical or confusingly similar, not only to a mark, but to any “name” in which the complainant has civil rights or interests.

The complainant must prove that either registration or use of the disputed domain name is in bad faith, but not both as in the traditional UDRP.  Examples of bath faith provided by WIPO include:

  • The purpose for registering or acquiring the domain name is to sell, rent or otherwise transfer the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the name or mark or to a competitor of that complainant, and to obtain unjustified benefits;
  • The disputed domain name holder, on many occasions, registers domain Names in order to prevent owners of the names or marks from reflecting the names or the marks in corresponding domain names;
  • The disputed domain name holder has registered or acquired the domain name for the purpose of damaging the Complainant’s reputation, disrupting the Complainant’s normal business or creating confusion with the Complainant’s name or mark so as to mislead the public;
  • Other circumstances which may prove the bad faith.

The language of proceedings will be in Chinese unless otherwise agreed by the parties or determined by the Panel.  More information is available at WIPO’s site.

© 2019 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

For more on internet IP concerns, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

Claim Construction Disputes Must Be Decided Before Applying Alice

On August 16, 2019, the Federal Circuit issued a 2-1 decision holding that a lower court erred by adjudicating patent eligibility without resolving the parties’ claim construction dispute. See MyMail, Ltd. v. ooVoo, LLC et al., Nos. 2018-1758, 2018-1759 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2019).

The patents at issue in MyMail cover methods for modifying toolbars displayed on Internet-connected devices. In response to defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings that the patents claim ineligible subject matter, MyMail raised a legal dispute over the proper construction of “toolbar.” The district court granted defendants’ motions without addressing the parties’ claim construction dispute, and without construing “toolbar.” The Court found in a split decision that the district court erred.

The majority held that “[d]etermining patent eligibility requires a full understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter.”  Accordingly, “if the parties raise a claim construction dispute at the Rule 12(c) stage, the district court must either adopt the non-moving party’s constructions or resolve the dispute to whatever extent is needed to conduct the § 101 analysis.”  Because the district court never addressed the parties’ claim construction dispute, or otherwise construed “toolbar,” the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

In his dissent, Judge Lourie argued that the facts of the case demonstrate that the parties’ claim construction dispute is “little more than a mirage,” and the claims at issue are “clearly abstract, regardless of claim construction.”

Implications

This decision provides patentees with another tool to help delay early patent eligibility decisions by raising legal issues over the proper scope of the claims. It is important to note, however, that this decision does not mean that judges must always construe the claims before ruling on patent eligibility—only when the parties raise a dispute. Further, patentees should weigh the relative pros and cons of raising claim construction issues early in a case, as this may come with some risks including putting a stake in the ground without sufficient discovery concerning the accused products.

© 2019 Brinks Gilson Lione. All Rights Reserved.

For more on patent law see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

How to Get a PTAB Decision Designated Precedential

This past year, we have seen the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) designate a number of decisions as precedential and informative more so than in past years. This is directly a result of the USPTO’s revised Standard Operating Procedure 2 (SOP2). On September 20, 2018, the USPTO announced that Board decisions can now be designated as precedential or informative through either one of two tracks: (1) POP Review or (2) a “ratification” process.

Under both tracks, a newly formed Precedential Opinion Panel (POP) comprising of at least three members will decide whether the decision should be designated as precedential or informative. Members of the POP will be selected by the Director and, by default, will comprise the Director, the Commissioner of Patents and the Chief Judge. The three members of the POP may each decide to delegate their authority in certain circumstances.

POP Review

POP Review under the first track is a rehearing of an issue in a pending trial. A party to a proceeding or any other member of the Board may recommend POP review—or a rehearing—of a particular Board decision. The request for POP review should be limited to situations where the Board decides issues of exceptional importance involving policy or procedure. A screening committee will review the recommendations and forward its recommendations to the Director. The Director will then convene with the POP to decide whether to grant rehearing, and if rehearing is granted, to render a decision on rehearing of the case.

If POP review is ordered, the Order will identify the issues the POP intends to resolve, may request additional briefing from the parties and, in some cases, may authorize amicus briefs. The POP may also order, at its discretion, an oral hearing. The decision resulting from POP Review will then be designated precedential, informative, or “routine.”

At this time, only two decisions have been issued by the newly formed POP:

  • Proppant Express Investments, LLC v. Oren Techs., LLC, Case IPR2018-00914, Paper 38 (Mar. 13, 2019) (designated: Mar. 13, 2019)

  • GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc., Case IPR2018-01754, Paper 38 (Aug. 23, 2019) (designated: Aug. 23, 2019)

Please see my latest blog post on the GoPro decision regarding the one-year time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).

To request POP review, a party to the proceeding must submit a request by email to Precedential_Opinion_Panel_Request@uspto.gov. The email must identify with particularity the reasons for recommending POP review along with a request for rehearing filed with the Board under 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a) or 42.71(d). In addition, counsel must also include a statement that the Board’s decision for which rehearing is requested was contrary to law or is a question of exceptional importance.

“Ratification” process

Under the second track, the public may nominate already issued decisions to be designated precedential or informative. Under this track, the Board is relying on the public to recognize which decisions are valuable to post-grant practice. This is the more traditional path for which a decision may be designated as precedential or informative. In this past year, there have been more than a dozen decisions that have been designated as precedential or informative through this ratification process. As above, a screening committee will review the recommendations and the Director will then convene with the POP to decide whether to designate the decision as precedential or informative.

Nominations should be submitted by email to PTAB_Decision_Nomination@uspto.gov and must set forth with particularity the reasons for the requested designation.

To learn more about the process under either track described above, I recommend reviewing the revised Standard Operating Procedure 2 (SOP2) online which provides the detailed procedural requirements for nominating a decision as precedential or informative.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California
ARTICLE BY Margaux A. Savee of Polsinelli PC.

Celebrity Entertainer Sues Over Video Game Avatar

As real-world celebrities continue to expand the reach of their persona into the digital realm, the potential benefit for advertisers, game developers and esports event promoters is exceedingly high. But with increased opportunity comes increased risk.

A New York Supreme Court recently addressed this risk when it construed the State’s right of publicity statute[1] in a dispute over an NBA 2K18 video game avatar. In Champion v. Take Two Interactive Software, Inc., celebrity basketball entertainer Phillip “Hot Sauce” Champion sued the video game developer, alleging violation of his right to privacy for Take-Two’s use of his name and likeness. The Court ultimately dismissed the lawsuit, but not before it provided a helpful discussion of New York’s publicity statute and its modern application to the esports industry.

A Primer on New York’s Publicity Statute

New York publicity law allows both criminal charges and civil liability for use of a person’s “name, portrait or picture” for advertising or trade purposes without prior written permission. This right to publicity extends to any recognizable likeness that has a “close and purposeful resemblance to reality.” Courts have already held that video game avatars are within the scope of the statute’s reach.

However, while seemingly broad at first pass, this statutory right is actually more narrow than similar rights in other states where the right to publicity is recognized only at common law (i.e., in states that have no black-letter publicity statute). For example, in New York, neither “incidental” use of a person’s name or likeness, nor use that is protected under the First Amendment, are violations.

Further, unlike the words “portrait” and “picture,” the word “name” in the statute is construed literally. In fact, New York courts find liability only for uses involving an individual’s full name, and not just a surname, nickname, or business name. The statute does, however, protect certain “stage names” in limited situations, such as when the individual has become known by a stage name virtually to the exclusion of his or her real name.

The Plaintiff and the Video Game

Phillip Champion is a prominent street basketball entertainer known professionally as “Hot Sauce.” Champion claims that he is widely recognized as both “Hot Sauce” and “Hot Sizzle” in social media, and is regularly depicted on television and in blogs, movies, YouTube videos, sports magazines and live halftime shows. As a result, Champion is able to license his celebrity persona through sponsorships and endorsement deals with prominent consumer brands like AND1.

Photographs of Champion filed with the Court.

Take-Two created the NBA 2K18 basketball simulation video game, which realistically depicts the on-court competition and off-court management of the National Basketball Association. Users can create a custom player avatar, or select from existing player avatars modeled after real-life professional athletes. The game’s “MyCareer” mode allows the user to create a custom basketball player, and then design and play through the character’s entire career, competing in games and participating in off-court activities. The “Neighborhoods” option, which ties to the off-court activities in the MyCareer mode, lets users explore an off-court urban world while interacting with other basketball players—most of which are non-playable characters controlled by the computer—in scenarios like exercising in public gyms and playing casual basketball games on city courts.

Champion’s Claims

Champion’s lawsuit stems from one of the non-playable characters in the game’s Neighborhood mode, who is depicted as a young, African-American male with a mohawk, wearing all-white hi-top sneakers, a tank-top, and black shorts with white piping. On the front and back of the tank-top is the numeral “1,” and on the back are the words “Hot Sizzles.”

Images of the “Hot Sizzles” avatar filed with the Court.

Champion alleged that the look of the “Hot Sizzles” avatar incorporated numerous personal aspects of his life and identity in violation of the New York publicity statute, and further that the avatar’s “Hot Sizzles” name was itself a violation because Champion is “ubiquitously” known as “Hot Sizzle.”  Take-Two responded that its “Hot Sizzles” avatar does not sufficiently resemble Champion, whether in name or image, under New York law.

On Champion’s claims to his likeness, the Court found no physical resemblance between Champion and the “Hot Sizzle” avatar, and determined that the only reasonable commonalities are that “both are male, African-American in appearance, and play basketball.” The Court compared this case to two similar cases (Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc.  and Gravano v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. ), both involving Take-Two’s Grand Theft Auto video game, in which the avatars exhibited many closer similarities to the plaintiffs in clothes, hair, poses, voice, and life stories. Finding no similar likenesses in this case, the Court ruled that, at least from a visual perspective, the Hot Sizzles avatar in NBA 2K18 is not recognizable as Champion as a matter of law.

On Champion’s claim to the name “Hot Sizzles,” the Court recognized that the use of a person’s celebrity or “stage” name with a video game avatar could aid in recognition of the avatar as that person’s likeness. However, the Court determined that Champion’s “primary performance persona” is actually “Hot Sauce,” which is entirely distinct from the NBA 2K18 avatar’s name, “Hot Sizzles.” Champion was not able to show that he is widely known as “Hot Sizzle” to the public at large—as opposed to just in the sporting or gaming circles—so the Court ruled that, without this level of connection between Champion and the name “Hot Sizzle,” Take-Two’s use of “Hot Sizzles” does not aid in the visual recognition of the NBA 2K18 avatar as Champion.[2]

Incidental Use and the First Amendment

Take-Two also defended against Champion’s claims by alleging that the “Hot Sizzles” character falls within the “incidental use” exception to liability under New York’s statute. After reviewing the NBA 2K18 game content and related advertising, the Court seemed to agree that the avatar “is a peripheral non-controllable character” that “adds nothing of true substance to a user’s experience in the game.” However, the Court declined to make an affirmative ruling on this component of the lawsuit.

Finally, Take-Two argued that its NBA 2K18 game is protected speech under the First Amendment, and as such, it does not constitute “advertising or trade” under New York’s law. In response, the Court declared that, while video games may conceptually qualify for free speech protection, not every video game constitutes “free speech” fiction or satire. In comparing NBA 2K18 to games that contain a detailed story with pre-defined characters, dialogue and unique environments created entirely by the game designers, the Court determined that here, the users create their own basketball career and completely define their character. Accordingly, the Court found that categorizing NBA 2K18 as “protected fiction or satire” under the First Amendment is “untenable.”

What it Means

As novel sponsorship and endorsement opportunities are created through the advent of esports, advertisers, game developers, and event promoters must be certain they have the appropriate content and publicity licenses in place. However, because publicity laws, in particular, are enforced at the state level, doing this without expert guidance can be daunting. Using the right tools and a proactive licensing and review strategy, brands and marketing agencies can capture (and keep) a broader share of the esports industry’s revenues, and keep the competition on the court, not in it.

[1] New York Civil Rights Law, §§ 50-51.

[2] The Court determined that “Hot Sizzle” is, at best, Champion’s secondary “nickname.”

Copyright © 2019, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Bronze, Shape, Glow: A Copyright Tale Destined For Broadway

Stores like Aldi are increasingly popular with UK consumers as a result of offering “copycat” products of well-known brands at drastically lower prices. However, with this rise in popularity, brand owners and creatives are being increasingly frustrated by finding their products and ideas at the mercy of imitation products.

One such aggrieved party was well-known makeup brand Charlotte Tilbury (Tilbury), who found their “Starburst” lid design and the “Powder Design” of their “Filmstar Bronze and Glow” set had provided the ‘inspiration’ for Aldi’s own “Broadway Shape and Glow” set. Tilbury filled a UK High Court claim for copyright infringement over the products shown below, with Aldi adamantly rejecting that any copyright had been infringed in their ‘inspired’ makeup set.

The main difficulty Tilbury faced was the fact that it is notoriously hard to claim copyright in mass produced 3D products as English Courts have historically been reticent to consider them “sculptures” or “works of artistic craftsmanship”.

However, Tilbury was successful in arguing that the “Starburst” lid design and the “Powder Design” on their product were original artistic works and as such the product was protected by copyright. Tilbury were able to establish their artistic copyright as “a work need only be ‘original’ in the limited sense that the author originated it by his efforts rather than slavishly copying it from the work produced by the efforts of another person.” Once establishing the existence of copyright in the artistic work the Court had little difficulty in finding that it had been substantially copied by Aldi for its “Broadway Shape and Glow” set and summary judgement was granted in Tilbury’s favour.

This case not only marks a success for the aggrieved brands and creatives who feel short changed by “Like brand inspiration” products but also provides some interesting learning opportunities for brand owners in the quest to protect their designs. Tilbury was successful in arguing copyright infringement due to the original artistic “starburst” element in its product design, the elements where the copyright lay. Brand owners may consider incorporating similar artistic elements into their products to act as a form of protection against imitators or at least provide ammunition for a copyright infringement claim should they need it.

Click here for the Judgement.

Copyright 2019 K & L Gates

Article by Serena Totino and  Daniel R. Cartmell of K&L Gates.
For more copyright cases see the Intellectual Property law page of the National Law Review.

Genotyping Patent Claims Do Not Escape The Reach of s. 101

In Genetic Veterinary Sciences, Inc. v. Laboklin GMBH & Co., the University of Berlin, App. No. 2018-1565 (Fed. Cir., Aug. 9, 2019), a Fed. Cir. panel affirmed the district court’s JMOL ruling that the claims of the University’s U.S. Pat. No. 9,157,114 were patent-ineligible because they merely involved the discovery of a natural phenomenon. Interestingly, the Judges on the panel were Wallach, Hughes and Stoll, all of whom dissented from the refusal of the Fed. Cir. to rehear the Athena decision en banc. However, Athena was a straightforward “If A, then B” diagnostic test, while the claims of the ‘114 patent were not written as diagnostic claims, but as “method of genotyping” claims:

An in vivo method for genotyping a Labrador Retriever comprising:

  1. obtaining a biological sample from the Labrador Retriever,
  2. genotyping a SUV39H2 gene encoding the polypeptide of SEQ ID NO:1[;] and
  3. detecting the presence of a replacement of a nucleotide T with a nucleotide G at position 972 of SEQ ID NO:2.

This “genotyping method” detected a single point mutation in the gene that confirms the presence of a skin condition, HNPK, in the dog, that is heritable if both parents possess the mutation. It can also be used to confirm whether or not a skin condition present in the dog is HNPK.  However, the absence in the claim of a step directed to drawing a diagnostic conclusion from the presence of the mutation, while in accord with the PTO’s 2014 101 Guidance, did not save this claim from the judicial exception prohibiting claiming a law of nature. Rather, the claim jumped from a legal frying pan of Athena into the legal fire of Ariosa, that bars patenting the mere discovery or observation of a natural phenomenon:

“Similarly [to Ariosa], In re BRCA1 – & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation, we concluded that the claims were directed to a patent ineligible law of nature because the claims’ “methods, directed to identification of alterations of the gene, require[d] merely comparing the patient’s gene with the wild–type gene and identifying any differences that ar[o]se”. 774 Fed.. Cir.755, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In each of these cases, the end result of the process, the essence of the whole, [Ed. note: Is this some new poetic legal standard?] was a patent-ineligible concept”. [Ed. note: “concept” seems to be veering into abstract idea-land.]…Taken together, the plain language of claim 1 demonstrates that it is directed to nothing more than ‘observing or identifying’ the natural phenomenon of a mutation in the SUV39H2 gene….Thus the asserted claims are directed to a natural phenomenon at Alice step 1.”

Since the next section of the opinion is entitled “The Asserted Claims Do Not Recite an Inventive Concept”, you know this opinion is going to end badly for Labokin, the exclusive licensee of the university patent. Given that this opinion was written by the dissenters in the Athena petition for rehearing in banc, might this case turned out differently? Could the existence of the mutation in some of the SUV39H2 genes have been part of a public data base but its significance be unknown until the inventor discovered that the mutation could be correlated to the presence of HPNK? In other words, could the panel have begun by giving weight to the fact that one could observe the mutation without knowing what it means?

To get “credit” for the discovery of the utility of the mutation, claim 1, at the least, would need a mental process step that draws a diagnostic conclusion, a la Athena. Now the Athena dissenters would argue that the discovery of the utility of the correlation should provide the “inventive step” required by Alice step 2. But the Fed. Cir.’s Meriel decision precludes that outcome, since that panel ruled that the discovery of the utility of a correlation cannot meet the “inventive step” requirement. (Genetics Techs. v. Meriel is cited at page 25 of the slip opinion, but only as supporting a finding a lack of inventive step when the laboratory techniques employed to carry out the diagnostic procedure are routine, conventional, etc.)

So to get this claim past the “inventive concept” gatekeepers, it would also need to recite a positive action step of some sort. Here, the panel cites and distinguishes Vanda because it taught “a specific method of treatment for specific patients, using a specific compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome.” Remember, the claims of Vanda recited a first genotyping step, and then drawing a conclusion from that step, but didn’t stop there. This case did not give the dissenters much to work with, so they wrote a decision that Siri could have come up with. This case could at least have taken a swing at the failure of the Alice test to consider the claim elements in ordered combination. Judge Newman may yet get to write for a panel that has the nerve to distinguish Mayo and to find that an “If A, then B” diagnostic claim based on the discovery if the utility of a natural correlation is patent eligible because the steps, considered as a whole, are not conventional or well-known to the art.

© 2019 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

For more on patent eligibility see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

Will the Supreme Court Weigh in on the Copyright Lawsuit of the Decade?

When two tech titans clash in court, the outcome can reverberate widely. In what has been dubbed the “copyright lawsuit of the decade,” Oracle sued Google in 2010 for infringing its copyrights in 37 Java Application Programming Interface (API) packages used in Google’s Android software platform for mobile devices (as explained further below, API packages consist of pre-written computer programs that perform specified functions).

At the first trial in 2012, a jury found that Google infringed Oracle’s copyrights. The judge, however, concluded that the Java API packages were not copyrightable as a matter of law. In 2014, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for a second jury trial on Google’s fair use defense. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court denied Google’s cert petition.

In 2016, a second jury found in favor of Google on its fair use defense, and the trial court denied Oracle’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. In 2018, the Federal Circuit overturned the jury’s verdict, concluding that Google’s use of the 37 Java API packages was not fair use as a matter of law. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

On January 24, 2019, Google petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. It identified the issues presented as:

(i) whether copyright protection extends to a software interface; and

(ii) whether Google’s use of a software interface in the context of creating a new computer program constitutes fair use.

The Federal Circuit’s rulings sent shockwaves through the software industry, and fifteen parties—ranging from corporations like Microsoft to software-related associations, and intellectual property scholars—filed amicus briefs in support of Google’s petition. Microsoft warned that the Federal Circuit’s approach “threatens disastrous consequences for innovation” in the software industry by depriving third parties of access to and reuse of functional code used to “facilitate interoperability across myriad software platforms and hardware devices.” An association representing over 70,000 software developers worldwide asserted that the Federal Circuit’s conclusions had spawned confusion concerning whether longstanding practices such as sharing libraries of common software functions constitute copyright infringement. Likewise, Professor Peter S. Menell and Professor David Nimmer (the editor of Nimmer on Copyright) maintained that the Federal Circuit had “upended nearly three decades of sound, well-settled, and critically important decisions of multiple regional circuits on the scope of copyright protection for computer software.”

On March 27, 2019, Oracle filed its opposition to the petition. The tech giant identified the issues as:

(i) Whether the Copyright Act protects Oracle’s computer source code that Google concedes was original and creative, and that Oracle could have written in any number of ways to perform the same function?

(ii) Whether the Federal Circuit correctly held that it is not fair use as a matter of law for Google to copy Oracle’s code into a competing commercial platform for the purpose of appealing to Oracle’s fanbase, where Google could have written its own software platform without copying, and Google’s copying substantially harmed the actual and potential markets for Oracle’s copyrighted works?

After Google filed its reply, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States. This is where the case presently stands.

The Java Programming Language

Oracle’s predecessor, Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Sun”) developed the Java programming language to allow programmers to write programs that run on different types of computing devices without having to rewrite the programs from scratch for each type of device. To that end, Java’s motto is “write once, run anywhere.”

To provide programmers with shortcuts for executing specific functions, Sun created the Java API, which consists of packages (akin to a bookshelf in a library), classes (akin to books on the shelves), and methods (akin to “how-to” chapters in each book). See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 977 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d and remanded, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

Each method performs a specific programming function (for example, choosing between the greater of two integers). The key components of a method are: the “declaring code” that defines the package, class and method names, form of inputs and outputs, and the “implementing code” that provides instructions to the computer concerning how to carry out the declared function using the relevant inputs.

Google began negotiating with Sun in 2005 to license and adapt Java for its emerging Android software platform for mobile devices. After those negotiations failed, Google decided to use Java anyway, and copied verbatim the declaring code in 37 Java API packages (consisting of 11,500 lines of code), as well as the structure and organization of the packages (referred to as the SSO). However, Google wrote its own implementing code for the relevant methods.

In 2007, Google began licensing the Android platform free of charge to smartphone manufacturers. It earned revenue—$42 billion from 2007 through 2016—from advertising on the phones. In 2010, Oracle acquired Sun, and promptly sued Google for infringement.

The Copyright Question

In 2014, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling that the declaring code and SSO were not entitled to copyright protection. Importantly, while the Federal Circuit only has jurisdiction over patent-related matters, it handled the appeal because Oracle’s complaint had also included patent claims (which the jury rejected). The Federal Circuit, however, applied Ninth Circuit law to the copyright questions presented.

The Federal Circuit began by noting that “copyright protection extends only to the expression of an idea—not to the underlying idea itself.” Moreover, to the extent the particular form of expression is necessary to the use of the idea, then using the expression to that extent is not copyright infringement. This is known as the “merger doctrine” which states that if there are a limited number of ways to express an idea, the idea is said to “merge” with its expression—and the expression becomes unprotected. Further, the “scenes a faire doctrine,” bars certain standard, stock, or common expressions from copyright protection.

Thus, to use a simple example, while a book on arithmetic can be copyrighted, the idea of adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing cannot be. Moreover, if using symbols like “+” and “x” are necessary or commonly used to express the concepts of adding and multiplying, those expressions are not copyrightable.

Applying these principles, the Federal Circuit first observed that copyright protection extends to expressive elements of a computer program. It then rejected Google’s argument that Oracle’s expression merged with unprotectable ideas, noting that Oracle had unlimited options as to the selection and arrangement of the declaring code that Google copied. The Federal Circuit also rejected Google’s reliance on the scenes a faire doctrine. Because at the time the code was written, its composition was not dictated by external factors like “mechanical specifications of the computer” or “widely accepted programming practices within the computer industry.”

The Fair Use Question

After determining that Oracle’s declaring code and SSO were subject to copyright protection, the Federal Circuit remanded for a jury trial on Google’s fair use defense. As noted, the jury found that Google had established the defense, but the Federal Circuit overturned that verdict.

The fair use defense is a judge-made doctrine that has been incorporated into the federal copyright statute as Section 107, which provides that “the fair use of a copyrighted work…for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” To determine whether particular copying constitutes fair use, the statute identifies the following factors as:

(1) “The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”

(2) “The nature of the copyrighted work.”

(3) “The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”

(4) “The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”

The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that because Google’s copying was for a highly commercial purpose, was not qualitatively insignificant, and substantially harmed Oracle’s own licensing efforts; the copying was not fair use as a matter of law, notwithstanding the jury’s verdict to the contrary.

Because APIs are key to broad acceptance of standardized software functions, IMS computer and software expert Dr. John Levy believes that were the Supreme Court to affirm the Federal Court’s ruling, it may severely limit the spread of useful API’s to important code bases. As an example, Dr. Levy notes that a small company will usually want to make its declaring code available to all users and developers, so that the underlying application code will get the broadest possible use and market share. The developer counts on having a competitive set of implementing code to make money.

According to Dr. Levy, the Federal Circuit may have been influenced by the fact that Google made so much money using the copied declaring code. But as evidenced by the large number of amicus briefs, the broader software industry cares more about defending a broad reading of “fair use” than assessing damages against companies who make money from copied declaring code.

Dr. Levy sees the issues in the Oracle case as similar to those in a case he worked on as an expert back in the 80386 chip days. In that case, Intel owned the instruction set of the 386 chip. But because Intel customers didn’t want to be limited to a single source for these Intel-compatible processors, Intel licensed the instruction set to other chip manufacturers.

“One licensee produced chips that performed the Intel-owned instruction set. Intel sued that licensee for copyright infringement of the underlying microcode (the implementation of the instruction set in the chip designed by the licensee company),” recalled Dr. Levy.

A federal court ruled that the microcode (firmware) was indeed copyrightable, but that there was no infringement under the “limited expression” doctrine explained above. There simply were not many ways to implement the licensed instructions in microcode, and therefore the licensee’s implementation did not infringe Intel’s own implementation. In the Oracle case, however, the Federal Circuit concluded that there were many ways for a programmer to select and arrange the declaring code that Google copied.

© Copyright 2002-2019 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

This article was written by Joshua Fruchter of IMS ExpertServices.
For more copyright cases, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law page.

Reading the Supreme Court Tea Leaves in Dex Media Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP

On June 24, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in Dex Media Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP. Next term, the Court will determine whether 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) permits appeal of the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute inter partes review upon finding that 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)’s time bar did not apply.

The Dex Media case has traveled a long and tortuous path. Its journey began with the service of a complaint in 2001 which was dismissed without prejudice in 2003, and the filing of a new complaint in 2012. The petition for inter partes review was filed in May 2013, and a final written decision of the Board issued in October 2014 finding that the asserted claims are invalid. From there, the case visited the Federal Circuit twice, the Supreme Court once and is now on its way back for a second time. On appeal, the dispute has focused on whether the petition for inter partes review was time barred by § 315(b), and whether the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to hear the appeal of that issue.

Facts of the Case

In 2001, Inforocket.com, Inc., an exclusive licensee to the patent-in-suit, filed a district court action against Keen, Inc. The complaint asserting infringement was served on September 14, 2001. While the case was pending, Keen acquired Inforocket as its wholly owned subsidiary and stipulated to a voluntary dismissal of the district court action without prejudice in 2003. Keen later changed its name to Ingenio. Click-to-Call subsequently acquired the patent-in-suit, and on May 29, 2012, filed patent infringement lawsuits against multiple parties, one of which was Ingenio.

On May 28, 2012, just under one year after being served with the complaint in the Click-to-Call action, Ingenio and two other defendants filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) of the patent-in-suit. In its preliminary response, Click-to-Call contended, among other things, that § 315(b) statutorily barred institution of the IPR proceedings, noting that Ingenio’s predecessor-in-interest was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent-in-suit in 2001. Section 315(b) states, “An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real part in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”

The Board instituted the proceeding, and based on Federal Circuit precedent found that dismissal of an infringement suit without prejudice nullifies the effect of the service of the original complaint against Keen. Therefore, service of the 2001 complaint did not bar the petition. Click-to-Call again argued that the petition was time-barred in its patent owner response; and in its final written decision, the Board reaffirmed its earlier conclusion on that point and found that the challenged claims were invalid.

In the case being reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit first had to decide whether it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the § 315(b) time bar in light of § 314(d), which states, “No Appeal. – The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and unappealable.” The Federal Circuit, relying upon its en banc ruling in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018), held that time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable.

In Wi-Fi One, the Federal Circuit based its finding on the rationale that the time-bar determination “is not akin to either the non-initiation or preliminary-only merits determinations for which unreviewability is common in the law,” and the fact that the time bar “sets limits on the Director’s statutory authority to institute.” Id. at 1373-74. Having decided the question of appealability, the Click-to-Call court then held en banc that the time-bar decision applies to bar institution of an IPR when a petitioner was served with a complaint for patent infringement more than one year before filing its petition, but the action was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

Predictions for the Supreme Court

Often, even without the presence of a circuit court split, the Supreme Court takes cases on appeal from the Federal Circuit to reign in and overrule the Appellate Court. In fact, the Supreme Court has reversed 70 percent of the Federal Circuit cases it has heard since 2007. There are two important factors to suggest that the Supreme Court will for a second time reverse the Federal Circuit in this case.

  • First, in a prior appeal of this case to the Federal Circuit in 2015, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on its prior precedent in Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc., which was subsequently overruled by Wi-Fi One. Click-to-Call petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and in June 2016, the Supreme Court granted cert, and vacated and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit to consider in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee. This suggests that, at the time, the Supreme Court thought there was a clear path for the Federal Circuit to hold that § 315(b) rulings are appealable, as the Federal Circuit did in both Wi-Fi One and its ruling that is currently under review. Since then, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed, with Justice Kennedy’s retirement and the confirmation of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. It seems now that at least four of the justices of the newly constituted Court may believe that the Federal Circuit’s decision is not consistent with § 314(d).
  • This contention also is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court declined to review both of the questions presented by the petition for cert. Dex Media, Inc., the successor-in-interest to Ingenio, also requested that the Supreme Court decide whether § 315(b) bars institution of an inter partes review when the previously served patent infringement complaint, filed more than one year before the IPR petition, had been dismissed without prejudice. The Supreme Court declined to hear that issue. One might suppose that if the Supreme Court believes the time-bar question is appealable, the Court also would want to rule on whether a dismissal without prejudice negates the effect of service of the complaint under the time bar statute. It is entirely possible that the Court declined to make that determination because the question will be moot once the Court determines there is no appellate jurisdiction over the time-bar issue.

Implications of the Ruling

If the Supreme Court affirms the Federal Circuit’s ruling and finds that § 315(b) questions are appealable, the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence regarding when the one-year period begins will remain binding, at least until the Supreme Court decides to hear that issue anew. This means that entities looking to file IPR petitions must be alert to the fact that a predecessor-in-interest may have been served with a complaint triggering the one-year time limit as well as whether to file a petition with other entities who (directly or through a predecessor-in-interest) may have been served with complaints that could bar the entire petition.

In contrast, what will happen if the Supreme Court reverses the Federal Circuit’s ruling and Orders dismissal of the appeal on the grounds that § 314(d) prohibits appeal of the time bar issue? Prior to the Federal Circuit’s ruling, the Board had consistently found, as they did in this case, that dismissal of a complaint without prejudice constituted a nullity in terms of the time-bar statute. If the Federal Circuit’s opinion in this case is overruled, its opinion would not be precedential and the Board could either interpret the statute as they had previously or alter the interpretation in view of the Federal Circuit’s opinion, though they would be under no obligation to do so. It also is possible that this becomes one of the many issues that are panel-dependent, forcing petitioners who were served with complaints that have been dismissed without prejudice to “roll the dice” on the issue.

PTAB practitioners should be watching the outcome of this case closely and consider all of the implications of the ruling before filing a petition for inter partes review. As the facts of this case highlight, they also should perform a thorough due diligence review of all “real parties in interest” related to the contemplated petitioner.

©2019 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

Game Over: Obviousness Can Be Based on a Single Prior Art Reference

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) obviousness decision, finding that obviousness can be based on a single prior art reference if modifying that prior art reference is found to be obvious. Game and Technology Co., Ltd. v. Activision Blizzard Inc., Case No. 18-1981 (Fed. Cir., June 21, 2019) (Wallach, J).

Game and Technology (GAT) owns a patent directed to a method for generating a “gamvatar” by combining game items with layers of an avatar in online games. Activision Blizzard and Riot Games sought and were granted inter partes review of the patent. During the proceeding, the PTAB construed the term “gamvatar” to be a combination of an avatar with a game item function, and construed the term “layers” to mean display regions. The PTAB issued a final written decision finding the challenged claims obvious based on a user manual for a video game called Diablo II. GAT appealed.

On appeal, GAT argued that the PTAB erred in construing the terms “gamvatar” and “layers,” and further argued that the PTAB erred in its determination that the claimed method would have been obvious over the Diablo II manual.

Addressing claim construction, GAT argued that the PTAB’s construction of “gamvatar” was broader than the broadest reasonable interpretation BRI, and argued that “gamvatar” should mean “concurrently usable online and in the game.” The Federal Circuit rejected GAT’s argument, finding that the PTAB did not err in construing the term “gamvatar” because the claims and specification both showed that “gamvatar” is a combination of an avatar with a game item function and is not limited to “concurrently useable online and in the game.” As to the term “layers,” GAT argued that the term should be construed as regions for displaying graphical objects where the layers are displayed on the avatar. The Court disagreed, finding that the claim and the specification supported the PTAB’s construction of the term “layers” to mean display regions.

Turning to obviousness, GAT argued that the PTAB erred in using the user manual to find obviousness because a “a single reference . . . cannot support obviousness.” The Federal Circuit rejected GAT’s argument as a matter of law, finding that a patent can be obvious based on a single prior art reference if it would have been obvious to modify the reference to arrive at the claims invention. Applying that standard here, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB did not err in its obviousness decision because the PTAB’s finding that the Diablo II manual teaches the “gamvatar” and the “layers” limitations was supported by substantial evidence.

 

© 2019 McDermott Will & Emery
For more in PTAB cases, please see the Intellectual Property type of law page on the National Law Review.