Tag: Intellectual property

Russian Sanctions Create Patent Risks

While multi-national sanctions recently imposed on Russia were intended to punish Russia for its aggression in Ukraine, the effects of the sanctions have led to a need for tough decisions for U.S. entities with patent interests in Russia.  The prohibitions on financial exchanges with certain Russian banks will essentially prevent any payment of fees to Rospatent (the Russian patent office), and although a general license from the Department of the Treasury provides a short window for winding down certain administrative transactions, U.S. entities engaged in patent transactions with Rospatent only have a short time to make decisions about current and future patent activities in Russia.

Prohibited Activities

On February 28, 2022, the Department of the Treasury initiated prohibitions related to transactions involving certain financial institutions in Russia, including the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.1 The directive specifically prohibits a United States person (unless otherwise excepted or licensed) from engaging in any transaction involving the listed financial institutions, including any transfer of assets to such entities or any foreign exchange transaction for or on behalf of such entities.  Under the directive, the prohibitions are specifically worded to include: (1) any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions of the directive; and (2) any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions of the directive.

Notably, the prohibited activities do not expressly prevent any transactions of a U.S. person with Rospatent.  And although the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has cut off direct engagement with Rospatent for carrying out activities such as use of the Global Patent Prosecution Highway (GPPH) program2, Rospatent is not currently a sanctioned entity under the directive.  This, however, is essentially a distinction without a difference.  Moreover, since the USPTO (and also the European Patent Office) has already cut ties with Rospatent, there still remains the possibility that Rospatent itself will be added to the sanctions at a future date and thus completely eliminate any pursuits by U.S. persons with Rospatent.

The current sanctions directly affect entities seeking patent protection in Russia since payments of required fees related to patent applications and granted patents in Russia are processed through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.  This includes a number of financial transactions, such as payment of government filings fees for directly filing a patent application in Russia or filing a national phase of an international PCT application in Russia, as well as incidental fees incurred during prosecution of pending Russian patent applications and payment of yearly maintenance fees for issued Russian patents.  This would also include payment of yearly maintenance fees for patents obtained through the Eurasian Patent Organization (EAPO) and maintained in Russia since such fees paid to the EAPO must be forwarded to Rospatent.  Because of the intertwining of Rospatent with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, any fees paid to Rospatent must be considered equivalent to making a transaction through said bank.

Patent prosecution in Rospatent requires engagement with a Russian patent practitioner.  While U.S. entities pursuing patent interests in Russia are unlikely to directly engage Rospatent and pay fees that are ultimately processed through the prohibited bank, it is clear from the directive that strategies, such as routing payments through countries that are neutral in relation to sanctions, are prohibited.  As noted above, the directive prohibits any transaction that actually “evades or avoids” the other prohibitions of the directive, as wells as any transaction that “has the purpose of evading or avoiding” the other prohibitions.  This language appears to have the potential to ensnare purposeful non-adherence as well as actions that unwittingly end in non-adherence (e.g., forgetting to discontinue an automated payment of a patent maintenance fee to Rospatent).

Deadline for Administrative Transactions

U.S. entities still have time to complete administrative transactions with Rospatent despite the February implementation of the directive.  On March 2, 2022, the Department of the Treasury issued a general license authorizing certain transactions that are otherwise prohibited by the directive.3  The license authorizes U.S. persons to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations or certifications to the extent such transactions are prohibited under the directive, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to such persons’ day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation.  For at least U.S. entities whose day-to-day operations include securing and maintaining intellectual property, including in Russia, this license provides a window to complete activities and avoid violation of the directive.  Currently, the transaction window provided under the license runs through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on June 24, 2022.

Forming a Russian Patent Strategy

The incursion of Russia into Ukraine has been underway for shortly more than one month, but there is no way to know when hostilities may cease.  Moreover, even when peace is achieved, it is impossible to know how long the current sanctions against Russia may continue.  Those familiar with patent law know that the business of obtaining patents is a deadline-driven venture, and uncertainty of time quickly breaks apart the paradigm.  A “wait and see” approach thus has the potential to result in a loss of patent rights as well as possible liability for knowingly or unknowingly engaging in activities that are prohibited under the directive.  Anyone engaged in patent activities in Russia thus would be advised to undertake a portfolio review and utilize the time remaining under the General License to form a plan that ensures compliance with the current sanctions.  This can include at least the following items.

Anyone engaged in patent activities in Russia thus would be advised to undertake a portfolio review and utilize the time remaining under the General License to form a plan that ensures compliance with the current sanctions.

  • Proceeding with Grant of Presently Allowed Applications – For Applicants that have received a Notice of Allowance with a due date after expiration of the General License, one may consider early payment of the fees.  This should only be done, however, to the extent that it is possible to confirm that payment will be processed through Rospatent and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation prior to the expiration of the General License on June 24, 2022.
  • Annuities on Granted Patents – Any patent annuity paid to Rospatent after the General License expires should be assumed to be in violation of the current sanctions.  Patent holders that engage a patent annuity service should contact their provider to confirm that they have a plan in place for compliance with the sanctions.  Some annuity services have, in fact, already announced that they will no longer make payments to the Rospatent until further notice.  Presumably, for Russian patents with annuities due in 2022, early payment could be made in the hope that normalcy will ensure prior to the deadline in 2023, but such action should only be taken to the extent one can ensure that payment is processed through Rospatent and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation before the deadline.  Even then, it may be advisable to consider whether “early” payment of patent annuities would be considered to be “ordinarily incident” to day-to-day operations of a person’s patent pursuits.  In the alternative, a patent owner should confirm that any Russian patents are under a “do not pay” order with their annuity provider to avoid an unintentional, automated payment in violation of the sanctions.
  • Filing a Direct or National Phase Patent Application – If a new patent application in Russia is planned, or if the deadline for national phase entry of a PCT application is approaching, one may consider early filing prior to the expiration of the General License.  This could be done in the hope that a deadline for payment of future fees to Rospatent do not arise before the time that sanctions are lifted.  This is seen to be a risky proposition since it is unknown how quickly Rospatent processes paid fees through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, and it is likewise unknown to what extent a fee paid to Rospatent before expiration of the General License but only processed through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation after expiration would be viewed as being in violation of the sanctions.  Moreover, if Rospatent itself is later added to the sanctions, any early filings would be at significant risk for abandonment due to an inability to continue transactions with Rospatent.
  • Filing Through EAPO as an Alternative to Russia – Russia is one of several countries where patent protection can be secured based on a granted patent from the EAPO.  As of this writing, the banks utilized for processing financial transactions for the EAPO (AO UniCredit Bank and AO Raiffeisenbank) are not included in the U.S. sanctions.  As such, direct filing or national stage entry with the EAPO can provide an alternate pathway for patent protection in Russia.  The cessation of interaction between the USPTO and the EAPO would not have a bearing on this option, but care would need to be taken to ensure that all documents otherwise transferrable directly between the offices are handled by other routes.  Once a patent is granted by the EAPO and Russia is elected as a country for maintenance of the patent, annuities paid to the EAPO are forwarded to Rospatent.  As such, this alternative pathway is only effective for patents where annuities in Russia would not become due until after lifting of sanctions.  As the average length of time for completion of patent prosecution with the EAPO is generally two or more years, one would hope that the current situation in Russia would be resolved within that timeframe.  Again, however, uncertainty remains.
  • Using Russia as an International Search Authority – Rospatent is one of the limited number of patent offices available for use as the ISA in a PCT application, and Rospatent may be preferred because of the relatively low cost relative to other ISA options.  Search fees paid to the World Intellectual Proper Organization (WIPO) are forwarded to Rospatent when chosen as the ISA, and it is not possible to ensure that such fees paid to WIPO will be forwarded to Rospatent, and then to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation before the expiration of the General License deadline.  As such, it is recommended to not use Rospatent as the ISA in any PCT application from now until sanctions are lifted.
  • Enforcement of Granted Russian Patents – A comprehensive patent strategy in Russia must now also consider the relative value of any Russian patents in light of the recent decree on patent enforceability in Russia.4   Therein, any holder of a Russian Patent from a so-called “unfriendly” foreign state is required to give a mandatory license with no compensation to anyone in Russia wishing to exercise the right of use without consent of the patent owner.  As with the entire situation, uncertainty reigns with this decree, and it is impossible to know when (if ever) rights of Russian patent holders from “unfriendly” states will be returned.  Accordingly, a Russian patent strategy must consider not only options for proceeding in the near term to secure rights to the extent possible but must also consider the reality that any “rights” that are secured with a Russian patent are of no effect and will be for the foreseeable future.

Next Steps

For anyone with significant patent interests in Russia, time is of the essence for cementing a strategy for moving forward.  For some, the most expeditious approach could be to simply close your file on any Russian patents and patent applications.  If such approach is taken, careful attention must be made, as noted above, to ensure that any possibility of a fee being paid to Rospatent after June 24, 2022, is eliminated.  For others, investments in Russia may not allow for a complete abandonment of possible future patent enforcement rights in Russia.  If actions as noted above are taken to “batten down the hatches” of the Russian patent portfolio prior to the deadline in order to weather this storm, timing is again crucial in order to avoid unintentional engagement in sanctioned activities.  Also, moving to patent filings through the EAPO as a starting point for Russia can be an effective workaround so long as Russian sanctions get lifted before any patent annuities through an EAPO patent would become due in Russia.  Finally, in forming a strategy, one also must consider that even before its recent decree on patent enforceability, Russia was already one of nine countries on the United States Trade Representative (USTR) “Special 301 Report”  of trading partners presenting the most significant concerns regarding insufficient IP protection or enforcement or actions that otherwise limited market access for persons relying on intellectual property protection.

1  Directive 4 Under Executive Order 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,” February 28, 2022, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury.  See, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/eo14024_directive_4_02282022….
2  USPTO Statement on Engagement with Russia, the Eurasian Patent Organization, and Belarus, March 22, 2022.  See, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-statement-engagement-r….
3  General License No. 13, “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 Under Executive Order 14024, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, March 2, 2022.  See, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl13.pdf. 
4  Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 06.03.2022 No. 299 “On Amendments to Clause 2 of the Methodology for Determining the Amount of Compensation Paid to a Patent Owner When Deciding to Use an Invention, Utility Model or Industrial Design without His Consent, and the Procedure for its Payment.” See, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070005?index=0&r…

Article By Ryan Cagle of Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.

Copyright Dispute Over Andy Warhol’s Portraits of Prince Heading to U.S. Supreme Court

The U.S. Supreme Court will review the standard for a “transformative” work as “fair use” under the Copyright Act.   Specifically, whether a second work of art is “transformative” when it conveys a different meaning or message from its source material, or not where it recognizably derives from and retains the essential elements of its source material.

The Court agreed to review the Second Circuit’s decision that Andy Warhol’s Prince Series portraits of the musician Prince did not make fair use of celebrity photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph of Prince.  Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, No. 21-869 (petition granted Mar. 28, 2022).

The Warhol Foundation’s (AWF) petition argues that the Second Circuit’s decision contradicts Supreme Court precedent that a new work is “transformative” if it has a new “meaning or message” citing Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1202-03 (2021) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).  AWF also argued that the Second Circuit’s decision creates a circuit split where the Ninth Circuit has held that even with few physical changes a work can be transformative if new expressive content or a new message is apparent.  As a result, this decision “threatens massive restrictions on First Amendment expression” that would create a “sea-change in the law of copyright.”

Goldsmith’s opposition brief asserts that the AWF mischaracterizes Supreme Court precedent.  And that the Second Circuit “faithfully applied” the proper test for transformativeness in determining Warhol’s series of silkscreen prints were not fair use.  Goldsmith also argues petitioner has manufactured a circuit split that does not exist.

This dispute stems from a a declaratory judgment action filed in 2017 by the Andy Warhol Foundation in the Southern District of New York seeking that Warhol’s portraits of Prince did not infringe photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph.  In 2019, the district court granted summary judgment to the Warhol Foundation, holding that the Prince Series was “transformative” because it incorporated a new meaning and message different from Goldsmith’s photograph.

In 2021, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that Warhol’s portraits were not fair use as a matter of law.  The Second Circuit held that Warhol’s use was not “transformative,” even though Warhol’s use included some visual differences from Goldsmith’s photograph, because Warhol’s use “retains the essential elements of the Goldsmith Photograph without significantly adding to or altering those elements.”

Multiple amicus briefs supporting the Warhol Foundation were filed including by a group of 12 copyright law professors; a group of 13 art law professors; artists and art professors Barbara Kruger and Robert Storr; and the Robert Rauschenberg Foundation, Roy Lichtenstein Foundation, and Brooklyn Museum.  The visual arts community and content creators in every industry will heavily watch this case.

The Supreme Court will hear the Warhol case in its new term, which begins in October.

Article By Susan M. Kayser and Eric W. Lee of K&L Gates

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates

So You Wanna Play with Copyright? “Joyful Noise” Ostinato Isn’t Original Expression

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s order vacating a jury award of damages for copyright infringement and granting judgment as a matter of law, explaining that the musical work alleged to have been copied did not qualify as an original work of authorship but consisted only of “commonplace musical elements.” Marcus Gray PKA Flame et al. v. Katheryn Elizabeth Hudson PKA Katy Perry et al., Case No. 20-55401 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2022) (Clifton, Smith, Watford, JJ.)

Key Definitions:

  • A musical scale is a sequence of musical notes or tones by pitch.
  • A subset of seven notes is called the minor scale and can be referred to with alphabetic names (A, B, C, etc.) or scale degrees (1, 2, 3, etc.).
  • An ostinato is a repeating musical figure (for example, 3-3-3-3-2-2).

In 2007, Marcus Gray (Flame) purchased an ostinato and used it in the song “Joyful Noise.” The song was released in 2008. While “Joyful Noise” did not achieve significant commercial success or airtime, it received millions of views online. In 2013, American singer-songwriter Katy Perry created “Dark Horse,” which was a hit, resulting in her performance at the Super Bowl halftime show in 2015.

The “Joyful Noise” ostinato consists of notes, represented as 3-3-3-3-2-2-2-1 and 3-3-3-3-2-2-2-6, whereas Dark Horse’s ostinato contains 3-3-3-3-2-2-1-5. Both have a uniform rhythm and equal note duration in time.

Plaintiffs sued Perry and her co-defendants for copyright infringement. Plaintiffs presented circumstantial evidence that the defendants had a reasonable opportunity to access “Joyful Noise” and that the ostinatos in both songs were substantially similar. Plaintiffs did not present direct evidence that Perry and the others had copied elements of the song, instead relying on testimony from their expert musicologist, Dr. Todd Decker.

Decker testified that the ostinatos were similar in many aspects, but he also testified that there was no single element that caused him to believe the ostinatos at issue were “substantially similar” when viewed “in isolation.” The jury also heard testimony from Perry’s expert, who disagreed altogether that the ostinatos were substantially similar.

The jury found that the defendants had a reasonable opportunity to hear “Joyful Noise” before composing “Dark Horse,” that the two songs contained substantially similar copyrightable expression and that “Dark Horse” used protected material from “Joyful Noise.” The jury found the defendants liable for copyright infringement and awarded $2.8 million in damages. The district court vacated the award and granted judgment as a matter of law to defendants, concluding that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to show that the “Joyful Noise” ostinato was a copyrightable original expression. The plaintiffs appealed.

The Ninth Circuit explained that because the plaintiffs did not present any direct evidence that the defendants copied the “Joyful Noise” ostinato, they were required to show that the defendants had access to the work and that the ostinatos were substantially similar.

The Ninth Circuit began with its analysis of the “substantially similar” prong, employing a two-part test having “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” components. The Court noted that while it must refrain from usurping the jury’s traditional role of evaluating witness credibility and weighing the evidence, the extrinsic test requires that the Court ensure that the evidence of objective similarities between two works is legally sufficient to serve as the basis of a copyright infringement claim, regardless of the jury’s views. The Court explained that the substantial similarity test focuses on the protectable elements standing alone and disregards non-protectable elements.

To be a protectable element under copyright law, the “Joyful Noise” ostinato had to qualify as “original expression.” Based on the trial record, the Ninth Circuit found that the “Joyful Noise” ostinato consisted entirely of commonplace musical elements, and that the similarities between the two ostinatos did not arise out of an original combination of these elements. Without original expression, no element identified by Flame was individually copyrightable. For example, the Court noted that “the fact that Joyful Noise and Dark Horse both make use of sequences of eight notes played in an even rhythm is a trite musical choice outside the protection of copyright law.”

Finding the evidence presented at trial legally insufficient to establish that the musical elements were individually copyrightable, the Ninth Circuit determined that the jury’s verdict finding defendants liable for copyright infringement was unsupported by substantial evidence. Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law.

Article By Jodi Benassi of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review. 

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

“Levitating” Lawsuits: Understanding Dua Lipa’s Copyright Infringement Troubles

Even global stardom will not make copyright woes levitate away from British superstar Dua Lipa. The pop icon is making headlines following a week of back-to-back, bi-coastal lawsuits alleging copyright infringement with her hit “Levitating.” First, on Tuesday, March 1st, members of reggae band Artikal Sound System sued Dua Lipa for copyright infringement in a Los Angeles federal district court1. Then, on Friday, March 4th, songwriters L. Russell Brown and Sandy Linzer filed their own copyright infringement lawsuit against the pop star in a New York federal district court2. Both lawsuits were filed claiming violations of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.3

The Artikal Sound System lawsuit is short and alleges that Dua Lipa and the co-creators of “Levitating” copied Artikal Sound System’s 2017 song “Live Your Life.”4 The lawsuit does not provide any details in the allegation, other than explaining that “Live Your Life” was commercially released in 2017, was available during the time Dua Lipa and her co-creators wrote “Levitating,” and that because the two songs are substantially similar “Levitating” could not have been created independently.5 As a remedy, Artikal Sound System seeks actual damages, a portion of Dua Lipa’s profits stemming from the alleged infringement, the cost of the lawsuit, and any additional remedies the Court sees fit.6

Similarly, the Brown and Linzer lawsuit alleges that Dua Lipa and her “Levitating” co-creators copied their works “Wiggle and Giggle All Night” and “Don Diablo.”7 More specifically, the Brown and Linzer lawsuit alleges that “Levitating” is substantially similar to “Wiggle and Giggle All Night” and “Don Diablo.”8

Accordingly, the lawsuit claims that the defining melody in “Levitating,” the “signature melody,” is a direct duplicate of the opening melody in “Wiggle and Giggle All Night” and “Don Diablo,” and therefore appears in all three songs.9 As additional support, the lawsuit points to professionals and laypersons noticing a similarity between the three songs, and Dua Lipa previously admitting that she “purposely sought influences from past eras for the album Future Nostalgia.”10

As for a remedy, Brown and Linzer request full compensatory and/or statutory damages, punitive damages, an injunction on “Levitating,” a portion of Dua Lipa’s profits stemming from the alleged infringement, the cost of the lawsuit, and any additional remedies the Court sees fit.11

The copyright infringement legal framework

A general overview of the copyright infringement legal framework is helpful in assessing the potential outcomes of the “Levitating” lawsuits. Specifically, the legal framework from the 9th Circuit, where one of the “Levitating” lawsuits was filed, provides great guidance.

In order to establish copyright infringement, one must prove two elements: owning a valid copyright and copying of “constituent elements of the work that are original.”12 Importantly, when there is no direct evidence of copying, but rather circumstantial evidence, plaintiffs must show that:

  1. the accused infringers had access to the copyrighted work, and

  2. the infringing work and the copyrighted work “are substantially similar.

Plaintiffs can easily show access to the copyrighted work, but “substantial similarity” is harder to show.

2-Part Test

Luckily, the 9th Circuit devised a 2-part test to prove “substantial similarity.”13 Under the test, there is sufficient copying, and therefore “substantial similarity,” if an infringing work meets an “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” prong.14 The intrinsic prong is met if there is “similarity of expression” between the works, as evaluated from the subjective standpoint of an “ordinary reasonable observer.”15 The extrinsic prong is objective and requires comparing the “constituent elements” of the copyrighted and infringing works to see if there is substantial similarity in terms of the “protected” elements in the copyrighted work.16

As such, if the commonality between the copyrighted and infringing works is not based on “protected” elements, then the extrinsic prong is not met, and there is no “substantial similarity” between the works for purposes of a copyright infringement action. It must be noted that the 9th Circuit recognizes that, in certain situations, there can be a “substantial similarity” even if the constituent elements are individually unprotected, but only if their “selection and arrangement” reflects originality.17

To understand “substantial similarity” one must define what is “protectable” under copyright law. Copyright protection extends only to works that contain original expression.18 In this context, the standard for originality is a minimal degree of creativity.19 According to the Copyright Act, protection does not extend to ideas or concepts used in original works of authorship.20 In the musical context, copyright does not protect “common or trite musical elements, or commonplace elements that are firmly rooted in the genre’s tradition” because “[t]hese building blocks belong in the public domain and cannot be exclusively appropriated by any particular author.”21

Katy Perry “Dark Horse” case and an ostinato

While the “Levitating” lawsuits are still young, a recent decision by the 9th Circuit in the infamous Katy Perry “Dark Horse” case is a good example of how courts conduct legal analyses in copyright infringement cases. The precedential ruling (Gray v. Hudson), released on March 10th, affirms a U.S. District Judge’s decision to vacate a jury verdict that awarded US$2.8 million in damages to a group of rappers who claimed Katy Perry’s “Dark Horse” copied their song “Joyful Noise.”22

The 9th Circuit’s opinion cogently applies copyright law to hold that the plaintiffs in the original lawsuit did not provide legally sufficient evidence that “Joyful Noise” and “Dark Horse” were “extrinsically similar” in terms of musical features protected by copyright law.23

Specifically, the Court reasoned that while “Dark Horse” used an ostinato (a repeating musical figure) similar to the one in “Joyful Noise,” the resemblance in the ostinatos stemmed from “commonplace, unoriginal musical principles” and made them uncopyrightable.24 Without the ostinatos, the plaintiffs could not point to any “individually copyrightable” elements from “Joyful Noise” that were “substantially similar” in “Dark Horse.”25

Additionally, the Court held that the “Joyful Noise” ostinato was not original enough to be a protectable combination of uncopyrightable elements.26 In turn, under the legal framework for copyright infringement the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden.27 The Court put it best by opining that:

“[a]llowing a copyright over [the] material would essentially amount to allowing an improper monopoly over two-note pitch sequences or even the minor scale itself, especially in light of the limited number of expressive choices available when it comes to an eight-note repeated musical figure.”28

“Levitating” lawsuits likely outcomes

Applying the copyright infringement framework to the “Levitating” lawsuits allows us to understand the likely outcomes. First, the Artikal Sound System lawsuit does not allege any direct evidence of copying. As such, Artikal Sound System must show that Dua Lipa had access to “Live Your Life” and that “Levitating” is “substantially similar” to their song under the 2-prong test. Access is easily proved, as “Live Your Life” was commercially available on multiple streaming services when Dua Lipa wrote “Levitating.”29

However, the Artikal Sound System lawsuit does not provide enough information to pass the 2-prong “substantial similarity” test. The lawsuit only alleges that “Levitating” is “substantially similar” to “Live Your Life,” but does not detail any similarities much less provide any evidence that there is similarity of expression between the works from the point of view of a reasonable observer, as required by the intrinsic component of the test.30

More importantly, the lawsuit does not even mention any protectable elements from “Live Your Life” copied in “Levitating” and would, therefore, fail the extrinsic prong of the “substantial similarity” test.31 In turn, as submitted, the Artikal Sound System lawsuit fails to make a prima facie case of copyright infringement by Dua Lipa’s “Levitating.”

The story may be different for the Brown and Linzer lawsuit. Like the first suit, the Brown and Linzer lawsuit does not provide direct evidence of copying and will therefore only succeed if it passes the circumstantial evidence requirements of 1) access and 2) “substantial similarity.” Unlike the first suit, however, the Brown and Linzer complaint includes comparisons of the notes in “Levitating” to the notes in “Wiggle and Giggle All Night” and “Don Diablo” as support for the allegation of “substantial similarity.”

The 2nd Circuit, where the lawsuit was filed, held that a court can determine as a matter of law that two works are not “substantially similar” if the similarity between the two works concerns non-copyrightable elements of the copyrighted work.32 In practice, this means that the 2nd Circuit can apply the 2-prong “substantial similarity” test. Brown and Linzer can easily prove access to “Wiggle and Giggle All Night” and “Don Diablo” since both songs are internationally popular.33

Brown and Linzer can also meet the intrinsic prong of the test because, as they point out, “laypersons” (ordinary reasonable observers) have noticed the commonality between their copyrighted works and “Levitating,” as supported by widespread postings on mediums like TikTok.34 The extrinsic prong of the test is more uncertain.

In their lawsuit, Brown and Linzer point to a “signature melody” that repeats in “bars 10 and 11 of all three songs… [and] with some slight variation, in bars 12 and 13.”35 The court may find that this “signature melody” is not protected by copyright if it reasons that a melody is a basic musical principle, much like the 9th Circuit did for ostinatos in the Katy Perry “Dark Horse” case.

At its core, it seems like Brown and Linzer will have to convince the court that a melody, which they define as “a linear succession of musical tones,” qualifies as copyrightable because it is an original creative expression. Conversely, Brown and Linzer can concede that a melody is not copyrightable, but that their original arrangement and use of the melody in their copyrighted songs is copyrightable. In the end, it will be up to whether or not a court finds that the “signature melody” is copyrightable. As such, the outcome of Brown and Linzer’s action for copyright infringement is uncertain.

Nonetheless, one thing is for sure, copied or not, “Levitating” will continue powering gym visits and nights out dancing.

Footnotes

  1. See Complaint, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  2. See Complaint, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  3. See Complaint at ¶ 7, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); Complaint at ¶ 12, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  4. See Complaint at ¶ 17, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  5. See Complaint at ¶ 15-18, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  6. See Complaint at ¶ 19-22, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  7. See Complaint at ¶ 2, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  8. See Complaint at ¶ 2, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  9. See Complaint at ¶ 3, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  10. See Complaint at ¶ 49, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  11. See Complaint at 13-14, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  12. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).

  13. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994).

  14. Id.

  15. Id.

  16. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).

  17. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003).

  18. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.

  19. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.

  20. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Skidmore as Tr. for the Randy Craig Wolfe Tr. v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

  21. Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1069.

  22. Gray v. Hudson, No. 20-55401, slip op at 26 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2022).

  23. Id.

  24. Id. at 14-21.

  25. Id. at 17.

  26. Id. at 22.

  27. Id. at 26.

  28. Id. at 24.

  29. See Complaint at ¶ 16, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  30. See Complaint at ¶ 18, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  31. See Complaint at ¶ 18, Cope v. Warner Records, Inc., Case 2:22-cv-01384 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

  32. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63-65 (2d Cir. 2010).

  33. See Complaint at ¶ 35, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  34. See Complaint at ¶ 4, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

  35. See Complaint at ¶ 38, Larball Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Dua Lipa, Case 1:22-cv-01872 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Article By Adrian Gonzalez Cerrillo and Sana Hakim of K&L Gates

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates

Europol: More Than Half of Counterfeits Originate in China

On March 7, 2022, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) jointly released the Intellectual Property Crime Threat Assessment 2022. Per the Assessment, China (including Hong Kong) was the main source of counterfeits based on number of counterfeits and by value of the counterfeits seized at the EU external borders.  Almost 76% of the fake goods detained were for trademark infringement; design infringement was the second most reported at 23% while copyright was third with 15%.

China and Turkey remain the main countries of origins for counterfeit clothing, shoes, bags, watches, and jewelry seized at the EU’s border. These goods are mostly ordered online and discovered as part of postal shipments or on passengers entering the EU.

Similarly, China is the country of origin for most of the seized counterfeit electrical/electronic and computer equipment, mobile phones and accessories. With respect to mobile phones, the Assessment states,

…the visual appearance of the counterfeit devices is very convincing, closely mimicking the external characteristics of the original phones. However, typically some features and software characteristics are missing and the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) is often fake.  The use of cheap and substandard electric components, which can be found in fake batteries, headphones or chargers, pose safety risks.

“China and Turkey were among the most frequently reported non-EU countries of origin for counterfeit food and drink seized at the EU’s external border.” Similarly, counterfeit perfumes and cosmetic products often originate from China and Turkey.

In addition to ready-to-use IPR-infringing goods, product components, such as aroma compounds, fixatives and solvents, are increasingly being seized. These components are used to create the final counterfeit products in the EU.

More worrisome, China and Turkey were the main origin of counterfeit pharmaceutical products.

Toys round out the top 10 counterfeits with China also being main point of origin.

The full Assessment is available here: IP_Crime_Threat_Assessment_2022_FullR_en.

Article By Aaron Wininger of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Ed Sheeran in “Shape of You” Court Battle

Singer Ed Sheeran is currently giving evidence in a three week High Court copyright trial over his 2017 chart-topping hit “Shape of You.”

Sheeran has been accused by two musicians, Sami Chokri and Ross O’Donoghue, that his hit song, “Shape of You” plagiarises “particular lines and phrases” of their 2015 composition, “Oh Why.” The two songs in question share a similar melody.

The dispute began back in May 2018 and saw Sheeran and his co-writers prevented from obtaining an estimated £20 million in royalties from performances or broadcasts of “Shape of You” after Chokri and O’Donaghue accused Sheeran and his co-writers of “appropriating” their music. Chokri claims that he sent the track to Sheeran in a bid to work with the star, but later heard the chorus on “Shape Of You” – which became the biggest selling single of 2017 in the UK.

Sheeran’s lawyers told the High Court at that time, that the musician and his co-writers had no recollection of having heard the song in question before the dispute began and asked the High Court to declare that he and his co-writers had not infringed Chokri and O’Donoghue’s copyright, with Sheeran also stating his reputation had been tarnished by the allegations.

In July 2018, Chokri and O’Donoghue issued a counterclaim for “copyright infringement, damages and an account of profits in relation to the alleged infringement”.

In a November 2020 ruling, the parties involved “anticipated that they would incur costs in the region of £3 million between them on the dispute”.

Andrew Sutcliffe QC, for Chokri and O’Donoghue, said the question at the heart of the case was “how does Ed Sheeran write his music?” and whether he “makes things up as he goes along during songwriting sessions or whether his songwriting process involves the collection and development of ideas over time which reference and interpolate other artists.”

Whilst the trial plays out in the High Court over the course of the next three weeks, it serves as a timely reminder that content created should be original and independent to avoid falling within the remit of copyright infringement. Otherwise, the risk of copyright infringement can be reduced by:

  • Obtaining relevant authorisations and approvals from a Collective Management Organisation, such as; PPL PRS (the UK’s music licensing company) or the Copyright Licensing Agency (for printed material);
  • Obtaining relevant permissions from a copyright owner/the copyright owner’s agent which may require the payment of licencing fees;
  • Entering into an assignment of intellectual property where copyright work has been produced as part of an underlying contractual agreement; and
  • Checking any relevant copyright/licencing terms to ascertain whether there is permission to reproduce certain content.

Article By Keisha Phippen of K&L Gates

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates

To Search or To Sink: The Importance of Clearing Your Brand

So many times in my three decades of practice I’ve shaken my head at the perils a trademark owner can so easily avoid by searching and clearing a mark. The litigations! The unnecessary attorneys’ fees! The time and resources lost! All because my client (or adversary) didn’t conduct a proper trademark search.

Adopting a Trademark

So what’s all the fuss about? Well, before adopting a trademark (that is, a brand name for goods or services) you should have an attorney commission a proper clearance search, review it, and provide you with a well-reasoned opinion as to the availability of the brand for “use” and “registration.” (Yes, they are different things, as explained below.) I’m not talking about an Internet search or an online search of U.S. Trademark Office records, though both can be useful to make sure there aren’t any easily found barriers to use or registration of a mark before a full search is commissioned.

I’m talking about a full clearance search done by a reputable vendor the attorney commissions to uncover all uses (registered and not) of the same or similar marks for the same or similar goods/services as you want to use your brand for. The resulting vendor’s report sent to the attorney is typically anywhere from 300 pages up to 1000 pages. Then the (experienced trademark) attorney reviews it and lets you know in a detailed opinion if the mark is free for you to use and register without entangling you in the risk of a dispute/lawsuit. If it’s not available, you pick another brand, and search again.

Using a Brand and Registering It

So what’s the difference between freedom to use a brand and freedom to register it? In the U.S., “common law” trademark rights can exist based solely upon use (that is use of a trademark without registration). That’s because consumers can associate a brand with a single source (the trademark owner/producer of goods/services) even if it’s not registered. (It’s different in other countries, and searches should be done in every country for which you want to use your brand.)

So it’s possible that there’s a barrier to use but not to registration, because a common law (unregistered) trademark is too similar to the brand you want to use, and is being used in connection with identical or related goods/services as your proposed brand. That’s why you want clearance to both use and register a mark. (Registration is important because it provides you with nationwide rights in your brand; common law trademarks cover only the geographic territory where sales under the brand occur.)

So please clear your mark. It’s pennies on the dollar compared to what you will spend in a dispute or (heaven forbid) litigation. Here’s to happy searching!

Article By Jeanne Hamburg of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

SCOTUS Shelves Request to Review 11th Circuit Dark Tower Decision, Ending Copyright Saga

The Supreme Court’s refusal to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in DuBay v. King marks an end to a 4-year copyright battle concerning the lead character of Stephen King’s acclaimed series, The Dark Tower.  The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirmed that the King’s anti-hero, Roland Deschain, is not substantially similar to William DuBay’s The Rook comic book character, Restin Dane. The decision illustrates the complexity of literary copyright infringement disputes, where a claim is brought based on a mix of original and stock character elements.

In 2017 William DuBay’s heir, Benjamin DuBay, sued novelist Stephen King, Marvel Entertainment, Sony Entertainment, and others for various counts of copyright infringement, alleging that King copied DuBay’s artistic expression based on purported similarity between lead characters of The Rook (Restin Dane) and The Dark Tower (Roland Deschain). The district court granted summary judgment to King, determining (1) that any similarities between the characters comprise unprotectable general ideas and scènes à faire elements; and (2) that the protectable original character elements in dispute are different, such that “no reasonable jury…could find the works substantially similar.” DuBay appealed.

The principal issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in assessing substantial similarity.  DuBay argued that the characters were substantially similar based on several shared characteristics, including: (1) similar names; (2) interaction with time-travel related towers; (3) having a bird as a companion; (4) having knightly characteristics; (5) wearing Western-style clothing; (6) surviving a fictionalized interpretation of The Alamo; (7) the use of knives; and (8) traveling back in time to save a young boy who becomes a gunslinger. DuBay also argued that the unique combination of these elements made Dane a distinctive character, and that Deschain is a copy of DuBay’s artistic expression in that character.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed DuBay’s contentions in two parts.

First, the court assessed whether each of the claimed character elements merit copyright protection. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that “character names do not merit copyright protection,” since mere words and short phrases cannot be protected under copyright law.  The court reiterated that only original elements of a copyrighted work can be afforded protection, and that certain claimed elements (i.e., “knightly heritage,” time travel to “different times and parallel worlds,” “western attire,” “fictionalized Alamo histories,” and “knife wielding”) are merely general ideas or scènes à faire that are “too general to merit copyright protection.”  The court then reviewed the remaining elements to determine whether the shared characteristics rendered the characters substantially similar.  Although both characters may be broadly similar in having bird companions, a relationship to towers and tower imagery, and past time travel experiences involving the rescue of a young boy, the court found that the depiction of these elements was different in each work.  For example, whereas Dane lives in and travels via tower shaped structures shaped like the namesake chess piece, Deschain embarks on an endless mission to find an elusive Gothic tower that connects parallel worlds and time periods.  Because the portrayals of each original element are distinguishable, the court determined that no reasonable jury could have concluded that the works were similar.

Second, the court examined whether the characters are substantially similar based on each character’s combination of the claimed elements (or the “look and feel” of the characters).  The Court recognized of the potential dangers of comparing works based on individual similarities alone because an original combination of unoriginal elements can potentially sustain a claim of copyright infringement.  However, the court found that any similarities of combined elements were “superficial” at best, and that the “look and feel” analysis actually hurt, rather than helped, DuBay’s case by highlighting differences in expression of shared original character elements.

Takeaway:

The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear Dubay reinforces the basic tenet of copyright law that general ideas or scènes à faire cannot be protected by copyright.  It also reminds litigants that although a combination of original and non-original elements can be protected under copyright law, broad similarities are usually insufficient to sustain a copyright infringement claim.

The case is DuBay v. King, 844 Fed. Appx. 257 (11thCir. 2019), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 490 (2021).

Article By Spencer K. Beall and Margaret A. Esquenet of Finnegan

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2021 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP

The Time Has Come for Trademark Modernization Act Regulations

On Dec. 18, 2021, regulations implementing the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (TMA) went into effect. Trademark owners and practitioners should be aware of the new procedures and ensure they are ready for the changes.

Trademark Modernization Act Regulations

Our posts “Three Things to Know About the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020” and “The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020: New Rules and Procedures” from March and May 2021, respectively, gave an overview of the changes that will be implemented with the act. Most notably, the TMA provides for new procedures to challenge trademark registrations based on nonuse – expungement, and reexamination. It is intended that the new ex parte expungement and reexamination proceedings will be faster and more efficient alternatives to cancellation procedures before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. You can read the final rule here.

Another significant change is the requirement for filers to verify their identity with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). This is part of the USPTO’s efforts to protect the integrity of the register and combat fraudulent filings, which have been on the uptick. Beginning in early 2022, the following must verify their identity with the USPTO using one of the verification options that includes an electronic process by ID.me

Trademark owners and corporate officers not represented by an attorney, US-licensed attorneys (including in-house counsel), and Canadian attorneys or agents are required to verify their identity. Paralegals and other support staff working for an attorney must be sponsored by a verified attorney. Trademark owners who are represented by an attorney do not currently need to verify their identities to sign electronic forms sent by their attorney; however, if the representation by that attorney ends, the owners will need to submit to the verification process.

It is important that trademark holders and practitioners prepare for these new policies and procedures to ensure they can complete filings on a timely basis.

Article By Danielle M. DeFilippis of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2021 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

Quentin Tarantino’s Secret NFTs

Quentin Tarantino recently announced plans to auction off seven scenes from the 1994 motion picture Pulp Fiction as non-fungible tokens or NFTs. These “Tarantino NFTs” will include a collection of high-resolution digital scans of the original handwritten Pulp Fiction screenplay. The NFTs each contain scans of the uncut screenplay pages themselves that form a single scene from the movie. They will be auctioned on the NFT marketplace OpenSea and are built on the blockchain platform Secret Network, which launched in February 2020.

Secret Network, developed by SCRT Labs, has additional data privacy & encryption features compared to other blockchain platforms that implement NFTs. These additional features are used to keep information associated with an NFT secret. For example, the buyer of an NFT is better able to hide their identity. Further, content associated with an NFT can be kept private to the buyer if they so choose.

Miramax was quick to oppose this new venture, filing suit on the heels of Tarantino’s announcement. Miramax asserts that because Tarantino assigned to Miramax in 1993 nearly all of his rights to Pulp Fiction, Tarantino’s remaining rights under the operative agreements are too narrow for him to produce, market, and sell NFTs. Tarantino’s reserved rights include “print publication” and “screenplay publication”, but Miramax contends that that is insufficient for Tarantino to produce NFTs. Miramax’s reasoning is that since each NFT is by definition unique and therefore a “one-time transaction,” distributing an NFT is not “print publication.” Miramax may find some support for that argument in the Copyright Act, which defines “publication” as “distribution of copies,” using the plural form and not the singular. Further, Miramax claims that Tarantino’s rights do not include a “future media” clause, supporting its contention that NFTs were not contemplated by the operative agreements, while Miramax’s rights specifically do. As Miramax states, “Tarantino’s conduct may mislead other creators into believing they have rights to exploit Miramax films through NFTs and other emerging technologies, when in fact Miramax holds those rights for its films.”

Ultimately, the dispute centers on these two questions:

  • Is Miramax correct that an NFT is not a “printed publication” because it is a “one-time transaction?”
  • Does the Copyright Act’s definition of “publication” as “distribution of copies” in the plural favor Miramax’s argument, since each NFT is unique by definition?

Tarantino’s announcement has generated intense interest in the cachet and bragging rights associated with owning a portion of his work. Like previous new technologies, however, NFTs may not fit neatly into existing legal structures. And since it has yet to be determined whether Tarantino has the rights to produce NFTs of the Pulp Fiction screenplay, interested buyers would do well to exercise a healthy degree of caveat emptor until the legal landscape is more certain.

This article was written by Michael R. Graif, Frank L. Gerratana and Allen Loayza of Mintz Levin law firm. For more articles about NFTs, please click here.