Hi TCPAWorld! The Baroness here and I have a good case today.
Dickson, v. Direct Energy, LP, et al., No. 5:18-CV-00182-JRA, 2024 WL 4416856 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2024).
Let’s dive in.
Background
In this case, the plaintiff Dickson alleges the defendant Direct Energy sent him ringless voicemails (RVMs) in 2017 without consent.
Direct Energy filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it cannot be held liable under the TCPA because it did not directly make the calls to Dickson (a third-party vendor did) and it cannot be held vicariously liable for the calls under agency principals.
More specifically, Direct Energy argues that Total Marketing Concepts (TMC) was an independent agent and was not acting with actual or apparent authority when it violated the TCPA and Direct Energy did not ratify the illegal acts of TMC.
Law
For those of you not familiar, a motion for summary judgment is granted when there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Under the TCPA, a seller can be held either directly or vicariously liable for violations of the TCPA.
As noted above, Direct Energy did not directly deliver any RVMs to Dickson. So it cannot be directly liable for the calls. Dickson instead seeks to hold Direct Energy vicariously liable for the acts of TMC and TMC’s subvendors.
Let’s first look at the principal/agent relationship.
Direct Energy primarily argued that TMC was NOT its agent because of the terms of their agreement. Specifically, Direct Energy identified TMC as an “independent contractor.” Moreover, TMC was “expressly instructed to send RVMs only with TCPA-compliant opt-in consent.”
Importantly, however, whether an agency relationship exists is based on an assessment of the facts of the relationship and not on how the parties define their relationship.
Listen up folks—contractual terms disclaiming agency will not cut it!
While Direct Energy and TMC did have a provision in their contract which expressly disclaimed any agency relationship, the Court highlighted that the parties entered into an amended agreement which expressly authorized TMC to (among other things) close sales on Direct Energy’s behalf and thereby bind Direct Energy in contracts with customers. In other words, Direct Energy authorized TMC to enter into agreements on its behalf.
The Court also found Direct Energy exerted a high level of control over TMC:
- Direct Energy had the ability to audit TMC’s records to ensure compliance with its contractual obligations
- Direct Energy could audit TMC’s subcontractors in the same manner
- Direct Energy had access to TMC facilities to ensure compliance
- Direct Energy had the ability to terminate the contract with or without cause
- Direct Energy authorized TMC to telemarket on its behalf using the Direct Energy trade name as if Direct Energy was making the telemarketing call
Therefore, the Court found Dickson produced evidence which a reasonable jury could find that Direct Energy exerted such a level of control over TMC such that there was a principle/agent relationship, despite their contract expressly providing otherwise.
ACTUAL AUTHORITY
Actual authority exists when a principal explicitly grants permission to an agent to act on their behalf, whether through express or implied means.
Express authority
Pursuant to the Teleservices Agreement, TMC was responsible for complying with the TCPA. Thus, there was no evidence that TMC had express actual authority to contract individuals who had not given consent.
Implied authority
Dickson argued that Direct Energy nonetheless led TMC to reasonably believe it should make telemarketing calls that violate the TCPA. However, the Court found that TMC’s authority was expressly limited to opt-in leads. So, Dickson failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material facts showing that TMC acted actual authority—either express or implied—when it contracted potential customers who had not opted in to receiving such calls.
APPARENT AUTHORITY
Apparent authority arises when a principal’s conduct leads a third party to reasonably believe that an agent has the authority to act on the principal’s behalf, even if such authority has not been explicitly granted.
Here’s where it gets interesting.
Dickson presented evidence that Direct Energy received several thousand complaints regarding the RVMs but did not stop the conduct.
That’s a lot of complaints..
Moreover, Direct Energy authorized TMC to use its trade name and approved the scripts. Thus, Dickson argued Direct Energy allowed third-party recipients of the RVMs to reasonably believe the RVMs were from Direct Energy.
And even though TMC used other third-party telephony services, this was expressly authorized by the agreement between Direct Energy and TMC.
Therefore, the Court found that Dickson demonstrated that Direct Energy authorized and instructed TMC to use its tradename in its RVMs, approved the scripts used by TMC, and knew or should have known of TMC’s improper conduct and that did not take action to prevent that conduct from continuing.
As such, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact existed that TMC acted with apparent authority when it contracted potential customers who had not opted in to receiving such calls.
RATIFICATION
Ratification occurs when an agent acts for the principal’s benefit and the principal does not repudiate the agent’s actions.
A plaintiff must present some evidence that a principal benefitted from the alleged unlawful conduct of its purported agent to hold the principal liable for the acts of the agent under the theory of ratification.
Here, Dickson failed to produce evidence that Direct Energy received any benefit from TMC’s unlawful telemarketing acts. For example, Dickson produced no evidence of any contracts that Direct Energy secured as a result of TMC contacting potential consumers who had not given opt-in consent. Importantly, the Court stated “[p]ure conjecture that Direct Energy must have benefitted in some way because of the volume of calls made by TMC on its behalf is simply not enough to survive summary judgment.”
Therefore, the Court found Dickson failed to demonstrate the existence of a material fact as to whether Direct Energy ratified TMC’s violations of the TCPA.
In light of the above, the Court recommended denying Direct Energy’s motion for summary judgment. Although there was no genuine issue of material fact related to actual authority and ratification, the Court determined that a genuine issue of material fact does exist concerning whether TMC acted with apparent authority.
This case highlights the complexities of agency relationships in TCPA cases and serves as a reminder for companies: mere contractual disclaimers of agency will not suffice. Courts can still hold you vicariously liable for the actions of third parties acting on your behalf! Choose the companies you are working with wisely.