The Affordable Care Act—Countdown to Compliance for Employers, Week 29: Wellness Programs, Smoking Cessation and e-Cigarettes

MintzLogo2010_Black

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) generally prohibits discrimination in eligibility, benefits, or premiums based on a health factor, except in the case of certain wellness programs. Final regulations issued in 2006 established rules implementing these nondiscrimination and wellness provisions. TheAffordable Care Act largely incorporates the provisions of the 2006 final regulations (with a few clarifications), and it changes the maximum reward that can be provided under a “health-contingent” wellness program from 20 percent to 30 percent. But in the case of smoking cessation programs, the maximum reward is increased to 50 percent. Comprehensive final regulations issued in June 2013 fleshed out the particulars of the new wellness program regime.

Health-contingent wellness programs require an individual to satisfy a standard related to a health factor to obtain a reward. The final rules divide health-contingent wellness programs into the following two categories: activity-only programs, and outcome-based programs. As applied to smoking cessation, an “activity-only program” might require an individual to attend a class to obtain the reward. In contrast, an outcome-based program would require an individual to quit smoking, or least take steps to do so under complex rules governing alternative standards.

Nowhere do the final regulations address the role of electronic cigarettes (or “e-cigarettes”). Simply put, the issue is whether an e-cigarette user is a smoker or a nonsmoker? (According to Wikipedia, an electronic cigarette (e-cig or e-cigarette), “is a battery-powered vaporizer which simulates tobacco smoking by producing a vapor that resembles smoke. It generally uses a heating element known as an atomizer that vaporizes a liquid solution.”) But questions relating to e-cigarettes are starting to surface in the context of wellness program administration. Specifically:

  1. Is an individual who uses e-cigarettes a “smoker” for purposes of qualifying, or not qualifying, for a wellness program reward, and
  2. May a wellness program offer e-cigarettes as an alternative standard, i.e., one that if satisfied would qualify an individual as a non-smoker?

Is an individual who uses e-cigarettes a “smoker” for purposes of qualifying, or not qualifying, for a wellness program reward?

While the final rules don’t mention or otherwise refer to e-cigarettes, they do provide ample clues to support the proposition that smoking cessation involves tobacco use. Here is the opening paragraph of the preamble:

SUMMARY: This document contains final regulations, consistent with the Affordable Care Act, regarding nondiscriminatory wellness programs in group health coverage. Specifically, these final regulations increase the maximum permissible reward under a health-contingent wellness program offered in connection with a group health plan (and any related health insurance coverage) from 20 percent to 30 percent of the cost of coverage. The final regulations further increase the maximum permissible reward to 50 percent for wellness programs designed to prevent or reduce tobacco use. (Emphasis added.)

There is also a discussion in the preamble about alternative standards (79 Fed Reg. p. 33,164 (middle column)), which reads in relevant part:

The Departments continue to maintain that, with respect to tobacco cessation, ‘‘overcoming an addiction sometimes requires a cycle of failure and renewed effort,’’ as stated in the preamble to the proposed regulations. For plans with an initial outcome-based standard that an individual not use tobacco, a reasonable alternative standard in Year 1 may be to try an educational seminar. (Footnotes omitted.)

In addition, the final regulations’ Economic Impact and Paperwork Burden section is replete with references to tobacco use, as are the examples (see Treas. Reg. § 54.9802-1(f)(4)(vi), examples 6 and 7).

On the other hand, the definition of what constitutes a participatory wellness program refers simply to “smoking cessation” (Treas. Reg. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(ii)(D)), and the definition of an outcome-based wellness program (Treas. Reg. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(v)) simply refers to “not smoking.” In neither case is there any reference to tobacco.

The Affordable Care Act’s rules governing wellness programs are included in the Act’s insurance market reforms, which take the form of amendments to the Public Health Service Act that are also incorporated by reference in the Internal Revenue Code and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). By virtue of being included in ERISA, participants have a private right of action to enforce these rules. So an employer that wanted to treat the use of e-cigarettes as smoking in order to deny access to a wellness reward would likely confront arguments similar to those set out above in the event of a challenge.

May a wellness program offer e-cigarettes as an alternative standard, i.e., one that if satisfied would qualify an individual as a non-smoker?

This is perhaps a more difficult question. May an employer designate e-cigarette use as an alternative standard? Anecdotal evidence suggests that employers are not doing so, at least not yet. But could they do so? And would it make a difference whether the e-cigarette in question used a nicotine-based solution as opposed to some other chemical? (According to Wikipedia, “solutions usually contain a mixture of propylene glycol, vegetable glycerin, nicotine, and flavorings, while others release a flavored vapor without nicotine.”) The answer in each case is, it’s too soon to tell.

The benefits and risks of electronic cigarette use are uncertain, with evidence going both ways. Better evidence would certainly give the regulators the basis for further rulemaking in the area. In the meantime, the final regulations’ multiple references to tobacco, and by implication, nicotine, seem to furnish as good a starting point as any. This approach would require a wellness plan sponsor to distinguish between nicotine-based and non-nicotine-based solutions, which may prove administratively burdensome.

The larger question, which may take some time to settle, is whether e-cigarettes advance or retard the cause of wellness. Absent reliable clinical evidence, regulators and wellness plan sponsors have little to guide their efforts or inform their decisions as to how to integrate e-cigarettes into responsible wellness plan designs. Complicating matters, the market for e-cigarettes is potentially large, which means that reliable (read: unbiased) clinical evidence may be hard to come by. For now, all plan sponsors can do is to answer the questions set out above in good faith and in accordance with their best understanding of the final regulations.

Article By:

Of:

 

DOL, IRS, and HHS Put the Brakes on Stand-Alone Health Reimbursement Arrangements Used to Access Health Insurance Coverage in the Individual Market

The National Law Review recently featured an article regarding Health Reimbursement Arrangements written by Alden J. Bianchi and Gary E. Bacher of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.:

MintzLogo2010_Black

 

In a set of Frequently Asked Questions(FAQs) posted to the Department of Labor’s website on January 24, the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury (the “Departments”) put a stop to an approach to health plan design under which employers furnish employees with a pre-determined dollar amount (a “defined contribution”) that employees can apply toward the purchase of health insurance coverage in the individual health insurance market.

An arrangement under which an employer provides an amount of money to employees to pay for unreimbursed medical expenses or for individual market premiums is itself a “group health plan.” Such an arrangement is referred to and regulated under the Internal Revenue Code as a “health reimbursement arrangement” or “HRA.”2 The HRA approach described above is referred to as a “stand-alone HRA” to distinguish it from arrangements in which the HRA is paired with an employer’s group health plan. This latter HRA design is referred to as an “integrated HRA.”

The rules governing HRAs stand in contrast to cafeteria plans and medical flexible spending arrangements, which pave the way for employee contributions to be paid with pre-tax dollars. Where employee contributions are limited to premiums, the cafeteria plan is referred to colloquially as a “premium-only” plan. Where employees can set aside their own money to pay for certain medical expenses including co-pays and co-insurance with pre-tax dollars, the arrangement is referred to as a “medical flexible spending arrangement” or “medical FSA.” Medical FSAs can include employer money (typically in the form of “flex credits”), but they cannot be used to pay health insurance premiums.

While some vendors have begun to market stand-alone HRAs, it was never clear that HRAs used to access individual market coverage could pass muster under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “Act”) or other applicable laws. The regulatory hurdles, both before and after 2014, include the following:

  1. Before 2014, carriers issuing coverage in the individual market are free to impose all manner of underwriting conditions, which raise the specter of discrimination based on health status in violation of Title I of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). These concerns disappear commencing in 2014 as a consequence of the Act’s comprehensive overhaul of health insurance underwriting practices.
  2. The Act generally prohibits group health plans and health insurance carriers from imposing lifetime or annual limits on the dollar value of essential health benefits. In prior guidance, the regulators gave a “pass” to integrated HRAs, but not to stand-alone HRAs.
  3. Because individual market products are age rated, the same coverage will cost more in the hands of an older employee than in the hands of a similarly-situated younger employee. Before 2014, the variations in premium costs are a matter of state law; from and after 2014, the Act establishes a federal floor under “modified community rating” rules that permit a disparity of no more than 3:1. Under either regulatory regime, a flat dollar amount is thought to raise questions under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Under the ADEA, variations in premiums are permitted only where the added cost charged to an older employee is justified by the actuarially-adjusted cost of providing the benefits to the older employee.

The FAQs cite the Act’s ban on lifetime and annual limits as the basis for their objection to stand-alone HRAs used to access individual market coverage. Specifically, the FAQs note that—

“[A]n HRA is not considered integrated with primary health coverage offered by the employer unless, under the terms of the HRA, the HRA is available only to employees who are covered by primary group health plan coverage provided by the employer. …”

The Departments state their objections unequivocally: an HRA used to purchase coverage in the individual market cannot be considered integrated with that individual market coverage. Therefore, such an arrangement does not satisfy the requirements Act prohibiting group health plans and health insurance carriers from imposing lifetime or annual limits on essential health benefits. The Departments also made clear that an employer-sponsored HRA may be treated as integrated with other coverage only if the employee receiving the HRA is actually enrolled in that coverage. Thus, if an HRA credits additional amounts to an individual only when he or she does not enroll in the employer’s group health plan, the HRA will not comply with the Act.

Recognizing the potential hardship to existing stand-alone HRAs, the FAQs include a special rule for amounts credited or made available under HRAs in effect prior to January 1, 2014. Whether or not an HRA is integrated with other group health plan coverage, unused amounts credited before January 1, 2014 may be used after December 31, 2013 to reimburse medical expenses without running afoul of the Act. If the HRA did not prescribe a set amount or amounts to be credited during 2013, then the amounts credited cannot exceed the amount credited for 2012.

©1994-2013 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.