Expanding Retaliation: Fourth Circuit Rejects “Manager Rule” in Title VII Cases

After helping an employee report a complaint of harassment, a manager expresses concern over the company’s handling of the situation and tells the employee the complaint is being mishandled. After the complaining employee files (and then settles) a Title VII against the company, the manager is fired for failing to take a “pro-employer” stance and act in the company’s “best interests.” Does the manager have a Title VII retaliation claim? That is the exact question recently decided by the United States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic.

According to the complaint, which the court accepted as true for purposes of its review, J. Neil DeMasters began working as an employee assistance program consultant for Carilion in 2006. Two years later, DeMasters was consulted by an employee who complained that his supervisor was sexually harassing him. DeMasters relayed the substance of the complaint to human resources, which investigated the allegations and fired the supervisor. The employee was told the supervisor would never be back in the workplace, but a few days later the employee’s department manager allowed the supervisor to return to collect belongings. The employee complained to DeMasters that he felt uncomfortable at work and that he was facing increasing hostility from the supervisor’s allies and friends.

Upon learning this, DeMasters contacted HR to express his concern with how the situation was being handled, and HR confirmed it was aware the employee was being harassed by co-workers. DeMasters offered to coach the HR department on better ways to handle harassment complaints. HR declined, stating it would handle the situation. However, the employee reported to DeMasters that the harassment continued to get worse on a daily basis. DeMasters then opined to the employee that the complaints were being mishandled by HR. With that, DeMasters stopped having contact with the complaining employee.

Two years later, however, the employee filed a Title VII claim, which was settled. A few weeks after the settlement, DeMasters was called into a meeting with corporate counsel, the vice president of HR, and his own department director. DeMasters was told that by not taking the “pro-employer side,” he had put the company at risk of substantial liability. Two days later, DeMasters was fired for, among other reasons explained to him in writing, failing to act in the company’s best interests and failing to protect the company.

DeMasters filed a Title VII retaliation claim, which was dismissed by the federal district court for two reasons. First, the district court found that when DeMasters’ actions were examined individually, each action failed to constitute “protected activity” under Title VII. Second, even if he had engaged in protected activity, the “manager rule” prevented him from bringing a Title VII retaliation claim because he was acting within the scope of his job duties when reporting the complaints of the employee and discussing the matter with the company.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit roundly rejected both aspects of the district court’s reasoning. The appellate court found the district court’s individualized assessment of DeMasters’ actions to be “myopic.” The correct approach, the appellate court counseled, was to examine the totality of the circumstances in a “holistic approach.” As the court put it, just as a play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes, so a discrimination claim cannot be understood without looking at the overall scenario. With this in mind, the Fourth Circuit had no difficulty finding DeMasters engaged in protected activity by complaining to the company that he felt the complaining employee was still being subjected to unlawful conduct.

The court then turned to the “manager rule,” which finds its origin in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and requires an employee to “step outside” his role of representing the company in order to engage in protected activity. Under this theory, DeMasters’ job duties required him to counsel the employee and relay complaints to HR, and therefore his actions were not protected activities.

The Fourth Circuit again roundly rejected the application of the “manager rule” to the Title VII context. The court first found that whatever statutory support the “manager rule” had in the FLSA context did not exist in the Title VII context because the statutory language of Title VII differs from the FLSA in important considerations.

The court then found that two separate Title VII concepts counseled against the “manager rule.” First, under Fourth Circuit case law, an employer can escape Title VII liability if an employee’s conduct at work is sufficiently insubordinate, disruptive, or nonproductive. If the “manager rule” requires an employee to step outside his job duties in order to engage in protected activities, then it would put an employee in the dilemma of needing to step outside their job duties to have Title VII’s protections but then risk those same protections because stepping outside job duties could be seen as sufficiently insubordinate. Second, because Title VII offers employers the affirmative defense in certain harassment claims that complaining employees failed to follow the company’s internal reporting procedures, implementing a “manager rule” that could discourage employees responsible for helping other employees, such as DeMasters, from reporting concerns of discrimination. Thus, the “manager rule” would prevent Title VII’s overall goal of preventing and eliminating discrimination and harassment in the workplace.

The Fourth Circuit became just the second appellate court to look at and decide the “manager rule” question in the Title VII context in a published opinion. The Sixth Circuit similarly decided that it did not apply, but the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have non-precedential opinions adopting the “manager rule” in the Title VII context. Continued split among the federal courts on this issue increases the likelihood the Supreme Court may one day decide the issue.

For employers, the case serves as another reminder that concerns and complaints expressed by managers in harassment claims should be taken seriously and that great care needs to be taken to ensure employees are not retaliated against. Courts and the EEOC have been taking an increasingly expanded view of what constitutes protected activity and retaliation, and employers not mindful of these developments ignore them at their peril.

Gonzalez Saggio & Harlan LLP | Copyright (c) 2015

Hostile Work Environment Case Gets Additional Fourth Circuit Scrutiny

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​The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has agreed to an en banc rehearing (in which all judges on the court will hear the case) of Boyer-Liberto v. Fountainebleau Corp. after a three-judge panel of the court ruled in May 2014 that the factual allegations in the case did not rise to the level of a hostile work environment. The three-judge panel ruled that because a racial slur used inh the workplace was limited to two occasions arising from a single incident, the plaintiff had not been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her race.

Ms. Boyer-Liberto based her EEOC Charge of Discrimination and subsequent lawsuit against her former employer on two conversations she had with a coworker about an incident that occurred on September 14, 2010. During those conversations, which were on two consecutive days, the coworker twice directed a racial slur at Ms. Boyer-Liberto. One week after the incident, Ms. Boyer-Liberto was terminated from her job. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment to the former employer, holding the offensive conduct was too isolated to support the plaintiff’s claims for discrimination and retaliation, and the three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed that decision. Although the appeals court agreed the term used was “derogatory and highly offensive,” it held “a co-worker’s use of that term twice in a period of two days in discussions about a single incident was not, as a matter of law, so severe or pervasive as to change the terms and conditions of Liberto’s employment so as to be legally discriminatory.”

The Fourth Circuit has agreed to rehear the case, but it is not clear Ms. Boyer-Liberto will fare better on the rehearing although she argued in her petition for rehearing that the three-judge panel’s decision was inconsistent with other court rulings. That panel had specifically addressed the other cases Ms. Boyer-Liberto argued supported her claim and distinguished each as involving a greater number of incidents occurring over a longer time period or involving conduct having long-term, ongoing consequences.

As the panel noted in this case, a hostile work environment exists when “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” The Fourth Circuit’s upcoming decision in this case bears watching to see if the court takes the opportunity to expand what has been a relatively narrow definition of hostile work environment. Regardless, employers should promptly investigate any claims of harassment or discrimination, document those investigations, and act quickly to address any harassment or discrimination uncovered in the investigations.

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Employer Used As Means to Commit Crime not a Victim under Restitution Act, Fourth Circuit Court Rules

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The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”) provides that a victim of a federal crime may be entitled to an order of restitution for certain losses suffered as a direct result of the commission of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.  A question that courts sometimes face is whether a company can be considered a “victim” under the MVRA if an employee uses that company as an instrument to defraud the federal government.

Looking at this issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on April 4, 2014, declined to allow a company’s bankruptcy estate to receive restitution for a large debt caused by an owner/employee’s fraud because that company was used as an instrument for that fraud.  In re Bankruptcy Estate of AGS, Inc., No. 12-cr-113 (4th Cir., April 4, 2014).

Dr. Allen G. Saoud was convicted after a June 2013 jury trial of five counts of health care fraud.  Dr. Saoud, who is a dermatologist, in 2005 was excluded from participating in Medicare and Medicaid for 10 years.  He then plotted to maintain ownership and control of his dermatology practice, AGS, Inc. in violation of the exclusion.  He founded a new dermatology practice and transferred all of his patients to this new practice.  After selling  his new practice to Dr. Fred Scott for $1.8 million,  Dr. Saoud then sold AGS, which had lost its value, for $1 million to nurse practitioner Georgia Daniel.  Despite  these sales, he continued to control and profit from both entities, partly by collecting Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement funds.

After Dr. Saoud was convicted, the estate of AGS, Inc., which had filed for bankruptcy, sought a $1 million restitution award to cover bankruptcy creditor claims that stemmed partly from the underlying fraud.   The district court declined.  The Estate of AGS, Inc. then filed a writ of mandamus with the Fourth Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit also refused  to award restitution to the Estate.  The Court held that Dr. Saoud used AGS, Inc. as an instrument in his scheme to illegally obtained Medicare and Medicaid funds, and as such, the Court declined to “also hold that AGS was one of the scheme’s victims.”

AGS, Inc. should be a source of concern to companies that have sustained losses as a result of employee fraud.  If an employee, director, officer or owner uses a company to defraud the government and that company incurs tax or other debt liability as a result of that fraud, that company may not be able to receive restitution under the MVRA.  Jackson Lewis attorneys are available to advise companies on the scope of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act and their rights in collecting amounts lost to criminal acts.

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4th Cir. First to Apply "Disability" Definition Under ADAAA – ADA Amendments Act of 2008

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On January 23rd, in a ground-breaking decision under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an injury that left the plaintiff unable to walk for seven months and that, without surgery, pain medication, and physical therapy, likely would have rendered the plaintiff unable to walk for far longer can constitute a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The Fourth Circuit in Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corp. indicated that it is the first appellate court to apply the ADAAA’s expanded definition of “disability.”

The Court reversed a District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s case pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia based its dismissal of the plaintiff’s disability-based discharge claim on its view that the plaintiff’s impairment was temporary and therefore not covered by the Americans With Disabilities Act. In its reversal, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff “has unquestionably alleged a ‘disability’ under the ADAAA sufficiently plausible to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”

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Timothy M. McConville

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Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C.