Tag: Foreign Investments

CFIUS Determines it Lacks Jurisdiction to Review Chinese Land Acquisition

In 2022, Fufeng USA, a subsidiary of Chinese company Fufeng Group, purchased 370 acres near Grand Forks, North Dakota, with the intention of developing the land to build a plant for wet corn milling and biofermentation,[1] prompting opposition from federal and state politicians.[2] North Dakota Senators, North Dakota’s Governor, and Senator Marco Rubio urged the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review the acquisition as a potential national security risk for being located within 12 miles from the Grand Forks Air Force Base, which is home to military drone technology and a space networking center.[3] Following CFIUS’ review of Fufeng’s notice submission, CFIUS determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the transaction. This post summarizes the public information about that CFIUS case and provides observations about the responses by North Dakota and CFIUS in the wake of Fufeng’s proposed investment.

CFIUS Review and Determination

1. Procedural History

In conjunction with rising public opposition to its land acquisition, public reports show that Fufeng USA submitted a declaration to CFIUS on July 27, 2022.[4] North Dakota local news outlet Valley News Live obtained a copy of the CFIUS closing letter to that declaration filing, which stated that CFIUS determined on August 31, 2022 that it lacked sufficient information to assess the transaction and requested that the parties file a full notice.[5] (CFIUS has the option under the regulations to request a full notice filing at the conclusion of the abbreviated 30-day review of a declaration filing.) Based on the CFIUS closing letter to that subsequent notice filing, which was likewise obtained and published by Valley News Live, Fufeng USA submitted a notice on October 17, 2022, and CFIUS subsequently concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the transaction in December 2022.[6]

2. Why CFIUS did not Review under its Part 802 Covered Real Estate Authority

According the CFIUS Letter released by Fufeng to Valley News Live, Fufeng submitted its notice pursuant to 31 C.F.R. Part 800 (“Part 800”), which pertains to covered transaction involving existing U.S. businesses.[7] The closing letter made no reference to the transaction being reviewed as a “covered real estate transaction” under 31 C.F.R. Part 802 (“Part 802”).[8] A reason for this could be that, at the time the case was before CFIUS, the land acquisition by Fufeng USA was not within any of the requisite proximity thresholds and, thus, did not fall within Part 802 authority. Under Part 802, CFIUS has authority over certain real estate transactions involving property in specific maritime ports or airports, or within defined proximity thresholds to identified “military installations” listed in Appendix A to Part 802. Grand Forks Air Force Base was not included in Appendix A at that time, nor was the acquired land within the defined proximity of any other listed military installation. Accordingly, the only way for CFIUS to extend authority would be under its Part 800 authority relating to certain acquisitions of U.S. businesses.

3. CFIUS Determined It Lacked Jurisdiction Under its Part 800 Covered Transaction Authority

CFIUS’ closing letter to Fufeng stated that “CFIUS has concluded that the Transaction is not a covered transaction and therefore CFIUS does not have jurisdiction under 31 C.F.R. Part 800.”[9] Part 800 provides CFIUS with authority to review covered control transactions (i.e., those transactions that could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person) or covered investment transactions (i.e., certain non-controlling investments directly or indirectly by a foreign person in U.S. businesses involved with critical technology, critical infrastructure, or the collection and maintaining of US citizen personal data). Greenfield investments, however, inherently do not involve an existing U.S. business. As such, greenfield investments would be outside of CFIUS’ jurisdiction under Part 800. Although the justification underlying CFIUS’ determination regarding Fufeng’s acquisition is not publicly available, CFIUS might have determined that it lacked authority under Part 800 because Fufeng’s purchase of undeveloped land was not an acquisition of a U.S. business, but more likely a greenfield investment.

State and Federal Response

Under state and federal pressure, the City of Grand Forks, which initially approved Fufeng’s development of the corn milling facility, “officially decided to terminate the development agreement between the city and Fufeng USA Inc.” on April 20, 2023.[10] This decision was largely impacted by the U.S. Air Force’s determination that “the proposed project presents a significant threat to national security with both near- and long-term risks of significant impacts to our operations in the area.”[11] As of today, the land appears to still be under the ownership of Fufeng USA.[12]

CFIUS’ determination that it lacked authority drew sharp criticism from state and federal politicians. North Dakota Senator Cramer purported that CFIUS may have determined the jurisdictional question too narrowly and indicated that the determination may prompt federal legislative action.[13] Senator Marco Rubio (R-Florida) concurred, issuing a statement that permitting the transaction was “dangerous and dumb.”[14] In response to the determination, the Governor of South Dakota announced plans for “legislation potentially limiting foreign purchases of agricultural land” by investigating “proposed purchases of ag land by foreign interests and recommend either approval or denial to the Governor.”[15]

On April 29, 2023, North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum signed Senate Bill No. 2371 into law, which prohibits local development and ownership of real property by foreign adversaries and related entities, effective August 1, 2023. Notably, these entities include businesses with a principal executive offices located in China, as well as businesses with a controlling Chinese interest or certain non-controlling Chinese interest.

On May 5, 2023, the U.S. Department of Treasury, the agency tasked with administering CFIUS, also took steps to expand its authority to cover more real property acquisitions. It published a Proposed Rule that would expand CFIUS covered real estate transaction authority over real restate located with 99 miles of the Grand Forks Air Force Base and seven other facilities located in Arizona, California, Iowa, and North Dakota. See a summary of that Proposed Rule and related implications at this TradePractition.com blog post.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See, Alix Larsen, CFIUS requesting Fufeng USA give more information on corn mill development, Valley News Live (Sep. 1, 2022), https://www.valleynewslive.com/2022/09/01/cfius-requesting-fufeng-usa-give-more-information-corn-mill-development/.

[2] See Letter from Gov. Doug Burgum to Secretaries Janet Yellen and Lloyd Austin (Jul. 25, 2022), https://www.governor.nd.gov/sites/www/files/documents/Gov.%20Burgum%20letter%20urging%20expedited%20CFIUS%20review%2007.25.2022.pdf; Letter from Senators Marco rubio, John Hoeven, and Kevin Cramer to Secretaries Janet Yellen and Lloyd Austin (Jul. 14, 2022), https://senatorkevincramer.app.box.com/s/2462nafbszk2u6yosy77chz9rpojlwtl.

[3] See id; Eamon Javers, Chinese Company’s Purchase of North Dakota Farmland Raises National Security Concerns in Washington, CNBC, July 1, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/07/01/chinese-purchase-of-north-dakota-farmland-raises-national-security-concerns-in-washington.html.

[4] See, Alix Larsen, CFIUS requesting Fufeng USA give more information on corn mill development (Sep. 1, 2022), https://www.valleynewslive.com/2022/09/01/cfius-requesting-fufeng-usa-give-more-information-corn-mill-development/.

[5] See id.

[6] See Stacie Van Dyke, Fufeng moving forward with corn milling plant in Grand Forks (Dec. 13, 2022), https://www.valleynewslive.com/2022/12/14/fufeng-moving-forward-with-corn-milling-plant-grand-forks/.

[7] See id.

[8] Id.

[9] See id.

[10] Bobby Falat, Grand Forks officially terminates Fufeng Deal (Apr. 20, 2023), https://www.valleynewslive.com/2023/04/20/grand-forks-officially-terminates-fufeng-deal/.

[11] News Release, Senator John Hoeven, Hoeven, Cramer: Air Force Provides Official Position on Fufeng Project in Grand Forks, (Jan. 31, 2023), https://www.hoeven.senate.gov/news/news-releases/hoeven-cramer-air-force-provides-official-position-on-fufeng-project-in-grand-forks.

[12] See, Meghan Arbegast, Fufeng Group owes Grand Forks County more than $2,000 in taxes for first half of 2022 (Apr. 5, 2023), https://www.grandforksherald.com/news/local/fufeng-group-owes-grand-forks-county-more-than-2-000-in-taxes-for-first-half-of-2022.

[13] See Josh Meny, Senator Cramer discusses latest on Fufeng in Grand Forks (Dec. 27, 2022), https://www.kxnet.com/news/kx-conversation/senator-cramer-discusses-latest-on-fufeng-in-grand-forks/.

[14] Press Release, Senator Marco Rubio, Rubio Slams CFIUS’s Refusal to Take Action Regarding Fufeng Farmland Purchase (Dec. 14, 2022) https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2022/12/rubio-slams-cfius-s-refusal-to-take-action-regarding-fufeng-farmland-purchase.

[15] Jason Harward, Gov. Kristi Noem takes aim at potential Chinese land purchases in South Dakota (Dec. 13, 2022),https://www.grandforksherald.com/news/south-dakota/gov-kristi-noem-takes-aim-at-potential-chinese-land-purchases-in-south-dakota.

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Congress Enacts New Law to Control Foreign Investments in the U.S.

President Trump signed into law the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) to modernize the CFIUS review process to address 21st century national security concerns today. Congress enacted FIRRMA as Title XVII of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, HR 5515.

Background and Rationale for the New Law

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an inter-agency committee led by the Treasury Department to review transactions that could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person (referred to as “covered transactions”) in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the national security of the United States. CFIUS operates pursuant to section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (the “Exon-Florio” amendment), as later amended by Congress and as implemented by Executive Order.

For many years, CFIUS has worked to police national security concerns arising from investment in the U.S. by foreign companies and entities. Two transactions in the last few years have made the issue of foreign investment in the U.S. (and the role of CFIUS) notorious: first, the Dubai Ports World controversy in 2006 involving the sale of port management businesses in six major U.S. seaports to a company based in the United Arab Emirates and, second, the 2012 effort by a Chinese-owned company to purchase land for a windfarm next to a U.S. military weapons testing facility in Oregon. Current law governing CFIUS was last updated more than a decade ago, and its jurisdiction has been increasingly perceived as too limited.

Many government and private industry observers have come to believe that the CFIUS review process is neither designed to, nor sufficient to, address modern threats to national security. Their perception was that China and others have cheated the system, exploited the gaps in its authorities, and have structured their investments in U.S. businesses to evade scrutiny. In short, their view was that many transactions that could pose national security concerns often escaped review altogether.

For example, in introducing the bipartisan FIRRMA in late 2017, Sens. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and John Cornyn (R-TX) asserted that:

To circumvent CFIUS review, China will often pressure U.S. companies into arrangements such as joint ventures, coercing them into sharing their technology and know-how. This enables Chinese companies to acquire and then replicate U.S.-bred capabilities on their own soil. China has also been able to exploit minority-position investments in early-stage technology companies to gain access to cutting-edge IP, trade secrets, and key personnel. It has figured out which dual-use emerging technologies are in development and not yet subject to export controls.

Substantive Changes in CFIUS Law

To counteract these new threats, FIRRMA is intended to strike a balance between giving CFIUS additional authority that it needs to address modern national security issues without unduly chilling foreign investment in the American economy and slowing American economic growth in the process. The new law refashions the authority of CFIUS to allow it to reach additional types of investments like minority-position investments and overseas joint ventures. Plus, it creates a new streamlined filing process to encourage notification of potentially problematic transactions. The provisions of FIRRMA make the following changes:

  • FIRRMA expands CFIUS jurisdiction to cover minority investments, any change in a foreign investor’s rights regarding a U.S. business, and any device or scheme designed to evade CFIUS, as well as the purchase, lease, or concession of certain real-estate by or to a foreign person.

  • FIRRMA recognizes the authority of CFIUS to review non-controlling, non-passive investments, especially those involving critical technology and critical infrastructure

  • FIRRMA for the first time recognizes the authority and responsibility of CFIUS to protect against the exposure of sensitive personal data as part of its national security jurisdiction.

  • FIRRMA allows CFIUS to include in the review process any emerging and critical technologies and sets reporting requirements for them.

  • FIRRMA expands CFIUS’s ability to unilaterally choose to initiate a review in the case of a breach of a prior agreement with CFIUS and with respect to covered transactions that have not been submitted to CFIUS for review.

FIRRMA modifies the definition for covered transaction to include “other investments” by a foreign person in a U.S. business that owns, operates, manufactures, supplies, or services to critical infrastructure, produces critical technologies, or maintains or collects sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens. The “other investments” provisions is designed to capture small investments that might not otherwise fall within CFIUS jurisdiction because they lack the previously-required threshold of “control.”

Procedural Changes

Among the procedural changes is that FIRRMA establishes a new expedited process for securing CFIUS clearance by filing a five-page “declaration” (instead of a lengthier written notice). After reviewing such a declaration, CFIUS may direct the parties to submit a full notice.

Any party to a covered transaction may choose to follow the declaration approach, but a declaration is mandatory for any “foreign person in which a foreign government has, directly or indirectly, a substantial interest.” This requirement may be waived by CFIUS if the foreign government does not direct the foreign business and the foreign business has previously cooperated with the Committee. CFIUS may also choose to require a mandatory declaration where a U.S. business that controls critical infrastructure, technology, or sensitive personal data is a party to the transaction.

The new legislation also is intended to improve information-sharing with U.S. allies and partners and provides needed additional resources to the panel while maintaining safeguards to ensure that CFIUS would review transactions only when necessary.

Effective Date

Effective immediately, FIRRMA increases the filing and review schedule to 45 days and the investigatory phase to a second 45 day period. The act permits CFIUS to extend the investigation period by another 15 days in “extraordinary circumstances.” The legislation also adds an additional 15 days to the President’s current 15-day review period in extraordinary cases. Thus, relatively complex CFIUS cases may routinely begin to take 105 days (45+45+15) following initiation, instead of the previous 75 days (assuming that the parties do not withdraw and refile their notice).

Certain other provisions of FIRRMA have a delayed effective date (which is the earlier of 18 months following enactment or 30 days after CFIUS determines that it has sufficient resources). For example, the delayed date applies to the expansion of “covered transactions” to include real estate located in important ports or near sensitive US government facilities such as military installations. The delayed date also applies to CFIUS’s expanded jurisdiction with respect to “other investments” in U.S. business that own critical infrastructures or technologies or that maintain sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens.

 

© 2018 Schiff Hardin LLP
This post was written by William M. Hannay of Schiff Hardin LLP.