European Commission Action on Climate Taxonomy and ESG Rating Provider Regulation

On June 13, 2023, the European Commission published “a new package of measures to build on and strengthen the foundations of the EU sustainable finance framework.” The aim is to ensure that the EU sustainable finance framework continues to support companies and the financial sector in connection with climate transition, including making the framework “easier to use” and providing guidance on climate-related disclosure, while encouraging the private funding of transition projects and technologies. These measures are summarized in a publication, “A sustainable finance framework that works on the ground.” Overall, according to the Commission, the package “is another step towards a globally leading legal framework facilitating the financing of the transition.”

The sustainable finance package includes the following measures:

  • EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act: amendments include (i) new criteria for economic activities that make a substantial contribution to one or more non-climate environmental objectives, namely, sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources, transition to a circular economy, pollution prevention and control, and protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems; and (ii) changes expanding on economic activities that contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation “not included so far – in particular in the manufacturing and transport sectors.” The EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act has been operative since January 2022 and includes 107 economic activities that are responsible for 64% of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU. In addition, “new economic sectors and activities will be added, and existing ones refined and updated, where needed in line with regulatory and technological developments.” “For large non-financial undertakings, disclosure of the degree of taxonomy alignment regarding climate objectives began in 2023. Disclosures will be phased-in over the coming years for other actors and environmental objectives.”
  • Proposed Regulation of ESG Rating Providers: the Commission adopted a proposed regulation, which was based on 2021 recommendations from the International Organization of Securities Commissioners, aimed at promoting operational integrity and increased transparency in the ESG ratings market through organizational principles and clear rules addressing conflicts of interest. Ratings providers would be authorized and supervised by the European Securities and Markets Authority. The regulation “provides requirements on disclosures around” ratings methodologies and objectives, and “introduces principle-based organizational requirements on” ratings providers activities. The Commission is also seeking advice from ESMA on the presentation of credit ratings, with the aim being to address shortcomings related to “how ESG factors are incorporated into methodologies and disclosures of how ESG factors impact credit ratings.”
  • Enhancing Usability: the Commission set out an overview of the measures and tools aimed at enhancing the usability of relevant rules and providing implementation guidance to stakeholders. The Commission Staff Working Document “Enhancing the usability of the EU Taxonomy and the overall EU sustainable finance framework” summarizes the Commission’s most recent initiatives and measures. The Commission also published a new FAQ document that provides guidance on the interpretation and implementation of certain legal provisions of the EU Taxonomy Regulation and on the interactions between the concepts of “taxonomy-aligned investment” and “sustainable investment” under the SFDR.

Taking the Temperature: As previously discussed, the Commission is increasingly taking steps to achieve the goal of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, known as Fit for 55. Recent initiatives include the adoption of a carbon sinks goal, the launch of the greenwashing-focused Green Claims Directive, and now, the sustainable finance package.

Another objective of these regulatory initiatives is to provide increased transparency for investors as they assess sustainability and transition-related claims made by issuers. In this regard, the legislative proposal relating to the regulation of ESG rating agencies is significant. As noted in our longer survey, there is little consistency among ESG ratings providers and few established industry norms relating to disclosure, measurement methodologies, transparency and quality of underlying data. That has led to a number of jurisdictions proposing regulation, including (in addition to the EU) the UK, as well as to government inquiries to ratings providers in the U.S.

© Copyright 2023 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

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Upstream and Affiliate Guaranties in NAV Loans

Guaranties are a common feature in fund finance transactions. Particularly in NAV loans, upstream and affiliate (or “sideways”) guaranties are used. Below we discuss some of the context for the use of these types of guaranties, as well as some of the issues that lenders should consider in relying on them.

Upstream Guaranties

It is not uncommon in NAV loan transactions for the borrower to hold the underwritten assets for the financing (i.e., the fund’s portfolio of investments) through one or more controlled subsidiary holding vehicles (each, a “HoldCo”). Lenders may take a pledge of the management and economic interests in the HoldCos (rather than the underlying investments). In order to get as close to the underlying investments as possible (without taking a pledge), lenders may require that a HoldCo issue a guaranty directly to the lenders (or the administrative agent, on behalf of the lenders), guaranteeing the borrower’s obligations under the NAV loan facility. This “upstream” guaranty provides the lenders a direct claim against the HoldCo for amounts due under the loan, mitigating some of the risk of structural subordination to potential creditors (expected or unexpected) at the level of the HoldCo.[1]

Affiliate Guaranties

It is also common in NAV loan facilities for the borrower’s portfolio of investments to be held by multiple subsidiaries and/or affiliates of the borrower. Each such subsidiary or affiliate may be designated as a guarantor for repayment of the loan. As a result, such entities end up guaranteeing the obligations of their affiliates. The purpose of these affiliate guaranties is the same as the upstream guaranties discussed above – namely, to provide the lenders with a more direct enforcement claim in a default scenario.

Use of Such Guaranties

Motivations for the use of such upstream and affiliate guaranties may include:

a lender’s desire to underwrite a broader portfolio of investments, mitigating concentration risk to the portfolio of a single holding entity;
a lender’s desire to ensure that it is not subordinate to creditors that may arise at the level of the entity that directly owns the investment; or
a borrower’s desire to obtain a higher loan-to-value ratio than the lenders would otherwise provide based on the investments alone.
While upstream and affiliate guaranties can help to address these issues, they may raise nuanced legal issues that should be discussed with counsel in light of the relevant facts and circumstances.

Enforceability Considerations

Guaranties constitute the assumption of the liabilities of another entity and are contingent claims against the guarantor. Under certain insolvency laws, guaranties may be subject to challenge, and payments under guaranties may be subject to avoidance. Upstream or affiliate guaranties may be subject to heightened scrutiny and challenge in a bankruptcy or distress scenario. Below are a few potential issues lenders should bear in mind with respect to upstream and affiliate guaranties.

1. Constructively Fraudulent Transfer Avoidance. Under Bankruptcy Code section 548 and certain state laws, (a) transfers of property (including grants of security interests or liens), or (b) obligations assumed (such as incurring a loan or guaranty obligation) may be avoided as constructively fraudulent if BOTH of the following requirements are satisfied:[2]

  • (i) the transferor/guarantor does not receive reasonably equivalent value; AND
  • (ii) the transferor/guarantor is insolvent or undercapitalized or rendered insolvent, undercapitalized or unable to pay its debts because of the transfer or the assumed liability.

A guaranty by a parent of the obligations of a wholly owned and solvent subsidiary, a so-called downstream guaranty, is generally regarded as providing the parent with reasonably equivalent value through an enhancement of the value of its equity ownership of the subsidiary.

Upstream and affiliate guaranties require more scrutiny than guaranties by a borrower parent to determine whether any potential enforceability issues are present.

a. Reasonably Equivalent Value. The determination of value is not formulaic or mechanical, but rather generally determined by the substance of the transaction. Value or benefits from a transfer may be direct (e.g., receipt of loan proceeds) or indirect. But if indirect, they must be “fairly concrete.”

In each of the above scenarios, we are assuming that the upstream or affiliate guarantor would not use the proceeds of any loans and, consequently, would not be added to the loan facility as a borrower. However, other indirect but tangible benefits or value to the guarantor should be identified, e.g., favorable loan terms or amendments, use of the NAV facility proceeds that may indirectly but materially benefit the guarantor, maintenance of the entire fund group of entities that benefits the guarantor, etc.

b. Financial Condition of Guarantor. The financial condition of the transferor/guarantor is evaluated at the time of the incurrence of the guaranty. The evaluation is made from the debtor/guarantor – in what condition was the guarantor left after giving effect to the transfer or assumption of the obligation. Diligence regarding a guarantor’s financial condition may demonstrate that such guarantor is sufficiently creditworthy to undertake the guaranty and remain solvent and able to conduct its respective businesses. Representations from the guarantor may be sought to confirm its financial condition.

c. Potential Mitigants. In addition to performing diligence with respect to the above points, lenders and their counsel will often include contractual provisions to mitigate the possibility that a guaranty may be found to constitute a fraudulent transfer. Savings clauses, limited recourse guaranties, and net worth guaranties are all tools that can be used to address the issues noted above. The scope and appropriateness of such provisions is beyond the scope of this article and should be discussed with external deal and restructuring counsel.

2. Preference Challenge. Under Bankruptcy Code section 547, a transfer made by a debtor to a creditor, on account of an antecedent debt, that is made while the debtor was insolvent and within 90 days before the bankruptcy case has been commenced may be subject to avoidance as a preferential transfer. Certain defenses may apply to a potential preferential transfer, including the simultaneous exchange of “new value” by the creditor. However, note that any pre-bankruptcy transfers of value, like payments under a guaranty, may be subject to scrutiny and potential challenge by the guarantor/debtor or a bankruptcy trustee.

Guaranties can be an important element in structuring NAV loan transactions to achieve the terms desired by the parties and to provide necessary protections for the lenders, but consideration needs to be given to the legal issues, such as the ones mentioned here, that their inclusion can present.

[1] Lenders will typically also require the HoldCo to pledge its accounts to which proceeds of the underlying investments are paid, allowing lenders to foreclose on such cash at the HoldCo level, without the need for such cash to first be distributed up to the borrower.

[2] Note that the precise language of certain state fraudulent transfer laws may differ, but conceptually, most state statutes require a showing of (i) insufficient or unreasonably small consideration in exchange for the transfer or liability incurred, and (ii) the transferor/debtor being insolvent at the time of the transfer, or becoming insolvent or subject to financial distress as a result of the transfer.

© Copyright 2023 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

The Future of Stablecoins, Crypto Staking and Custody of Digital Assets

In the wake of the collapse of cryptocurrency exchange firm FTX, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has ratcheted up its oversight and enforcement of crypto firms engaged in activities ranging from crypto staking to custody of digital assets. This is due in part to concerns that the historically free-wheeling and largely unregulated crypto marketplace may adversely impact U.S. investors and contaminate traditional financial systems. The arguments that cryptocurrencies and digital assets should not be viewed as securities under federal laws largely fall on deaf ears at the SEC. Meanwhile, the state of the crypto economy in the United States remains in flux as the SEC, other regulators and politicians alike attempt to balance competing interests of innovation and investment in a relatively novel and untested asset class.

Is Crypto Staking Dead?

First, what is crypto staking? By way of background, it’s necessary to understand a bit about blockchain technology, which serves as the underpinning for all cryptocurrency and digital asset transactions. One of the perceived benefits of such transactions is that they are decentralized and “peer-to-peer” – meaning that Person A can transact directly with Person B without the need for a financial intermediary to approve the transaction.

However, in the absence of a central authority to validate a transaction, blockchain requires other verification processes or consensus mechanisms such as “proof of work” (which in the case of Bitcoin mining ensures that transactions are valid and added to the Bitcoin blockchain correctly) or “proof of stake” (a network of “validators” who contribute or “stake” their own crypto in exchange for a chance to validate a new transaction, update the blockchain and earn a reward). Proof of work has come under fire by environmental activists for the enormous amounts of computer power and energy required to solve complex mathematical or cryptographic puzzles to validate a transaction before it can be recorded on the blockchain. In contrast, proof of stake is analogous to a shareholder voting their shares of stock to approve a corporate transaction.

Second, why has crypto staking caught the attention of the SEC? Many crypto firms and exchanges offer “staking as a service” (SaaS) whereby investors can stake (or lend) their digital assets in exchange for lucrative returns. This practice is akin to a person depositing cash in a bank account in exchange for interest payments – minus FDIC insurance backing of all such bank deposits to protect investors.

Recently, on February 9, 2023, the SEC charged two crypto firms, commonly known as “Kraken,” for violating federal securities laws by offering a lucrative crypto asset SaaS program. Pursuant to this program, investors could stake their digital assets with Kraken in exchange for annual investment returns of up to 21 percent. According to the SEC, this program constituted the unregistered sale of securities in violation of federal securities laws. Moreover, the SEC claims that Kraken failed to adequately disclose the risks associated with its staking program. According to the SEC’s Enforcement Division director:

“Kraken not only offered investors outsized returns untethered to any economic realities but also retained the right to pay them no returns at all. All the while, it provided them zero insight into, among other things, its financial condition and whether it even had the means of paying the marketed returns in the first place.”1

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Kraken has agreed to pay a $30 million civil penalty and will no longer offer crypto staking services to U.S. investors. Meanwhile, other crypto firms that offer similar programs, such as Binance and Coinbase, are waiting for the other shoe to drop – including the possibility that the SEC will ban all crypto staking programs for U.S. retail investors. Separate and apart from potentially extinguishing a lucrative revenue stream for crypto firms and investors alike, it may have broader consequences for proof of stake consensus mechanisms commonly used to validate blockchain transactions.

NY DFS Targets Stablecoins

In the world of cryptocurrency, stablecoins are typically considered the most secure and least volatile because they are often pegged 1:1 to some designated fiat (government-backed) currency such as U.S. dollars. In particular, all stablecoins issued by entities regulated by the New York Department of Financial Services (NY DFS) are required to be fully backed 1:1 by cash or cash equivalents. However, on February 13, 2023, NY DFS unexpectedly issued a consumer alert stating that it had ordered Paxos Trust Company (Paxos) to stop minting and issuing a stablecoin known as “BUSD.” BUSD is reportedly the third largest stablecoin by market cap and pegged to the U.S. dollar.

The reasoning behind the NY DFS order remains unclear from the alert, which merely states that “DFS has ordered Paxos to cease minting Paxos-issued BUSD as a result of several unresolved issues related to Paxos’ oversight of its relationship with Binance in regard to Paxos-issued BUSD.”The same day, Paxos confirmed that it would stop issuing BUSD. However, in an effort to assuage investors, Paxos stated “All BUSD tokens issued by Paxos Trust have and always will be backed 1:1 with U.S. dollar–denominated reserves, fully segregated and held in bankruptcy remote accounts.”3

Separately, the SEC reportedly issued a Wells Notice to Paxos on February 12, 2023, indicating that it intended to commence an enforcement action against the company for violating securities laws in connection with the sale of BUSD, which the SEC characterized as unregistered securities. Paxos, meanwhile, categorically denies that BUSD constitute securities, but nonetheless has agreed to stop issuing these tokens in light of the NY DFS order.

It remains to be seen whether the regulatory activity targeting BUSD is the beginning of a broader crackdown on stablecoins amid concerns that, contrary to popular belief, such coins may not be backed by adequate cash reserves.

Custody of Crypto Assets

On February 15, 2023, the SEC proposed changes to the existing “custody rule” under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. As noted by SEC Chair Gary Gensler, the custody rule was designed to “help ensure that [investment] advisers don’t inappropriately use, lose, or abuse investors’ assets.”The proposed changes to the rule (referred to as the “safeguarding rule”) would require investment advisers to maintain client assets – specifically including crypto assets – in qualified custodial accounts. As the SEC observed, “[although] crypto assets are a relatively recent and emerging type of asset, this is not the first time custodians have had to adapt their practices to safeguard different types of assets.”5

A qualified custodian generally is a federal or state-chartered bank or savings association, certain trust companies, a registered broker-dealer, a registered futures commission merchant or certain foreign financial institutions.6 However, as noted by the SEC, many crypto assets trade on platforms that are not qualified custodians. Accordingly, “this practice would generally result in an adviser with custody of a crypto asset security being in violation of the current custody rule because custody of the crypto asset security would not be maintained by a qualified custodian from the time the crypto asset security was moved to the trading platform through the settlement of the trade.”7

Moreover, in a departure from existing practice, the proposed safeguarding rule would require an investment adviser to enter into a written agreement with the qualified custodian. This custodial agreement would set forth certain minimum protections for the safeguarding of customer assets, including crypto assets, such as:

  • Implementing appropriate measures to safeguard an advisory client’s assets8
  • Indemnifying an advisory client when its negligence, recklessness or willful misconduct results in that client’s loss9
  • Segregating an advisory client’s assets from its proprietary assets10
  • Keeping certain records relating to an advisory client’s assets
  • Providing an advisory client with periodic custodial account statements11
  • Evaluating the effectiveness of its internal controls related to its custodial practices.12

The new proposed, cumbersome requirements for custodians of crypto assets appear to be a direct consequence of the collapse of FTX, which resulted in the inexplicable “disappearance” of billions of dollars of customer funds. By tightening the screws on custodians and investment advisers, the SEC is seeking to protect the everyday retail investor by leveling the playing field in the complex and often murky world of crypto. However, it still remains to be seen whether, and to what extent, the proposed safeguarding rule will emerge after the public comment period, which will remain open for 60 days following publication of the proposal in the Federal Register.


1 SEC Press Release 2023-25 (Feb. 9, 2023).

NY DFS Consumer Alert (Feb. 13, 2023) found at https://www.dfs.ny.gov/consumers/alerts/Paxos_and_Binance.

3 Paxos Press Release (Feb. 13, 2023) found at https://paxos.com/2023/02/13/paxos-will-halt-minting-new-busd-tokens/.

4 SEC Press Release 2023-30 (Feb. 15, 2023).

5 SEC Proposed Rule, p. 79.

6 SEC Fact Sheet: Proposed Safeguarding Rule.

7 SEC Proposed Rule, p. 68.

For instance, per the SEC, this could require storing crypto assets in a “cold wallet.”

9 Per the SEC, “the proposed indemnification requirement would likely operate as a substantial expansion in the protections provided by qualified custodians to advisory clients, in particular because it would result in some custodians holding advisory client assets subject to a simple negligence standard rather than a gross negligence standard.” See SEC Proposed Rule, p. 89.

10 Per the SEC, this requirement is intended to “ensure that client assets are at all times readily identifiable as client property and remain available to the client even if the qualified custodian becomes financially insolvent or if the financial institution’s creditors assert a lien against the qualified custodian’s proprietary assets (or liabilities).” See SEC Proposed Rule, p. 92.

11 Per the SEC, “[in] a change from the current custody rule, the qualified custodian would also now be required to send account statements, at least quarterly, to the investment adviser, which would allow the adviser to more easily perform account reconciliations.” See SEC Proposed Rule, p. 98.

12 Per the SEC, the proposed rule would require that the “qualified custodian, at least annually, will obtain, and provide to the investment adviser a written internal control report that includes an opinion of an independent public accountant as to whether controls have been placed in operation as of a specific date, are suitably designed, and are operating effectively to meet control objectives relating to custodial services (including the safeguarding of the client assets held by that qualified custodian during the year).” See SEC Proposed Rule, p. 101.

© 2023 Wilson Elser

UK Prohibits Certain Investment in Russia

From 19 July 2022,1 it is a violation of UK financial sanctions for any person who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that they are carrying out, directly or indirectly, certain investment activity in Russia. These prohibitions follow the UK Government’s 6 April 2022 announcement of its intention to introduce an outright ban on all new outward investment in Russia.

The prohibitions are subject to exceptions and do not impact acts undertaken to satisfy obligations under a contract concluded before 19 July 2022, or an ancillary contract necessary for the satisfaction of that contract, subject to notifying Her Majesty’s Treasury at least five working days before the day on which any related act is carried out. There is also the option to apply for a specific Treasury licence, such as to enable humanitarian assistance activity or if connected with the provision of medical goods or services.

Furthermore, General Licence INT/2022/2002560 has been granted, taking effect from 19 July 2022 and expiring on 26 July 2022, allowing a seven-day wind-down period in respect of the prohibited activities.

What Is Prohibited?

The Regulations prohibit:

  • Directly or indirectly establishing any joint venture with a person connected with Russia;
  • Opening representative offices or establishing branches or subsidiaries in Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in Russian land and persons connected with Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a relevant entity or persons (other than an individual) with a place of business in Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia; and
  • The provision of investment services directly related to all the activities summarised above.

Definitions

A “person connected with Russia” means:

  • any individual or group of individuals who are ordinarily resident or located in Russia, or an entity which is incorporated or constituted under Russian law or domiciled in Russia;2

and is not:

  • A Schedule 2 Entity, as detailed in the Regulations;3 or
  • An entity domiciled outside of Russia or a branch, or subsidiary, of such a non-Russian entity.4

A “branch”5 means, in relation to a person other than an individual, a place of business which forms a legally dependent part of that person and which carries out all or some of the transactions inherent in the business of that person.

A “relevant entity”6 means a person, other than an individual, which has a place of busines located in Russia, but is not a person connected with Russia.

A person directly or indirectly “acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a person or entity”7 means:

  • Acquiring any share in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any voting rights in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of the person or entity; or
  • Acquiring any means of ensuring that the affairs of the person or entity are conducted in accordance with the wishes of the person.

Exceptions

The exceptions8 introduced enables a person to deal directly or indirectly with:

  • A transferable security otherwise prohibited by Regulation 16;
  • A relevant security issued by a person connected with Russia; or
  • A relevant security issued by a relevant entity.

Full definitions of the terms above are included within Regulation 60ZZA.

From 19 July 2022,1 it is a violation of UK financial sanctions for any person who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that they are carrying out, directly or indirectly, certain investment activity in Russia. These prohibitions follow the UK Government’s 6 April 2022 announcement of its intention to introduce an outright ban on all new outward investment in Russia.

The prohibitions are subject to exceptions and do not impact acts undertaken to satisfy obligations under a contract concluded before 19 July 2022, or an ancillary contract necessary for the satisfaction of that contract, subject to notifying Her Majesty’s Treasury at least five working days before the day on which any related act is carried out. There is also the option to apply for a specific Treasury licence, such as to enable humanitarian assistance activity or if connected with the provision of medical goods or services.

Furthermore, General Licence INT/2022/2002560 has been granted, taking effect from 19 July 2022 and expiring on 26 July 2022, allowing a seven-day wind-down period in respect of the prohibited activities.

What Is Prohibited?

The Regulations prohibit:

  • Directly or indirectly establishing any joint venture with a person connected with Russia;
  • Opening representative offices or establishing branches or subsidiaries in Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in Russian land and persons connected with Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia;
  • Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a relevant entity or persons (other than an individual) with a place of business in Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, persons connected with Russia; and
  • The provision of investment services directly related to all the activities summarised above.

Definitions

A “person connected with Russia” means:

  • any individual or group of individuals who are ordinarily resident or located in Russia, or an entity which is incorporated or constituted under Russian law or domiciled in Russia;2

and is not:

  • A Schedule 2 Entity, as detailed in the Regulations;3 or
  • An entity domiciled outside of Russia or a branch, or subsidiary, of such a non-Russian entity.4

A “branch”5 means, in relation to a person other than an individual, a place of business which forms a legally dependent part of that person and which carries out all or some of the transactions inherent in the business of that person.

A “relevant entity”6 means a person, other than an individual, which has a place of busines located in Russia, but is not a person connected with Russia.

A person directly or indirectly “acquiring any ownership interest in or control over a person or entity”7 means:

  • Acquiring any share in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any voting rights in the person or entity;
  • Acquiring any right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of the person or entity; or
  • Acquiring any means of ensuring that the affairs of the person or entity are conducted in accordance with the wishes of the person.

Exceptions

The exceptions8 introduced enables a person to deal directly or indirectly with:

  • A transferable security otherwise prohibited by Regulation 16;
  • A relevant security issued by a person connected with Russia; or
  • A relevant security issued by a relevant entity.

Full definitions of the terms above are included within Regulation 60ZZA.


FOOTNOTES

1 Regulation 18B introduced via The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 12) Regulations 2022 [2022 No. 801], in force as of 19 July 2022.

2 Regulation 19A(2), The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 [2019 No. 855] – as amended.

3 See pp. 123-124.

4 Regulation 16(4D), Ibid.

5 Regulation 18B(8), The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 12) Regulations 2022 [2022 No. 801].

6 Regulation 18B(8), Ibid.

7 Regulation 18B(8), Ibid.

8 Regulation 60ZZA, Ibid.

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Community Banks and Overdrafts — Time for Reconsideration?

Bank consumer overdraft fees (together with nonsufficient funds (NSF) fees and returned check fees) have long been a target of attacks by consumer advocacy groups and progressive politicians who claim that such fees are disproportionately levied on the most vulnerable consumers. The Obama-era Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) initiated efforts to regulate overdraft programs, which were shelved during the Trump administration, and legislation to restrict overdraft fees has regularly been proposed and considered by Congress, but not enacted.

2022, however, may be the year that the US financial regulatory agencies finally move to impose formal restrictions on banks’ overdraft fee programs. In particular, the CFPB, increasingly assertive in President Biden’s second year in office, has clearly signaled its intent to take action in this area:

  • Rohit Chopra, the director of the CFPB, has spoken out on numerous occasions — in public appearances, opinion pieces, and blog posts — regarding the imperative of reining in so-called junk fees charged by banks and other financial companies.
  • On January 26, 2022, the CFPB published a request for public comment targeting “exploitative junk fees,” including overdraft and NSF fees. The CFPB stated that the goal of its information request was to assist the agency’s plan to “craft rules, issue industry guidance, and focus supervision and enforcement resources,” with the goals of reducing excessive fees and eliminating illegal practices.

The attack on overdraft fee programs has been echoed by other administration officials as well as by allied politicians. Acting Comptroller of the Currency Michael Hsu has called traditional bank overdraft programs “a significant part” of a “regressive system” that penalizes the poor and has stated that “banks that hesitate to adopt pro-consumer overdraft programs will soon be negative outliers.” On March 31, 2022, the House Financial Services Subcommittee held a hearing on possible government intervention to restrict overdraft programs, clearly showing coordination by the committee majority with the Biden administration’s initiatives. In March 2022, a group of US Senate Democrats (including Banking Committee Chairman Sherrod Brown) sent letters to seven large banks urging them to abolish or significantly reduce overdraft and other fees, and in early April, New York Attorney General Letitia James, in recent letters signed by numerous other state attorneys general, asked the country’s four largest banks to eliminate consumer overdraft fees altogether by summer 2022.

Adding to the chorus of Biden administration and other political voices critical of overdraft fees has been a steady stream of announcements over the past year by many large banks regarding plans to eliminate or greatly restrict their overdraft and related fees. In January 2022 alone, five of the country’s largest banks announced the planned elimination of NSF fees and certain overdraft charges. These announcements add weight to the CFPB’s attacks on overdraft fee programs and will inevitably result in additional pressure on other large banks to follow suit.

The bottom line is that federal regulation of this area may finally be on the horizon, if not imminent, although it is anyone’s guess what form regulatory action will take. The initial targets of any action taken by the CFPB — whether formal rulemaking, statements of policy, or increased enforcement activity — are likely to be banking companies that have total assets in excess of $10 billion and that are thus subject to direct supervision by the CFPB. However, whatever new policy is implemented by the CFPB in this area will inevitably be applied by the three principal federal banking agencies to financial institutions of all sizes, and community banks should prepare themselves for increased examination scrutiny of their overdraft fee programs and the potential for enforcement actions.

Accordingly, community banks — especially those heavily reliant on overdraft fee income — should review their overdraft programs, ensure that they are compliant with existing regulations and best practices, and consider changes to respond to possible regulatory concerns. While it is impossible to react effectively to a regulatory regime that has not been proposed, much less implemented, reports and statements by the CFPB and other banking agencies provide some guidance. First, the CFPB has indicated that it will demand transparent and fully disclosed pricing of overdraft solutions that allow consumers to make an informed choice. In addition, Acting Comptroller Hsu stated in a December 2021 speech — in which he notably did not call for banks to eliminate overdraft fees — that the OCC had identified several features of bank overdraft programs that could be modified or recalibrated to help achieve the goal of improving the financial health of vulnerable consumers. He stated that these changes included:

  • Requiring consumer opt-in to the overdraft program.
  • Providing a grace period before charging an overdraft fee.
  • Allowing negative balances without triggering an overdraft fee.
  • Offering consumers balance-related alerts.
  • Providing consumers with access to real-time balance information.
  • Linking a consumer’s checking account to another account for overdraft protection.
  • Collecting overdraft or NSF fees from a consumer’s next deposit only after other items have been posted or cleared.
  • Not charging separate and multiple overdraft fees for multiple items in a single day and not charging additional fees when an item is re-presented.

Finally, community banks should closely monitor CFPB and other bank regulators’ overdraft fee initiatives, through state and national bankers associations and otherwise, and continue to explore potential methods of managing their overdraft programs in line with stated and possible future regulatory concerns.

© 2022 Jones Walker LLP
For more about banking institutions, visit the NLR Financial, Securities & Banking section.

SEC Adopts Expansion of “Accredited Investor” Definition

On August 26, 2020, the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted amendments to Rule 501, Rule 144A and other related rules (the Amendments) to expand the definition of “accredited investor” under the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act). The amendments were adopted largely as proposed and broaden the scope of natural persons and entities that may qualify to participate in private offerings of securities that are exempt from registration under the Securities Act.

In particular, the “accredited investor” designation will now include the following:

  • Natural persons holding certain professional certification and designations. The SEC will periodically issue orders designating those professional certificates, designations or credentials that, when held by a natural person, would qualify such person as an accredited investor. Contemporaneously with the Amendments, the SEC designated holders in good standing of the Series 7, Series 65 and Series 82 licenses as qualifying for accredited investor status. In evaluating additional professional designations for qualifying status, the SEC will consider a non-exhaustive list of attributes established by the Amendments.
  • “Knowledgeable Employees” of private funds as defined under the Investment Company Act, but only with respect to investment in such private fund. A Knowledgeable Employee’s spouse will also be considered an accredited investor with respect to joint investments in the private fund.
  • Certain enumerated entities, including:
    • federal- or state-registered investment advisers and exempt reporting advisers, regardless of the level of assets under management;
    • rural business investment companies (RBICs), as defined in Section 384A of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act;
    • limited liability companies that have total assets in excess of $5 million and were not formed for the purpose of acquiring the securities offered1 ; and
    • any entity with at least $5 million in investments (as defined under the Investment Company Act of 1940) that has not been formed for the purpose of investing in the securities offered, in order to encompass entities such as Indian tribes, foreign entities and local government bodies that were not previously covered by Rule 501.
  • “Family offices” and their “family clients,” each as defined under the Advisers Act, provided the family office has at least $5 million in assets under management, was not formed for the purpose of acquiring the securities offered and was directed to make the investment by a person who has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters such that the family office is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the investments.

The Amendments would also clarify that spousal equivalents can pool finances when determining qualification as an accredited investor and update the definition of “qualified institutional buyer” under the Securities Act to conform with the new accredited investor definition.

The expansion of the accredited investor definition has many implications for asset managers, including updates to offering and subscription documents and questionnaires, consideration of expanded options for funding GP commitments via the expanded pool of knowledgeable employees and affiliated professionals and evaluation of fund-raising opportunities. Commissioners adopted the amendments on a 3-2 vote, with commenters disagreeing with the SEC’s decision not to index the wealth thresholds, which were initially adopted in 1982, for inflation.

The Amendments will go effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.

_________________________________________________

1 While Rule 501 did not explicitly include LLCs meeting these requirements prior to the Amendments, the SEC historically has taken the position that such LLCs qualify as accredited investors.


© 2020 Vedder Price
For more SEC news, visit the National Law Review Securities, SEC, & Financial Institution Law News section.

Trouble In Paradise: Florida Court Rules That Selling Bitcoin Is Money Transmission

The growing popularity of virtual currency over the last several years has raised a host of legislative and regulatory issues. A key question is whether and how a state’s money transmitter law applies to activities involving virtual currency. Many states have answered this – albeit in a non-uniform way – through legislation or regulation, including regulatory guidance documents. For instance, Georgia and Wyoming have amended their money transmitter statutes to include or exclude virtual currencies explicitly. In other states, such as Texas and Tennessee, the state’s primary financial regulator has issued formal guidance. In New York, the Department of Financial Services issued an entirely separate regulation for virtual currencies. Still, in others, neither the legislature nor the relevant regulator has provided any insight into how the state’s money transmitter law may apply.

In most states, the judicial branch has not yet weighed in on the question. But Florida is an exception. On January 30, 2019, in State v. Espinoza, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal interpreted the state’s money transmission law broadly and held that selling bitcoin directly to another person is covered under the law. [1] The decision will have broad implications for the virtual currency industry in Florida.

BACKGROUND: MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT AND MICHELL ESPINOZA

In December 2013, the Miami Beach Police Department (“MBPD”) perused an Internet website that provided a directory of buyers and sellers of bitcoin. In an undercover capacity, an MBPD agent contacted one of the users, Michell Espinoza. Shortly thereafter, the agent arranged to meet and purchase bitcoin from Espinoza in exchange for cash. The MBPD agent who purchased the bitcoin implied that he would use the bitcoin to fund illicit activities. One month later, the MBPD made a second purchase from Espinoza, telling him that the bitcoin would be used to purchase stolen credit card numbers. After a third and fourth transaction, the MBPD arrested Espinoza. The State of Florida charged him with two counts of money laundering and one count of engaging in the business of a money transmitter without a license. Espinoza moved to dismiss the charges, arguing, among other things, that Florida’s money transmitter law does not apply to bitcoin. The trial court agreed and dismissed all counts against Espinoza.

THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT’S OPINION: SELLING BITCOIN CONSTITUTES MONEY TRANSMISSION

Florida appealed, and the appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling. The court started its analysis noting that the state’s money transmitter law requires anyone engaging in a “money services business” to be licensed. [2] A “money services business” is defined as “any person . . . who acts as a payment instrument seller, . . . or money transmitter.” [3] The court held that bitcoin is regulated by Florida’s money transmitter law, and, as a result, Espinoza was both “acting as a payment instrument seller” and “engaging in the business of a money transmitter.”

Under the Florida statute, a “payment instrument seller” is an entity that sells a “payment instrument.” [4] The phrase “payment instrument” is defined to include a variety of instruments, including “payment of money, or monetary value whether or not negotiable.” [5] The phrase “monetary value,” in turn, is defined as “a medium of exchange, whether or not redeemable in currency.” [6] The court interpreted these definitions – which it described as “plain and unambiguous” – to conclude bitcoin falls under the definition of “payment instrument.” To reach that conclusion, it reasoned that bitcoin, which is redeemable for currency, is a medium of exchange, which falls under the definition of “monetary value.” Therefore, it falls under the definition of “payment instrument.” [7] To purportedly bolster its point, the court noted that several businesses in the Miami area accepted bitcoin as a form of payment. It also pointed to a final order from the Florida Office of Financial Regulation (“OFR”) in which OFR granted Coinbase a money transmitter license. The court noted that Coinbase provides a service “where a Coinbase user sends fiat currency to another Coinbase user to buy bitcoins.” “Like the Coinbase user,” the court reasoned, the MBPD detective “paid cash to Espinoza to buy bitcoins.”

The court also concluded Espinoza was acting as a money transmitter. Under the Florida statute, a money transmitter is an entity that “receives currency, monetary value, or payment instruments for the purpose of transmitting the same by any means….” [8] Espinoza argued he fell outside this definition because he did not receive payment for the bitcoin for the purpose of transmitting the same to a third party. The court disagreed. It held that the law does not require the presence of a third party because the definition of money transmitter does not mention a third party, either expressly or implicitly. [9] It also disagreed with the trial court and Espinoza’s “bilateral limitation,” which would require Espinoza to have both received and transmitted the same form of currency, monetary value, or payment instrument. According to the court, Espinoza fell within the ambit of the law because he received fiat for the purpose of transmitting bitcoin. It explained that the phrase “the same” in the definition of “money transmission” modifies the list of payment methods, and the use of “or” in that list of payment methods – “currency, monetary value, or payment instrument” – means that “any of the three qualifies interchangeably on either side of the transaction.”

As additional support for its position, the court distinguished a final order entered into by OFR: In re Petition for Declaratory Statement Moon, Inc. According to the court’s description, Moon sought to establish a bitcoin kiosk program under which a Moon customer would pay fiat to a licensed money services business in exchange for a PIN, and the customer would then enter the PIN into a Moon kiosk, which would initiate a transfer of bitcoins to the user from a Moon bitcoin address. Once the PIN was redeemed, the licensed entity would pay Moon. OFR determined Moon did not a license. The court distinguished the Moon order because “Moon merely facilitated the transfer of bitcoins through the use of a licensed money services business,” whereas “[h]ere, no licensed money services business was utilized in the exchange of U.S. dollars for bitcoins that occurred between Espinoza and” the MBPD agent.

COUNTERPOINTS TO THE COURT’S OPINION

Several state legislatures or regulators have amended or interpreted their money transmitter laws to apply to virtual currency, but those actions do not take the form of a judicial opinion. Here, the Third District Court provided its specific reasoning for reaching its conclusions. It remains to be seen whether Espinoza will seek review from the Florida Supreme Court, but there are at least a few points in the court’s opinion that warrant further review and analysis.

First, Espinoza did not receive money for the purpose of transmitting it. He received it in exchange for selling bitcoin; he received it for the purpose of possessing it. The court rejected Espinoza’s attempt to impose a third-party requirement, but the most natural reading of the phrase “transmitting” would require Espinoza to send onward whatever value he received. Merriam-Webster defines “transmit” as “to send or convey from one person or place to another.” By using the words “receive” and “transmit,” the Florida law focuses on the act of sending money to another person and excludes the act of selling money or monetary value. If simply selling property were sufficient to trigger the money transmitter law, the statute would likely sweep far more broadly than intended. Here, Espinoza was acting as a merchant selling goods. This would not constitute money transmission under any reasonable reading of the law. Indeed, some states (and FinCEN) have recognized that a party selling its own inventory of virtual currency in a two-party transaction is not a money transmitter.

Second, the court’s conclusion is further undercut by considering the Moon proceeding the court discusses. The opinion notes “the PIN provided by the licensed money services business to Moon’s customers provided a mechanism by which the exchange of U.S. dollars for bitcoins could be identifiable.” The PIN could arguably be classified as a payment instrument because it is an “other instrument” or “monetary value.” If transmission to a third party is not required, as the court holds, then Moon should have needed a license when it received the PIN and then transmitted bitcoins back to the user that was redeeming the PIN. But that wasn’t the conclusion OFR reached.

Third, the court’s interpretation of how OFR would treat Espinoza’s actions is questionable. In 2014, OFR issued a consumer alert stating that “[v]irtual currency and the organizations using them are not regulated by the OFR.” [10] In addition, in January 2018, OFR released another consumer alert regarding cryptocurrency, stating that “[cryptocurrencies] are subject to little or no regulation,” which further indicates OFR does not interpret the money transmission law to cover cryptocurrencies. [11] The court does not acknowledge these statements. Although the court focuses on an OFR order regarding Coinbase, that order granted Coinbase a license and listed a variety of activities in which Coinbase was engaged or planned to engage. The order does not specify what specific activity was licensable, but it is likely that a license was granted because of the receipt and transmission of fiat currency.

CONCLUSION

If Espinoza appeals, the case could go to the Florida Supreme Court, where the virtual currency industry will receive a more definitive answer. In the meantime, virtual currency businesses should be aware that the Florida Attorney General’s Office interprets the state’s money transmitter act to regulate bilateral sales of virtual currency for fiat currency and is willing to prosecute at least certain cases of unauthorized sales. As of now, Florida’s Third District Court agrees. How the Espinoza case concludes and whether and how the Florida legislature responds will be important to the virtual currency industry.

NOTES

[1] — So. 3d –, 2019 WL 361893 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

[2] FLA. STAT. § 560.125.

[3] Id. § 560.103(22).

[4] Id. § 560.103(30).

[5] Id. § 560.103(29) (emphasis added).

[6] Id. § 560.103(21).

[7] The court principally discusses whether bitcoin falls under Florida’s money transmitter law. In a few instances, it also references “virtual currency” generally, but it is not clear how broadly it was intending to apply its holding.

[8] Id. § 560.103(23).

[9] As a counterpoint, the court noted that the Financial Crime Enforcement Network’s (“FinCEN”) definition of money transmitter explicitly includes a third party requirement because it defines a money transmitter as someone that accepts value from one person and transmits value to “another location or person by any means….” 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A).

[10] Consumer Alert: Update on Virtual Currency, Office of Financial Regulation, Sept. 17, 2014.

[11] Consumer Alert: Cryptocurrency, Office of Financial Regulation, Jan. 17, 2018.

 

Copyright 2019 K&L Gates