Tag: finance and banking

The Unredeemable Debtor

The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.

– Oliver Wendell Holmes

Bankruptcy law decisions are replete with references to the “worthy debtor.”  In re Carp, 340 F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2003); In re BankVest Capital Corp., 360 F.3d 291 (1st Cir.2004); In re Institute of Business and Professional Educ., Inc., 79 B.R. 948 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Nickerson, 40 B.R. 693 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984); In re Marble, (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984); In re Doherty, 219 B.R. 665 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1998).

These decisions typically employ the “worthy debtor” nomenclature in the context of the entitlements that are afforded by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  It is always the “worthy debtor” that is entitled to a discharge of debts, a “fresh start”,  or to reject cumbersome contracts. This usage bespeaks a universe that also contains the “unworthy debtor,” a party whose behavior does not merit the statutory benedictions of the Bankruptcy Code. The identity of these parties is most often examined in the context of the discharge of debts and the behavior or actions that merit a denial of discharge or the finding that a particular debt is non-dischargeable.

There is a larger and more amorphous question though that also merits consideration, namely are their industries, companies, enterprises whose function and purpose is so odious and inconsistent with the precepts of good citizenship and the “moral development of the race”, to quote Justice Holmes, that they should be denied the benefits of reorganization afforded by the Bankruptcy Code.

If there is an argument to be made to prevent such enterprises from receiving the benefits of the Bankruptcy Code, to deny them the colloquial label of “worthy debtor”, that recourse likely lies within the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that require that a plan of reorganization be “proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).  The “not forbidden by law” requirement is of limited utility in situations where the behavior is recognizable as immoral or intrinsically evil to most but has not yet been sanctioned by any legislative authority. Notably, and perhaps inversely, enterprises engaged in the sale and growing of cannabis are without access to the Bankruptcy Code because they act in contravention of the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq., which has been found to take precedence over state laws allowing the sale of cannabis. See, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005).  As a result, bankruptcy being a creature of federal law, cannabis cases are generally being dismissed at the outset for cause in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) and not making it as far as the confirmation standard. See, In re Way To Grow, Inc., 597 B.R. 111 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018).

If “forbidden by law” is unavailable as a source of relief, the last best hope to prevent the sanctioned reorganization of the unworthy debtor lies within the requirement that a plan be proposed in “good faith.”

“Good faith” is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, a fact that makes it more likely that our  understanding of good faith may be transitory and that as the ‘moral development of the race’ proceeds, so might our understanding of ‘good faith.’  In other words, what was good faith yesterday might not, in light of our communal experience and growth as citizens, be good faith today.

In the first instance, we can understand from the ordering of the words within section 1129(a)(3) that the good faith standard exists independently of the ‘forbidden by law’ standard.  A plan of reorganization may describe a course of action not forbidden by law, but may still not meet the ‘good faith’ standard.

The good faith standard as used within section 1129(a)(3) is most commonly described as proposing a plan that fulfills the purposes and objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.  Those purposes and objectives within the context of Chapter 11 are most commonly understood as being “to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.”  NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1983);  see also, Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 452 (1999) (“[T]he two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11 [are] preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors”)

This case law, which is by far the most consistent usage of the term, emphasizes paying back creditors and preserving an ongoing enterprise. It does not suggest the existence of anything more amorphous beyond those standards and it supports the idea that the ‘good faith’ standard is not meant to be an existential inquiry into the moral worth of a particular industry.

Bankruptcy courts have, however, recognized that the absence of a definition of good faith leaves courts without “any precise formulae or measurements to be deployed in a mechanical good faith equation.”  Metro Emps. Credit Union v. Okoreeh–Baah (In re Okoreeh–Baah), 836 F.2d 1030, 1033–34 (6th Cir.1988) (interpreting good faith in context of Chapter 13).

Any successful collateral attack under section 1129(a)(3) on the ‘good faith’ of the immoral enterprise must likely follow the path of connecting the good faith standard to the “public good.”  Bankruptcy Courts have invoked the ‘public good’ in refusing to enforce certain contracts and have followed the dictates of some courts that “while violations of public policy must be determined through “definite indications in the law of the sovereignty,” courts must not be timid in voiding agreements which tend to injure the public good or contravene some established interest of society. Stamford Bd. of Educ. v. Stamford Educ. Ass’n., 697 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.1982).

The concept of the ‘public good’ is not a foreign one in bankruptcy courts.  Seeking relief for debtors that are the only providers of a service within their geographic area is an immensely easier task, no court, and no bankruptcy judge, likes to see a business fail and when the business is important to the community, support for reorganization from the bench often works to make reorganization easier.  Bankruptcy courts, although restrained by a statutory scheme, are as a matter of practice courts of equity.  Employing those equitable arguments to support a reorganization is both achievable and a reality of present practice.

Whether equitable arguments can be inversely employed to graft a sense of the ‘public good’ onto the good faith requirement within section 1129(a)(3) is decidedly uncertain and is not directly supported by the case law as it exists.

Somewhere out there though in one of those small border towns between the places of unelected legislators and the judicious and novel application of historical precedent lies the “moral development of the race” and the bankruptcy court that finds that incumbent within the concept of good faith is fair consideration of the public good.

Article By Peter J. Haley of Nelson Mullins

For more bankruptcy and restructuring news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright ©2022 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP

Banking Regulators Publish Proposed Rule to Update Community Reinvestment Act Regulations

On May 5, 2022, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (collectively the agencies) issued a joint notice of proposed rulemaking (the Proposed CRA Rule) that proposes changes to the way the agencies evaluate a bank’s performance under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The team at Bradley is conducting an in-depth review of the Proposed CRA Rule and expects to release a detailed blog post on the significant number of proposed changes to the CRA regulations in the coming days. Below are highlights of a few of the changes the agencies seek to make through the Proposed CRA Rule.

If implemented as written, the Proposed CRA Rule would:

  • Update the CRA evaluation framework, with performance standards tailored to a bank’s size and business model
  • Create four new performance tests to evaluate large bank CRA performance: the Retail Lending Test, Retail Services and Products Test, Community Development Financing Test, and Community Development Services Test
  • Establish specific performance tests for small and intermediate-sized banks
  • Update the requirements for the delineation of assessment areas
  • Create updated record-keeping, data collection, reporting, and disclosure requirements for large banks

These highlights are only a partial selection of the changes proposed by the agencies. Stay tuned for a more expansive description of the details of the Proposed CRA Rule.

The agencies are accepting comments on the Proposed CRA Rule through August 5, 2022. If your organization is considering submitting a public comment on the proposed changes to the CRA regulations, we suggest that you begin reviewing the Proposed CRA Rule soon.

© 2022 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more articles about banking regulations, visit the NLR Financial, Securities & Banking section.

Don’t Use “Build Back Better” to Sabotage the False Claims Act

Congress is on the verge of setting a dangerous precedent.  As part of the Build Back Better Act, it has added two provisions equivalent to a “get out of jail free card” for Big Banks that violate federal law when they hand out billions in federal mortgage-related benefits.   The two provisions create exemptions to False Claims Act liability by creating blanket immunity from liability when banks fail to exercise due diligence, violate FHA housing regulations, or even directly violate federal laws such as the Truth in Lending Act.

It is obvious why banks want to have their federally sponsored mortgage practices immunized from exposure to the False Claims Act (“FCA”).  The FCA works remarkably well and is widely recognized as “the most powerful tool the American people have to protect the government from fraud.”   The law has directly recovered over $64.450 billion in sanctions from fraudsters since Congress modernized it in 1986.  During the debates on the massive trillion-dollar infrastructure laws enacted or debated this year, corporate lobbyists have been extremely active in successfully preventing Congress from adding any new anti-fraud measures to protect taxpayers from fraud.  As part of these efforts, they targeted the False Claims Act as enemy #1 and already have blocked one key amendment needed to close some weaknesses in that law.

With the Build Back Better Act, these corporate lobbyists have taken their opposition to effective anti-fraud laws to a higher level.  Instead of trying to repeal the FCA, they are simply exempting Big Banks from liability under that law in two new programs.  It is obvious why the Big Banks want the exemption from FCA liability.  As a result of illegal or irresponsible lending and foreclosure practices, such as those that fueled the 2008 financial collapse, banks have had to pay billions in sanctions to the United States.

Two words explain why the FCA is “the most powerful tool” protecting taxpayers from fraud:  Whistleblowers and sanctions.  If you accept federal taxpayer monies, you are required to spend that money according to your contractual agreement or the law.  The FCA’s first secret weapon is whistleblowers.  The law encourages whistleblowers, known as qui tam “relators,” to report violations of the FCA.  Whistleblowers disclosures trigger the overwhelming majority of FCA cases, and the law incentivizes employees to risk their careers to serve the public interest. The second secret weapon is how you prove liability.  Second, when an institution accepts federal monies (such as banks that operate various federally sponsored loan programs), liability can attach if the institution acts in “deliberate ignorance of the truth” when spending federal dollars.  Similarly, if payments are made with “reckless disregard of the truth,” liability can attach.  In other words, corporations (including banks) that accept federal money must ensure that these monies are spent as required by law, regulation, or contract.  Safeguards must be in place to prevent fraud.  If a bank does not have adequate compliance programs to protect against fraud, it cannot plead ignorance when the law is broken and taxpayers are ripped off.

These two key elements of the False Claims Act are precisely what the banking lobby is attempting to undermine through the Build Back Better Act.  The tactics employed by the Big Banks are somewhat devious.  They are doing an end-run around the False Claims Act by exempting themselves from having to engage in any due diligence when spending billions in federal dollars.  The banks are seeking to add language to the Build Back Better Act that will immunize themselves from liability under the False Claims Act when they make payments in “reckless disregard” to the legality of those payments.  The immunities they are seeking legalize “deliberate ignorance” in the use of taxpayer money, in complete defiance of the False Claims Act. Thus, whistleblowers who report these frauds will be stripped of protections they have under the False Claims Act, and the federal government will have no effective way to recover damages from these frauds.

What language in the Build Back Better Act creates an exemption to False Claims Act liability?

Two highly technical provisions are deeply buried within the 2135 pages of the Build Back Better Act’s legislative text. The provisions are sections 40201 and 40202 of the Build Back Better Act.  These two sections establish helpful programs that will provide needed financial support to first-generation homebuyers.  Section 40201(d)(5) would provide $10 billion in down payment assistance. Section 40202(f) would give an interest rate reduction on new FHA 20-year mortgage products to first-time homeowners with a potential value of $60 billion.  But the banking lobby has corrupted these otherwise well-meaning programs. The exemptions obtained by the banks are incubators for massive fraud.  It permits the Big Banks to escape any liability when they abuse the generosity of taxpayers and dole out billions to unqualified individuals.

How do the exemptions work?  To qualify for these taxpayer-financed benefits, an applicant simply has to “attest” that they are first-time/first-generation homebuyers.  That would be the end of the inquiry a bank would need to approve making a payment from the billions allocated in these two programs. Anyone could simply stroll into a bank and “attest” to being such a first-time homebuyer and would thereafter qualify for the federal benefits.  The banks would not be required to do any diligence of their own to confirm the borrower’s eligibility.  Willful ignorance would be legalized.  Reckless disregard in the handling of taxpayer monies would be permitted under this law.  Safeguards, such as requiring banks to adhere to the Truth in Lending Act, which requires verification of a borrower’s statements, would not apply.

Under Sections 40201(d)(5) and 40202(f), banks will not be held liable once they are lied to, even if the bank has reason to know that the borrower is not eligible for the federal payout.  Banks can spend taxpayer money even if the information on an applicant’s loan application directly contradicts the borrower’s attestation that they are a first-time homeowner.  Given the lack of any compliance standards, the temptation to engage in fraud in these programs will be overwhelming.

Permitting banks to escape liability under the False Claims Act opens the door to paying billions of dollars in benefits to unqualified persons.  Such payments rip off the taxpayers and severely hurt all honest first-generation homebuyers denied benefits.  For every fraudster who benefits from this program, an honest homebuyer will be left in the cold due to the reckless disregard of the banks.

Congress should never use a back-door procedure to undermine the False Claim Act, as it sets a dangerous precedent.  It is a devious way to undermine America’s “most effective” anti-fraud law.  Instead of undermining the False Claims Act by granting immunities to Big Banks, Congress should be strengthening anti-fraud laws to protect the taxpayers and ensure that the trillions of dollars spent on COVID-19 relief programs and infrastructure improvement are lawfully spent in the public interest.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2021. All Rights Reserved.
For more articles about banking and finance, visit the NLR Financial, Securities & Banking section.

A Flurry of CFTC Actions Shock the Cryptocurrency Industry

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) sent shockwaves across the cryptocurrency industry when it issued a $1.25 million settlement order with Kraken, one of the industry’s largest market participants. The next day, the CFTC announced that it had charged each of 14 entities for offering cryptocurrency derivatives and margin trading without registering as a futures commission merchant (FCM). While the CFTC has issued regulatory guidance in the past and engaged in some regulatory enforcement activities, it has now established itself as a key regulator of the industry along with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the US Department of the Treasury (Treasury). Market participants should be aware that the CFTC will continue to take a more active role in regulation and enforcement of commodities and derivatives transactions moving forward.

The CFTC alleged that each of the defendants were acting as an unregistered FCM. Under Section 1a(28)(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act (the Act), 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(28)(A), an FCM is any “individual, association, partnership, or trust that is engaged in soliciting or accepting orders for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery; a security futures product; a swap . . . any commodity option authorized under section 6c of this title; or any leverage transaction authorized under section 23 of this title.” In order to be considered an FCM, that entity must also “accept[] money, securities, or property (or extends credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or may result therefrom.” (See: 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(28)(A)(II).) 7 U.S.C. § 6d(1), requires FCMs to be registered with the CFTC.

IN DEPTH

THE KRAKEN SETTLEMENT

On September 28, 2021, the CFTC issued an order, filing and settling charges against respondent Payward Ventures, Inc. d/b/a Kraken for offering margined retail commodity transactions in cryptocurrency—including Bitcoin—and failing to register as an FCM. Kraken is required to pay a $1.25 million civil monetary penalty and to cease and desist from further violations of the Act. The CFTC stated that, “This action is part of the CFTC’s broader effort to protect U.S. customers.”

The CFTC’s order finds that from approximately June 2020 to July 2021, Kraken violated Section 4(a) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6(a)(2018) by offering to enter into, entering into, executing and/or confirming the execution of off-exchange retail commodity transactions with US customers who were not eligible contract participants or eligible commercial entities. The CFTC also found that Kraken operated as an unregistered FCM in violation of Section 4d(a)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1) (2018). According to the order, Kraken served as the sole margin provider and maintained physical and/or constructive custody of all assets purchased using margins for the duration of a customer’s open margined position.

Margined transactions worked as follows: The customer opened an individual account at Kraken and deposited cryptocurrency or fiat currency into the account. The customer then initiated a trade by selecting (1) the trading pair they wished to trade, (2) a purchase or sale transaction and (3) a margin option. All trades were placed on Kraken’s central limit order book and executed individually for each customer. If a customer purchased an asset using margin, Kraken supplied the cryptocurrency or national currency to pay the seller for the asset. If a customer sold an asset using margin, Kraken supplied the cryptocurrency or national currency due to the buyer. Trading on margin allowed the customer to establish a position but also created an obligation for the customer to repay Kraken at the time the margined position was closed. The customer’s position remained open until they submitted a closing trade, they repaid the margin or Kraken initiated a forced liquidation based on the occurrence of certain triggering events, including limitations on the duration of an open margin position and pre-set margin thresholds. Kraken required customers to exit their positions and repay the assets received to trade on margin within 28 days, however, customers could not transfer assets away from Kraken until satisfying their repayment obligation. If repayment was not made within 28 days, Kraken could unilaterally force the margin position to be liquidated or could also initiate a forced liquidation if the value of the collateral dipped below a certain threshold percentage of the total outstanding margin. As a result, actual delivery of the purchased assets failed to occur.

The CFTC asserted that these transactions were unlawful because they were required to take place on a designated contract market. Additionally, by soliciting and accepting orders for, and entering into, retail commodity transactions with customers and accepting money or property (or extending credit in lieu thereof) to margin these transactions, Kraken was operating as an unregistered FCM.

Coinciding with the release of the enforcement action against Kraken, CFTC Commissioner Dawn D. Sump issued a “concurring statement.” In it, she appeared to be calling upon the CFTC to adopt more specific rules governing the products that are the subject of the enforcement action. Commissioner Sump seemed to indicate that it would be helpful to cryptocurrency market participants if the CFTC clarified its position on the applicability of the Act, as well as registration requirements. The CFTC will likely issue guidance or rules to clarify its position on which cryptocurrency-related products trigger registration requirements.

CFTC CHARGES 14 CRYPTOCURRENCY ENTITIES

On September 29, 2021, the CFTC issued a press release and 14 complaints against cryptocurrency trading platforms. The CFTC is seeking a sanction “directing [the cryptocurrency platforms] to cease and desist from violating the provisions of the Act set forth herein.” Each of the platforms have 20 days to respond.

All of the complaints are somewhat similar in that the CFTC alleges that each of the cryptocurrency platforms “from at least May 2021 and through the present” have offered services to the public “including soliciting or accepting orders for binary options that are based off the value of a variety of assets including commodities such as foreign currencies and cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin, and accepting and holding customer money in connection with those purchases of binary options.”

The CFTC has taken the position that “binary options that are based on the price of an underlying commodity like forex or cryptocurrency are swaps and commodity options as used in the definition of an FCM.” (The CFTC has previously taken the position that Bitcoin and Ethereum constitute “commodities,” doing so in public statements and enforcement actions.) In a prominent enforcement action previously filed by the CFTC in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the court held that “virtual currency may be regulated by the CFTC as a commodity” and that it “falls well-within the common definition of ‘commodity’ as well as the CEA’s definition of commodities.” (See: CFTC v. McDonnell, et al., 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 228 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018); CFTC v. McDonnell, et al., No. 18-cv-461, ECF No. 172 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2018).) In the action the CFTC filed against BitMEX in October of 2020, it alleged that “digital assets, such as bitcoin, ether, and litecoin are ‘commodities’ as defined under Section 1a(9) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9). (See: CFTC v. HDR Global Trading Limited, et al., No. 20-cv-8132, ECF 1, ¶ 23 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020).)

The CFTC has previously taken the position that Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin are considered commodities. However, in these recently filed complaints, the CFTC did not appear to limit the cryptocurrencies that would be considered “commodities” to just Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin. Instead, the CFTC broadly referred to “commodities such as foreign currencies and cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin.” It remains to be seen which of the hundreds of cryptocurrencies on the market will be considered “commodities,” but it appears that the CFTC is not limiting its jurisdiction to just three. It is also an open question as to whether there are certain cryptocurrencies or cryptocurrency referencing financial products that the SEC and CFTC will determine are subject to the overlapping jurisdiction of both regulators, similar to mixed swaps under the derivatives rules.

The CFTC also singled out two of these cryptocurrency platforms, alleging that they issued false statements to the effect that it “is a registered FCM and RFED with the CFTC and member of the NFA.” The CFTC noted that neither of these entities were ever registered with the National Futures Association (NFA) and one of the NFA ID numbers listed “identifies an individual who was once registered with the CFTC but has been deceased since 2009.”

WHAT’S NEXT

While the SEC, Treasury and DOJ are often considered the most prominent federal regulators in the cryptocurrency space, this recent sweep by the CFTC is not the first time it has flexed its muscles. The CFTC went to trial and won in 2018, accusing an individual of operating a boiler room. In October 2020, the CFTC filed a case against popular cryptocurrency exchange BitMEX for failing to register as an FCM, among other counts. However, unlike those one-off enforcement actions, the recent actions targeting multiple market participants within two days is a big step forward for the CFTC. Cryptocurrency derivative trading has been rising in popularity over the last few years and it is unsurprising that the CFTC is taking a more active enforcement role.

It is expected that regulatory activity within the cryptocurrency space will increase from all US regulators, including the CFTC, SEC, Treasury and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, especially as cryptocurrency products are increasingly classified as financial products subject to regulation. While the CFTC and other regulators have issued some regulatory guidance, regulators appear to be taking a “regulatory guidance by enforcement action” strategy. Market participants will need to thoughtfully consider all relevant regulatory regimes in order to determine what compliance activities are necessary. As we describe, multiple classifications are possible.

© 2021 McDermott Will & Emery
For more on cryptocurrency litigation, visit the NLR Cybersecurity, Media & FCC section.

CFTC Clarifies That Variation Margin Constitutes Settlement

The Division of Clearing and Risk (DCR) of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has issued an interpretive letter clarifying that payments of variation margin, price alignment amounts and other payments in satisfaction of outstanding exposures on a counterparty’s cleared swap positions constitute “settlement” under the  (CEA) and CFTC Regulation 39.14. The CEA and CFTC Regulation 39.14 provide that a derivatives clearing organization (DCO) must effect a settlement at least once each business day and ensure that settlements are final when effected.

Although not mentioned by DCR, the letter is clearly intended to complement earlier guidance issued jointly by the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Guidance) regarding the Regulatory Capital Treatment of Certain Centrally Cleared Derivatives Contracts Under Regulatory Capital Rules. As the Guidance explains in greater detail, for purposes of the risk-based capital calculation and the supplementary leverage ratio calculation, the regulatory capital rules require financial institutions to calculate their trade exposure amount with respect to derivatives contracts. The trade exposure amount, in turn, is determined, in part, by taking into account the remaining maturity of such contracts. The Guidance goes on to explain that for a derivatives contract that is structured such that on specific dates any outstanding exposure is settled and the terms are reset so that the fair value of the contract is zero, the remaining maturity equals the time until the next reset.

“Accordingly, for the purpose of the regulatory capital rules, if, after accounting and legal analysis, the institution determines that (i) the variation margin payment on a centrally cleared Settled-to-Market Contract settles any outstanding exposure on the contract, and (ii) the terms are reset so that fair value of the contract is zero, the remaining maturity on such contract would equal the time until the next exchange of variation margin on the contract.”

CFTC Letter No. 17-51 provides the legal analysis to confirm that, as a condition of registration with the CFTC as a DCO, each DCO must provide for daily settlement of all obligations, including the payment and receipt of all variation margin obligations, which payments are irrevocable and unconditional when effected. As a result, a clearing member’s obligations to each DCO are satisfied daily and the fair value of the open cleared derivatives held at the DCO is effectively reset to zero daily.

This post was written by James M. Brady & Kevin M. Foley of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP., ©2017
For more Financial & Banking legal analysis, go to The National Law Review