Fifth Circuit Archives - The National Law Forum

Understanding the New FLSA Overtime Rule: Texas v. United States Department of Labor

This article is an update to “Understanding the New FLSA Overtime Rule: What Employers Need to Know.”

As you know, on April 23, 2024, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a Final Rule modifying nationwide overtime rules under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Final Rule increased the salary thresholds in the salary level test for highly compensated and white-collar employees. Under the new Final Rule, salary thresholds for both highly compensated and white collar employees increased in two stages, with the first increase already occurring as of July 1, 2024, and the second increase set to occur on January 1, 2025.

On November 15, 2024, in State of Texas v. Dep’t of Labor, 24-cv-468-SDJ, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas vacated the April 2024 Final Rule.

The district court’s ruling vacates the Final Rule in its entirety on a nationwide basis, including the portion of the rule that went into effect on July 1, 2024, as well as the further increase set for January 1, 2025. This effectively reverted the FLSA minimum threshold for white collar employees back to $35,568 and highly compensated employees back to $107,432.

In its decision, the district court recognized a two-month-old decision by the Fifth Circuit in Mayfield v. United States Department of Labor, 117 F.4^th 611 (5th Cir. 2024), which upheld the 2019 increase. In Mayfield, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress had “explicitly delegated authority to define and delimit the terms of the [e]xemption.” However, while the Eastern District acknowledged Mayfield, it nevertheless concluded that, while the DOL has the power to impose some limitations on the scope of terms identified in the white collar exemption, it does not have the authority to “enact rules that replace or swallow the meaning those terms have.”

Significantly, the court also relied upon the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, stating that “[c]ourts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.” 144 S.Ct. 2444, 2273 (2024). Loper Bright is the much-publicized case that overturned the Chevron doctrine, which required courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of the law. As such, Texas may just be the tip of the iceberg when it comes to battles between courts and agencies.

The Texas court reasoned that while the DOL can use a minimum salary threshold, it cannot do so in a manner that disrupts the other factors considered for the above-described exemptions. Under the court’s interpretation, the April 2024 Final Rule disturbed the balance of other factors, effectively making “salary predominate over duties for millions of employees.”

While this decision may have national implications, it is unclear whether the DOL will appeal the decision. In the meantime, the April 2024 Final Rule sits in limbo. Now, the question on everyone’s mind is simple: “What do we do with employees whose salary we changed in order to comply with the July 1, 2024 increase?”

Supreme Court Declines to Hear “Willfulness” Case

On Monday, October 7, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to consider a petition for certiorari in United States ex rel. Hart v. McKesson Corp., Case No. 23-1293, where relator, Adam Hart (“Relator”), sought review of a Second Circuit decision upholding the dismissal of Relator’s complaint against pharmaceutical distributor, McKesson Corporation (“McKesson”).

The case involved allegations that McKesson violated the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”), which prohibits offering, paying, soliciting, or receiving remuneration to induce the purchase of goods and services paid for by a federal health program. Relator, a former McKesson employee, filed a qui tam action, claiming McKesson provided valuable business management tools—valued at over $150,000—to oncology practices at no cost, in order to induce them to purchase oncology pharmaceuticals from McKesson.

The Second Circuit dismissed Relator’s federal claims, reasoning that the allegations failed to meet the mens rea (intent) element under the AKS. The Court held that, to act willfully under the AKS, a defendant must know that its conduct is unlawful, either under the AKS or other law. Since Relator’s allegations did not plausibly suggest McKesson acted with knowledge of illegality, his federal False Claims Act claims based on the federal AKS were dismissed.

The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear Relator’s case preserves the existing circuit split regarding the interpretation of “willfulness” under the AKS. The Second Circuit, along with the Eleventh Circuit, has adopted the view that the AKS is violated when a defendant intends to violate a legal standard. This contrasts with the Fifth Circuit, which interprets the mens rea element to prohibit acts done knowingly and willfully, as opposed to by mistake or accident, and the Eight Circuit, which requires intent to commit an act known to be wrongful, but not necessarily known to be unlawful.

As it stands, the unresolved split among the circuits on this critical issue remains, and providers should be mindful that, at least in the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the stricter interpretation of “willfulness” under the AKS will continue to apply.

The Fifth Circuit Confirms the DOL’s Authority to Use Salary Basis Test for FLSA Overtime Exemptions

On September 11, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mayfield v. U.S. Department of Labor confirmed that the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) has the authority to use a salary basis to define its white-collar overtime exemptions. This is a significant win for the DOL as it is presently defending its latest increase to the minimum salary thresholds for executive, administrative, and professional exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), also known as the FLSA’s “white-collar exemptions,” in litigation pending in the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern and Northern Districts of Texas.

The Mayfield Decision

In Mayfield, a unanimous three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit provided that the DOL has the authority to “define and delimit” an exemption from overtime pay under the FLSA. In so ruling, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit initiated by a Texas fast-food operator, Robert Mayfield, who claimed Congress never authorized the DOL to use salaries as a test for whether workers have managerial duties.

The Court rejected Mayfield’s argument. In response, the Fifth Circuit wrote that “[d]istinctions based on salary level are… consistent with the FLSA’s broader structure, which sets out a series of salary protections for workers that common sense indicates are unnecessary for highly paid employees.” Upon issuing the Mayfield decision, the Fifth Circuit joined the four other federal appeals courts that have considered this issue previously (including the D.C. Circuit, Second Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit).

2024 DOL Rule

The 2024 DOL rule effectively focused on three main points. First, it raised the minimum weekly salary to qualify for the FLSA’s white-collar exemptions from $684 per week to $844 per week (equivalent to a $43,888 annual salary) on July 1, 2024. Second, it called for another increase of the minimum weekly salary to $1,128 per week (equivalent of a $58,656 annual salary) on January 1, 2025. Third, under the 2024 DOL rule, the above salary threshold would increase every three years based on recent wage data.

As mentioned above, the Mayfield decision comes at a time when the DOL is defending its recent 2024 rule increasing the salary thresholds for white-collar exemptions in both the Eastern and Northern Districts of Texas. Indeed, the Mayfield decision’s timing could not have come at a more opportune time for the DOL because it supplies these Texas federal judges with new direction from the Fifth Circuit to consider when making their rulings.

What Does This Mean for Employers?

The Mayfield decision bolsters the DOL in its bid to set and increase the minimum salary requirements for its white-collar overtime exemptions, which will certainly pose challenges for employers in creating compliant employee compensation structures. In short, if the 2024 DOL rule goes into effect, employers will have to substantially raise their employees’ salaries to ensure they remain properly exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA.

by: Derek A. McKee of Polsinelli PC

For more news on Overtime Exemption Litigation, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

US District Court Sets Aside the FTC’s Noncompete Ban on a Nationwide Basis

On August 20, the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) final rule banning noncompetes is unlawful and “set aside” the rule. “The Rule shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on its effective date of September 4, 2024, or thereafter.”

The district court’s decision has a nationwide effect. The FTC is very likely to appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Meanwhile, employers need not concern themselves for now with the rule’s notice obligations, and the FTC’s purported nationwide bar on noncompetes is ineffective. Employers do, however, need to remain mindful of the broader trend of increasing hostility to employee noncompetes.

The Court’s Decision

On April 23, the FTC voted 3-2 to publish a final rule with sweeping effects, purporting to bar prospectively and invalidate retroactively most employee noncompete agreements. The court’s decision addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on the propriety of the FTC’s rule. The court denied the FTC’s motion and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for two reasons.

First, the court held that the FTC lacks substantive rulemaking authority with respect to unfair methods of competition under Section 6(g) of the FTC Act. In reaching its holding, the court considered the statute’s plain language, Section 6(g)’s structure and location within the FTC Act, the absence of any penalty provisions for violations of rules promulgated under Section 6(g), and the history of the FTC Act and subsequent amendments. Because the FTC lacked substantive rulemaking authority with respect to unfair methods of competition, and hence authority to issue the final noncompete rule, the court did not consider additional arguments regarding the scope of the FTC’s statutory rulemaking authority. Notably, the court did not consider whether the final rule could overcome the major questions doctrine.

Second, the court held that the FTC’s final noncompete rule was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it was “unreasonably overbroad without a reasonable explanation” and failed to establish “‘a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” The court heavily discounted studies that the FTC had relied upon that purported to measure the impact of statewide noncompete bans because no state had ever enacted a ban as broad as the FTC’s ban: “[t]he FTC’s evidence compares different states’ approaches to enforcing non-competes based on specific factual situations — completely inapposite to the Rule’s imposition of a categorical ban.” “In sum, the Rule is based on inconsistent and flawed empirical evidence, fails to consider the positive benefits of non-compete agreements, and disregards the substantial body of evidence supporting these agreements.” The court further held that the FTC failed to sufficiently address alternatives to issuing the rule.

In terms of a remedy, the court “set aside” the FTC’s final noncompete rule. The “set aside” language is drawn verbatim from the APA. The court noted that the FTC’s argument that any relief should be limited to the named plaintiffs in the case was unsupported by the APA. Instead, the court noted that its decision has a nationwide effect, is not limited to the parties in the case, and affects all persons in all judicial districts equally.

Further Litigation

In addition to a likely FTC appeal to the Fifth Circuit, two other cases are pending that likewise challenge the FTC’s final noncompete rule. First, in ATS Tree Services v. FTC, pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the district court previously denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Second, in Properties of the Villages, Inc. v. FTC, pending in the Middle District of Florida, the court enjoined the FTC from enforcing the rule against the named plaintiffs. A final judgment in one of these cases that differs from the result in the Northern District of Texas could eventually reach the courts of appeals and potentially lead to a circuit split to be resolved by the US Supreme Court.

Takeaways for Employers

For now, the FTC’s noncompete rule has been set aside on a nationwide basis, and employers need not comply with the rule’s notice obligations. Noncompetes remain enforceable to the same extent they were before the FTC promulgated its final rule. Depending on how further litigation evolves, the rule could be revived, a temporary split in authority could arise leading to confusion where the rule is enforceable in certain jurisdictions but not in others, or the rule will remain set aside.

An important part of the court’s decision is its rejection of the FTC’s factual findings, which were made in support of the rule, as poorly reasoned and poorly supported. As we discussed in our prior client alerts, we anticipate that employees may cite the FTC’s findings to support challenges to enforceability under state law. The court’s analysis of the FTC’s factual findings may substantially undermine the persuasive authority of the FTC’s findings.

Employers should anticipate that noncompete enforcements in the coming years will remain uncertain as courts, legislatures, and government agencies continue to erode the legal and policy justifications for employee noncompetes. This counsels in favor of a “belt and suspenders” approach for employers to protect their legitimate business interests rather than relying solely on noncompetes.

Petition for Certiorari Filed in Supreme Court in False Claims Act Case Seeking Review of Whether “Willful” Under the Anti-Kickback Statute Requires Knowledge that the Conduct is Unlawful

The Supreme Court now has the opportunity to define “willfulness” under the federal criminal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). In a declined qui tam case filed against McKesson Corporation, a pharmaceutical wholesaler, the relator, Adam Hart, a former McKesson employee, filed a petition for certiorari seeking Supreme Court review of a Second Circuit decision that upheld the dismissal of relator’s complaint asserting claims under the civil False Claims Act (FCA) premised on alleged violations of the AKS. U.S. ex rel. Hart v. McKesson Corp., 96 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2024). A violation of the AKS requires as the scienter element that the defendant “knowingly and willfully” offered or paid remuneration to induce the recipient of the renumeration to purchase goods or items for which payment may be made under a federal health care program. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2). The Second Circuit held that a defendant does not act “willfully” within the meaning of the AKS unless that defendant “act[s] knowing that his conduct is unlawful.” United States ex rel. Hart, 96 F.4th at 154.

The AKS is enforced both as a criminal statute and, as in this case, is frequently used by the government or relators as a predicate violation to support an alleged violation of the civil FCA. Since 2010, Congress has specified that a claim that includes items or services “resulting from” an AKS violation is a false or fraudulent claim under the FCA. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g). Though the evidentiary standard in criminal and civil cases differs, the government or relator in civil cases must adequately plead the “knowingly and willfully” scienter element of the AKS.

Hart alleged in his Second Amended Complaint that McKesson offered physician oncology practices two valuable business tools, the Margin Analyzer and the Regimen Profiler, to induce those practices to purchase oncology pharmaceuticals from McKesson. Hart alleged that these business tools were prohibited remuneration, and that McKesson acted “knowingly and willfully” in offering these two tools to its customers in violation of the AKS. Hart’s basis for alleging “willfulness” included: (1) alleged document destruction during the litigation; (2) Hart informed his supervisor during compliance training about the potential AKS violation, yet McKesson continued to provide these tools, worth about $150,000, to medical practices free of charge in exchange for commitments to purchase drugs from McKesson; and (3) Hart’s discussions with other employees that McKesson was inappropriately exploiting the business tools.

After the government declined to intervene, the District Court dismissed the FCA claims in a Second Amended Complaint (after dismissing the prior complaint as well) by ruling that Hart failed to plausibly allege sufficient facts to suggest McKesson acted “willfully”. The Second Circuit upheld the dismissal and agreed that a defendant acts “willfully” under the AKS only if the defendant knows “that its conduct is, in some way, unlawful.”

The Second Circuit rejected the relator’s proposed approach, a looser standard that would meet the “willfully” standard of the scienter element if (a) the company provided something of value in connection with the sale of pharmaceuticals reimbursed by the government, and (b) knew, even through general compliance training, that it is illegal to provide things of value to induce sales. Hart filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting the question: “[t]o act ‘willfully’ within the meaning of the [AKS], must a defendant know that its conduct violates the law?”

There is no dispute, under the law, that a defendant does not need “specific intent” to violate the AKS. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h). However, the petition raises questions about how certain sister Circuits interpret “willfully” when addressing violations of the AKS:

The Second Circuit held in this case that a defendant does not act “willfully” within the meaning of the AKS unless that defendant “act[s] knowing that his conduct is unlawful, even if the defendant is not aware that his conduct is unlawful under the AKS specifically.” United States ex rel. Hart v. McKesson Corp., 96 F.4th 145,154 (2d Cir. 2024).
The Eleventh Circuit, in accord with the Second, has also held that a defendant must know that its conduct is unlawful in order to violate the AKS. United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[T]o find that a person acted willfully in violation of § 1320a-7b, the person must have acted voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, that is with a bad purpose, either to disobey or disregard the law.”) (internal quotations omitted)).
The relator argues in the petition that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits are split with the Second Circuit. Relator relies on a Fifth Circuit case holding that “willfully” requires that a “defendant willfully committed an act that violated the . . . Statute” without a requirement that a defendant know its conduct is unlawful. United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 210 & n.19 (5th Cir. 2013). However, a more recent Fifth Circuit case, which was cited by the Second Circuit, defines “willfully” to mean “the act was committed voluntarily or purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.” United States v. Nora, 988 F.3d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
The relator cites an Eighth Circuit case holding a defendant’s conduct is willful if a defendant “knew that his conduct was wrongful,” but asserts the Eighth Circuit has not “require[d] proof that [the defendant] . . . knew it violated ‘a known legal duty.’” United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996). However, a more recent Eighth Circuit relied on Jain to uphold a jury instruction stating, “[a] defendant acts willfully if he knew his conduct was wrongful or unlawful.” United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 708 (8th Cir. 2011).
The Second Circuit did recognize a circuit split, but described its view as in “align[ment] with the approach to the AKS taken by several of our sister courts [including the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits], which have held or implied that to be liable under the AKS, defendants must know that their particular conduct was wrongful.” United States ex rel. Hart, 96 F.4th at 154-55.

It is important to remember that the AKS is a felony statute subject to criminal fines and up to 10 years of imprisonment. It also criminalizes conduct that, in other industries, is not illegal. Further, due to the breadth of the statute and its complexity, Congress and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General (OIG) have developed a complicated set of guidance to help attorneys and compliance professionals understand and provide counsel with respect to AKS compliance, including statutory exceptions, regulatory safe harbors, advisory opinions, and an enormous body of sub-regulatory guidance. The Second Circuit understood this and noted that its “interpretation of the AKS’s willfulness requirement thus protects those (and only those) who innocently and inadvertently engage in prohibited conduct.” Id. at 155-56.

If the Supreme Court takes an interest in this case, it likely will invite the view of the Solicitor General. Any Supreme Court interest in granting this petition will likely attract a wide range of amici participation at the certiorari stage by health care industry groups and associations, pharmaceutical company associations, other business groups, as well as associations of whistleblower counsel and other supporters of the private action qui tam provisions of the FCA. Though the range of holdings by the Courts of Appeal are often nuanced, Supreme Court consideration of the issue would be viewed as very significant, and a decision that creates a rigorous standard for “willfulness,” or alternatively, a lenient one, could considerably impact the Department of Justice (DOJ) and relators’ ability to successfully plead, and prove, an AKS violation as a predicate to an alleged FCA violation.

Update on FTC Noncompete Ban: Court Challenges Begin

On April 23 we reported on the Federal Trade Commission’s vote to ban almost all non-competition agreements in the United States. Within hours of that vote, Ryan LLC, a global tax consulting firm headquartered in Dallas, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas challenging the FTC’s authority to issue such a rule.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been allowed to intervene in that case and will join in the challenge to the FTC ban.

Ryan’s claims are that:

The FTC lacks the legal authority to promulgate such a rule.
Even if Congress had granted that authority by statute, such a grant would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch, in violation of Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution.
The FTC Act is unconstitutional because it limits the president’s authority to remove subordinates (in this case, FTC Commissioners).
The FTC promulgated the rule in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act because it failed to establish a factual basis for the rule.
The rule is retroactive in purporting to invalidate all existing non-competition agreements, but the FTC has no authority to issue retroactive rules.

Based on our review of the pleadings filed thus far in the case, we think that the U.S. Chamber and its allies agree that these are the correct arguments and that they will file a brief supporting them.

Ryan is asking the court for two things: a stay of the effective date of the rule, and preliminary and permanent injunctions barring the FTC from enforcing it. The case is on an expedited schedule, with briefing to be completed by June 12 and a ruling expected on the pending motion by July 3.

Given that the rule’s effective date is September 4, if the court can meet that schedule, employers should have sufficient time to take the necessary steps to comply, if the court allows the rule to go into effect.

However, we would advise employers to start identifying all employees who are subject to an existing non-competition agreement, so they can move quickly to meet the notice requirements over the summer, should that become necessary.

The FTC Has Banned Non-Competes: What Do Employers in the Energy Space Do Now?

When is the FTC’s rule effective?

The FTC’s non-compete ban is not in effect yet. It does not become effective until 120 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register of the final rule. The Federal Register is expected to publish the final rule next week, likely making the effective date around the beginning of September 2024.

Has litigation already been filed to challenge the non-compete ban?

The FTC’s non-compete ban is subject to at least two existing legal challenges seeking to have it invalidated. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division (Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 6:24-cv-00148 (E.D. Tex. filed April 24, 2024); see also Ryan, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 3:24-cv-986 (N.D. Tex. filed April 23, 2024)). We don’t know whether these legal challenges will be successful, but we will provide updates when we know more.

What if the legal challenges are unsuccessful?

If the legal challenges are not successful and the rule goes into effect 120 days from next week (again, approximately early September 2024), here are steps that employers can take to get ready for the effective date:

Review existing agreements to determine if they are now “unfair methods of competition”:
- One issue to analyze is whether an individual with a non-compete is a “worker” or a “senior executive.”
  - If a “senior executive,” then a non-compete in place that pre-exists that effective date can still be enforced.
  - If not a “senior executive,” then any non-compete clause that pre-dates the effective date for a worker is banned by the rule.
  - If an independent contractor (or another non-employee worker), any non-compete clause is banned.
- Another issue to consider is whether non-solicitation, non-disclosure, or reimbursement provisions could be subject to the FTC ban. A provision that prevents a worker from seeking or accepting work in the U.S. with a different person or from operating a business in the U.S., then it is a “non-compete clause” that is subject to the rule. Depending on the wording and the factual circumstances, an obligation not to solicit customers could be considered a prohibited non-compete. For example, if an obligation not to solicit certain clients keeps a worker from accepting any job in the Permian Basin, it is arguable that the provision operates as a non-compete and violates the rule.
Determine whether notice is required: After reviewing which non-compete clauses are not in compliance with the FTC rule, prepare a notice for workers who are currently subject to a non-compete clause banned by the rule. The FTC put out model language on the notification, which informs the worker that the non-compete clause is no longer valid as of the effective date.
Update any form agreements: As part of the review of existing non-compete agreements, take the opportunity to update form agreements to remove now unenforceable non-compete (and possibly non-solicit) provisions. It is always a good idea to review and update the agreement generally to make sure that it reflects your current business and definition of confidential information.
Enter into non-compete agreements with “senior executives”:
- The FTC ban permits non-compete agreements with “senior executives” that pre-exist the effective date to continue after the effective date. After the effective date, an employer may not require a senior executive to sign a new non-compete.
- The term “senior executive” refers to officers earning more than $151,164 with “policy-making authority.” As so defined, the FTC estimates that senior executives represent less than 0.75% of all workers.
- “Policy-making authority” means “final authority to make policy decisions that control significant aspects of a business entity or common enterprise and does not include authority limited to advising or exerting influence over such policy decisions or having final authority to make policy decisions for only a subsidiary of or affiliate of a common enterprise.”
- Energy company officers of companies that are part of a common enterprise or joint venture will want to analyze whether senior executives have final authority that qualifies for a non-compete under the rule.
- As always, any employer should make sure that a non-compete complies with existing state laws to assist in any enforcement efforts.
Take note of violations before the effective date: The FTC’s noncompete ban does not apply where a cause of action related to a noncompete clause accrued before the effective date. So, if a worker is violating a noncompete that would otherwise be banned under the FTC rule, an employer may want to consider whether to initiate legal action against that worker before the effective date to fall under this exception.

Federal Court Strikes Down NLRB Joint Employer Rule

On March 8, 2024, just days before it was set to take effect, U.S. District Judge J. Campbell Barker of the Eastern District of Texas vacated the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB’s”) recent rule on determining the standard for joint-employer status.

The NLRB issued the rule on October 26, 2023. It established a seven-factor analysis, under a two-step test, for determining joint employer status. Under the new standard, an entity may be considered a joint employer if each entity has an employment relationship with the same group of employees and the entities share or codetermine one or more of the employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment which are defined exclusively as:

Wages, benefits and other compensation;
Hours of working and scheduling;
The assignment of duties to be performed;
The supervision of the performance of duties;
Work rules and directions governing the manner, means and methods of the performance of duties and grounds for discipline;
The tenure of employment, including hiring and discharge; and
Working conditions related to the safety and health of employees.

Set to take effect on March 11, 2024, the NLRB’s decision would have rescinded the 2020 final rule which considered just the direct and immediate control one company exerts over the essential terms and conditions of employment of workers directly employed by another firm. The new rule would have expanded the types of control over job terms and conditions that can trigger a joint employer finding.

In the lawsuit, filed by the United States Chamber of Commerce and a coalition of business groups, the Chamber and coalition claimed that the NLRB’s rule is unlawful and should be struck down because it is arbitrary and capricious. Judge Barker agreed as he held that the NLRB’s new test is unlawfully broad because an entity could be deemed a joint employer simply by having the right to exercise indirect control over one essential term. Judge Barker faulted the design of the two-step test which says an entity must qualify as a common-law employer and must have control over at least one job term of the workers at issue to be considered a joint employer, finding that the test’s second part is always met whenever the first step is satisfied. The Court vacated the new standard and indicated it will issue a final judgment declaring the rule is unlawful.

The NLRB quickly responded to the Court’s ruling. In a statement on March 9, 2024 NLRB Chairman Lauren McFerran said the “District Court’s decision to vacate the Board’s rule is a disappointing setback but is not the last word on our efforts to return our joint-employer standard to the common law principles that have been endorsed by other courts.” According to the NLRB, the “Agency is reviewing the decision and actively considering next steps in this case.”

What Employers Need to Know

The legality of the NLRB’s joint-employer standard has been a contested issue since the October 2023 announcement. The rule will not go into effect as scheduled, but Judge Barker’s decision is unlikely to be the final word on the matter.

An Early Christmas Present from Three Fifth Circuit Judges Who Concluded a Louisiana Property Is Not Subject to Federal Clean Water Act Jurisdiction

Garry Lewis owns 2000 acres in Livingston Parish, Louisiana and he has been fighting with the Army Corps of Engineers over whether any of those 2000 acres are wetlands subject to Federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction for over a decade. On two separate occasions the Army Corps of Engineers has said the answer to that question is “yes”. The first time the Corps made this determination, a District Court Judge disagreed. The second time was before the Supreme Court’s definition of “Waters of the United States”, including jurisdictional wetlands, in Sackett v. EPA and it is that second determination that is the subject of a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision earlier this week.

The Sacketts had been fighting with EPA and the Corps about whether their much smaller property was subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction for twice as long as Mr. Lewis until the Supreme Court found in the Sacketts’ favor earlier this year. The day the Supreme Court decided Sackett I wrote that “[f]or my entire adult life, the Courts have deferred to EPA’s interpretation of statutes it has been charged by Congress to implement. That era is most certainly over . . .”

This week three Judges of the Fifth Circuit proved my point. Over the Corps’ objection, the Judges took it upon themselves to apply the Supreme Court’s Sackett holding to determine that “based on photographs of [Mr. Lewis’s] property” there is “no ‘continuous surface connection’ between any plausible wetlands on the Lewis tracts and a ‘relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters.’”

The Corps had argued unsuccessfully that it should be given the opportunity to apply Sackett for itself before Judges weighed in.

The Fifth Circuit Judges were probably right to conclude that, given the chance, the Corps “could create an ‘endless loop’ of financially onerous regulatory activity” for Mr. Lewis. But the Judges fail to mention that conclusion could be based on the fact that EPA’s and the Corps’ tenth, post Sackett, attempt to determine the reach of the Clean Water Act continues to extend Clean Water Act jurisdiction to “tributaries,” “impoundments,” and “wetlands” that have a “continuous surface connection” to waters that are not “traditional navigable waters, the territorial seas, [or] interstate waters.” That’s a different standard than the Justice Alito-supplied standard the three Fifth Circuit Judges applied in holding that the Lewis property was not subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction even though a culvert on the Lewis property connects to a “relatively permanent water” which connects to another “relatively permanent water” which connects to a “traditional navigable water.”

Now EPA’s and the Corps’ most recent Waters of the United States regulation is currently being challenged in two Federal District Courts, including on the basis that the regulation is broader than allowed by the Supreme Court in Sackett. But that regulation hasn’t been struck down yet. That apparently didn’t matter at all to these three Judges of the Fifth Circuit. And it may be worth mentioning that one of those challenges to EPA’s and the Corps’ regulation is in Federal District Court in Texas which is in, you guessed it, the Fifth Circuit.

What does this all mean? Well, I think it means we’re going to continue to see some Judges applying the Supreme Court’s Sackett holding to determine the extent of Clean Water Act jurisdiction, ignoring EPA’s and the Corps’ subsequent regulation, unless and until Congress decides to get involved in the longest running controversy in environmental law.

Supreme Court Declines to Resolve Circuit Split on Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in FLSA Collective Actions

On June 6, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear petitions seeking review of whether federal courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs who join Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective actions when their claims are not connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state. The petitions sought review of rulings on the issue by the First and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals in Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc. and Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc., respectively. As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision declining to hear the petitions, there remains a circuit split as to whether the Court’s 2017 ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court applies to FLSA collective actions, and employers with nationwide footprints remain subject to uncertainty depending on jurisdiction.

To date, only the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have ruled on the issue. On August 17, 2021, the Sixth Circuit was the first to address the issue in Canaday. There, the Court held that federal courts may not exercise personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs who join FLSA collective actions when their claims are not connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state. Just one day later, on August 18, 2021, the Eighth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Vallone v. CJS Solutions Group, LLC.

On January 13, 2022, in Waters, the First Circuit held to the contrary, concluding that federal courts do have personal jurisdiction over claims asserted by nonresident opt-in plaintiffs.

The Significance of Bristol-Myers

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers provides the basis for the current circuit split. Bristol-Myers involved a mass tort action under state law for alleged defects in a blood-thinning drug, Plavix, which the company manufactured. Residents and nonresidents of California sued Bristol-Myers in California state court, alleging injuries related to the drug. The nonresident plaintiffs claimed no relationship with the forum state, nor did they purchase Plavix in California or suffer any harm from it in California. The Supreme Court reasoned that any similarity between the resident and nonresident plaintiffs’ claims was an “insufficient basis” to exercise specific jurisdiction. Unless nonresident plaintiffs could demonstrate that their claims arose out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, personal jurisdiction over the company did not exist, no matter “the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.”

In ruling that the California state court lacked jurisdiction over the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its holding might ultimately generate more litigation in the form of separate actions by nonresident plaintiffs in their respective states. But the Supreme Court also noted that all plaintiffs to the action could have brought a mass tort action against Bristol-Myers in New York (the company’s headquarters) or Delaware (its place of incorporation) because courts in those states would have had general personal jurisdiction over the company. Instead, the California state court could exercise only specific personal jurisdiction over the company based on its activities in the state. Notably, Bristol-Myers was limited to Rule 23 class actions, leaving lower courts to determine whether its holding applied to FLSA collective actions, which differ procedurally.

The Circuit Split

In Canaday, the Sixth Circuit reiterated the basic tenet that, pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the defendant’s contacts with the state in which the plaintiff filed the lawsuit. Because Anthem is both incorporated and headquartered in Indiana and not otherwise “at home” in the state of Tennessee, the district court in Tennessee lacked general jurisdiction over Anthem as a defendant. At issue was whether the district court in Tennessee had specific personal jurisdiction over Anthem, and thus, whether there was a claim-specific and Anthem-specific relationship between the nonresidents’ FLSA claims and the state of Tennessee.

Applying Bristol-Myers, the Sixth Circuit held that there was not. The court found that the nonresident plaintiffs did not bring claims arising out of or relating to Anthem’s conduct in Tennessee, because Anthem neither employed nor paid the nonresident plaintiffs within the state. The Sixth Circuit went on the explain that adherence to this approach should not change the way FLSA collective actions are filed, because plaintiffs traditionally file their actions where courts have general jurisdiction, or where the conduct occurred. Of note, Sixth Circuit Judge Bernice Donald dissented in Canaday, contending that Bristol-Myers does not apply to FLSA collective actions because the Supreme Court in that case addressed only the limitations of state courts, not federal courts, in their exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.

In Waters, the First Circuit largely followed the reasoning in Judge Donald’s dissent, concluding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb “rest[ed] on Fourteenth Amendment constitutional limits on state courts exercising jurisdiction over state-law claims” and thus did not control whether a federal court could exercise jurisdiction over federal claims asserted by nonresident plaintiffs. The First Circuit also observed that the plain language of Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merely concerns the service of summonses and does not “constrain[] a federal court’s power to act once a summons has been properly served, and personal jurisdiction has been established.”

Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court’s decision to deny the petitions means that employers with nationwide footprints continue to live with potentially inconsistent rulings on the question of whether a federal district court has jurisdiction to hear claims of out-of-state workers when the defendant is neither headquartered nor incorporated in the state. Canaday and Vallone stand to significantly limit the size and geographic scope of FLSA collective actions in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, absent a district court’s exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant, while Waters permits nationwide jurisdiction in the First Circuit. For now, at least, multistate employers face continued uncertainty on the issue until courts of appeals in the remaining circuits weigh in.

Article By Maggie (Hanrahan) Santen, Monica Lacks, and Samuel H. Ottinger of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Tag: Fifth Circuit

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