Federal Circuit’s Sandoz Decision Increases Importance of Post-Grant Proceedings to Biosimilar Developers

Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox

On Friday, December 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rendered its decision in Sandoz v. Amgen, No. 2014-1693, a case with major implications for the emerging U.S. biosimilars industry. The decision addresses when and how a party seeking to launch a biosimilar product in the U.S. can initiate litigation to challenge the brand company’s potential blocking patents. This is the first instance in which the Federal Circuit has had the opportunity to address the scope and applicability of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), which established a formal pathway for biosimilar approval in the US.

Background

At issue in Sandoz is a litigation Sandoz, Inc. initiated against Amgen, Inc. and Hoffman-La Roche Inc. on June 24, 2013. Sandoz’s complaint seeks a declaratory judgment (DJ) that two patents owned by Roche and exclusively licensed to Amgen are invalid, unenforceable, and would not be infringed by the commercial marketing of Sandoz’s biosimilar version of Amgen’s blockbuster biologic product Enbrel® (etanercept). The patents at issue extend Amgen’s protection around etanercept an additional 15 years past the original patents. Sandoz filed its complaint against Amgen prior to filing any application with the FDA for approval to market its biosimilar etanercept product, which is currently in Phase III clinical trials. Sandoz will not file with the FDA until the Phase III trial is complete, and of course will not be able to market its version of etanercept in the US without FDA approval. At the time of suit, Amgen had not alleged Sandoz was currently doing anything that exposes it to liability for infringing Amgen’s patents rights around Enbrel®.

The District Court Decision

Amgen moved to dismiss Sandoz’s complaint, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because no immediate and real controversy between the parties exists. In a brief order, the court granted Amgen’s motion to dismiss on two separate grounds. First, the court ruled that its discretion to enter a DJ in the case is subject to the provisions of the BPCIA, which sets specific limitations on the timing and conduct of any litigation arising from the filing of an application for approval to market a biosimilar. The court concluded that “neither a reference product sponsor, such as Amgen, nor [a biosimilar applicant] such as Sandoz, may file a lawsuit unless and until they have engaged in a series of statutorily–mandated exchanges of information” related to patents potentially in dispute. In this case, Sandoz had not complied with the exchanges as it had not even started the process by filing its application with the FDA.

Second, the court found that Sandoz had not established jurisdiction under traditional grounds because it had not established a real and immediate injury or threat of future injury caused by Amgen. The court noted that Amgen had never advised Sandoz that it intended to sue Sandoz, and that the mere allegation by Sandoz that it intended to file an application for FDA approval in the future was not sufficient to create a case on controversy. Sandoz appealed the district court order dismissing the action.

The Federal Circuit Decision

On appeal, Sandoz argued that the litigation provisions of the BPCIA only govern the statutory patent infringement litigation authorized by the Act after a biosimilar application is filed with the FDA, and do not apply to DJ actions in general. Sandoz further argued that nothing in the BPCIA can be construed to bar or limit in any way the ability to bring DJ actions to resolve patent disputes prior to filing a biosimilar application. Finally, Sandoz argued that the district court erred in concluding that Sandoz had not adequately demonstrated a sufficient actual case or controversy sufficient to allow the DJ action to proceed.

The Federal Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Sandoz’s complaint, concluding that Sandoz had not alleged an injury of sufficient immediacy and reality to create subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit noted that “a case of actual controversy” is a prerequisite to exercising declaratory judgment jurisdiction. The test for determining whether a case or controversy exists is whether “ there is a substantial controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” The Federal Circuit, however, declined to address the lower court’s interpretation of the BPCIA as barring a lawsuit by either the reference product sponsor or the biosimilar applicant unless and until the parties have engaged in the statutorily-mandated patent information exchanges.

In concluding that Sandoz’s complaint does not present a case or controversy, the Federal Circuit panel noted that there was no prior decision in which the Federal Circuit had found a case or controversy to exist when the only activity that would create exposure to potential infringement liability was a future activity requiring FDA approval that had not yet been sought. The court found the immediacy requirement lacking where the conclusion of Sandoz’s Phase III trial, which was a prerequisite for filing for FDA approval, was still several years away when Sandoz filed suit. The court refused to assume that the Phase III trial would be successful, and noted that the trial could in fact uncover issues with Sandoz’s product that could push the application filing date back even further. Alternatively, the clinical trial could fail resulting in Sandoz never seeking FDA approval, or Sandoz could modify its proposed product and file for approval on the modified product. The court also noted that Sandoz’s complaint lacked specificity as to how Amgen’s patents read or don’t read on Sandoz’s product; and instead relies on prior general assertions by Amgen that the patents at issue cover Enbrel, that Amgen will assert the patents against products that compete with Enbrel, and that Sandoz intends to market a competing product at some point in the future. Ultimately, the court concluded that the events allegedly exposing Sandoz to infringement liability may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all. The court found that Sandoz also had not shown that it would suffer any “immediate and substantial adverse impact” from not being able to seek or secure a patent adjudication before filing its application for FDA approval.

Unanswered Questions

The Federal Circuit specifically stated that its decision was limited to the particular facts before it, and does not address whether Sandoz would be able to seek declaratory judgment jurisdiction once it files its FDA application, or whether the BPCIA forecloses declaratory judgment actions outside of the statutorily-mandated patent information exchange once the application is accepted by the FDA. The decision also did not clarify the additional issue disputed by the parties concerning what constitutes sufficient “notice of commercial marketing,” which the BPCIA states must be provided by the biosimilar applicant prior to launch.

Increased Important of Post-Grant Proceedings before the USPTO

Although the Sandoz court made a point to limit the scope of its decision to the facts before it, the decision casts substantial doubt on the ability of any biosimilar developer to bring a district court action challenging the reference product sponsor’s patents prior to filing a biosimilar application with the FDA and triggering the patent information exchange provisions of the BPCIA. At the same time, the decision elevates the importance to biosimilar developers of post-grant challenges before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, such as inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR), as means for obtaining some degree of early patent certainty before initiating the FDA approval process. IPRs in particular have proven to be a potent weapon for generic drug manufacturers in the context of ANDA litigation. The lower standard of proof required to show invalidity, the expedited pace of the proceedings, and the decreased cost in comparison to district court litigation coupled with the extremely high rate in which patent claims are being invalidated provide generic manufacturers with tremendous leverage to obtain favorable settlements with brand companies. We expect that the Sandoz decision should only increase the speed with which post-grant proceedings are adopted in the biosimilar arena.

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Supreme Court Nixes "Amorphous" Federal Circuit Indefiniteness Standard

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The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday reversed long-standing Federal Circuit precedent, replacing the test used to determine whether a patent is indefinite with a new reasonable certainty standard (NAUTILUS, INC. v. BIOSIG INSTRUMENTS, INC., No. 13–369 (S. Ct. June 2, 2014).

The new reasonable certainty test raises the bar on the “clarity and precision” with whichpatents must be written. As a consequence, the burden on accused infringers attempting to invalidate patents based on ambiguous language is lowered. This new standard will prove especially helpful in the ongoing battle against patent trolls, who often wield portfolios of ambiguous or overly broad patents in an attempt to extract licensing fees. Tech companies, including Google, Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc., which are frequent targets of patent trolls, urged the Supreme Court to adopt the “reasonable certainty” standard.

The new standard will also require more precision in drafting and prosecuting patent applications. Exactly how precise language will need to be remains to be seen, but the Court explained that the old standard incentivized patent applicants and practitioners to “inject ambiguity” into their claims. The new standard was established, in part, to eliminate this incentive. The Court commented that patent practitioners are in the best position to resolve ambiguity in patent claims. In light of the Supreme Court’s admonition, patent applicants and practitioners seeking broad coverage of their inventions should use language no broader than necessary to adequately cover their inventions.

The Supreme Court’s decision stemmed from a dispute between Biosig Instruments and Nautilus, Inc. Biosig sued Nautilus for infringement of a patented heart monitor for exercise machines, which registered electrical waves to estimate a user’s heart rate. Nautilus convinced the trial court that Biosig’s patent was invalid as indefinite. Applying its “insolubly ambiguous” test, the Federal Circuit found the patent valid. Biosig sought review by the Supreme Court.

Justice Ginsberg delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. As embodied in the Patent Act, a patent must include “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant claims as his invention.”

This notice requirement is satisfied, the Court held, where the claims of the patent, read in light of the specification and prosecution history, informs with reasonable certainty those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention. Like any property right, the boundaries of the patent monopoly should be clear. The failure to afford the public clear notice of what is claimed, “thereby appris[ing] the public of what is still open to them,” chills innovation by creating a risk of infringement in “zones of uncertainty.”

The High Court remanded the case with instructions that the Federal Circuit should no longer employ the “insolubly ambiguous” or “amenable to construction” tests of patent claim indefiniteness under 35 USC § 112, ¶ 2. These words can “leave courts and the patent bar at sea without a reliable compass.” While noting that the Supreme Court does not “micromanage the Federal Circuit’s particular word choice” in applying patent-law doctrines, Justice Ginsberg wrote, “we must ensure that the Federal Circuit’s test is at least ‘probative of the essential inquiry.’”

The Federal Circuit test, according to the High Court, “invoked a standard more amorphous than the statutory definiteness requirement allows.” In addition to breeding lower court confusion, the discredited “insolubly ambiguous” standard tolerated “some ambiguous claims but not others….” The Court’s new reasonable certainty standard requires more definite claim language.

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Federal Circuit Grants Patent Term Adjustment After Allowance When Continued Examination Requested

Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox

 

On January 15, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided Novartis v. Lee (No. 2013-1160, -1179), holding that time spent in “continued examination” is excluded from a patent term adjustment even where the continued examination occurs after the application has been pending for more than three years. However, the Federal Circuit also held that the time excluded for continued examination is limited to the time before allowance of the application, and therefore positive patent term adjustment accrues from the date the application is allowed to issuance of the patent, as long as no later examination occurs.

Patent Term Adjustment

Applicants may be entitled to patent term adjustment (PTA) to remedy certain delays caused by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) during prosecution of an application. 35 U.S.C. § 154 specifies the patent term guarantees which, if not met, can serve as bases for PTA. In particular, § 154(b)(1)(B) provides one day of PTA for every day an application is pending for more than three years (known as “B delay”). According to § 154(b)(1)(B)(i), B delay does not include “any time consumed by continued examination of the application,” such as the filing of a Request for Continued Examination.

The Federal Circuit’s Decision

According to Novartis’ interpretation of the statute, applicants are entitled to PTA for any time spent by the USPTO after three years from the application filing date, even if continued examination has been requested. In contrast, the USPTO argued that the statutory language clearly excludes any time consumed by continued examination, no matter when it was initiated.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the USPTO, stating that PTA “should be calculated by determining the length of time between application and patent issuance, then subtracting any continued examination time and determining the extent to which the result exceeds three years.” The Federal Circuit also found the USPTO’s construction was otherwise supported by the statutory purpose and structure.

However, the Federal Circuit agreed with Novartis on the other statutory interpretation issue. Novartis argued that time consumed by continued examination should be limited to the time before allowance of an application, as long as no later examination actually occurred, while the USPTO argued that any time up until issuance of a patent should be excluded. The Federal Circuit rejected the USPTO’s reasoning, indicating that because a case not involving continued examination would undisputedly be entitled to the time from allowance to issuance, there was no basis for treating a case involving continued examination differently.

The following schematic illustrates the Federal Circuit’s holding:

USPTO

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Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.