Tag: false advertising

FTC Starts Long-Awaited Green Guides Review

  • On December 14, 2022, at an open meeting of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”), FTC commissioners voted unanimously to publish a Notice in the Federal Register announcing a Request for Public Comments on potential amendments to the Commission’s Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (“Green Guides” or “Guides”).
  • The FTC solicits comments on the ongoing need for the Guides and on specific claims addressed in the Guides, including “recyclable,” “recycled content,” “degradable,” “compostable,” and more. It also asks if it should initiate a rulemaking process and address claims it declined to consider during the last review, such as “organic” and “sustainable.”
  • Importantly, given the growth in some state laws that purport to restrict claims, the FTC asks for input on whether the Guides conflict with federal or state laws. This proceeding is expected to garner significant input.
  • Once the Notice is published in the Federal Register (which the FTC anticipates will be in mid-January 2023), interested stakeholders will have 60 days from the date of the Notice to submit comments to the FTC, unless an extension is granted.
  • For more information about the FTC Notice, please read our report here.

© 2022 Keller and Heckman LLP

For more Energy and Environmental Law news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Much A-Brew About Nothing: Court Dismisses False Ad Suit Against Starbucks

Judge Alison Nathan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently dismissed with prejudice a putative class action alleging Starbucks misrepresented itself as a “premium” coffee retailer. In doing so, the Court found that plaintiffs failed to allege Starbucks made any statements likely to mislead reasonable consumers, and that nearly all of the challenged statements were just puffery.  George v. Starbucks, (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2020).

Plaintiffs alleged Starbucks marketed itself as a high-end coffee brand, including claims that it serves “the finest whole bean coffees”; has a reputation for “quality” products; provides a “PERFECT” coffee experience; offers the “Best Coffee for the Best You”; brags that “It’s Not Just Coffee. It’s Starbucks;” and touts its warm welcoming environment. According to plaintiffs, this was false and misleading because many New York Starbucks locations allegedly are infested with pests and use noxious pesticides to abate these pests. Plaintiffs alleged violations of Sections 349 and 350 of the New York General Business Law, this statute’s unfair competition and false advertising provisions.

In dismissing plaintiffs’ claims, Judge Nathan found that “[n]early all of the language the customers object to consists of obvious ‘puffery’” that no reasonably buyer would take at face value. Plaintiffs argued that the whole of Starbucks’s brand messaging was “more than the sum of its parts,” pointing to two cases in which courts allowed advertising suits to proceed even where a defendant’s ads were not literally false when taken in isolation. However, the court noted that in both those cases, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants’ advertising campaign “implied specific, falsifiable facts.” By contrast, plaintiffs here did not allege Starbucks’s advertising communicated—even indirectly—any specific details about its products. Instead, plaintiffs argued the advertising was misleading because it portrayed Starbucks as providing “premium products made with the best ingredients.” However, as Judge Nathan found, claims that a seller’s products are “premium” or “the best” cannot support a cause of action for deceptive practices, whether made once or across all of the company’s brand messaging.

The court found one statement cited in the amended complaint could, if false, be actionable—that Starbucks baked goods contain “no artificial dyes or flavors.” However, the court noted the pesticide mentioned in the complaint was not an “artificial dye or flavor,” and no reasonable consumer would understand this statement to convey information about the company’s use of pesticides in its stores.

In their amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the pesticides Starbucks supposedly uses have manufacturer warnings against use in food service establishments, and the CDC warns that exposure to these pesticides can have serious health effects. However, none of the plaintiffs claimed to have gotten sick. Nor did plaintiffs allege that Starbucks advertised that it did not use these (or any other) pesticides. This case serves as yet another reminder that absent an actionably false or misleading statement, false advertising claims cannot be used to remedy other consumer complaints, and consumer assumptions not grounded in the text of advertising are ripe for dismissal. Watch this space for further development.

© 2020 Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more, visit the NLR Litigation / Trial Practice section.

Anheuser-Busch Not Liable for False Advertising for Pointing Out to Consumers that Miller Lite and Coors Light Use “Corn Syrup”

Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors produce some of the best-selling light beers in the United States — Bud Light, and Miller Lite and Coors Light, respectively — and regularly attack each other with witty ad campaigns. During Super Bowl LIII, Anheuser-Busch unveiled an advertisement campaign focused on the idea that Bud Light is made using rice as opposed to corn syrup. The Bud Light advertisements called attention to Miller Lite and Coors Light’s use of corn syrup as a source of sugar for the fermentation process. In response, Molson Coors advertised that its beer tastes better because of the corn syrup, which is not the same as high-fructose corn syrup used in other consumer products. Molson Coors also filed a lawsuit arguing that Anheuser-Busch violated Section 43 of the Lanham Act “by implying that a product made from corn syrup also contains corn syrup.”

Section 43 of the Lanham Act deals with false advertising and states that “[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” After Super Bowl LIII, Molson Coors filed a federal lawsuit claiming Anheuser Busch’s high-profile ads duped consumers into thinking that Miller Lite and Coors Light contained corn syrup, when in reality corn syrup is merely used as a “brewing fermentation aid” that does not end up in the final product.  Molson Coors Bev. Co. USA LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., LLC, 957 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2020).

The district court found that Anheuser Busch’s did not violate the Lanham Act and Molson Coors appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court framed the issue as a simple one: whether the true statement made in Anheuser-Busch’s advertisements—“their beer is made using corn syrup and ours isn’t”—wrongly implies that “their beer contains corn syrup.”

Molson Coors acknowledged that both Miller Lite and Coors Light are made using corn syrup and that Bud Light is not. Molson also acknowledged that corn syrup is listed as an ingredient in both Miller Lite and Coors Light. Molson, however, insisted that the list of ingredients is not the same as what the finished product “contains.” The Seventh Circuit found that although it is possible for an ingredient list to be treated as “inputs” instead of a list of what is in the finished product, the common usage of an ingredients list equates to the constituents of the product. Additionally, Anheuser-Busch never advertised that the rival products “contain” corn syrup, but consumers could infer as much from the statements made. But the Seventh Circuit found that consumers could infer the same thing from Molson’s own ingredient list. The court could not hold that it was false or misleading for a rival to make a statement that a competitor makes about itself.

In rejecting the false advertising claims, the appeals court said Molson Coors “brought this problem on itself” by listing corn syrup in its ingredients. Whether the use of corn syrup is a bad thing is for “consumers rather than the judiciary to decide.” The Seventh Circuit ruled that Anheuser-Busch did not violate the Lanham Act’s ban on false advertising by running Bud Light ads that mocked Miller Lite and Coors Light for using corn syrup. The court noted that “[l]itigation should not be a substitute for competition in the market,” which is what Molson Coors was trying to do in this case. The court even seemed to suggest that “[i]f Molson Coors does not like the sneering tone of Anheuser-Busch’s ads, it can mock Bud Light in return.”

COPYRIGHT © 2020, STARK & STARK
ARTICLE BY Gene Markin of Stark & Stark
For more articles on corn syrup litigation, visit the National Law Review Litigation / Trial Practice section.

Beware the COVID-19 Cure: The FTC Issues Warnings to Products Making COVID-19 Treatment Claims

With no approved vaccine, the world waits for the next big breakthrough in 2020’s medical emergency. Some companies already claim to have found it – and subsequently received warning letters from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for misbranding. The FTC is targeting companies promoting products with supposed COVID-19 cures, treatment or prevention for making illegal, unsubstantiated claims.

One of the FTC’s objectives is eliminating false and misleading information from the marketplace. The FTC Act defines false advertising as misleading in a “material respect,” which includes both affirmative statements and failure to “reveal facts material in the light of [the product’s] representations[.]” See 15 USC 55(a)(1).

The FTC accomplishes its goal by sending warning letters. Under the FTC Act, a product may be misbranded if it is promoted as a prevention, cure or treatment for COVID-19 – when in fact it has not been approved for such use by the Food and Drug Administration. Since March 2020, the FTC has issued more than 200 warning letters to various businesses that advertise wellness products and other services that allegedly address COVID-19.

In some instances, the claims involved a gross exaggeration of the product’s effectiveness. For example, the website “NothingsIncurable.com” advertised products alleged to “literally make you invulnerable.” The FTC concluded those claims constituted misbranding. But even when promotional statements do not include an explicit falsehood, overpromotion still can cross into misbranding. For example, businesses that claimed, “[this product] will target and increase your immunity to help ward off the COVID-19 virus” or that recommended their products as “scientifically proven to support healthy immune function” also were found to be misbranded.

In another example, a company included “Coronavirus” in the website navigation menu that led consumers to therapy kits intended to provide “specific nutrition” to “balance the terrain of the body to make it conducive to” its particular function. Although the product description did not reference COVID-19, the FTC concluded that the website navigation menu was suggestive enough to warrant a warning for misbranding.

Summary

The FTC warning letters advise businesses that “under the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq.,” they are prohibited from advertising “that a product or service can prevent, treat, or cure human disease unless you possess competent and reliable scientific evidence, including, when appropriate, well-controlled human clinical studies, substantiating that the claims are true at the time they are made.” In addition, products that claim or imply the ability to mitigate, prevent, treat, diagnose or cure COVID-19 must be approved drugs under section 505(a) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. In each case, the FTC required a response from the business within 48 hours, detailing the actions taken to address the FTC’s concerns.

During this unprecedented health crisis, companies that sell consumer products should exercise caution when mentioning COVID-19 in advertising or promotional statements. Mentioning COVID-19 in relation to a product, even if the product is intended to address more routine health issues, could be misleading.

© 2020 Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved.

For more on COVID-19, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Suit Over ‘No Preservatives’ Capri Sun Label Tossed

A proposed class action, filed in the Northern District of Illinois on October 25, 2018, against Kraft Heinz Food Co. accused the company of falsely advertising its Capri Sun juice as containing “no preservatives” when in fact it contains citric acid. Tarzian et al v. Kraft Heinz Food Company, Case No. 1:18-cv-07148. The complaint alleged that the representation that Capri Sun beverages contain “No Artificial Coloring, Flavors, or Preservatives” is unfair and deceptive advertising as the beverages contain a well-known preservative, citric acid.

In an order filed on October 10, 2019, U.S. District Judge Charles P. Kocoras dismissed the lawsuit and found that while the plaintiffs allege practices commonly used to manufacture citric acid throughout the industry, plaintiffs failed to draw a connection between the common industry practice and the actual practice used by Kraft.

This dismissal follows a dismissal of a similar matter in California federal court in 2015. Osborne v. Kraft Heinz Group, Inc., Case No. 3:15-cv-02653. In that case, plaintiffs accused Kraft of mislabeling Capri Sun drinks as “all natural” when they allegedly contained synthetic ingredients, including citric acid and natural flavor. In a hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria found that plaintiff did not know whether the citric acid used in Capri Sun’s drinks was natural or synthetic. The judge ultimately granted Kraft Heinz’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend the complaint. The plaintiff never filed an amended complaint.

© 2019 Keller and Heckman LLP

For more on food labeling laws, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

Claims of False Advertising and Unfair Competition Are Not Disparagement or Defamation

Most commercial general liability policies include coverage for personal and advertising injury claims by third parties.  In a recent case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether claims of false advertising and unfair competition brought against a competitor entitled the policyholder to a defense under its personal and advertising injury coverage.

In Albion Engineering Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 18-1756 (3rd Cir. Jul. 10, 2109) (Not Precedential), the policyholder was sued by a competitor alleging claims for false advertising and unfair competition based on the allegation that the policyholder’s products were represented as being made in the US when they were really made overseas.  The policyholder sought coverage from its carrier under its personal and advertising injury coverage, particularly for publication of material that slanders or libels a person or disparages a person’s goods, products or services.  The carrier disclaimed and the policyholder brought suit seeing to enforce coverage.  The district court dismissed the complaint after summary judgment in favor of the carrier.

On appeal, the policyholder contended that the claims in the underlying suit were essentially disparaging and defamatory.  In applying New Jersey law, the circuit court rejected the policyholder’s arguments because nothing alleged by the underlying claimant or in the extrinsic evidence discovered constituted the publication of false statements about the competitor.  Under New Jersey law, for the duty to defend to arise, the false and defamatory statement has to be made about another (in this case about the competitor’s products).  “For the suit to fall within the policy’s coverage, [policyholder] must demonstrate [competitor] brings a claim that [policyholder] (1) made an electronic, oral, written or other publication of material that (2) slanders or libels [competitor] or disparages [competitor’s] good, products, or services.” Here, said the court, the claims were about the policyholder’s own products, not about the competitor’s products.  Thus, because the policyholder had not shown that the competitor’s claims constitute disparagement or defamation claims made by the policyholder about the competitor’s products, the carrier had no duty to defend the underlying lawsuit.

 

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Red Stripe Prevails in Alcohol Beverage Labeling Class Action

The latest merits decision in the ongoing false advertising/labeling class actions appears here.  This case involves allegations that the labeling and marketing of Red Stripe Beer misleads consumers into thinking they are purchasing beer made in Jamaica from Jamaican ingredients.  In fact, production of Red Stripe for the US market moved to the US in 2012.  The Southern District of California’s Dumas v. Diageo PLC decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ case gives hope that companies with alcohol beverage brands originating overseas can produce those brands in the US without facing significant litigation risk.

The plaintiffs brought their case under several California statues and also alleged negligent and intentional misrepresentation.  Central to the plaintiffs’ allegations were statements on Red Stripe’s secondary packaging and labeling that the beer was a “Jamaican Style Lager” and contained “The Taste of Jamaica.”  The plaintiffs also pointed to the labeling and packaging’s continued display of the original Jamaican brewer’s logo as evidence of deception.  Finally, the plaintiffs pointed to the label’s statement that the beer “embodied the spirit, rhythm and pulse of Jamaica and its people.”  Of course, the labels and secondary packaging did disclose that the US market beer was brewed and bottled in Latrobe, Pennsylvania.

Looking only at the complaint and before any discovery, the court dismissed the case, concluding that “no reasonable consumer would be misled into thinking that Red Stripe is made in Jamaica with Jamaican ingredients based on the wording of the packaging and labeling.”  More specifically:

  • The mere fact that the words “Jamaica” and Jamaican” appear on the packaging does not support a conclusion that consumers would be confused about the origin and ingredients of the beer.

  • The statements on Red Stripe were similar to those made with respect to a “Swiss Army knife” – just as “Swiss” modified “Army,” in this case “Jamaican” modifies “Style” and does not connote the actual place of production.

  • Red Stripe’s display of “Jamaican Style” and similar claims are similar to Blue Moon making a “Belgian-Style Wheat Ale” and Harpoon making a “Belgian Style Pale Ale.”

  • “Taste of Jamaica” is too vague and meaningless to form the basis of a false advertising claim.

  • Red Stripe presents different facts from the facts that give rise to the false advertising case involving Beck’s Beer, where the labeling and packaging stated “Originating in Germany,” “brewed under the German Purity Law of 1516,” and “German quality.”

  • Even though consumers may have already held an expectation that Red Stripe is brewed in Jamaica based on past production on the island, no legal authority places a duty on marketers to counter such pre-conceived notions.

On the basis of this reasoning, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint as a matter of law.  It did, however, dismiss the case “without prejudice,” which will give the plaintiffs 15 days (until April 21, 2016) to assert new claims that might survive dismissal.

The Dumas opinion represents merely one battle won (at least temporarily) in what will no doubt prove a long war over alcohol beverage labeling in the United States.  Nevertheless, it provides helpful reasoning that may eventually influence other courts and provide guidance to marketers in the future.

Article By Marc E. Sorini of McDermott Will & Emery

© 2016 McDermott Will & Emery

Serious Games Require Serious Attention to Marketing Statements

BrainLumos Labs recently paid $2 million to the Federal Trade Commission to settle claims that it deceived consumers about its brain training application’s ability to increase cognitive function. According to the FTC,  the company alleged that its app, called Lumosity, provided many beneficial effects including the ability to improve users’ school and work performance, delay the onset of age-related cognitive disorders and help restore brain function lost as a result of brain trauma and other health conditions.

According to the FTC, the company did not have sufficient scientific data to back up the claims made in its ads. The FTC also claimed that the company did not disclose that it solicited consumer testimonials about the effectiveness of the product via a contest that offered users the chance to win iPads and other prizes.

In a prepared statement, the company stood by the scientific basis for its brain-training methods and asserted that the settlement was a result of its marketing language that has since been discontinued.

The use of games for “good” causes, such as education, health and training is known as “serious games.” The potential for these types of games to help people in a variety of ways is immense. The number of these games is growing rapidly.

Makers of these games must be mindful not to overreach in the claims of what these games can do. The FTC has been active in policing unsupported claims by app makers.

Additionally, the FTC has been enforcing its endorsement guidelines which require disclosure when a company provides some compensation or financial incentive for endorsements or testimonials. Here, the fact that users had a chance to win valuable prizes in exchange for providing testimonials apparently was not disclosed.

Serious games and other apps have tremendous opportunity to provide beneficial results. However, it is important for makers of these games and apps to understand and comply with the various legal issues that are relevant to these offerings. It is advisable to seek legal review of all serious games and apps and their marketing plan before they are released to identify potential legal issues.

Article By James G. Gatto of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
Copyright © 2015, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Uber Ordered to Buckle Up for Litigation: Taxicab Plaintiffs Ride out (in part) Uber’s Motion to Dismiss False Advertising Claims

A group of California taxicab companies sued Uber in federal court in San Francisco for falsely advertising the safety of Uber rides and for disparaging the safety of taxi rides. Uber moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ Lanham Actclaim, contending that the safety-related statements were non-actionable puffery and were not disseminated in a commercial context. Uber also moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ California unfair competition law (“UCL”) claim for lack of standing, and moved to strike plaintiffs’ request for restitution under the UCL and California’s false advertising law (“FAL”).

Declining to put the brakes on the lawsuit in its entirety, the court granted in part and denied in part Uber’s motion. L.A. Taxi Cooperative, Inc. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2015 WL 4397706 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2015).

The court agreed that some of Uber’s statements were non-actionable puffery. For example, Uber’s claim that it was “GOING THE DISTANCE TO PUT PEOPLE FIRST” was “clearly the type of ‘exaggerated advertising’ slogans upon which consumers would not reasonably rely.” It would be impossible to measure whether or how Uber was fulfilling this promise. Likewise, Uber’s statement “BACKGROUND CHECKS YOU CAN TRUST” was puffery because it made no specific claim about Uber’s services. The court therefore dismissed plaintiffs’ claims as to these non-actionable statements.

On the other hand, the court did not agree that Uber was merely puffing when it claimed it was “setting the strictest safety standard possible,” that its safety is “already best in class,” that its “three-step screening” background check process adheres to a “comprehensive and new industry standard,” or when Uber compared its background check process to the taxi industry’s background check process. These statements were not puffery because “[a] reasonable consumer reading these statements in the context of Uber’s advertising campaign could conclude that an Uber ride is objectively and measurably safer than a ride provided by a taxi . . . .”

The court also rejected Uber’s argument that, because certain advertising claims were preceded by phrases like “Uber is committed to” or “Uber works hard to” – for example, “We are committed to improving the already best in class safety and accountability of the Uber platform . . .” – that the advertising claims were merely aspirational and therefore non-actionable. The challenged statements did more than assert that Uber was committed to safety, the court found; they included statements regarding the objective safety and accountability of Uber’s service. A reasonable consumer might rely on such statements, so the court denied Uber’s motion to dismiss in this regard.

The court found that certain advertising statements Uber made to the media were non-commercial speech and therefore not actionable under the Lanham Act or California state law. These statements were made in response to journalists’ inquiries, and were “inextricably intertwined” with the journalists’ independent – and largely critical – coverage of Uber’s safety record, which was a matter of public concern. Accordingly, the court granted Uber’s motion and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims relating to these non-actionable statements.

But the court did find Uber’s statements on ride receipts to be commercial speech. Following a completed ride, Uber emails its customers a receipt that includes a $1.00 “Safe Rides Fee.” Uber explains to customers who click on a link in the receipt that the fee was intended “to ensure the safest possible platform for Uber riders,” that Uber would put the fee towards its “continued efforts to ensure the safest possible platform,” and that “you’ll see this as a separate line item on every uberX receipt.” Uber contended that such statements related to a past transaction, rather than a prospective transaction that Uber sought to induce, and therefore did not amount to commercial speech. The court disagreed, finding that “the complaint adequately allege[d] that the statements relating to the ‘Safe Rides Fee’ [were] made for the purpose of influencing consumers to use Uber’s services again.”

On the California UCL claim, the court found that the taxicab plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege that they relied on Uber’s allegedly false or misleading advertising. In dismissing this claim, the court explained that it was declining to join the minority of California federal courts that have permitted UCL claims to proceed where the plaintiff pled potential consumers’ reliance rather than the plaintiff’s own reliance.

Finally, the court found that plaintiffs did not have a viable claim for restitution under California’s UCL and FAL because that remedy is limited to “money or property that defendants took directly from [a] plaintiff” or “in which [a plaintiff] has a vested interest,” and the complaint failed to allege that plaintiffs had an ownership interest in Uber’s profits that they sought to disgorge.

ARTICLE BY Lawrence I Weinstein & Jeffrey H Warshafsky of Proskauer Rose LLP

© 2015 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Catch of the Day: Tuna Fish Brand StarKist Swims into a Sea of Trouble After Agreeing to Settle Claims Against It

StarKist Co. recently agreed in principle to a $12 million settlement with a putative class of plaintiffs concerning alleged under-filling of tuna fish cans. But agreeing on the dollar figure seems to have been the easy part; the parties in this bitterly-fought case have become embroiled in motion practice about the allocation of that $12 million payout.

The case under discussion is Hendricks v. StarKist Co., No. 3:13-cv-0729-HSG in the Northern District of California. Plaintiff alleged that StarKist had been under-filling its cans of tuna fish, resulting in a product weight that fell below the federally mandated minimum averages of 2.84 to 3.23 ounces of tuna per 5 ounce can. This practice, plaintiff alleged, violated California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California’s False Advertising Law, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and plaintiff also brought various common law claims.

StarKist moved to transfer or dismiss the case, and the Court denied the motion to transfer and mostly denied StarKist’s motion to dismiss. The Court also denied StarKist’s motion for reargument. Plaintiff subsequently moved to certify a nationwide class for his common law claims, moved for sanctions relating to alleged discovery misconduct, and several interested parties sought to intervene and certify statewide sub-classes under other states’ laws. On the morning that all those motions were to be argued, the parties signed a binding settlement term sheet under which StarKist would make available $8 million in cash and $4 million in vouchers to the settlement class.

There was a catch, however, over how to allocate payments from the settlement fund. Plaintiff proposed a flat-rate payout of $25 in cash or $50 in vouchers to class members. Plaintiff’s proposal would potentially exhaust the settlement fund quickly, and Starkist objected to it. Specifically, StarKist argued that it is “arbitrary and bear[s] no relationship to the number of StarKist products each class member purchased or the extent of purported injury” (emphasis in original). By contrast, StarKist’s allocation proposal would award each class member $1.00 for up to ten products purchased, and an additional $1.00 for every ten cans of StarKist tuna fish purchased with an upper limit set at 250 cans or $25.00. StarKist also proposed that vouchers be available in lieu of cash at a value of $1.50 per ten cans of StarKist tuna fish purchased with a maximum value of $37.50.

It remains to be seen whether StarKist’s arguments will persuade the Court to can plaintiff’s flat-rate payout. We will, of course, monitor developments in this case, but in the interim it bears repeating that sometimes the dollar figure is the easy part of settling a putative class action.

ARTICLE BY

Lawrence I Weinstein & Benjamin M Rattner of Proskauer Rose LLP
© 2015 Proskauer Rose LLP.