The Increasing Role of Cybersecurity Experts in Complex Legal Disputes

The testimonies and guidance of expert witnesses have been known to play a significant role in high-stakes legal matters, whether it be the opinion of a clinical psychiatrist in a homicide case or that of a career IP analyst in a patent infringement trial. However, in today’s highly digital world—where cybercrimes like data breaches and theft of intellectual property are increasingly commonplace—cybersecurity professionals have become some of the most sought-after experts for a broadening range of legal disputes.

Below, we will explore the growing importance of cybersecurity experts to the litigation industry in more depth, including how their insights contribute to case strategies, the challenges of presenting technical and cybersecurity-related arguments in court, the specific qualifications that make an effective expert witness in the field of cybersecurity, and the best method for securing that expertise for your case.

How Cybersecurity Experts Help Shape Legal Strategies

Disputes involving highly complex cybercrimes typically require more technical expertise than most trial teams have on hand, and the contributions of a qualified cybersecurity expert can often be transformative to your ability to better understand the case, uncover critical evidence, and ultimately shape your overall strategy.

For example, in the case of a criminal data breach, defense counsel might seek an expert witness to analyze and evaluate the plaintiff’s existing cybersecurity policies and protective mechanisms at the time of the attack to determine their effectiveness and/or compliance with industry regulations or best practices. Similarly, an expert with in-depth knowledge of evolving data laws, standards, and disclosure requirements will be well-suited to determining a party’s liability in virtually any matter involving the unauthorized access of protected information. Cybersecurity experts are also beneficial during the discovery phase when their experience working with certain systems can assist in potentially uncovering evidence related to a specific attack or breach that may have been initially overlooked.

We have already seen many instances in which the testimony and involvement of cybersecurity experts have impacted the overall direction of a legal dispute. Consider the Coalition for Good Governance, for example, that recently rested its case(Opens an external site in a new window) as the plaintiffs in a six-year battle with the state of Georgia over the security of touchscreen voting machines. Throughout the process, the organization relied heavily on the testimony of multiple cybersecurity experts who claimed they identified vulnerabilities in the state’s voting technology. If these testimonies prove effective, it will not only sway the ruling in the favor of the plaintiffs but also lead to entirely new policies and impact the very way in which Georgia voters cast their ballots as early as this year.

The Challenges of Explaining Cybersecurity in the Courtroom

While there is no denying the growing importance of cybersecurity experts in modern-day disputes, it is also important to note that many challenges still exist in presenting highly technical arguments and/or evidence in a court of law.

Perhaps most notably, there remains a significant gap in both legal and technological language, as well as in the knowledge and understanding of cybersecurity professionals and judges, lawyers, and the juries tasked with parsing particularly dense information. In other words, today’s trial teams need to work carefully with cybersecurity experts to develop communication strategies that adequately illustrate their arguments but do not result in unnecessary confusion or a misunderstanding of the evidence being presented. Visuals are a particularly useful tool in helping both litigators and experts explain complex topics while also engaging decision-makers.

Depending on the nature of the data breach or cybercrime in question, you may be tasked with replicating a digital event to support your specific argument. In many cases, this can be incredibly challenging due to the evolving and multifaceted nature of modern cyberattacks, and it may require extensive resources within the time constraints of a given matter. Thus, it is wise to use every tool at your disposal to boost the power of your team—including custom expert witness sourcing and visual advocacy consultants.

What You Should Look for in a Cybersecurity Expert

Determining the qualifications of a cybersecurity expert is highly dependent on the details of each individual case, making it critical to identify an expert whose experience reflects your precise needs. For example, a digital forensics specialist will offer an entirely different skill set than someone with a background in data privacy regulations and compliance.

Making sure an expert has the relevant professional experience to assess your specific cybersecurity case is only one factor to consider. In addition to verifying education and professional history, you must also assess the expert’s experience in the courtroom and familiarity with relevant legal processes. Similarly, expert witnesses should be evaluated based on their individual personality and communication skills, as they will be tasked with conveying highly technical arguments to an audience that will likely have a difficult time understanding all relevant concepts in the absence of clear, simplified explanations.

Where to Find the Most Qualified Cybersecurity Experts

Safeguarding the success of your client or firm in the digital age starts with the right expertise. You need to be sure your cybersecurity expert is uniquely suited to your case and primed to share critical insights when the stakes are high.

Introducing the New SmartExpert: Self-driving Car "Drivers"

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has deemed the artificial intelligence that controls Google’s self-driving car a qualified “driver” under federal regulations. So, if a computer can drive, must we have a computer testify as to whether this new “driver” was negligent? It sounds laughable: “Do you, computer, swear to tell the truth?” But, with so many new potential avenues of litigation opening up as a result of “machines at the wheel,” it made us wonder how smart the new expert will have to be?

With its heart beating in Silicon Valley and its position well-established as a proponent of computer invention and progress, it was surprising when California was the first state to suggest we need a human looking over the computer’s shoulder. That is essentially what the draft regulations from the California Department of Motor Vehicles for the regulation of self-driving vehicles proposes – that self-driving cars have a specially-licensed driver prepared to take the wheel at all times. After years spent developing and testing self-driving cars in its home town of Mountain View, California, Google may now be looking elsewhere for testing and production. The rule proposed by the California DMV would make Google’s car impossible in the state.  Why?  Because humans cannot drive the Google self-driving car. It has no steering wheel and no pedals. The Google car could not let a human take over the wheel. Does that thought make you pause?

It apparently didn’t give the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration any cause for concern, as they approved Google’s self-driving software, finding the artificial intelligence program could be considered a bonafide “driver” under federal regulations. In essence, Google’s driving and you are simply a passenger. If you would hesitate to get in, Google’s Chris Urmson, lead engineer on the self-driving car program explains: “We need to be careful about the assumption that having a person behind the wheel will make the technology safer.” Urmson is basically saying computers are safer than humans. When you think about the number of automobile accident-related deaths in the United States alone, he may be right.  If he is right, wouldn’t artificial intelligences sophisticated enough to drive a car more safely than humans be able to learn to do other things better as well? Couldn’t they drive a forklift, perform surgery on humans, manage a billion dollar hedge fund? If that is where things are heading, who will testify as to the applicable standards of behavior for these machines? In the hedge fund example, will it be a former hedge fund manager who has years of experience handling large, bundled securities or a software developer who has years of experience programming artificial intelligence?

Who do you think will be able to testify in cases where an artificially-intelligent machine plays a role? Liability at the hands of a machine is bound to emerge. Someone will have to speak to the standard of judgment, discretion, and care applicable to machines. Maybe Google will be allowed to text while driving. Who’s to say?

© Copyright 2002-2016 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

Introducing the New SmartExpert: Self-driving Car “Drivers”

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has deemed the artificial intelligence that controls Google’s self-driving car a qualified “driver” under federal regulations. So, if a computer can drive, must we have a computer testify as to whether this new “driver” was negligent? It sounds laughable: “Do you, computer, swear to tell the truth?” But, with so many new potential avenues of litigation opening up as a result of “machines at the wheel,” it made us wonder how smart the new expert will have to be?

With its heart beating in Silicon Valley and its position well-established as a proponent of computer invention and progress, it was surprising when California was the first state to suggest we need a human looking over the computer’s shoulder. That is essentially what the draft regulations from the California Department of Motor Vehicles for the regulation of self-driving vehicles proposes – that self-driving cars have a specially-licensed driver prepared to take the wheel at all times. After years spent developing and testing self-driving cars in its home town of Mountain View, California, Google may now be looking elsewhere for testing and production. The rule proposed by the California DMV would make Google’s car impossible in the state.  Why?  Because humans cannot drive the Google self-driving car. It has no steering wheel and no pedals. The Google car could not let a human take over the wheel. Does that thought make you pause?

It apparently didn’t give the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration any cause for concern, as they approved Google’s self-driving software, finding the artificial intelligence program could be considered a bonafide “driver” under federal regulations. In essence, Google’s driving and you are simply a passenger. If you would hesitate to get in, Google’s Chris Urmson, lead engineer on the self-driving car program explains: “We need to be careful about the assumption that having a person behind the wheel will make the technology safer.” Urmson is basically saying computers are safer than humans. When you think about the number of automobile accident-related deaths in the United States alone, he may be right.  If he is right, wouldn’t artificial intelligences sophisticated enough to drive a car more safely than humans be able to learn to do other things better as well? Couldn’t they drive a forklift, perform surgery on humans, manage a billion dollar hedge fund? If that is where things are heading, who will testify as to the applicable standards of behavior for these machines? In the hedge fund example, will it be a former hedge fund manager who has years of experience handling large, bundled securities or a software developer who has years of experience programming artificial intelligence?

Who do you think will be able to testify in cases where an artificially-intelligent machine plays a role? Liability at the hands of a machine is bound to emerge. Someone will have to speak to the standard of judgment, discretion, and care applicable to machines. Maybe Google will be allowed to text while driving. Who’s to say?

© Copyright 2002-2016 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

Expert Witness Soap Opera Plays Out in Federal Court as Daubert Motions Fail

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A federal magistrate judge has found himself at the center of a soap opera – literally.

As a battle brews between two Spanish-language television networks over copyright claims to the substance of their respective soap operas, Miami Federal Court Judge Jonathan Goodman has found himself faced with having to evaluate experts on telenovelas.

A telenovela, which combines the Spanish words for “television” and “novel,” is actually slightly different from a typical soap opera in that it has a limited run, or an end. Telenovelas are basically novels that play out on television and are popular throughout Mexico, Latin America, Europe, and Asia.

These are just a few of the factual intricacies that Judge Goodman found himself learning about as he attempted to rule on the admissibility of the telenovela experts that both parties offered in the recent U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida case of Latele Television, C.A. v. Telemundo Communications Group, LLC, et al. 

For plaintiff, expert Dr. Tomás López-Pumarejo, a Brooklyn College professor and author of a “pioneering book on television serial drama,” is expected to testify that after performing a detailed literary analysis of the two telenovelas in question, he found substantial and striking similarities between the two shows and “leaves – in my opinion – no doubt that [El Rostro de Analía] is a remake of [María María].”

Contradicting López-Pumarejo is expert witness Dr. Carolina Acosta-Alzuru, a University of Georgia professor and author of a book on Venezuelan telenovelas. Acosta-Alzuru is expected to testify that the dissimilarities between El Rostro de Analía and María María “in terms of core plot development, triangle structure, character design, telenovela subgenre, and qualitative characteristics of dialogue far outweigh the limited similarities in the triggering plot.”

Plaintiff, however, told the court that defendant actually hired the author of María María, which originally aired in 1989, to develop El Rostro de Analía and “that the copyright infringement is so obvious that the public and press have designated El Rostro as a remake or retelling of María María.”

However, according to one Mexican actress, the practice of remaking a successful telenovela from the past is not unusual. Adriana Llabrés, who stars on the telenovela Yo No Creo En Los Hombres, tells BullsEye that recreating a new telenovela from one that was previously successful is something that happens all the time, including on her own show, which has been remade twice.

“Most of the soap operas are remakes, and they have been for the past few years,” Llabrés explained to BullsEye. “The writer agrees with the director as to what they want to keep from the past versions based in accordance with the public’s perceived desires. They then may adapt the story to suit the tastes of the viewers.”

What allegedly appears to be different in this case is that while the original writer and new director may have collaborated, the original copyright holder was allegedly left out of the equation.

Considering all of this comparative television evidence and dissecting these two programs, however, will not be a task that Judge Goodman will need to undertake immediately, as he is faced with more than one Daubert motion. Goodman is the judge, not the jury; he is the gatekeeper, not the ultimate umpire on these issues.

The Daubert Decisions

In his December 15 Omnibus Order on Daubert Motions, Goodman explained that his role as gatekeeper “is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the jury’s role because, as Daubert explained, ‘vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.’”

Goodman found that both parties will have “ample opportunity” to cross-examine and attempt to impeach the other’s expert witnesses and that it would be inappropriate for the court to exclude either side’s telenovela expert.

“There is no doubt that the three Daubert motions all generate significant challenges to the proposed expert testimony,” Goodman wrote. “Nevertheless, the Undersigned deems the legal assaults to relate more to the weight of the experts’ opinions and to their credibility, rather than the threshold issue of admissibility.”

Specifically in addressing the qualifications of plaintiff’s expert Dr. López-Pumarejo, the court refuted defendants’ contention that Dr. López-Pumarejo offered only “impermissible legal conclusions” that are the “ultimate issue in the case” and based on the “insufficient methodology” by which he examined only a small percentage of the two telenovela scripts. Dr. López-Pumarejo’s conclusion that María María and El Rostro de Analía were “substantially similar” was formulated after he reviewed 33 episodes of the former and 53 episodes of the latter, totaling about 23 percent of the combined telenovelas’ aired content.

“This alleged deficiency may well generate fodder for fruitful cross-examination but the Undersigned views the objection insufficient to support a request to flat-out exclude his testimony,” Goodman wrote, citing Oceania Cruises, 654 F.3d at 1193- “in most cases, objections to the inadequacies of a study are more appropriately considered an objection going to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.”

Goodman notes that he expects defendants to rigorously cross-examine Dr. López-Pumarejo about his failure to review even a quarter of the telenovelas’ materials and that it is this cross-examination that will provide “sufficient protection” to the parties and to overall fairness of the trial.

In the same manner, the court addresses plaintiff’s complaints and corresponding Daubert challenges to defense expert Dr. Acosta-Alzuru. The court notes that despite plaintiff’s claims that Dr. Acosta-Alzuru is unqualified as an expert, the professor has presented numerous lectures to U.S. State Department officials in Venezuela on her various studies of Spanish-language telenovelas and is the only expert who actually reviewed all 376 hours of the two TV shows, producing summary recaps and plot diagrams of each episode.

“The mere fact that she has not written a telenovela herself is insufficient to preclude her expert testimony, [nor is she] subject to exclusion as an expert merely because she is not a ‘literary expert’ or an expert on copyright infringement,” Goodman wrote. “Moreover, Acosta carefully addressed the existence of unprotectible scène à faire even though she did not use that specific term. Latele can certainly question her at trial about her unfamiliarity with the term, but it has not convinced the Undersigned that Acosta’s unfamiliarity with a few legal terms is reason enough to exclude her, especially given her substantial background in telenovela analysis.”

Cash and Clichés

A scène à faire, French for a “scene that must be done,” is a scene that is rather obligatory or necessary for the story or genre, and in copyright law, this term refers to a creative work that is unprotected because of this mandated or necessitated role.

Perhaps every romantic comedy has to have a love triangle, every action movie a chase scene, and every tragedy a tragic death. Copying such plot twists can be no copyright infringement.

However, the question for the Latele v. Telemundo jury will be whether or not the story is told differently. They will have full exposure to both sides’ expert testimony and perhaps hours of dramatic television ahead.

How much money Telemundo made as a result of El Rostro is also in dispute and subject to differing expert witness interpretations. Defendants retained CPA expert Ben Sheppard to refute the report of plaintiff expert Steven Berwick regarding the apportionment of Telemundo profits to the show and of the amount that would be attributable to the copyright-infringing portions thereof in the event that liability is, in fact, found.

Judge Goodman denied plaintiff’s Daubert motion to exclude expert witness Sheppard, citing similar reasons as stated above and saying that cross-examination and jury instruction shall cure any alleged deficiencies in the expert analysis. As for defendants’ omnibus motion in limine to exclude Berwick’s opinions, which was not a Daubert motion, the judge will decide in a separate order.

Defendants have until February 10, 2015, to fulfill plaintiff’s discovery demands.

When it comes to the copyright claims between two TV shows, do we even need experts to testify as to “substantial similarities,” or should we simply let laypeople and juries decide if two shows are too similar to have avoided copyright infringement?

OF

Class Action Defense Cases–American Honda v. Allen: Seventh Circuit Court Reverses Class Action Certification Order Holding District Court’s Daubert Analysis Inadequate And Expert Testimony Inadmissible

National Law Review’s featured blogger Michael J. Hassen of Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell LLP provides some insight on a recent 7th Circuit class action case which addresses expert testimony:

District Court Erred in Granting Class Action Certification because Expert Testimony Establishing Rule 23(b)(3)’s Predominance Prong was Unreliable and District Court’s Daubert Analysis Inadequate Seventh Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against American Honda and Honda of America (collectively “Honda”) alleging product defect liability concerning Honda’s Gold Wing GL1800 motorcycle; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that a design defect in the steering assembly causes the motorcycle to “wobble.” American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 814 (7th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), relying heavily on an expert’s opinion that common issues predominate; Honda opposed class action treatment and challenged the expert opinion relied upon by plaintiffs in their motion. Id. Defense attorneys moved under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to strike plaintiffs’ expert report on the grounds that the expert’s “wobble decay standard was unreliable because it was not supported by empirical testing, was not developed through a recognized standard-setting procedure, was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific, technical, or professional community, and was not the product of independent research.” Id. The district court agreed to rule on the admissibility of the report prior to ruling on class certification because the report was central to the motion, id. But while the court announced “definite reservations about the reliability of [the expert’s] wobble decay standard,” it refused to exclude the report entirely “at this early stage of the proceedings.” Id., at 814-15. The district court granted class action certification, id., at 815, and Honda sought leave to appeal, id., at 814. The Seventh Circuit granted Honda’s request and reversed.

The Circuit Court explained that the issue before it was “whether the district court must conclusively rule on the admissibility of an expert opinion prior to class certification in this case because that opinion is essential to the certification decision.” American Honda, at 814. The Court summarized the expert’s “wobble decay” opinion, which was based on a standard the expert himself had devised and that he himself characterized as “reasonable.” Id. The expert opinion was important because “most of Plaintiffs’ predominance arguments rest upon the theories advanced by [their expert].” Id. (quoting Allen v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 264 F.R.D. 412, 425 (N.D. Ill. 2009)). In response to Honda’s objections and following the Daubert hearing, the district court “noted that it was concerned that, among other things, [the expert’s] wobble decay standard may not be supported by empirical evidence, the standard has not been generally accepted by the engineering community, and [his] test sample of one may be inadequate to conclude that the entire fleet of GL1800s is defective.” Id., at 814-15. Nevertheless, the lower court believed it was too early in the litigation to dismiss the expert’s opinion in its entirety, and so it granted class action treatment without prejudice to Honda moving to exclude the expert’s opinion. Id., at 815.

As a matter of first impression in the Seventh Circuit, the Court “specifically addressed whether a district court must resolve a Daubert challenge prior to ruling on class certification if the testimony challenged is integral to the plaintiffs’ satisfaction of Rule 23’s requirements.” American Honda, at 815. The Circuit Court held “that when an expert’s report or testimony is critical to class certification, as it is here…, a district court must conclusively rule on any challenge to the expert’s qualifications or submissions prior to ruling on a class certification motion.” Id., at 815-16. Thus, in the Seventh Circuit’s view, “the district court must perform a full Daubert analysis before certifying the class if the situation warrants.” Id., at 816. This includes not only the expert’s qualifications, but “any challenge to the reliability of information provided by an expert if that information is relevant to establishing any of the Rule 23 requirements for class certification.” Id.

In this case, the district court “started off on the right foot by beginning to undertake what might have become a fairly extensive Daubert analysis,” and both acknowledged “and largely agreed with” Honda’s concerns about the reliability of the testimony of plaintiff’s expert, “[y]et the district court ultimately declined, without further explanation, ‘to exclude the report in its entirety at this early stage of the proceedings.’” American Honda, at 816. The Circuit Court explained at page 816 that the district court’s analysis (or lack thereof) constituted an abuse of discretion: “The court’s effective statement of admissibility here is not even conclusory; it leaves open the questions of what portions of [the expert’s] testimony it may have decided (or will decide) to exclude, whether [the expert] reliably applied the standard to the facts of the case, and, ultimately, whether Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. As a result, the district court never actually reached a conclusion about whether [the] expert report was reliable enough to support Plaintiffs’ class certification request. Instead it denied Honda’s motion to exclude without prejudice and noted that the case was in an ‘early stage of the proceedings.’”

Reviewing the expert’s report on the merits, the Seventh Circuit held that “our examination of the record reveals that exclusion is the inescapable result when the Daubert analysis is carried to its conclusion.” American Honda, at 817. The issue here was one of reliability rather than qualifications, but the Circuit Court noted that “even the most ‘supremely qualified expert cannot waltz into the courtroom and render opinions unless those opinions are based upon some recognized scientific method and are reliable and relevant under the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert.’” Id. (citing Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 759 n.5 (7th Cir.1999)). Based on the Court’s analysis, the expert’s testimony was unreliable, see id., at 817-18, and “expert testimony that is not scientifically reliable should not be admitted, even ‘at this early stage of the proceedings,’” id., at 819 (citation omitted). Because the expert’s testimony formed the foundation for Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance test, class action certification could not stand. Id. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit granted Honda’s petition for leave to appeal and vacated the denial of Honda’s motion to strike and the district court’s order grant of class action treatment. Id.

NOTE: In response to plaintiffs’ request that the Circuit Court deny leave to appeal, the Seventh Circuit explained, “Given the uncertainty surrounding the propriety of conducting a Daubert analysis at the class certification stage, and the frequency with which this issue arises, we find the question to be one appropriate for resolution under Rule 23(f).” American Honda, at 815 (citation omitted).

© 2010 Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP. All rights reserved.

About the Author:

Michael J. Hassen is a Litigation Partner at Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP with more than 23 years experience in general business and commercial litigation, including class action defense and matters involving intellectual property, securities and unfair competition.  415-984-9666 / www.jmbm.com