Tag: EU

New Application of Anti-Money Laundering Rules to Art Transactions

Art dealers and intermediaries are about to face new transparency regulations in several European nations. Art brokers and dealers involved in any cross-border transactions with people in E.U. nations should pay careful attention to the new rules as they roll out over the next year.

I. New European Union Rules

A recent European Council Directive will likely have a significant impact on European art and antiquities transactions by requiring brokers and dealers to identify buyers and sellers in most transactions.  The Directive, intended to increase transparency in the art market, aims to make it harder to launder money through anonymous art sales.

This Directive builds on more broadly applicable European Council directives designed to prevent abuse in financial transactions. (Council Directive 2015/849, art. 2 (EU) (“Fourth EU Money Laundering Directive”)). The Fourth EU Money Laundering Directive targets both money laundering, i.e., the transfer, concealment, or acquisition of property derived from criminal activity, as well as terrorist financing, i.e., providing funds that may be used to carry out terrorist activities.  (Fourth EU Money Laundering Directive, art. 1).

The recent Fifth EU Money Laundering Directive expands the scope of these rules to art dealers and brokers, specifically:

persons trading or acting as intermediaries in the trade of works of art, including when this is carried out by art galleries and auction houses, where the value of the transaction or a series of linked transactions amounts to EUR 10 000 or more; and

persons storing, trading or acting as intermediaries in the trade of works of art when this is carried out by free ports, where the value of the transaction or a series of linked transactions amounts to EUR 10 000 or more.

(Council Directive 2018/843, art. 1 (EU) (“Fifth EU Money Laundering Directive”)).

Under the new Fifth Directive, art gallerists, auction houses, brokers and dealers must conform to due diligence requirements designed to increase transparency, including:

…identifying the customer and verifying the customer’s identity…

identifying the beneficial owner and taking reasonable measures to verify that person’s identity…

verify[ing] that any person purporting to act on behalf of [a] customer is so authorised and identify[ing] and verify[ing] the identity of that person…

(Fourth EU Money Laundering Directive, art. 13).

The Fifth EU Money Laundering Directive will have a significant impact on legitimate art transactions.  Those involved in such transactions will need to take appropriate steps to determine the real parties in interest in the art transaction. This requirement runs counter to the industry practice in many transactions, where agents and intermediaries sometimes control information about the ultimate buyer.

The Fifth EU Money Laundering Directive became operative on July 9, 2018 but has no force until adopted in the national law of EU Member states. States have until January 2020 to adopt the provision into their national laws. Electronic copies of the Directives may be found here and here.

II. New Rules in the U.S.

U.S.-based art dealers, brokers, gallerists and auction houses should carefully consider how the Fifth Directive will apply to them if they are involved in art transactions occurring at least in part in E.U. Member states that have implemented the Directive in their national law. As with other E.U. rules, such as the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation, the applicability of E.U. law to U.S. entities is not always straightforward.

Here in the U.S., legislators have proposed similar rules, but none have yet been acted on. In the last session of Congress, a bipartisan House bill was introduced to amend the Bank Secrecy Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 et seq) to include “dealers in art or antiquities.” (115 H.R. 5886). Like the E.U. Fourth Directive, the Bank Secrecy Act aims to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, in part through recordkeeping standards and mandated reports of possible criminal activity. If the Act were amended to include those involved in art transactions, art dealers would be subject to the same requirements.

Electronic copies of the proposed bill (now expired) can be found here, and the Bank Secrecy Act can be found here.

 

© 1998-2019 Wiggin and Dana LLP

Brexit: Bracing for IP Changes

The United Kingdom is due to leave the European Union on March 29, 2019 (Brexit day). If the UK does leave the EU under the currently proposed terms, then the UK would enter a so-called transition period ending on December 31, 2020 and the current status quo would effectively be maintained during this period. However, the UK Parliament recently refused to ratify the current terms of withdrawal and there remains a risk that there will be a “no-deal” Brexit that would not include any transition period. From an intellectual property perspective, these uncertainties and tentative changes should be taken into consideration in the upcoming weeks when developing international filing strategies.

Trademarks

A no-deal Brexit has substantial implications for the continued protection and enforcement of EU trademarks in the UK. However, the position as it stands under the current agreement will be as follows:

  • EU trademark registrations currently on the register will have a duplicate UK registration automatically added to the UK register (no new filing required);
  • Current EU applications will have the same procedure once registered, even if the registration date is post-Brexit; and
  • For trademark applications post-Brexit, two filings will have to be made to cover the former 28 countries of the EU (one UK direct application and one EU application).

Under these prospective events moving forward, it is not anticipated that the EU Intellectual Property Office will decrease their costs for an EU application (because the territories covered decrease from 28 to 27). Accordingly, it may prove cost effective to file any anticipated EU applications before the March 29, 2019 deadline to avoid the need to file two applications.

Patents

There will be no change to the application processes for UK and European patents. Patents covering the UK are granted by two organizations: the UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO). Applications for patents can be filed directly with the UKIPO or EPO, or can be made pursuant to an international patent application filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Neither of these organizations are EU institutions and they will continue to function after Brexit.

Domain Names (.eu)

To register an .eu domain name, a person or entity must reside in or be established within the European Union. As a result, effective from March 30, 2019 (in the event of a no-deal Brexit) to January 1, 2021 (in the event the withdrawal agreement is ratified), entities that are established only in the UK – and natural persons who reside in the UK – will no longer be eligible to register .eu domain names, or to renew .eu domain names registered if they are .eu registrants, before Brexit day.

EURid, the registry manager of .eu domain names, has published a notice on its website which states that a no-deal Brexit will have the following consequences:

  1. UK registrants of .eu domain names will have until May 30, 2019 to update their contact details to an EU address or to transfer their domain names to an EU resident. During this period, their domain names will remain active but cannot be transferred to a UK registrant and will not be automatically renewed (but instead moved to “withdrawn” status).
  2. As of May 30, 2019 all registrants that do not demonstrate their eligibility will be deemed ineligible and their domain names will be withdrawn (that is, they can no longer support any active services such as websites or email), but they will remain in the .eu registry database and may be reactivated if the eligibility criteria are satisfied. On March 30, 2020 all the affected domain names will be revoked and will become available for general registration (which gives rise to a risk of cybersquatting).
© 2019 Varnum LLP
This post was written by Charles F. Gray and Erin Klug of © 2019 Varnum LLP.
Read more about Brexit on our National Law Review Global Page.

International Sanctions and the Energy Sector – Part 2: Russia

In the second part of this series we explore the EU and the US sanctions that have been imposed against the Russian energy sector.

RUSSIA

Background
The sanctions regimes against Russia were imposed in response to actual or alleged actions by the Russian government.  These included the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine in 2014, plus the alleged malicious cyber activities aimed at interfering with or undermining the 2016 US presidential election.

They initially targeted a number of individuals and companies alleged to be involved in these actions or those close to the Russian government.  However, they have since been expanded to include sanctions prohibiting activity in certain sectors of Russia’s economy (in particular its energy industry) and have also targeted a number of the so-called ‘Oligarchs’ and the companies in their control.

More recently, sanctions have been imposed in the wake of the Novichok nerve agent attack in Salisbury, UK.

This article concentrates on the sanctions directly targeting the Russian energy sector.

The EU Sectoral Sanctions
The EU sanctions targeting the Russian energy sector are primarily contained in Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (as amended) (the “EU Regulation”).  They seek to inhibit oil exploration and production projects in Russia:

  1. in waters deeper than 150 meters;
  2. in the offshore area north of the Arctic Circle; or
  3. which exploit shale formations by way of hydraulic fracturing.

(the “Targeted Projects”)

The sanctions operate in two key ways.  First, by preventing the sale, supply, transfer or export of the items listed in Annex II of the EU Regulation (which includes a number of items that can be used in the exploration or production of oil, for example, drill pipe and casing) by EU persons or from the EU for use in the Targeted Projects.1  Second, by prohibiting the direct or indirect provision of associated services necessary for the Targeted Projects, including: drilling, well testing, logging and completion services; and supply of specialised floating vessels.2

The EU Regulation also prohibits:

  1. certain dealings, directly or indirectly, with transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days and issued after 12 September 2014 by, or
  2. the making of loans or credit with a maturity over 30 days to,

certain Russian companies involved in the sale or transportation of crude oil or petroleum products, any non-EU subsidiaries owned 50% or more by them and any person acting on their behalf or at their direction.3  The companies currently listed in the EU Regulation are Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom Neft.

Finally, the EU Regulation states that prior authorisation is required in respect of the provision of certain assistance or financing related to the items listed in Annex II of the EU Regulation to individuals or entities in Russia or if the items are to be used in Russia.4

A separate EU regulation prohibits the sale, supply, transfer or export of certain goods and technology suited for use in the energy sector and for the exploration of oil, gas and mineral resources to Crimea or Sevastopol and any associated assistance of financing.5

The EU sanctions apply to anyone within the EU, any EU national or company incorporated in the EU (wherever they may be physically located), and to any business done in whole or in part in the EU.

The US Sectoral Sanctions
The US sanctions targeting the Russian energy sector are primarily contained in Executive Order 13662 (as amended) (the “Order”) and in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”).

The Order applies to “United States persons”.6  However, it could also apply to non-US persons in respect of any transaction that causes a US person to violate the Order or causes a violation of the Order to occur in the US.

In similar fashion to the EU Regulation, Directive 4 of the Order seeks to inhibit oil exploration and production from the Targeted Projects.  It does this by preventing goods, services (other than financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production from being provided to certain restricted entities and their 50% or more subsidiaries.

However, following the introduction of CAATSA in August 2017, the US sectoral sanctions went a step further than their EU counterparts.  In particular, CAATSA extended Directive 4 to include oil projects outside Russia in which the restricted Russian entities have a 33% or greater ownership interest or own the majority of the voting rights.  The US sectoral sanctions can therefore impact projects located far from Russian borders.

The Order also attacks the ability of key companies in the Russian energy sector to access the international debt markets.  Directive 2 of the Order prohibits new debt with a maturity of more than 60 days being issued to certain entities and their 50% or greater subsidiaries.

CAATSA contains various additional provisions impacting the Russian Energy Sector.  In particular, it provides for the:

  1. mandatory imposition of sanctions on non-US persons who knowingly7 make a significant investment8 in a project intended to extract crude oil from deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale projects in Russia (section 225); and
  2. discretionary imposition of sanctions on a person (not limited to US persons) who knowingly:
    1. makes an investment of $1 million or more (or an aggregate value of $5 million or more over a 12‑month period), which directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of the ability of Russia to construct energy export pipelines; or
    2. provides goods, services, technology, information or support to Russia, which could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernisation or repair of energy export pipelines. (section 232)

That section 232 refers to “energy export pipelines” is significant.  Unlike the previous sanctions targeting the oil sector, section 232 could be applied to pipelines carrying Russian gas, large amounts of which are imported by the EU.

These additional provisions purport to have extraterritorial effect, which means they are of concern to non-US persons who are otherwise outside the US jurisdiction.  Any non-US persons breaching these provisions may become subject to secondary sanctions that would severely restrict their ability to do business with the US and to access the US financial system, and therefore the international financial system.

The Reaction of Energy Companies
The sanctions imposed on the Russian energy sector have received mixed reactions among energy companies.  The differences between the EU and US sanctions, most especially the manner in which they are enforced, has led to the perception that US companies are more affected than their European counterparts.

Mostly, however, energy companies have been able to progress their projects unimpeded by the sanctions.  This likely reflects the types of projects being progressed in Russia since the sanctions came into force.

The EU and US sectoral sanctions target oil exploration and production from deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale projects in Russia.  Such projects are complicated and require the adoption of advanced techniques and technologies.  Accordingly, they are typically more expensive than, for example, conventional shallow water or onshore drilling operations.  Projects of this nature therefore tend to be uneconomic in periods of lower oil prices, such as those experienced since 2014.  For these reasons, it is possible that such projects might not have been pursued since 2014 even in the absence of sanctions.

In fact, Russian oil production has increased from 10.86 million barrels per day in 2014 to 11.23 million barrels per day in 2017, making it the world’s third largest producer in 2017 behind the US and Saudi Arabia.9  This is a clear indication that the sanctions have not had a significant impact on the Russian energy sector’s ability to produce crude.

Looking Forward
It is questionable whether the sanctions imposed on Russia’s energy sector have been effective.  They have not, it seems, prevented Russia from increasing its production of oil.  Neither have they prevented all deepwater, Arctic or shale projects from being progressed.  However, with higher oil prices than when the sanctions first took effect, the economics of such projects should become more palatable and Russia may begin to feel the impact of the sanctions to greater extents.

Furthermore, the extraterritorial aspects of CAATSA are likely to begin affecting the appetite of non-US persons to make significant investments in Russian energy export pipelines or in Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale projects.  There is also the risk of further sanctions.  The US Energy Secretary, Rick Perry, recently indicated that sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline are possible and that further energy‑related sanctions are planned.10   In addition, further sanctions on Russia in relation to the Novichok nerve agent attack in Salisbury, UK are expected, although it is not yet clear what form they will take and whether they will target Russia’s energy sector.11

In the first part of this three part series we considered the impact of President Trump’s decision to re-impose sanctions on Iran’s energy sector with effect from 5 November 2018.

________________________________________________________________

1 Article 3 of the EU Regulation.

2 Article 3a of the EU Regulation.

3 Articles 5(2) and 5(3) of the EU Regulation.

4 Article 4.3(a) of the EU Regulation.

5 Article 2(b) of Regulation EU No 692/2014.

6 United States persons is defined as “any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States” (Section 6(c) of Executive Order 13662).

7 “Knowingly” for these purposes means a person who had actual knowledge, or who should have known, of the conduct, circumstance or result.

8Guidance from the US Department of State that whether or not an investment is “significant” will be determined on a case by case basis taking into account inter aliathe nature and magnitude of the investment and its relation and significance to the Russian Energy Sector.

9here.

10here.

11 here.

 

© 2018 Bracewell LLP
This post was written by Robert Meade and Joshua C. Zive of Bracewell LLP.

Dutch Supervisory Authority Announces GDPR Investigation

On July 17, 2018, the Dutch Supervisory Authority announced that it will start a preliminary investigation to assess whether certain large corporations comply with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) – see the official press release here (in Dutch).  To that end, the authority will review the “records of processing activities” from thirty randomly selected corporations which are located in the Netherlands.

Article 30 of the GDPR requires data controllers and processors to maintain a record of their processing activities.  These records must, among other things, include a description of the categories of data subjects and types of personal data processed, as well as the recipients of the data and the transfer mechanisms used.  While small organizations with less than 250 employees are generally exempted, but there are several exceptions to the exemption which may still cause this obligation to apply to them as well.

The thirty corporations will be selected from ten different economic sectors across the Netherlands, namely: metal industry, water supply, construction, trade, catering, travel, communications, financial services, business services and healthcare.

According to the authority, the correct maintenance of records of processing activities is an important first indication of an organization’s compliance with the new EU data protection rules.

 

© 2018 Covington & Burling LLP
This post was written by Kristof Van Quathem of Covington & Burling LLP.

Three Important Considerations For All Businesses in Light of GDPR

Today, the European General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) takes effect. The GDPR is the most comprehensive and complex privacy regulation currently enacted. The GDPR can apply to a business or organization (including a non-profit organization) anywhere in the world and its potential financial impact is huge; fines can reach up to € 20 million Euros (over $23 million USD) or 4% of an entity’s total revenue, whichever is greater. Not surprisingly, the potential for this type of penalty has caused concern and chaos leading up to the May 25, 2018 effective date. In light of this significant international development, all organizations should consider the following:

1. Does the GDPR Apply?

If your entity “processes” the “personal data” of anyone within the European Union, then the GDPR may apply. “Personal data” under the GDPR is any information that could identify an individual, directly or indirectly, like a name, email address or even an IP address. The GDPR also broadly defines “processing” to include activities such as collecting, storing or using the personal data. For more information on how to determine if the GDPR applies to your entity, watch our 3-minute video on the subject.

2. If the GDPR Does Apply, What is the Compliance Strategy?

You need a plan. Yes, it would have been ideal to have it in place by today but if the GDPR applies to your entity, do not delay any further in creating a GDPR compliance strategy. A GDPR compliance strategy starts with a detailed examination of your entity’s data collection and use practices. Those practices must comply with the GDPR requirements and your entity may need to implement new or revised policies to address specific compliance requirements. This process is specific to the particular practices of each entity – there is no one-size-fits-all GDPR compliance program. You can find the regulatory language here.

3. Even If the GDPR Does Not Apply, How Do You Handle the Data You Collect?

Even if the GDPR does not apply to your entity, there are significant risks and liability surrounding the data collection and processing practices of any business. Data breaches happen every day. No business is immune. Each organization should closely examine its data collection and use practices and determine if it absolutely needs all of the data it collects. Then, the organization must determine whether the steps it is taking to protect the data it collects are reasonable in today’s environment. In Massachusetts, businesses must undergo this process and create a written information security plan. In Connecticut, having such a plan may help avoid a government enforcement action if you experience a data breach. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission and states’ Attorneys General are actively pursuing companies with questionable privacy practices.

© Copyright 2018 Murtha Cullina.
This post was written by Dena M. Castricone and Daniel J. Kagan of Murtha Cullina.

Getting Closer to put the UPC into Force

April 26, 2018 is a remarkable date: first it’s World IP Day celebrating IP around the world. Second, and this is unique, the British IP Minister Sam Gyimah MP announced that the UK ratified the Unified Patent Court Agreement (UPC Agreement). By doing so the UK agreed to be bound to both the UPC agreement and the UPC’s Protocol on Privileges and Immunities (PPI). The UPC will be a court common to the contracting member states within the EU having exclusive competence in respect of European Patents and European Patents with unitary effect.

In addition to Paris and Munich, London hosts a section of the Court’s central Division dealing with patents in the field of life sciences and pharmaceuticals. The way is now open for discussion about UK’s future within the UPC system after-Brexit. As of today, the UPC Agreement is ratified by 16 countries of the European Union.

To bring the Agreement into force, UK, France and Germany have to ratify the UPC Agreement and the PPI, now everyone is waiting for Germany, as France has already ratified.

Germany’s completion is currently on hold due to a constitutional complaint pending before the German Federal Constitutional Court.  According to rumours abound in the German IP community this complaint might be dismissed and the ratification will be finished during this year.

It’s time to get ready for playing with the new system!

 

Copyright 2018 K & L Gates.
This post was written by Christiane Schweizer of K & L Gates.
Read more on intellectual property on the National Law Review’s Intellectual Property Page.

GDPR May 25th Deadline Approaching – Businesses Globally Will Feel Impact

In less than four months, the General Data Protection Regulation (the “GDPR” or the “Regulation”) will take effect in the European Union/European Economic Area, giving individuals in the EU/EEA greater control over their personal data and imposing a sweeping set of privacy and data protection rules on data controllers and data processors alike. Failure to comply with the Regulation’s requirements could result in substantial fines of up to the greater of €20 million or 4% of a company’s annual worldwide gross revenues. Although many American companies that do not have a physical presence in the EU/EEA may have been ignoring GDPR compliance based on the mistaken belief that the Regulation’s burdens and obligations do not apply outside of the EU/EEA, they are doing so at their own peril.

A common misconception is that the Regulation only applies to EU/EEA-based corporations or multinational corporations with operations within the EU/EEA. However, the GDPR’s broad reach applies to any company that is offering goods or services to individuals located within the EU/EEA or monitoring the behavior of individuals in the EU/EEA, even if the company is located outside of the European territory. All companies within the GDPR’s ambit also must ensure that their data processors (i.e., vendors and other partners) process all personal data on the companies’ behalf in accordance with the Regulation, and are fully liable for any damage caused by their vendors’ non-compliant processing. Unsurprisingly, companies are using indemnity and insurance clauses in data processing agreements with their vendors to contractually shift any damages caused by non-compliant processing activities back onto the non-compliant processors, even if those vendors are not located in the EU/EEA. As a result, many American organizations that do not have direct operations in the EU/EEA nevertheless will need to comply with the GDPR because they are receiving, storing, using, or otherwise processing personal data on behalf of customers or business partners that are subject to the Regulation and its penalties. Indeed, all companies with a direct or indirect connection to the EU/EEA – including business relationships with entities that are covered by the Regulation – should be assessing the potential implications of the GDPR for their businesses.

Compliance with the Regulation is a substantial undertaking that, for most organizations, necessitates a wide range of changes, including:

  • Implementing “Privacy by Default” and “Privacy by Design”;
  • Maintaining appropriate data security;
  • Notifying European data protection agencies and consumers of data breaches on an expedited basis;
  • Taking responsibility for the security and processing of third-party vendors;
  • Conducting “Data Protection Impact Assessments” on new processing activities;
  • Instituting safeguards for cross-border transfers; and
  • Recordkeeping sufficient to demonstrate compliance on demand.

Failure to comply with the Regulation’s requirements carries significant risk. Most prominently, the GDPR empowers regulators to impose fines for non-compliance of up to the greater of €20 million or 4% of worldwide annual gross revenue. In addition to fines, regulators also may block non-compliant companies from accessing the EU/EEA marketplace through a variety of legal and technological methods. Even setting these potential penalties aside, simply being investigated for a potential GDPR violation will be costly, burdensome and disruptive, since during a pending investigation regulators have the authority to demand records demonstrating a company’s compliance, impose temporary data processing bans, and suspend cross-border data flows.

The impending May 25, 2018 deadline means that there are only a few months left for companies to get their compliance programs in place before regulators begin enforcement. In light of the substantial regulatory penalties and serious contractual implications of non-compliance, any company that could be required to meet the Regulation’s obligations should be assessing their current operations and implementing the necessary controls to ensure that they are processing personal data in a GDPR-compliant manner.

 

© 2018 Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP.
More on the GDPR at the NLR European Union Jurisdiction Page.

EU Adopts New Sanctions on North Korea

On 16 October, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted new EU autonomous measures reinforcing the sanctions on North Korea imposed by the UN Security Council, effective immediately. They include a total ban on EU investment in North Korea across all sectors, whereas previously the ban related to certain sectors, such as the arms industry and chemical industries. Also, there is a total ban on the sale of refined petroleum products and crude oil. The amount of personal remittances to North Korea has been lowered from €15,000 to €5,000 in light of suspicions that they are being used in support of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. In addition, three persons and six entities were added to the list of those subject to an asset freeze and travel restrictions.

This post was written by International Trade Practice at Squire Patton Boggs of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP., © Copyright 2017
For more Antitrust Law legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

Brexit: Limiting the Damage

It is one of the ironies of history that the EU as it is today, starting with the single market, was largely made in Britain, the achievement, above all, of former prime minister Margaret Thatcher and her right-hand man in Brussels, the then Commissioner (Lord) Arthur Cockfield. The single market has long been viewed by observers in countries with less of a free market tradition as a typically British liberal invention. And yet it is this market, as well as the EU itself, that another Conservative government is now seeking to leave.

Britain has also left its stamp on key EU initiatives from regional policy to development assistance and fisheries. The EU’s interest in a common foreign and security policy originally stemmed from Britain. The EU’s comparatively transparent and accountable administrative rules date from the reforms introduced by former British Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock when he was Vice-President of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004. Thus, representatives of Britain’s two major parties have helped to make the EU what it is today.

If British prime ministers had explained to public opinion earlier the extent of their country’s influence on the EU, something that other Europeans never doubted, the referendum of 23 June 2016 might never have occurred.

A “Smooth and Sensible” Brexit

Be that as it may, Europeans on both sides of the English Channel are now grappling with the consequences of that vote. If reason and economic interest prevail, a “smooth and sensible” Brexit, as evoked by the British prime minister in Florence in September, might yet emerge.

This would involve a broad agreement, in 2017, on the principal aspects of the divorce settlement. This concerns mainly Britain’s financial commitments to the EU, the residence, professional and health rights of citizens living on both sides of the Channel after Brexit, and the need to maintain the Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland and to avoid a hard border across the island of Ireland after Brexit. While Brussels, London and Dublin have affirmed their intention of achieving these goals, there are many practical and political issues to resolve.

If sufficient confidence and trust between EU and UK negotiators is established, it should also be possible to agree to the general terms of a future political and economic agreement between London and Brussels by the end of the year and to broach the question of transitional arrangements to smooth the way for government and business. The British government wishes to ensure that business need adjust to Brexit only once, hence the need for a smooth transition to a well-defined future relationship.

If good progress is made next year, the separation agreement and transitional arrangements could be drawn up by October 2018, allowing enough time for approval by EU and British institutions ahead of Britain’s exit from the EU at midnight between 29 and 30 October 2019. Little, except Britain’s lost vote in EU institutions, would then change for the next two to three years, as the UK continued to make payments to the EU budget, respect judgements of the European Court of Justice and accept the free movement of labour.

The breathing space would be used to negotiate, sign and ratify a two-part long-term agreement. The first part would cover trade and economic issues; it could take effect provisionally relatively quickly after agreement had been reached. The second part, though, would be a wide-ranging political agreement, involving security and even aspects of defence. Both sides have an interest in cooperation on armaments production and unconventional forms of conflict, as well as police and judicial affairs. This would involve the member states’ legal responsibilities and require ratification by all twenty-eight countries concerned. It might not come into effect before the mid-late 2020s.

This relatively benign sequence of events assumes that the British government is unified behind its negotiator, David Davies, and that the political situation in Britain and the EU remains generally stable. It also assumes that the EU can move beyond its rigid two-stage sequencing of the negotiations.

However, there may well be political upsets, involving a leadership competition in the Conservative Party and, perhaps, an early general election. The opposition Labour Party may come to power bringing a change in priorities but also differences of opinion in its own ranks. The British economy will be damaged by Brexit, according to leading economists, and public opinion is likely to react when this is widely felt.[1]Until now, the main impact has been a decline in sterling and rising inflation, raising the prospect of higher interest rates.

The “Cliff Edge” Scenario

Such uncertainties, as well as the divergent political agendas of London and Brussels, may make the smooth and sensible Brexit impossible to achieve during the limited time available. This opens the way to a second scenario, widely described in Britain as the cliff edge. Under this hypothesis, the December 2017 goal for achieving a breakthrough in the separation talks is missed. This further postpones discussion of transitional arrangements and a future long-term agreement.

Negotiations continue fitfully during 2018 but the two sides are too far apart to reach agreement by October 2018, which the EU chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, has designated as the effective deadline. If October passes without an overall agreement, it will probably be too late to secure the agreement of the European Parliament before 29 March 2019, when the two-year negotiating period initiated by the British government’s notification of withdrawal expires. Nonetheless, negotiations might well go down to the wire.

Unless all twenty-eight countries “stop the clock” at midnight, an old Brussels ruse, the UK would then leave the EU without an agreement. Business leaders have warned of the chaos this will bring. There will be an unmanageable fivefold increase in work at British, Irish and mainland European ports checking consignments, the suspension of air travel between the UK and the EU, pending the conclusion of a new air transport agreement, and other major disruptions.

Health, safety, veterinary and phytosanitary inspections, as well as the assessment of customs duties, would lead to long queues of lorries at ports on both sides of the channel. Neither side can build the necessary infrastructure and linked IT systems or recruit sufficient qualified staff in time to cope with dramatically increased requirements after a hard Brexit. Supply chains would be disrupted and many foreign-owned companies, which had not already relocated to remaining EU countries, would seek to do so rapidly.

The political and economic damage of going over the cliff edge would last for years and embitter the UK’s relations with the EU and third countries. Many would question the value of Britain’s WTO commitments in the absence of appropriate trading arrangements between Britain and the EU.

This then is a sketch of the cliff edge. Those who admire Britain for its pragmatism, fairness and common sense find it hard to believe that such a scenario might become reality. Surely, they say, Britain and the EU are involved in preliminary skirmishing of the type that precedes any negotiation. They are sure to come to their senses as the decisive deadlines approach. Nothing is less than certain.

A Tale of “Downside” Risks

The outcome may well diverge from either the optimistic or the pessimistic scenarios delineated above. However, the risks are mainly “downside” as the economists put it. British negotiators have not yet grasped the fundamentally asymmetric nature of negotiations between twenty-seven countries backed by European institutions on the one side and a single country seeking to leave the club on the other. It would be better for government, business and the public, if this reality were more widely recognized, leading to realistic negotiating targets. Indeed, Brexit is not really a negotiation at all in the usual sense. It is rather an effort by the leaving country to secure some exceptions from the club’s rules at the time of its departure. This is much akin to the efforts of a candidate (joining) country to achieve some, temporary, transitional exceptions to the EU’s rules.

The Brexit talks are essentially an exercise in damage limitation, mainly through transitional arrangements. When the divorce and transitional arrangements have been agreed, Britain and the EU can concentrate on negotiating a long-term partnership which will be in their mutual interest.

This post was written by Michael Leigh of Covington & Burling LLP., © 2017
For more Global legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election; Brexit West?

brexit westIt is hard to overstate the political and policy parallels between the recent UK “Brexit” vote to leave the European Union (“EU”) and the pending U.S. presidential election.  Both cases reflect the significant tensions between globalism and national sovereignty, as well as the competing ideologies of capitalism and what might be described as European corporatism.  The narrowly-decided Brexit vote can be viewed as a reassertion of national sovereignty, reflecting deep political divisions and concerns about economic dislocation, immigration, and national security.  Similar political forces in the U.S. have given rise to the unlikely presidential candidacy of Donald Trump.

Regardless of the outcome of the November 8 election, these underlying political forces will continue to shape public policy on both sides of the Atlantic.  With respect to Brexit, the UK Prime Minister Theresa May recently revealed that she will trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty no later than the end of March 2017.  Recent statements suggest that the United Kingdom may force a “hard Brexit,” i.e., leaving the EU within two years and without the framework for the future relation with the EU being agreed upon.  In other words, the pace of fundamental policy changes could be much faster than many observers currently anticipate.

Importantly, domestic policy outcomes will depend, to unprecedented extent, on discussions that will occur at an international level.  Understanding these dynamics will be the key to successful strategies for favorably influencing policy outcomes in Brussels, London, and Washington, DC.  This analysis briefly touches on some of the key policymakers who will shape the complex interplay between the U.S., the UK, and the EU, demonstrating that a government relations function will be an important facet on every successful strategic business plan.

United Kingdom

Theresa May, United Kingdom Prime Minister

As leader of a Conservative UK government, Theresa May will play an integral role in setting the tone on the UK side of the Brexit negotiations.

Rt. Hon. David Davis, MP and Secretary of State for Exiting the EU

David Davis will manage policy decisions in the Brexit negotiations and work to establish the future relationship between the EU and UK.

Oliver Robbins, Permanent Secretary for the Department of Exiting the EU

Oliver Robbins will be responsible for supporting the newly-formed Department of Exiting the EU in the Brexit negotiations.

Rt. Hon. Liam Fox, MP and Secretary of State for International Trade

Liam Fox will develop and negotiate free trade agreements with non-EU countries.

Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board

Mark Carney will set policy for the Bank of England and will attempt to mitigate shocks to the UK economy throughout the negotiations (his term was recently extended until mid-2019).

European Union

Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission

Jean-Claude Juncker will head the European Commission and will set policy for the EU in the Brexit negotiations

Michel Barnier, Chief EU Negotiator

Michael Barnier, former-European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, will lead the Brexit negotiations for the EU.

Didier Seeuws, Official Negotiator for European Council

Didier Seeuws will lead a “Brexit taskforce” of EU negotiators that will focus on technical issues of the treaty negotiations.

Guy Verhofstadt, Member of the European Parliament and European Parliament Brexit Negotiator

Guy Verhofstadt will represent the European Parliament in the Brexit negotiations.

Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank

Mario Draghi and the European Central Bank will likely act in an advisory capacity for the EU during the Brexit negotiations.

United States

Considering Hillary Clinton’s and Donald Trump’s opposing views on the government’s role in the financial system, the outcome of the U.S. election will likely impact the ongoing global regulatory tension between market-based capitalism and state-based corporatism.  Moreover, the U.S. plays a key role on such international bodies as the G20, the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”), International Organization of Securities Commissions, and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which will serve as echo chambers as the new bilateral and multilateral agreements are negotiated.

Hon. Hillary Clinton, Democratic Presidential Nominee

Hillary Clinton will draw on her experience as Secretary of State as the U.S. reacts to Brexit negotiations.  A Clinton Administration will be much more inclined to embrace the trend that emerged after the 2008 financial crisis of greater international cooperation on financial regulation.  A likely hallmark of Hillary Clinton’s approach is an emphasis on collaborating with international economic powers to reduce risks to the stability of the global financial markets.  In this regard, a Clinton Administration will probably be receptive to engaging international regulatory bodies on heightened global capital requirements for financial institutions and on more stringent margin and collateral rules for securities and derivatives transactions.  Additionally, Hillary Clinton has advocated in favor of international regulations for resolving globally active financial institutions that could pose a risk to the financial system and called for an expansion of the authority of regulators to police financial market activity, including providing them additional authority to address risky activity in the “shadow banking” sector.

Donald Trump, Republican Presidential Nominee

If Donald Trump wins the election, his nationalistic policy agenda will probably place far less emphasis on international financial regulation.  More specifically, a Trump Administration will likely shun the macro-prudential framework set forth by the FSB and the G-20.  A Trump Administration may also revisit financial markets regulation with an eye toward U.S. competitiveness.  While the Republican Party platform included a provision calling for the resurrection of the Glass-Steagall Act, Republicans are unlikely to pursue this as a policy objective.  More likely, the House Republican financial reform proposals, principally House Financial Services Committee Chairman Rep. Jeb Hensarling’s (R-TX) Financial CHOICE Act, will be the foundation for any financial reforms in a Trump Administration.

What Can Be Done?

These turbulent times will produce winners and losers on both sides of the Atlantic.  Accordingly, government relations efforts to favorably influence policy outcomes will be an integral component of every successful strategic business plan.  That requires a deep understanding of the nuts and bolts of the relevant issues and relationships with key policymakers in the U.S., UK, EU so they can receive the best input on the merits of competing regulatory alternatives.

ARTICLE BY Daniel F. C. Crowley,  Bart Gordon, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Giovanni Campi & Ignasi Guardans of K & L Gates

Copyright 2016 K & L Gates