Trade Mark Re-filing And Bad Faith – Go Directly To Jail. Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200

Hasbro Inc. (Hasbro), owner of the well-loved board game Monopoly, suffered a defeat on 22 July 2019, before the EUIPO Board of Appeal in relation to the MONOPOLY trade mark. The EU registration for the MONOPOLY trade mark was partially invalidated as it was found that Hasbro had acted in bad faith when filing the application as part of a ‘trade mark re-filing’ programme.

Background

Hasbro applied to register the trade mark MONOPOLY for goods and services in Classes 9, 16, 28 and 41 of the Nice Classification. The application was published on 9 August 2010 and the mark was registered on 25 March 2011. Kreativini Dogadaji d.o.o (KD) filed an application for invalidation of the trademark in 2015, arguing that it had been registered in bad faith on the basis that the mark was a repeat filing of three identical earlier trade mark registrations for MONOPOLY.

Acting in bad faith

The EUTM Regulation states that a trade mark shall be declared invalid where the applicant acted in bad faith at the time of filing the application for the trade mark. However, EU trade mark law does not provide a definitive clarification of bad faith and ‘bad faith’ is not defined in the EUTM Directive or Regulation. The most notable case from the CJEU dealing with bad faith is the Lindt Goldhase-case (C-529/07) which sets out three areas of consideration:

  1. the applicant knows that a third party is using, in at least one member state, an identical/similar sign for an identical/similar product or service for which the registration is sought

  2. the applicant’s intention of preventing that third party from using the sign, and

  3. the degree of legal protection enjoyed by the third party’s sign and by the sign for which registration is sought.

Nonetheless, these factors are only examples and are not exhaustive, ‘bad faith’ cannot be restrained to a limited set of circumstances.

Findings of Board of Appeal

The Board of Appeal found that Hasbro had a dishonest intention at the time of filing the contested EUTM on the basis that Hasbro had previously filed and successfully registered MONOPOLY as an EUTM on three previous occasions. This dishonest intention was found because Hasbro had repeated filings in effect to circumvent the legal risk of removal due to non-use after five years. Although Hasbro claimed it had been adding more goods and services with each subsequent re-filing, the Board of Appeal did not deem it an acceptable excuse. The Board therefore invalidated the MONOPOLY mark for all goods and services identical or similar to those covered by the earlier trade marks.

The Key Takeaways

Hasbro did try to argue that their re-filing tactic was common practice in maintaining ownership of a trade mark, which it is, but the decision highlights that a tactics popularity does not equate to acceptability or legality. Brand owners should carefully consider the risk of invalidation or opposition on the basis of bad faith when filing future trade mark applications for existing brands.


Copyright 2019 K & L Gates
ARTICLE BY Niall J. Lavery and Simon Casinader of K&L Gates.
For more trade mark cases, see the Intellectual Property law page on the National Law Review.

War of the Words: Ninth Circuit Reverses Judgment for the Insurer in Rare War Exclusion Case

In Universal Cable Prods. LLC v. Atlantic Specialty Ins. Co., 2:16 cv-04435 PA, (9th Cir. July 12, 2019), the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s determinations as it relates to the application of two war exclusions.

In the summer of 2014, Universal Cable Productions wasfilming a television series, Dig, in Jerusalem.  During filming, hostilities arose in the region as Hamas, a Palestinian political movement, began firing rockets from Gaza into Israel.  The ongoing and escalating Israeli-Palestinian strife caused Universal to halt production, and ultimately move it out of the area.  Not surprisingly, the move resulted in significant expenses, prompting Universal to file a claim under its television production policy in order to cover the costs.

The insurer denied coverage for the claim, relying, for apparently the first time, on the applicability of the policy’s war exclusions.  The exclusions, which the insurer argued were triggered by Hamas’ firing of rockets, barred coverage for expenses resulting from: war, warlike action by a military force, or insurrection, rebellion, or revolution.  Universal countered that the exclusions are not applicable because the terms in the exclusions had a specialized meaning in the insurance context, and the Hamas action did not comport with that meaning.  The district court, refusing to apply any specialized meaning and instead using the plain meaning of the terms, sided with the insurer and found that Hamas’ actions clearly constituted war or warlike action which triggered the application of the exclusions.  Universal appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s analysis—namely the district court’s refusal to apply the alleged specialized meaning of the exclusions’ terms—finding that a provision of the California Civil Code required the application of specialized meaning when the meaning has been developed from customary usage.  The appellate court first found that the principal construing any ambiguity in favor of the insured was not applicable.  In doing so, the court noted that “the typical concerns animating [that principle] do not exist here.”  Next, the court found that because the terms “war” and “warlike action by a military force” had acquired a special meaning via usage, that special meaning must be followed and failure to do so “is reversible error.”  The court determined that in the insurance context, “war” and “warlike action by a military force” required the existence of “de jure” or “de facto” governments and because the court found that Hamas is neither, the exclusions did not work to bar coverage. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s ruling in favor of the insured.


©2011-2019 Carlton Fields, P.A.

Article by Roben West of Carlton Fields.
For more insurance law, see the National Law Review Insurance Reinsurance & Surety law page.

Esports Star Tfue Sues To Void His Contract With FaZe Clan

Fortnite player Turner Tenney, professionally known as “Tfue,” has sued to void his contract with Esports team, FaZe Clan, Inc. Tfue’s action, filed in Los Angeles Superior Court, alleges that the terms of the contract he signed to play for FaZe Clan’s Fortnite team are grossly oppressive, onerous, and one-sided and in violation of California law. His action could have a significant impact on the Esports industry and the players who participate in Esports as professional gamers.

Recognized as one of the world’s best Fortnite players, Tfue entered in an agreement with FaZe in April 2018.

The Complaint alleges that Tfue did not understand the terms of the agreement he signed and that he was exploited by FaZe. It further alleges that FaZe breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty by failing to share profits with him as mandated by the terms of his agreement and by rejecting a sponsorship deal and acting against his best interests. In addition,

Tfue alleges multiple violations of California law, including Section 16600 of the California Business and Professions Code, Section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code, and California’s Talent Agency Act.

The contract refers to Tfue as an independent contractor. It mandates that he play in tournaments and training sessions, perform three days a month of publicity and promotional services, and participate in the company’s social media campaigns. In addition, Tfue is required to wear clothing bearing FaZe logos and identification, as well as items associated with specific FaZe Clan sponsors.

In exchange for an initial monthly base pay of $2,000 for the first six months of the contract, FaZe had an option to extend its deal with Tfue for an additional three-year period (which the company exercised) and unilaterally increase or decrease his monthly by 25%. The agreement also entitles Tfue to 80% of cash prizes earned from playing in Fortnite tournaments and an equal split with FaZe Clan of income earned from in-game merchandise, appearances, and touring and sign-up bonuses. The agreement also provides finder’s fees for brand deals that feature Tfue that can result in as much as 80% of the deal being retained by FaZe. The contract also limit Tfue’s ability to sign with another esports company at the end of his contract in 2021.

Tfue also seeks repayment of his sponsorship, fees, and commissions, as well as additional compensatory damages and punitive damages. In addition, he seeks to enjoin FaZe Clan’s ongoing alleged violations of California law.

It is probable that the court venue will be challenged. The agreement between FaZe and Tfue contains a choice-of-law provision, which provides that the agreement “shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York” and the parties “submit exclusively to the state or federal courts in New York, NY for any claim” arising from the contract.

This suit will be watched closely by the industry. The lack of industry regulation and unified structure, employment law issues appear ripe for litigation. Esports team owners should ensure their contracts with players comply with federal and state employment laws and the contract language clearly defines sponsorships and endorsements, compensation, arbitration clauses, hours of service, health insurance, non-competition, and anticipated event participation.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019
More in video gaming legal concerns on the National Law Review Entertainment, Art & Sports page.

Kentucky to Begin Taxing Video Streaming Services under Telecom Tax

Legislators in Frankfort added a new “video streaming service” tax to the omnibus tax bill (HB 354) as part of a closed-door conference committee process before the bill was hastily passed in the House and Senate. Notably, the new video streaming service tax was not previously raised or discussed as part of HB 354 (or any other Kentucky legislation) before it was included in the final conference committee report that passed the General Assembly in March.

Specifically, as passed by the General Assembly, HB 354 will add “video streaming services” to the definition of “multichannel video programming service” subject to the telecom excise tax.  This is the same tax imposition that the Department of Revenue argued applied to video streaming services in the Netflix litigation—an argument that was rejected by the courts in Kentucky and then subsequently settled on appeal. Under existing law, Kentucky taxes “digital property” under the sales and use tax. The term is broadly defined and applies to audio streaming services, but expressly carves out “digital audio-visual works” (i.e., downloaded movies, TV shows and video; defined consistently with the SSUTA) from the scope of the sales and use tax imposition. HB 354 would not modify the treatment of digital goods and services under the sales and use tax, and changes that would be implemented are limited to the telecom excise tax imposed on the retail purchase of a multichannel video programming service.

As amended by HB 354, the definition of “multichannel video programming service” for purposes of the telecom excise tax would be expanded to mean “live, scheduled, or on-demand programming provided by or generally considered comparable to or in competition with programming provided by a television broadcast station and shall include but not be limited to: (a) Cable service; (b) Satellite broadcast and wireless cable service; and (c) Internet protocol television provided through wireline facilities without regard to delivery technology; and (d) video streaming services.” The legislation defines “video streaming services” as “programming that streams live events, movies, syndicated and television programming, or other audio-visual content over the Internet for viewing on a television or other electronic device with or without regard to a particular viewing schedule.” Thus, the “video streaming services” language in HB 354 would clearly subject over-the-top video streaming service providers to the excise tax on the retail purchase of a multichannel video programming service. As passed by the General Assembly, the new video streaming services excise tax in HB 354 would “apply to transactions occurring on or after July 1, 2019.”

Governor Matt Bevin signed HB 354 into law on March 26, 2019. The General Assembly subsequently passed a “cleanup bill” (HB 458) that was enacted into law last month, but it did not make any changes to the part of HB 354 that expanded the scope of the tax on multichannel video programming services to include video streaming services.

Kentucky is a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Governing Board. Taxation of electronically transferred audio-visual works is something specifically dealt with in the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA). The SSUTA also prohibit the enactment of so-called “replacement taxes” that have the effect of avoiding the provisions of the SSUTA.  Kentucky’s inclusion of streamed movies in its tax on multichannel video programming services, a regime outside the sales and use tax, could run afoul of the SSUTA’s prohibition on replacement taxes, potentially putting the state out of compliance with the SSUTA and exposing it to the risk of sanctions by the Governing Board.

Practice Note:  From an administrability and compliance point of view, enacting a new tax on digital goods and services as part of excise or gross receipts taxes outside the generally applicable sales and use tax poses significant problems. Many businesses that are not telecom providers simply do not have the compliance infrastructure to allow them to collect and remit taxes other than sales and use taxes. In addition, by taxing certain digital goods and services under a tax other than what is applicable to similar content sold via a tangible medium (such as a physical movie rental or viewing a movie in theater), the federal Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act enacted by Congress may be implicated and pose a litigation risk to the state. Both the compliance nightmare and litigation risk could be easily avoided by imposing the tax under the sales and use tax (as opposed to miscellaneous excise or gross receipts taxes). We will continue to monitor the digital tax climate in Kentucky, and encourage companies impacted by this new imposition to contact the authors to discuss this issue in more detail.

© 2019 McDermott Will & Emery
Read more SALT news on the National Law Review’s Tax page.

Chicago and Cook County Amusement Tax

In previous posts, we have explored several local Illinois taxes, including the Chicago Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax and Cook County Parking Lot Tax. Also notable is the Chicago and Cook County Amusement Tax, which can apply more broadly than taxpayers often anticipate. Specifically the scope of the amusement tax has been expanded over the last few years to non-traditional amusements, including electronically transferred television shows, movies, videos, music, and games.

Imposition of The Amusement Tax

Although the Chicago and Cook County amusement tax are imposed similarly on taxpayers, they are independently administered taxes that feature key differences. Both the Chicago Amusement Tax Ordinance (“Chicago Ordinance”) and Cook County Amusement Tax Ordinance (“Cook County Ordinance”) impose the tax “upon the patrons of every amusement” within the city or county, but require the owner, manager, or operator of the amusement to collect the tax from each patron and remit the tax to the Chicago Department of Finance (“Chicago Department”) or the Cook County Department of Revenue (“Cook County Department”).[1] Further, both Ordinances define “amusement” as “any exhibition, performance, presentation or show for entertainment purposes”.[2]

Where the Chicago and Cook County Ordinances deviate, however, are the examples used to define “amusement”, the rates of tax, and applicable exemptions. For example, although the Ordinances provide similar examples of qualifying amusements, including a motion picture show, athletic contest, or any theatrical, musical or spectacular performance, the Chicago Ordinance also includes “paid television programming” viewed within or outside the home.[3] In contrast, the County Ordinance does not include such language. Additionally, whereas the Chicago Ordinance imposes the amusement tax at a rate of 9 percent of the admission fees or other charges paid for the privilege to enter, witness, view or participate in the amusement, the County Ordinance imposes the tax at a rate of 3 percent (unless a lower rate applies, as addressed below).[4]

Further, the Chicago and Cook County Ordinances often exempt different activities. For example, although both Ordinances exempt admission fees to witness in person “live theatrical, live musical or other live cultural performances that take place in any auditorium, theater or other space”[5] with a certain limited capacity (“Small Venue Exemption”), the Ordinances include a different capacity limitation. Under the Chicago Ordinance, the Small Venue Exemption renders the amusement tax inapplicable where the maximum capacity of the venue, including all balconies and all sections, is not more than 1,500 persons.[6] In contrast, under the Cook County Ordinance, the Small Venue Exemption only applies where the venue has a capacity of not more than 750 persons.[7] Further, if the venue has a capacity of more than 750 persons, but fewer than 5,000 persons, the Cook County amusement tax applies at a rate of 1 percent rather than the general rate of 3 percent.[8] This serves as a notable example of where the Ordinances may appear to be substantially similar but in fact feature key differences. Additionally, whereas the City clarified in a 2004 Amusement Tax Ruling that “primarily educational” activities are not taxable amusements, Cook County has not released similar guidance.[9] The result is that depending on the nature of the activity, amusement tax may apply in one but not both jurisdictions.

Identifying Taxable “Admission Fees”

A contested issue in applying the amusement tax in both Chicago and Cook County is the amount that compromises the taxable “admission fees or other charges paid for the privilege to enter, witness, view” such amusement.[10] For example, in 2014, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that under the Cook County Ordinance, for club seats and luxury suites to Chicago Bears home football games, “admission fees or other charges” include the amenities available to holders of club seat tickets and tangible personal property included in the luxury suite admission price, not just the value of the home seat games.[11] The Court determined that because a fan cannot witness a game from a club seat without paying the club privilege fee and annual licensing fee, it is not possible to separate the “other charges” from the fee paid to enter the stadium.[12] As a result, the Illinois Appellate Court determined the full price paid by club seat holders and luxury suite licensees is subject to the County’s amusement tax. This decision may lead to efforts by the Chicago Department and Cook County Department to expand a taxpayer’s taxable base beyond the mere value of a “seat”. For example, both the County and the City have been aggressive in their application of the amusement tax to service fees despite clear language in the Ordinances that exempts separately stated optional charges.[13]

Expanding the Scope to Electronically Transferred Amusements

The Chicago Department has recently become aggressive in its expansion of the scope of the Chicago Ordinance. In a 2015 Amusement Tax Ruling, the Chicago Department asserted that the amusement tax is imposed “not only [on] charges paid for the privilege to witness, view or participate in amusements in person but also charges paid for the privilege to witness, view or participate in amusements that are delivered electronically.”[14] As a result, the Chicago Department intended to clarify that the Chicago amusement tax applies to fees or charges for the following if delivered in the City: (1) watching electronically delivered television shows, movies or videos; (2) listening to electronically delivered music; and (3) participating in games, on-line or otherwise.[15] Although treated with resistance by taxpayers[16], the implication is that the City Department has the authority to impose the amusement tax on users of streaming services such as Netflix and Spotify, and online gaming, such as PlayStation. Following the Mobile Telecommunication’s Sourcing Conformity Act[17], the amusement tax applies to customers whose residential street address or primary business address is in Chicago, as reflected by their credit card billing address, zip code or other reliable information.[18]

Further, as explored briefly above, the Chicago Ordinance treats “paid television programming” as a taxable amusement.[19] “Paid television” means programming that can be viewed on a television or other screen, and is transmitted by cable, fiber optics, laser, microwave, radio, satellite or similar means to members of the public for consideration.[20] Additionally, an “owner” includes “any person operating a community antenna television system or wireless cable television system, or any other person receiving consideration from the patron for furnishing, transmitting, or otherwise providing access to paid television programming.”[21]

In 2014, the Chicago Department began auditing and assessing amusement tax on a number of restaurants and bars located through the City who subscribed to paid satellite television programming and who did not collect the amusement tax[22]. In a move to clarify the application of the tax, in November 2016, the Chicago Department released an Informational Bulletin that provided additional information to business subscribers of satellite television regarding their obligation to collect and remit the Chicago amusement tax. As a result, bars, restaurants and any other businesses that subscribe to satellite television are required to remit the Chicago amusement tax on charges paid for satellite television services used in Chicago.

Applicability to Ticket Resellers and Agents

An area of uncertainty within both the Chicago and Cook County amusement tax is the potential applicability to ticket resellers and agents. The issue dates back to 2006 when the Chicago Department amended the Chicago Ordinance to require not only a “reseller” but also a “reseller’s agent” to collect and remit amusement tax.[23]This amendment set the stage for the Chicago Department to attempt to collect the tax from StubHub as a reseller’s agent. StubHub is an internet auction listing service that operates a “platform” where it charges buyers and sellers a fee to buy and sell ticket to various events.

On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the Court entered a significant decision for online auctioneers, holding that municipalities may not require electronic intermediaries to collect and remit amusement taxes on resold tickets.[24] The basis of the Court’s ruling is that although the Illinois Ticket Sale and Resale Act (the “Act”) [25]gives municipalities the authority to require sellers and resellers of tickets to collect the amusement tax, municipalities do not have the authority to require internet auction listing services, such as StubHub, to collect the tax.[26] Although both the Chicago and Cook County Ordinance still define an “operator” as a person who “sells or resells a ticket”, the Stubhub decision resulted in the removal of the term “reseller’s agent” and “auctioneer” from the Chicago Ordinance.[27]

Conclusion

Although the Chicago and Cook County amusement tax are similarly imposed, there are notable differences between the applicability of the Chicago and Cook County Ordinances. These differences are particularly noteworthy with respect to potential exemptions and electronically transferred amusements. Accordingly, taxpayers should not assume that because the amusement tax applies in one locality, it applies in both Chicago and Cook County.


[1] Municipal Code of Chicago (“M.C.C.”) § 4-156-020(A), 4-146-030(A); Cook County Ordinance (“C.C.O.”) § 74-392(a), 74-395(a).

[2] M.C.C. § 4-156-010; C.C.O. § 74-391.

[3] M.C.C. § 4-156-010.

[4] M.C.C. § 4-156-020; C.C.O. § 74-392.

[5] The Chicago and Cook County Ordinance define “live theatrical, live musical or other live cultural performance” identically as a “live performance in any of the disciplines which are commonly regarded as part of the fine arts, such as live theater, music, opera, drama, comedy, ballet, modern or traditional dance, and book or poetry readings. The term does not include such amusements as athletic events, races, or performances conducted as adult entertainment cabarets.” M.C.C. § 4-156-010; C.C.O. § 74-391. In this regard, the Chicago Department and Cook County Department appear to play the role of an art critic, defining which activities qualify as “fine arts”. See a prior post exploring the issue in the context of disc jockeys.

[6] M.C.C. § 4-156-020(D).

[7] C.C.O. § 74-392(d).

[8] C.C.O. § 74-392(f)(1).

[9] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #1, ¶ 2.

[10] M.C.C. § 4-156-020; C.C.O. § 74-392.

[11] Chi. Bears Football Club v. Cook County Dep’t of Revenue, 16 N.E.3d 827, 835 (2014).

[12] Id. at 834. In determining the full price paid by club seat ticket holders and luxury suite licensees is subject to the amusement tax, the Court affirmed the reasoning of the court in Stasko v. City of Chicago, 997 N.E.2d 975, 993 (2013)(holding that the Chicago Ordinance applied because purchasing the permanent seat license was a prerequisite to viewing the game).

[13] M.C.C. § 4-156-020(H); C.C.O. § 74-392(e)(3).

[14] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #5.

[15] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #5, ¶ 8.

[16] The Chicago amusement tax, as it applies to certain electronically delivered amusements, such as paid television, was challenged but held by the Cook County Circuit Court to be constitutional in Labell v. City of Chicago, Case No. 15 CH 13399 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct. May 24, 2018). In this application, the amusement tax is often derisively referred to as the “ Cloud Tax” or the “Netflix Tax“.

[17] 35 ILCS 638.

[18] Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling #5, ¶ 13.

[19] M.C.C. § 4-156-010.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] For additional background regarding the Department’s efforts to collect the Chicago amusement tax from satellite providers, see a prior post.

[23] Under the Chicago Ordinance, a reseller’s agent is a “person who, for consideration, resells a ticket on behalf of the ticket’s owner or assists the owner in reselling the ticket. The term includes but is not limited to an auctioneer, a broker or a seller of tickets for amusements, as those terms are used in 65 ILCS 5/11-42-1, and applies whether the ticket is resold by bidding, consignment or otherwise, and whether the ticket is resold in person, at a site on the Internet or otherwise.” M.C.C. § 4-156-010 (amended May 24, 2006).

[24] City of Chicago v. Stubhub, Inc., 979 N.E.2d 844, 845 (2011).

[25] 720 ILCS 375/0.01 et seq. (2010).

[26] Stubhub, Inc., 979 N.E.2d at 857.

[27] M.C.C. § 4-156-010; C.C.O. § 74-391.

 

© Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered 2019. All Rights Reserved.

“Inclusion Riders” On The Storm

Oscar-winner Frances McDormand ended her acceptance speech with a reference to two words – “Inclusion Rider” – that sent many Oscar viewers scrambling to Google her cryptic message. But the term, and its legal implications, are somewhat more complicated than several news and entertainment outlets are reporting today. The term “inclusion rider” was coined a few years ago by Dr. Stacy Smith, the founder and director of the Annenberg Inclusion Initiative  at USC. Dr. Smith delivered a Ted Talk in 2016 describing an inclusion rider as a potential solution to ongoing diversity issues and concerns in Hollywood. Specifically, she described the idea of having A-list actors demand provisions in their contracts that call for all the roles in whatever project they are working on to reflect broader demographics.

There is likely nothing wrong with a narrowly-tailored and creative provision like the one Dr. Smith described in her Ted Talk. Creative types already have in some instances exercised considerable leeway in setting their own casting criteria, and one need look no further than the hit Broadway musical “Hamilton” with its famously diverse casting to understand that under the rubric of creative choice, such standards can pass muster (although they may still face opposition).

Notwithstanding what may happen in the creative/artistic space, explicit demands or requirements based on race, religion, gender, or any other protected characteristic could run into challenges. In an interview backstage last night, McDormand told reporters “I just found out about this last week. It means you can ask for and/or demand at least 50 percent diversity in, not only casting, but also the crew.”  When it comes to a film or television crew, although an actor may request that good faith effort be undertaken to hire a diverse crew, demanding that certain race or gender quotas be met could run afoul of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and comparable state law, which generally bans employment discrimination and quotas by private employers.

An inclusion rider like the one described by Dr. Smith might work in the entertainment industry based on First Amendment and creative license protections. But employers, both in the entertainment industry and outside of it, should be wary of agreeing to riders demanding that specific quotas be met. Those demands, no matter how well-intentioned, could be challenged as being discriminatory.

 

© 2018 Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more entertainment legal news go to the National Law Reviews Entertainment Law Page.

When Quirk of Copyright Law Creates Christmas Classic: It’s Wonderful Life and Public Domain

Christmas treeGeorge Bailey stands on a bridge begging for another chance at life. Upon being granted a second chance, he joyously runs home to embrace his family. As the community of Bedford Falls rallies around him and raises funds to save the endangered Building and Loan and George Bailey personally from an unjustified failure, someone proclaims a toast to George Bailey, “the richest man in town.” It’s a powerful ending to a beloved holiday classic, and it would have been forgotten over time but for accidentally allowing a copyright to expire.

The 1909 Act is the copyright act that governs copyrightable works created before 1964. The Act created two, distinct copyright terms for each individual work: a 28-year initial term and a 28-year renewal term. The initial term applied automatically, but the copyright owner had to file a renewal application with the U.S. Copyright Office to get the second term. If the owner failed to file a renewal application before the first 28-year term expired, the work automatically entered the public domain.

Into this copyright framework, a movie called It’s a Wonderful Life was released in December 1946. It was directed by Frank Capra and starred James Stewart. Upon its release, it was not the booming success that one might imagine based on its reputation now. While it was not a complete box-office failure, it struggled financially and never came close to reaching its break-even point. Capra and Stewart would never work together again. In fact, it was a major blow to Capra’s reputation, and in the aftermath of the film, Capra’s production company went bankrupt.

More holiday movies were created over the years, and the film was largely forgotten. At the end of the initial 28-year copyright term in 1974, a clerical mistake prevented the copyright owner of It’s a Wonderful Life from filing a renewal application, and the movie went into the public domain. TV studios, eager for inexpensive content to show during the holidays, began showing the movie every year because they were not required to pay any royalties while the film was in the public domain. Over the next approximately 20 years, the film was shown repeatedly every holiday and claimed its current status as a holiday classic.

Everything changed in 1993. In response to a Supreme Court ruling in Stewart v. Abend, the current copyright owners of It’s a Wonderful Life were able to enforce a copyright claim to the movie. The Court in Steward v. Abend held that a current copyright owner has the exclusive right to exploit derivative works, even in light of potentially conflicting agreements by prior copyright holders. Coincidentally, the Steward v. Abend case involved another James Stewart movie, Rear Window.

Because the current copyright owners of It’s a Wonderful Life still owned the movie rights of the original story on which the movie is based, the current copyright owners argued that their rights to the story told in It’s a Wonderful Life still existed and were enforceable to prevent unauthorized showing of the movie in its current form. The newly-returned owners were thus able to stop any unauthorized showings of the movie, but by then the movie was firmly entrenched as a holiday classic. It has been popular ever since. So the next time you sit down to watch George Bailey offer to lasso the moon for Mary or watch them dancing over an expanding swimming pool, just remember that we all might have missed this movie entirely if not for a clerical mistake causing a renewal application not to be filed.

©1994-2015 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

To Apple, Love Taylor: Apple Responds with Royalties

“To Apple, Love Taylor” has been the tweet heard ‘round the music world.  With more than 61 million followers, Taylor Swift has become the “loudest” voice for emerging and independent artists in the music-streaming realm.  As copyright lawsuits from record companies continue to crop up across the industry, music-streaming service providers have become far more sensitive to the demands of artists and the trend for higher royalty payments.  Case in point: when Taylor “streams” for royalties, Apple responds.

Taylor’s tweet to Apple explained, “with all due respect,” why she was planning to withhold her mega best-selling album 1989 from Apple’s new music-streaming service, Apple Music.  Apparently, Apple’s plan to withhold royalty payments from musicians during the service’s initial, free three-month trial period did not sit well with Swift.  Speaking primarily on behalf of emerging and independent artists, Swift deemed three months “a long time to go unpaid.”  Taylor’s stance followed a long line of objections from songwriters, artists, and labels over allegedly unfair payment by music-streaming services.  Recently, the Turtles and other performers brought suit against Sirius XM to collect royalty payments that had not been paid for songs produced before 1972.  Previously, big streamers like Sirius XM and Pandora were not paying royalties for songs launched before 1972 because they were not protected by federal copyright law.  In the wake of the Turtles suit, Apple was swift to respond to Swift’s plea.  Eddy Cue, Apple’s senior vice-president of internet software and services, tweeted “we hear you @taylorswift13 and indie artists” and called Taylor to deliver the news personally.  Apple had reconsidered its plan and will now be paying artists royalties at the outset of its Apple Music launch.

Clearly, Taylor’s attempt at flattery, saying that the initial decision to withhold royalty payments was surprising in light of Apple’s reputation as a “historically progressive and generous company,” got her everywhere.  Taylor claimed that her complaints were not the rantings of a “spoiled, petulant child,” but rather “echoed sentiments of every artist, writer, and producer in [her] social circles who [we]re afraid to speak up publicly because [they] admire and respect Apple so much.”  As she pointed out, Apple’s plan to offer royalty-free streaming during its initial start-up period could have had disastrous effects on artists planning to release new albums during that time.  While the cost of these royalties may not be relatively significant to Apple, the goodwill and favor fostered among artists, labels, and consumers is invaluable.  Apple’s move indicates that artists are finally succeeding in shifting royalty payments more toward their favor via lawsuits, negotiations, and now very public Twitter exchanges.  The power of public opinion is not only strong but, these days, instantaneously widespread, and Apple was smart to respond.

It seems that Sirius heard Apple too.  Just days after Eddy Cue’s public response to Taylor Swift, Sirius settled its lawsuit with the Turtles to the tune, no pun intended, of $210 million for its broadcast of songs produced before 1972.  Under the settlement, Sirius will continue to play the older songs until 2017, at which time it will strike new licensing deals with affected artists.  With this settlement in place and with the established prospect for older performers to collect royalties in the future, the Turtles and Sirius are once again “Happy Together.”

This public discourse over streamed music, copyrights, and royalty payments illustrates the fast-paced evolution of the industry since the introduction of digital music files in the Napster heyday.  Streaming services have been forced to anticipate and address the demands of artists, particularly that of the growing request for greater royalties.  While a voice as “loud” as that of Taylor Swift may warrant an immediate, calculated response, it is likely we will see more music royalties and other digital copyright litigation in the years to come.

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Fashion Documentaries: A Fashion Do

Sheppard Mullin 2012

 

Since the first major fashion documentary featuring designer Isaac Mizrahi, “Unzipped,” made its debut in 1995, the popularity of fashion documentaries has only gained traction.  Within the past five years, a smattering of renowned brands, including Marc Jacobs, Louis Vuitton, and Valentino, as well as some fixtures in fashion like Anna Wintour and Diana Vreeland, have allowed cameras to capture their exclusive world of fashion through their respective documentaries.  More recently, James Franco, the former face of Gucci, steered his production company toward a collaboration with Gucci’s creative director Frida Giannini, creating the documentary entitled “The Director: An Evolution in Three Acts.”  The film, which debuted last spring at the Tribeca Film Festival, documented how a Gucci collection comes together.  Even retailers are following suit, with documentaries such as director Matthew Miele’s “Scatter My Ashes at Bergdorf Goodman,” which features the history of New York’s famous luxury department store, making their way to audiences.

While fashion documentaries have yet to garner the same level of commercial appeal as the level attained by certain political and/or topical documentaries, the fashion industry’s elite players seem eager and willing to demystify their creative process on-screen.  The value, while not necessarily directly realized through documentary distribution proceeds, may indirectly be realized through marketing.  In the same vein as fashion film shorts, full-length fashion documentaries blur the line between film and advertisement for the brands upon which the films are based.  (See Victoria Lee and Ted Max, Fashion Film Art Movement, Fashion and Apparel Law Blog, June 14, 2012).

Yet tension may exist between the desire of fashion houses and designers to promote their brands in a particular light, and documentary filmmakers’ desire to capture the provocative truth, whether positive or negative.  Even when the filmmaker has a vested interest in the brand’s success, it may have a particular point of view which is not in line with the brand’s marketing goals.  Therefore, when contemplating whether to pull back the curtain for the cameras, it’s important for a fashion brand to consider all the potential issues which may arise from the release of a fashion documentary featuring the brand and to preemptively address these potential issues during contract negotiations with the filmmaker involved with the project.

Certain contractual limitations on the filmmaker, such as those affecting access granted to production crews and approvals and controls over aspects of the documentary’s development and production, may be negotiated as precautionary measures for the brand to ensure the documentary serves its purpose as a marketing tool.  As “Bergdorf’s” director, Matthew Miele noted in a press release, while his film could come across as overly promotional, he noted that he retained control over its contents, working closely with Bergdorf Goodman during the post-production and editing process.

Based on the flurry of fashion documentaries slated to be released this year, including films profiling Stanley Marcus of Neiman Marcus, New York fashion icon Iris Apfel, and Miele’s look at Tiffany & Company, fashion documentaries appear to continue to serve a valuable marketing purpose.  No doubt with the right filmmakers attached to a fashion documentary project, a fashion brand can use the finished product to increase its presence as global powerhouse, both on- and off-screen.

Article by:

Fashion and Apparel Team

Of:

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP