Tag: employment

You Have Mail (Better Read It): District Court Finds EEOC 90-Day Deadline Starts When Email Received

If a letter from the EEOC is in your virtual mailbox but you never open it, have you received it? Most of us are familiar with the requirement that a claimant who files an EEOC charge has 90 days to file a lawsuit after receiving what is usually required a “right-to-sue” letter from the agency. This is one of the deadlines that both plaintiff and defense counsel track on their calendars. But when is that notice officially “received” by the claimant — especially in these days of electronic correspondence? In Paniconi v. Abington Hospital-Jefferson Health, one Pennsylvania federal court decided to draw a hard line on when that date actually occurs.

A Cautionary Tale

Denise Paniconi worked for a hospital in Pennsylvania and filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging race and religious discrimination. The EEOC investigated and issued a right-to-sue letter dated September 8, 2021, which gave her 90 days to file her complaint. She filed her complaint 91 days after the EEOC issued the letter. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint for failing to comply with the 90-day deadline.

What ordinarily would just be a day counting exercise took a twist because of how the EEOC issued the notice. The EEOC sent both the plaintiff and her lawyer an email stating that there was an “important document” now available on the EEOC portal. Neither the plaintiff nor her lawyer opened the email or accessed the portal until sometime later. They argued that the 90-day filing deadline should run from the date that the claimant actually accesses the document, not from the date the EEOC notified them it was available.

The court dismissed the complaint for failing to meet the deadline. The opinion noted that although the 90-day period is not a “jurisdictional predicate,” it cannot be extended, even by one day, without some sort of recognized equitable consideration. Paniconi’s lawyer argued that the court should apply the old rule for snail mail  ̶  without proof otherwise, it should be assumed that the notice is received within three days after the issuance date. The court disagreed and pointed out that no one disputed the date that the email was sent  ̶   it was simply not opened and read by either Paniconi or her lawyer. The court said that there was no reason that those individuals did not open the email and meet the 90-day deadline.

Deadlines Are Important

This is another example of how electronic communication can complicate the legal world. The EEOC has leaned into its use of the portal, and the rest of the world needs to get used to it. The minute you receive an email or notice from the portal, you need to calendar that deadline. Some courts (at least this one) believe that electronic communication is immediate, and you may not get grace for not logging on and finding out what is happening with your charge. Yet another reason to stay on top of your emails.

Article By J. William Manuel and Anne R. Yuengert of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

Supreme Court Declines to Resolve Circuit Split on Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in FLSA Collective Actions

On June 6, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear petitions seeking review of whether federal courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs who join Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective actions when their claims are not connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state. The petitions sought review of rulings on the issue by the First and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals in Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc. and Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc., respectively. As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision declining to hear the petitions, there remains a circuit split as to whether the Court’s 2017 ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court applies to FLSA collective actions, and employers with nationwide footprints remain subject to uncertainty depending on jurisdiction.

To date, only the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have ruled on the issue. On August 17, 2021, the Sixth Circuit was the first to address the issue in Canaday. There, the Court held that federal courts may not exercise personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs who join FLSA collective actions when their claims are not connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state. Just one day later, on August 18, 2021, the Eighth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Vallone v. CJS Solutions Group, LLC.

On January 13, 2022, in Waters, the First Circuit held to the contrary, concluding that federal courts do have personal jurisdiction over claims asserted by nonresident opt-in plaintiffs.

The Significance of Bristol-Myers

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers provides the basis for the current circuit split. Bristol-Myers involved a mass tort action under state law for alleged defects in a blood-thinning drug, Plavix, which the company manufactured. Residents and nonresidents of California sued Bristol-Myers in California state court, alleging injuries related to the drug. The nonresident plaintiffs claimed no relationship with the forum state, nor did they purchase Plavix in California or suffer any harm from it in California. The Supreme Court reasoned that any similarity between the resident and nonresident plaintiffs’ claims was an “insufficient basis” to exercise specific jurisdiction. Unless nonresident plaintiffs could demonstrate that their claims arose out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, personal jurisdiction over the company did not exist, no matter “the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.”

In ruling that the California state court lacked jurisdiction over the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its holding might ultimately generate more litigation in the form of separate actions by nonresident plaintiffs in their respective states. But the Supreme Court also noted that all plaintiffs to the action could have brought a mass tort action against Bristol-Myers in New York (the company’s headquarters) or Delaware (its place of incorporation) because courts in those states would have had general personal jurisdiction over the company. Instead, the California state court could exercise only specific personal jurisdiction over the company based on its activities in the state. Notably, Bristol-Myers was limited to Rule 23 class actions, leaving lower courts to determine whether its holding applied to FLSA collective actions, which differ procedurally.

The Circuit Split

In Canaday, the Sixth Circuit reiterated the basic tenet that, pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the defendant’s contacts with the state in which the plaintiff filed the lawsuit. Because Anthem is both incorporated and headquartered in Indiana and not otherwise “at home” in the state of Tennessee, the district court in Tennessee lacked general jurisdiction over Anthem as a defendant. At issue was whether the district court in Tennessee had specific personal jurisdiction over Anthem, and thus, whether there was a claim-specific and Anthem-specific relationship between the nonresidents’ FLSA claims and the state of Tennessee.

Applying Bristol-Myers, the Sixth Circuit held that there was not. The court found that the nonresident plaintiffs did not bring claims arising out of or relating to Anthem’s conduct in Tennessee, because Anthem neither employed nor paid the nonresident plaintiffs within the state. The Sixth Circuit went on the explain that adherence to this approach should not change the way FLSA collective actions are filed, because plaintiffs traditionally file their actions where courts have general jurisdiction, or where the conduct occurred. Of note, Sixth Circuit Judge Bernice Donald dissented in Canaday, contending that Bristol-Myers does not apply to FLSA collective actions because the Supreme Court in that case addressed only the limitations of state courts, not federal courts, in their exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.

In Waters, the First Circuit largely followed the reasoning in Judge Donald’s dissent, concluding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb “rest[ed] on Fourteenth Amendment constitutional limits on state courts exercising jurisdiction over state-law claims” and thus did not control whether a federal court could exercise jurisdiction over federal claims asserted by nonresident plaintiffs. The First Circuit also observed that the plain language of Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merely concerns the service of summonses and does not “constrain[] a federal court’s power to act once a summons has been properly served, and personal jurisdiction has been established.”

Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court’s decision to deny the petitions means that employers with nationwide footprints continue to live with potentially inconsistent rulings on the question of whether a federal district court has jurisdiction to hear claims of out-of-state workers when the defendant is neither headquartered nor incorporated in the state. Canaday and Vallone stand to significantly limit the size and geographic scope of FLSA collective actions in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, absent a district court’s exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant, while Waters permits nationwide jurisdiction in the First Circuit. For now, at least, multistate employers face continued uncertainty on the issue until courts of appeals in the remaining circuits weigh in.

Article By Maggie (Hanrahan) Santen, Monica Lacks, and Samuel H. Ottinger of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

EEOC and the DOJ Issue Guidance for Employers Using AI Tools to Assess Job Applicants and Employees

Employers are more frequently relying on the use of Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) tools to automate employment decision-making, such as software that can review resumes and “chatbots” that interview and screen job applicants. We have previously blogged about the legal risks attendant to the use of such technologies, including here and here.

On May 12, 2022, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued long-awaited guidance on the use of such AI tools (the “Guidance”), examining how employers can seek to prevent AI-related disability discrimination. More specifically, the Guidance identifies a number of ways in which employment-related use of AI can, even unintentionally, violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), including if:

  • (i) “[t]he employer does not provide a ‘reasonable accommodation’ that is necessary for a job applicant or employee to be rated fairly and accurately by” the AI;
  • (ii) “[t]he employer relies on an algorithmic decision-making tool that intentionally or unintentionally ‘screens out’ an individual with a disability, even though that individual is able to do the job with a reasonable accommodation”; or
  • (iii) “[t]he employer adopts an [AI] tool for use with its job applicants or employees that violates the ADA’s restrictions on disability-related inquiries and medical examinations.”

The Guidance further states that “[i]n many cases” employers are liable under the ADA for use of AI even if the tools are designed and administered by a separate vendor, noting that “employers may be held responsible for the actions of their agents . . . if the employer has given them authority to act on [its] behalf.”

The Guidance also identifies various best practices for employers, including:

  • Announcing generally that employees and applicants subject to an AI tool may request reasonable accommodations and providing instructions as to how to ask for accommodations.
  • Providing information about the AI tool, how it works, and what it is used for to the employees and applicants subjected to it. For example, an employer that uses keystroke-monitoring software may choose to disclose this software as part of new employees’ onboarding and explain that it is intended to measure employee productivity.
  • If the software was developed by a third party, asking the vendor whether: (i) the AI software was developed to accommodate people with disabilities, and if so, how; (ii) there are alternative formats available for disabled individuals; and (iii) the AI software asks questions likely to elicit medical or disability-related information.
  • If an employer is developing its own software, engaging experts to analyze the algorithm for potential biases at different steps of the development process, such as a psychologist if the tool is intended to test cognitive traits.
  • Only using AI tools that measure, directly, traits that are actually necessary for performing the job’s duties.
  • Additionally, it is always a best practice to train staff, especially supervisors and managers, how to recognize requests for reasonable accommodations and to respond promptly and effectively to those requests. If the AI tool is used by a third party on the employer’s behalf, that third party’s staff should also be trained to recognize requests for reasonable accommodation and forward them promptly to the employer.

Finally, also on May 12th, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released its own guidance on AI tools’ potential for inadvertent disability discrimination in the employment context. The DOJ guidance is largely in accord with the EEOC Guidance.

Employers utilizing AI tools should carefully audit them to ensure that this technology is not creating discriminatory outcomes.  Likewise, employers must remain closely apprised of any new developments from the EEOC and local, state, and federal legislatures and agencies as the trend toward regulation continues.

Article By Joseph C O’Keefe and Edward C. Young of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Illinois Department of Labor Publishes Guidance for Employers Seeking Equal Pay Registration Certificate

Effective March 24, 2022, the Illinois Equal Pay Act (IEPA) was amended to require private businesses with more than 100 employees in Illinois to obtain an Equal Pay Registration Certificate (EPRC) by March 23, 2024, and every two years thereafter.

To apply for the EPRC, businesses must submit the following to the Illinois Department of Labor (IDOL): (1) a filing fee; (2) an equal pay compliance statement; (3) a copy of the employer’s most recently filed EEO-1 report; and (4) a list of employees separated by gender and the race and ethnicity categories as reported in the employer’s most recently filed EEO-1 report, and the total wages paid to each employee during the past calendar year.

The IDOL recently updated its Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) for the EPRC, addressing, among other things, the application and submission processes, fee requirements, recertification, publicly available data, and penalties for employer noncompliance.  Here are key takeaways:

  • All employees based in Illinois, including those working remotely, should be included in the total employee count for reporting purposes. An employer’s total employee count includes the total number of people employed who worked in or were based out of Illinois on December 31 of the 12-month calendar year immediately prior the year the employer is required to submit an EPRC application.
  • For reporting purposes, “wages” means any compensation paid to an employee by an employer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement between the two parties, including wages, salaries, earned commissions, earned bonuses, stocks and ownership shares. This does not include retirement health insurance benefits, or other fringe benefits.
  • If an employer’s submitted wage data in its EPRC application shows that the employer is paying unequal wages to male and female employees or to African-American and non-African American employees, the IDOL may initiate its own investigation pursuant to Sections 10(a) and 15(c) of the IEPA and Section 320.200 of the IEPA regulations.
  • Before any fines may be imposed for a violation of the IEPA, the IDOL will provide notice to an employer that violates the IEPA and inadvertently fails to file an initial EPRC application or recertification that they have 30 calendar days to submit the application or recertification. If the employer fails to do so, it shall be fined up to $10,000.
  • An employer that falsifies or misrepresents data on an EPRC application faces suspension or revocation of the EPRC and civil penalties up to $10,000.
  • Current employees subject to the IEPA may request anonymized data from the IDOL regarding their job classification or title and the pay for that classification.

Illinois employers should audit their pay practices to ensure that any differences in wages amongst employees of similar job classifications are justified by legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more articles covering labor law updates, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Six Things to Know About New York’s New Employer Notification Requirements for Electronic Monitoring of Employees

Under an amendment to the New York Civil Rights Law that will take effect on May 7, 2022, private-sector employers that monitor their employees’ use of telephones, emails, and the internet must provide notice of such monitoring. The following provides highlights of the new law.

Question 1. Which employers and electronic monitoring activities are covered?

Answer 1. The law applies to any private individual or entity with a place of business in New York, and it broadly covers “telephone conversations or transmissions, electronic mail or transmissions, or internet access or usage by an employee by any electronic device or system, including but not limited to the use of a computer, telephone, wire, radio, or electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical systems [that] may be subject to monitoring.”

Q2. Are any electronic monitoring activities exempted from coverage?

A2. The law does not cover processes “designed to manage the type or volume of incoming or outgoing electronic mail or telephone, voice mail or internet usage,” and it also does not apply to processes “that are not targeted to monitor or intercept the electronic mail or telephone voice mail or internet usage of a particular individual.” The law also exempts processes that are “performed solely for the purpose of computer system maintenance and/or protection.”

Q3. What are some of the law’s compliance obligations?

A3. Private-sector employers that “monitor[] or otherwise intercept[] [employee] telephone conversations or transmissions, electronic mail or transmissions, or internet access or usage” must post a notice of electronic monitoring in a “conspicuous place which is readily available for viewing” by affected employees. Employers also must furnish new employees with written notice when they are hired. The law requires that newly hired employees acknowledge receipt of the notice, “either in writing or electronically.”

Q4. What information must be included in the notices?

A4. Under the law, employers are required to notify employees that “any and all telephone conversations or transmissions, electronic mail or transmissions, or internet access or usage by an employee by any electronic device or system” may be subject to monitoring “at any and all times and by any lawful means.” The law requires that the written notice advise employees that the electronic devices or systems that may be subject to monitoring include, but are not limited to, “computer, telephone, wire, radio or electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical systems.”

Q5. What are the penalties for violations of the law?

A5. The law provides for the imposition of civil penalties for violations of its requirements. Employers found to be in violation of the law are subject to civil penalties of $500 for a first offense, $1,000 for a second offense, and $3,000 for a third offense and for each subsequent offense. The Office of the New York State Attorney General will enforce the law.

Q6. Are there similar requirements in other jurisdictions?

A6. Connecticut and Delaware also require employers to provide notification of electronic monitoring. As the requirements of these laws vary slightly from New York’s law, employers doing business in either or both of these states and in New York may wish to consider whether to adopt a single approach, or adopt approaches tailored to each jurisdiction’s requirements.

Key Takeaways

New York employers that have not already taken action to comply with this new law may wish to consider whether to post physical notices in the workplace or utilize electronic postings that are visible upon logging in to the employer’s computer, or both.

Employers may also wish to determine how to incorporate the required notice to new employees in their new-hire and onboarding systems. Employers that address electronic monitoring in existing policies may also wish to review the existing policies to ensure that the information in those policies is consistent with the nature of the notification required by the new law, and update existing policies if warranted.

Employers may also wish to consider whether to obtain written or electronic acknowledgments of electronic monitoring from current employees. In addition, employers may wish to evaluate the potential for challenges to the use of information obtained through electronic monitoring absent compliance with the notice requirements.

© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more articles about labor laws, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Better Late than Never, Just About – UK Government Issues Workplace Guidance on Living with COVID

So with Covid 19 now officially behind us for all purposes (except actual reality, obviously), we have now been graced by the Government’s new “Living with Covid” guidance.  This was due to come into force on 1 April and was released fashionably late in the afternoon on, well, 1st April.  You could say with some justification that this did not give employers much time to prepare, but that is OK because on close review of the guidance there is in fact very little to prepare for.  As a steer to businesses, this is little short of directionless.

First, it makes the obvious point that the abolition of the requirement to give covid express consideration in workplace risk assessments does not take away any of the employer’s obligations to continue to comply with its health & safety, employment and equality duties (in the latter two cases, although unsaid, presumably as they may be affected by the former).

From there, the Government moves to normalise covid through a long list of symptoms common to it, colds, flu and other respiratory diseases – fair enough so far – but also to other quite unrelated conditions such as hangovers, migraines, food poisoning, being unfit, malaria and frankly just getting old (“unexplained tiredness, lack of energy”).  The list is significantly expanded from the traditional trio of continuous cough, fever, loss of taste and smell and now also includes muscle pain, diarrhoea, headache, loss of appetite and “feeling sick” (what, really?). Some medical practitioners say that this is long overdue recognition of all the things covid can do to you. However, it is still a wincingly unhappy expansion for employers, since the published list now essentially includes something from pretty much every ailment known to man. The guidance notes that it will not usually be possible to tell whether you have covid or something else from the symptoms alone and of course the free testing by which that could have been determined in the past is now largely withdrawn.  Therefore the guidance to individuals is that “if you have symptoms of a respiratory infection such as covid and you have a high temperature or you do not feel well enough to go to work, you are advised to try to stay at home and avoid contact with other people” and then “Try to work from home if you can.  If you are unable to work from home you should talk to your employer about options available to you”.  Given the rich panoply of symptoms now available to the discerning malingerer, justifying taking yourself home for five days while you work out whether your headache is covid or just a headache has never been so easy.

As a result, the burden is shifted squarely to employers to keep up the anti-covid fight, and in particular to decide whether to maintain restrictions on entry to their premises for those who are unvaccinated and/or untested.  Both will be increasingly difficult to sustain in view of the obvious official indifference to the question evidenced by the guidance, which focuses instead on the traditional measures of ventilation, regular cleaning of high-touch surfaces, provision of sanitiser and hygiene advice, etc. The other big hole in the guidance is as to the employer’s rights (or is it obligation?) to send someone home if they have one or more of that long list of potentially relevant symptoms, and even if the employee himself feels able to work and/or cannot work from home.  Nor does it deal with the employees’ sick pay rights in those cases.

Taking a reasonably hawkish view of those two questions:-

  1. If you know that the employee has symptoms which could well indicate that he is suffering from covid, and even if it could equally be something less serious, are you complying with your Health & Safety at Work Act duty to take all reasonably practicable steps to maintain a safe system of work if you allow him in anyway?  If he works in a sparsely –occupied well-ventilated area, perhaps yes, but otherwise probably not.  Given the virulence of Omicron, it is unarguably foreseeable that allowing someone who may have it to breathe wantonly on other people may lead to their contracting it too.  It is also clearly foreseeable, if no longer as much so as with the earlier covid variants, that those other people may become properly ill or die as a result.  Put mathematically, breach of duty + foreseeable risk of injury + causation + actual injury = liability.

So in my view, despite the vacuum in the new guidance, an employer not just can, but really should send home immediately an employee with any material case of the symptoms listed, as a minimum until it becomes clear that the real issue is something else (though not malaria – best not let them in either).

A firm stance on this will also help combat reluctance to return to the office among those staff concerned about the health risk of doing so.  If they or their cohabitants are particularly vulnerable, the knowledge that basically no precautions are being taken to ensure that those present in the workplace are all covid-free will only feed those anxieties.

  1. If the employee is sent home on these grounds and cannot work there, will he be entitled to full salary (as it was not by his choice) or sick pay only?  In many cases he will be back within a week and the two may be the same.  Where they are not, however, I believe that it would strictly be sick pay only – though the employee may himself be physically able to work, he is practically unable to do so by reason of his own possible medical condition, the risk it may pose to others in the workplace and the duty of the employer to take reasonable steps to head off that risk.  That said, there are employment relations arguments both ways on this – on the one hand, that the symptoms listed are so varied and transient that they represent an easy avenue for abuse, and on the other that if reporting them means you get packed off home on reduced pay (perhaps none until SSP kicks in on day 4), you are much less likely to report them in the first place and will probably prefer to pass your day posing an undeclared but potentially quite serious risk to your colleagues.

Article By David Whincup of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more coronavirus legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

The X Box: EEOC Announces Addition of Nonbinary Gender Option to Discrimination Charge

In recognition of Transgender Day of Visibility, today, the EEOC announced that it would be providing members of the LGBTQI+ community the option to select a nonbinary “X” gender marker when completing the voluntary self-identification questions that are traditionally part of the intake process for filing a charge of discrimination.

Specifically, in an effort to promote greater equity and inclusion, the EEOC will add an option to mark “X” during two stages of the intake and charge filing process. This addition will be reflected in the EEOC’s voluntary demographic questions relating to gender in the online public portal, which individuals use to submit inquires regarding the filing of a charge of discrimination, as well as related forms that are used in lieu of the online public portal. The nonbinary “X” gender marker will also be included in the EEOC’s modified charge of discrimination form, which will also include “Mx” in the list of prefix options.

Additionally, the EEOC will incorporate the CDC and NCHS’s proposed definition of “X,” which provides as follows: (1) “unspecified,” which promotes privacy for individuals who prefer not to disclose their gender identity; and (2) “another gender identity,” which promotes clarity and inclusion for those who wish to signify that they do not identify as male or female.

The EEOC’s announcement came shortly after the White House released a detailed Fact Sheet highlighting the steps the federal government has taken to address equality and visibility for Transgender Americans.

Article By Aretta K. Bernard and Stephanie Olivera Mittica of Roetzel & Andress LPA

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Roetzel & Andress

USCIS Policies Lead to High Denial Rates for L-1B Petitions

The L-1B nonimmigrant visa program is regularly utilized by companies to transfer employees with specialized knowledge from foreign countries to the United States. According to a recent analysis, the program continues to experience significant denial rates, raising questions about the underlying causes of the phenomenon.

L1-B Visa Program

The L1-B Visa Program allows employers to transfer certain nonimmigrant employees from foreign offices to offices within the United States. Specifically, the employment-based nonimmigrant visa program allows the transfer of professional employees with specialized knowledge relating to the organization’s interests from foreign offices to the United States, sometimes even to establish a U.S. office. To qualify under the program, the employee must possess “specialized knowledge,” which, according to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”), requires knowledge of the petitioning employer’s product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests. USCIS evaluates L-1B petitions on a case-by-case basis.

In practice, L-1B petitions are filed by employers on behalf of their employees seeking intracompany transfer. While an employer may file an L-1B petition for an individual employee, larger companies may have the option to file a “blanket petition” so long as the company meets certain criteria. When petitioning for individual employees, the petition must be approved and then taken to a U.S. consulate for approval. For blanket petitions that have been approved, the employer need only submit a Form 129S, Nonimmigrant Petition Based on Blanket L Petition, which then may be taken to a consulate for approval.

High Denial Rates of L-1B Petitions

A recent article by Forbes analyzed government data concerning L-1B petitions and detailed their trends over the last decade. During that period, the average denial rate for L1-B petitions was 28.2%, a significant number, especially considering the denial rate for H-1B petitions averages under 5%. While the denial rate declined to 21.3% in the third quarter of the fiscal year 2021 and 20.7% in the fourth quarter, the denial rates were 32.7% and 33.3% respectively for the first two fiscal quarters of 2021.

Given that L-1B petitions appear to receive greater scrutiny than other business nonimmigrant visas, one must wonder what causes the denial rate, and what steps can be taken to ensure approval of such a petition.

Explanations for High L-1B Denial Rates

The unusually high denial rate for L-1B petitions could be explained in part by the high bar set by USCIS in adjudicating the petitions. However, at least one attorney noted the case-by-case nature of the petitions do not easily lend itself to a simple adjudication process, noting that “USCIS applies [the standard] in a way that favors documentary evidence while discounting the company’s own assessments of the worker’s importance and knowledge […]” While the USCIS Policy Manual provides immigration officers with some guidance, more comprehensive guidance could certainly be helpful.

In response to the investigation conducted by Forbes, USCIS commented,

“USCIS officers review each L-1B petition on a case-by-case basis to determine if they meet all standards required under applicable laws, regulations, and policies. […] The agency will continue to solicit feedback from stakeholders to identify procedural efficiencies and promote policies that break down barriers in the lawful immigration system.”

Additionally, the denial rate can be attributed at least in part to the political implications of the executive branch. For the fiscal year 2021, the improvement that can be detected in the L-1B denial rate followed President Biden’s assumption of office. This shift may be attributed not to a more liberal implementation of policy, but rather to the reinstatement of the USCIS policy of giving deference to previous decisions. This deference does not extend to petitions or applications made by Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) or Department of State (“DOS”) officials.

The high denial rate for L-1B petitions serves to frustrate employers, and even discourages foreign investment in the United States. While the petitions continue to receive increased scrutiny, it is advisable to take the utmost care in the preparation of applications and ensure that all are supported with sufficient evidence and documentation.

Article By Raymond G. Lahoud of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more immigration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

Many New Jersey Employers Must Soon Offer Employee Retirement Savings Plans

The New Jersey Secure Choice Savings Program Act (the “Act”) is set to take effect on March 28, 2022 and will require many employers to offer their own retirement plan or provide access to a State-sponsored program.

This Act impacts all New Jersey businesses that:

  1. have employed at least 25 employees in the State during the previous calendar year;
  2. have been in business at least two years; and
  3. do not already offer a qualified retirement plan.

The Act mandates employers to offer their full and part-time employees a retirement savings in either the form of either a qualified retirement plan (e.g., a 401(k) or 403(b)), or through the New Jersey Secure Choice Savings Program (the “Program”). The State-sponsored Program is an individual retirement account (IRA) where employees contribute a portion of their pretax earnings via automatic payroll deductions.

Employers must first decide whether they want to sponsor a qualified retirement plan or opt for the State-sponsored Program. Those who fail to comply will be subject to penalties ranging from a written warning to a $500 fine per employee. Employers have nine months from the implementation date to comply with the Act. While the anticipated implementation date is March 28, 2022, the Treasury Department website dedicated to the program notes that implementation is not yet operational.

We suggest intermittently checking in on the website.

© 2022 Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C. All Rights Reserved
For more articles about employment law, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

UAE Employment Law Update

2 February 2022 saw the introduction of a new UAE Labour Law in the form of UAE Federal Law No. 33 of 2021, Regulating Labour Relations (“New Law”), repealing the existing UAE Labour Law, UAE Federal Law No. 8 of 1980 as amended (“Previous Law”).  In addition to the introduction of the New Law, a set of companion Executive Regulations were issued on 3 February 2022, fleshing out certain provisions of the New Law.

The following is a non-exhaustive overview of the principal provisions of the New Law and the Executive Regulations.

Whilst the New Law makes several significant introductions, it equally maintains the status quo in others, as such what we see here is more evolution rather than revolution in terms of the regulation of employment relations governed by the New Law.

As with the Previous Law, the New Law does not apply to employees in the Dubai International Financial Centre or the Abu Dhabi Global Market which both have their own standalone employment laws and regulations.  In addition, employees of federal and local government agencies, members of the armed forces, police and security employees and domestic service workers (Article 3(2) of the New Law) are not subject to the New Law.

  1. Employment Arrangements

The New Law and Executive Regulations (Article 5) introduces the following models of work:

  1. Full time – working for a single employer full time;
  2. Part time – working for a single employer part time;
  3. Temporary work – work carried out for a specified time and for a specific task;
  4. Flexible work – work that allows changing work hours to take into account operational needs of an employer;
  5. Remote work – work that is performed outside of the workplace and which may be either full time or part time; and
  6. Job sharing – work is divided between one or more employees on a part time basis.

Furthermore, the Executive Regulations provide that additional employment arrangements can be introduced based on labour market demands.

  1. Work Permits

The Executive Regulations (Article 6) stipulates the types of work permits available and the corresponding processes for obtaining, renewing and cancelling the same are as set in Article 7 of the Executive Regulations:

  1. Work permits for recruitment for employee’s outside of the UAE;
  2. Transfer work permit allowing a non-UAE national’s employment to be transferred between establishments registered with the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation (“MOHRE”/“Ministry”);
  3. Relative work permit allowing a person who is on the residence visa of a family member to work for an employer registered with the MOHRE;
  4. A temporary work permit for where an employer is employed for a job whose performance or completion requires a specified period;
  5. A task work / mission permit allowing for an employer to bring an employee from outside of the country in order to perform temporary work or a specific project for a definite term;
  6. A part time work permit;
  7. A juvenile work permit allowing for an employer to employ a juvenile between the age of 15 and 18;
  8. A student training and employment permit allowing for an employer to train or employ a student over the age of 15;
  9. GCC national work permit allowing employers to employ nationals of other GCC states;
  10. Golden visa work permit allowing the employment of an employee in the UAE who holds a golden visa;
  11. National trainee work permit; and
  12. Self-employment permit allowing individuals to engage in freelance work (under self residence for foreign nationals).

Additional types of work permits may be introduced in accordance with the provisions of the New Law.

  1. Equality and Non-Discrimination

The New Law introduces the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of: race, ethnicity, sex, religion, national origin, or on the grounds of disability (Article 4 of the New Law).

Women are entitled to identical wages for the same work (Article 4(4) of the New Law).

  1. Employment Contracts

Article 10(1) of the Executive Regulations provides the minimum requirements necessary for the purpose of a valid employment contract.

Article 10(2) of the Executive Regulations specifically permits an employer (with the consent of an employee) to add additional provisions (over those stipulated under Article 10(1) of the Executive Regulations) provided that the same are not in contradiction with the provisions of the New Law and the Executive Regulations.

The Ministry shall prepare (pursuant to Article 10(4) of the Executive Regulations) contract forms for:

  1. Full time employment;
  2. Part time employment;
  3. Flexible work employment;
  4. Remote work employment; and
  5. Job sharing employment.

The Ministry may as required introduce further standard form contracts.  It will be interesting to see if free zones (e.g.: JAFZA, DAFZA, DMCC and DDA) which are subject to the New Law follow suite.  At the date of this client alert not all free zones have introduced new standard form contracts in compliance with the New Law and Executive Regulations.

  1. Salary

All employers registered with the Ministry are required to pay employees under the Wage Protection System (“WPS”) (Article 16(1)(b) Executive Regulations).  All wages are to be paid in AED unless agreed otherwise by the contracting parties.  How this will work in practice given WPS has previously provided for payment only AED remains to be seen.

Article 25 of the New Law sets out permitted deductions from an employee’s salary.  Notably Article 25(1)(b) of the New Law puts a limit on the percentage of salary that can be deducted at 20%, it is unclear if this is a given month or during a year.  Consideration will need to be given to circumstances where housing loans or the like are advanced and then repaid.

Article 26 of the New Law provides that a minimum wage may be set in the future.

  1. Contract Term

One fundamental change under the New Law is the abolition of unlimited term contracts.  The New Law introduces a maximum fixed term of 3 years (Article 8(3) of the New Law), albeit it is our understanding that employers which are Dubai onshore entities will continue to be granted only 2 year work permits and as such fixed term contracts in such instances will be granted on the basis of 2 year renewable terms.

Fixed term contracts may be extended for up to a 3 year period (noting comments above regarding visa terms) or shorter periods one or more times and a renewal does not necessarily have to involve express written notice and consent, instead it can be extended implicitly (Article 8(5) of the New Law).

  1. Probationary Period

As with the Previous Law, probationary periods can run for a period not to exceed 6 months (Article 9(1) of the New Law)).  An employer wishing to terminate during a probationary period must provide at least 14 days’ notice to terminate.  In the event that an employee wishes to terminate (Article 9(1) of the New Law during the probationary period, the employee must: provide at least 30 days’ notice where they wish to take on employment with another employer in the UAE (Article 9(2) of the New Law); or provide at least 14 days’ notice where the employee wishes to leave the UAE (Article 9(3) of the New Law).

  1. Employer Obligations

An employer may not assign work to an employee that is “fundamentally different” to the work agreed in the employment contract (Article 12 of the New Law).

An employer is obliged amongst other things to: keep employee files in accordance with the provisions of Article 13(1) of the New Law; invest in the development of skills of employees (Article 13(5) of the New Law); bear the costs of private healthcare in accordance with corresponding legislation (Article 13(8) of the New Law); and provide its employees (upon the employee’s request) at termination with a confirmatory notice setting out date of joining, date of expiry, total service, last wage, job title and the reason for termination, even if the contents of that letter reduces the ability of the exiting employee to gain employment (Article 13(11) of the New Law).

  1. Employee Obligations

The employee is under various obligations pursuant to Article 16 of the New Law, these include but are not limited to obligations of: confidentiality (Article 16(4) of the New Law); developing functional and professional skills (Article 16(8) of the New Law); and honesty and professionalism in the performance of work (Article 16(2) of the New Law).

  1. Working Hours / Overtime

Subject to exceptions under the Executive Regulations, the maximum working hours for an employee is 8 hours a day or 48 hours per week, with an emphasis on the word “or” (Article 17(10) of the New Law).

Article 15(1) of the Executive Regulations stipulates specific circumstances where time spent by an employee travelling to their workplace will count towards their working hours.  As a general rule such travel time does not apply (Article 17(3) of the New Law).

Overtime payment mechanisms are set out under Article 19 of the New Law.  A maximum of 2 hours overtime a day is permitted (Article 19(1) of the New Law).  Overtime is paid at a 25% uplift of basic salary save where the hours of overtime take place between 10pm and 4am when overtime is paid at a 50% uplift of basic salary (Article 19(3) of the New Law).

If work is required on a rest day the overtime payment is paid at a 50% uplift of basic salary (Article 19(4) of the New Law).

Overtime entitlement does not extend to those categories of employees set out in Article 15(4) of the Executive Regulations. Furthermore such categories of worker are also exempt from the maximum work hours.  Employees who are exempt include directors and board Chairman and persons holding supervisory positions, it remains to be seen how this will work in practice.

  1. End of Service Gratuity

The rules regarding the payment of end of service gratuity under the New Law introduce two key changes: 1) the concept of deductions to gratuity entitlement where an employee terminates their employment (prior to the completion of 5 years’ service) is removed; and 2) the law is now specific in terms of UAE nationals employed in the private sector having no rights to end of service gratuity.  All other gratuity provisions remain as per the Previous Law i.e. gratuity is payable after 1 years’ continuous service, calculated only against base salary, capped at 2 years’ salary and calculated on the basis of 21 days base salary for the first 5 years of service and 30 days base salary for service over 5 years.  Entitlement to gratuity for part years served after the conclusion of the first year of continuous service remain.

It is worth noting that the New Law does (under Article 51(8)) leaves the possibility that end of service may be replaced by an alternative pensions system likely to be similar to the DEWS system operational in the Dubai International Financial Centre.

Article 53 of the New Law provides that all employee entitlements are to be paid within 14 days from the date of contract expiration.

Article 29 of the Executive Regulations places controls on what deductions an employer can make against end of service gratuity.  This does include the repayment of loans (Article 29(1)(a) of the Executive Regulations).

Article 30 of the Executive Regulations regulates how end of service will be paid to employees who are not full time employees.

  1. Labour Claims

Article 55(1) of the New Law provides that where an employee has a claim against their employer and the claim does not exceed AED 100,000, then any court fees which would be normally payable by the employee are waived.

  1. Holiday Entitlement

The New Law provides for a minimum holiday entitlement of 30 days (typically this is reflected in employment contracts as 25 working days) (Article 29(1) of the New Law).  For new employees holiday entitlement accrues at 2 days per month for the first 6 months of service.

Part time workers are entitled to holiday pursuant to the requirements of Article 18 of the Executive Regulations.

Article 19 of the Executive Regulations provides that where an employer has allowed for the carry over of balance of unused holiday entitlement (Article 29(5) of the New Law).  Article 19(1) of the Executive Regulations provides that an employee may carry forward no more than half of their annual leave into the following year.

Article 19(2) of the Executive Regulations provides that where an employee’s service is terminated, a cash allowance for accrued but unused holiday at the date of termination is payable based on basic salary.

  1. Maternity Leave

Article 30 of the New Law provides 60 days of maternity leave, 45 days at full pay and 15 days at half pay.  Additional unpaid leave is available in certain medical circumstances.

For employees returning from their maternity leave, and for a period not exceeding 6 months from the date of delivery shall be entitled to 2 daily rest periods for breastfeeding not to exceed an hour each day of entitlement.

  1. Sick Leave

Following the completion of a probation period, an employee is entitled (under Article 31 of the New Law) to sick leave of no more than 90 consecutive or intermittent days each year based on: a) 15 days full pay; b) 30 days with half pay; and c) the period thereafter unpaid.

An employer may terminate the service of an employee after sick leave has been exhausted (Article 31(5) of the New Law).

Article 20(1) of the Executive Regulations recognises that no sick leave will be paid where illness relates to abuse of drugs or alcohol or a violation of an employer’s safety instructions.

  1. Various Leaves

The New Law (Article 32 and Article 21 of the Executive Regulations) introduces a number of additional leave entitlements including parental leave, study leave, mourning leave, sabbatical leave for UAE nationals performing national or reserve service.  Unpaid leave entitlement is covered under Article 33 of the New Law.

  1. Wrongful Termination

The arbitrary dismissal provisions under the Previous Law have been abolished and replaced by Article 47 of the New Law, which provides that an employee’s termination is unlawful if the termination relates to: a) filing a serious complaint with the Ministry; or b) filing a case against the employer which has proven to be correct.

Any successful wrongful termination claim compensation is capped at 3 months of salary- subject to the court’s discretion.

  1. Non-Competes

Article 10 of the New Law allows non-compete provisions to be applied to protect legitimate business interests.  Such non-competes are not to exceed 2 years.

Article 12 of the Executive Regulations provides that in order for a non-competition clause to apply then the following must be specified: a) geographical scope; b) term not to exceed 2 years; and c) nature of work that is being prohibited.

Any non-compete provision will have no standing where the employer has terminated the employee’s employment.  Article 12(2) provides that the enforcement of any non-compete requires the employer to demonstrate damage arising from the breach.

Article 12(c) of the Executive Regulations provides that certain categories of employee may not be subject to non competes.

  1. Suspension

An employer may suspend an employee for a period of 30 days for the purposes of conducting a disciplinary investigation (Article 40(1) of the New Law).  During that suspension period an employer is entitled to suspend half of the suspended employee’s salary.  Insofar as the employee is not terminated following their suspension, the employee’s suspended salary shall be repaid.

Further suspension rights exist where an employee has been accused of assault or criminal behaviour involving fraud or dishonesty.

  1. Disciplinary Rules

Article 39 of the New Law together with Article 24 of the Executive Regulations regulate disciplinary rules and sanctions, which broadly speaking run from written notices, wage deductions and suspensions.

  1. Termination of Employment

Article 42 of the New Law provides that a contract of employment can be terminated as follows: a) mutual agreement; b) expiry of a contract term unless renewed; c) death of the employee or permanent incapacity; d) final judgment involving a prison sentence of greater than 3 months; e) closure of the employer; f) insolvency of the employer; or g) failure of the employee to renew their work permit.

Under Article 43 of the New Law, either party is entitled to terminate the contract of employment for any legitimate reason, provided that notice is given.  Minimum notice is 30 days and maximum notice is 90 days.

Article 44 of the New Law is in effect the new Article 120 from the Previous Law.  Article 44 sets out circumstances in which termination without notice can occur.

Article 46 of the New Law provides that an employee’s service cannot be terminated by an employer before exhausting all sick leave.

  1. Compliance

Employers are required to ensure that unlimited term employment contracts are converted to fixed term arrangements in accordance with the New Law and Executive Regulations within 1 year of the adoption of the New Law, i.e., 2 February 2023.

The provisions of the New Law and Executive Regulations apply to all unlimited term contracts governed pursuant to the Previous Law.

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