Tag: employment

Unpaid Employer Contributions as Plan Assets: Expansion Of Liability Under ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act)

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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), requires trustees of multiemployer pension and benefit funds to collect contributions required to be made by contributing employers under their collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) with the labor union sponsoring the plans. This is not always an easy task—often, an employer is an incorporated entity with limited assets or financial resources to satisfy its contractual obligations. In some instances, an employer will resort to filing for bankruptcy to obtain a discharge of its debts to the pension or benefit funds.

In a distinct trend, federal courts have found that, depending on the text of the underlying plan documents, unpaid employer contributions due under a CBA may be viewed as plan assets, such that the representatives of an employer who exercise fiduciary control over those plan assets can be held individually liable for the unpaid amounts (together with interest and penalties) under ERISA. These cases will no doubt help plan trustees and administrators collect monies owed to the plan. They also should serve as cautionary warnings to contributing employers to ensure that they fully understand the obligations that they are undertaking when they agree to contribute to ERISA funds pursuant to CBAs.

Background

In the typical scenario, an employer will agree under one or more of its CBAs to make specified contributions to fund the pension and health and welfare benefits promised to plan participants under the trust fund’s plan of benefits. If an employer fails to timely remit those payments in violation of the CBA and the plan’s rules, the trustees of the fund have a legal duty to attempt to recover the unpaid contributions unless, after fully examining the facts and circumstances, the trustees conclude that the likelihood of recovery is outweighed by its costs. What happens if the trustees expend the fund’s resources to seek to collect the unpaid obligations and obtain a judgment against the employer, only to find the company’s coffers empty? Or what if the company files for bankruptcy?

Unlike employee contributions, which under U.S. Department of Labor regulations are explicitly deemed to be plan assets, employer contributions are typically found to be contractual obligations that do not become plan assets until such amounts are paid by the employer to the trust fund. Hence, while an employer’s failure to remit an employee contribution relegates the employer to the status of an ERISA plan fiduciary because it is has authority and control over plan assets, employer contributions have generally been held not to constitute plan assets. As a result, an employer who fails to make its contributions due under the CBA may have committed a contractual violation but has not breached an ERISA fiduciary duty.

The Potential for Individual Fiduciary Liability

Recently, courts have regularly carved out an exception to the general rule that unpaid contributions are not plan assets by finding that employer contributions are plan assets where the CBA explicitly defines them as such. In such cases, these courts will then proceed to consider the next question of whether the officers, directors or other representatives of such employer exercised a level of control over corporate assets sufficient to make them an ERISA plan fiduciary and thus individually liable for the contributions—effectively stripping them of the protections of the corporate form. Furthermore, if elevated to the status of a fiduciary breach, the debt may not be dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, the plan could proceed to collect the unpaid contributions against the principals of the debtor personally.

For over a decade, some federal district courts in the Second Circuit have applied a two-part test in delinquent employer contribution cases to find that: (i) such contributions are plan assets when so specified by the CBA; and (ii) the principals of the employer are an ERISA plan fiduciary. More recently, the Second Circuit concluded that delinquent contributions were not plan assets where there were no provisions in the relevant plan documents that stated that unpaid contributions are assets of the plan. See In re Halpin, 566 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court expressly stated, however, that “the trustees were free to contractually provide for some other result.” It further noted that merely finding that delinquent contributions constitute plan assets does not end the inquiry. A court must also determine whether an individual defendant has exercised sufficient fiduciary conduct over the unpaid contributions to be found to be a plan fiduciary under ERISA.

While the Court’s statements were extraneous to the holding of the case, some district courts within the Second Circuit have seized upon this language and have cited In re Halpin for the proposition that employer contributions can be plan assets where the plan documents so provide. See, e.g., Trustees of Sheet Metalworkers Int’l Assoc. v. Hopwood, 09-cv-5088, 2012 WL 4462048 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012); Sullivan v. Marble Unique Corp., 10-cv-3582, 2011 WL 5401987, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011).

Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011 (11th Cir. 2003), held that delinquent contributions can constitute plan assets when explicitly provided for in the plan documents and corporate officers are plan fiduciaries with respect to those assets. The Court demanded a high level of clarity in the plan documents, however, regarding the delinquent contribution’s status as plan assets. It explained that when a corporation is delinquent in its contributions, the fund “has a sufficient priority on the corporation’s available resources that individuals controlling corporate resources are controlling fund assets. This in effect places heavy responsibilities on employers, but only to the extent that . . . an employer freely accepts those responsibilities in collective bargaining.”

In addition, district courts in the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have found that employer contributions constitute plan assets when the plan documents so provide. See, e.g., Trustees of Construction Industry and Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Archie, No. 2:12-cv-00225 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2014) (holding that unpaid contributions were plan assets based upon the CBA’s language and finding that the company principals’ acts and responsibilities demonstrated sufficient control and authority over the company’s operations and financials to qualify as ERISA fiduciaries); Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295, 301 (M.D. Penn. 1987) (refusing to dismiss fiduciary breach claims for alleged failure to pay delinquent contributions based upon the “clear and undisputed language [of the agreement] stating that title to all monies ‘due and owing’ the plaintiff fund is ‘vested’ in the fund,” rendering “any delinquent employer contributions vested assets of the plaintiff fund.”; Connors v. Paybra Mining Co., 807 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.W.V. 1992) (finding company officers personally liable for delinquent contributions that were plan assets based upon CBA’s language since they breached their fiduciary duty by exercising authority over those assets by favoring other creditors over the fund); see also Secretary of Labor v. Doyle, 675 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that district court erred in failing to determine whether payments collected from various employers were plan assets subject to ERISA).

District courts in the Sixth Circuit have even signaled support for finding that contributions are plan assets as soon as they become due, “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.” See, e.g., Plumbers Local 98 Defined Benefit Funds v. M&P Master Plumbers of Michigan, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 873, 879 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding company principal personally liable for delinquent contributions since “the CBA and trust agreements . . . treat these unpaid contributions as inalienable plan assets” and signaling support for holding delinquent contributions plan assets “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.”).

In a related context, a federal bankruptcy court recently refused to discharge a debtor’s debt for delinquent contributions based upon the Bankruptcy Code’s “defalcation in the performance of fiduciary duty” exception. See In re Fahey, 494 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013). Although the court initially found that the debtor lacked the necessary discretion for fiduciary status under ERISA because the “option to breach a contract does not constitute discretion in the performance of one’s duty,” the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit reversed. The Panel ruled that “even if an ERISA fiduciary does not per se satisfy the § 523(a)(4) requirement for ‘fiduciary capacity,’ an analysis of [the Debtor’s] control and authority over the plan in functional terms nonetheless yields the conclusion that he acted as a fiduciary of a technical trust imposed by common law.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found that the debtor prioritized payments that were personally beneficial over his obligations to the ERISA funds and, consequently, committed defalcation as contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.

View from Proskauer

Although the general rule that employer contributions do not constitute plan assets until actually received by the trust fund continues, recent decisions indicate an increased willingness by courts to carve out an exception to this rule. Funds looking to protect their ability to collect contributions should explicitly define in the plan documents and agreements with employers that plan assets also include all unpaid contributions in the hands of the employer. Employers should be fully cognizant of these provisions; otherwise its officers, directors and other representatives who choose to pay other creditors rather than the trust fund might be held personally liable for the unpaid amounts and interest and penalties, and possibly be unable to escape this liability through bankruptcy.

Article By:

Neal S Schelberg
Aaron Feuer
Of:
Proskauer Rose LLP.

What To Look For Down The Road: France

Sheppard Mullin 2012

There is some legislation being debated in the French Parliament.  One piece of legislation would encourage fathers to take leave to care for their children.  The goal would be to curb the systemic disadvantages that women experience in their careers due to motherhood.

Another bill has been introduced with the goal of reforming the system of continuing vocational training, which could have major financial implications.  The bill provides for the creation of a so-called “individual learning account” in which rights to training hours earned each year would accumulate, within a total limit of 150 hours.  The account would not be related to the company: it would be personal and “follow” the employee throughout his/her entire working life.

 Article by:

Terese M. Connolly

Of:

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

 

Illinois Whistleblower Awarded $3 Million Following Jury Trial

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In what appears to be an alarming trend for employers, the Chicago Tribune recently reported that a former Chicago State University employee was awarded $3 million after a Cook County, Illinois jury found that the University retaliated against him for reporting alleged misconduct by top university officials in violation of the Illinois State Official and Employees Ethics Act (5 ILCS 430/15-5, et seq.) and the Illinois Whistleblower Act.  Crowley v. Chicago State University, No. 2010-L-012657.

Background

Plaintiff James Crowley (Crowley) was the Senior Legal Counsel for Chicago State University (University).  His responsibilities included reviewing contracts and processing Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests.  During his employment, the University hired a new President, Wayne Watson (Watson).  Watson did not commence his employment immediately due to a retirement benefits regulation; however, Watson allegedly made official University decisions and moved into the Presidential residence during the interim period.  Crowley received several FOIA requests inquiring about whether Watson was working unofficially in contravention of the benefits regulation.

Crowley alleged that Watson urged him to withhold certain documents from the FOIA requests, and threatened him by saying “If you read this my way, you are my friend. If you read it the other way, you are my enemy.”  Crowley refused Watson’s request, and released all documents relevant to the FOIA inquiry.  Crowley reported his concerns about the FOIA requests, as well as concerns about the University’s contracting practices, to the Illinois Attorney General’s Office.  The University subsequently terminated Crowley’s employment.  Crowley filed suit alleging that he was terminated for refusing to withhold documents from the FOIA requests and reporting the University’s alleged misconduct in violation of the Illinois State Official and Employees Ethics Act and the Illinois Whistleblower Act.

Jury Verdict

The jury found in favor of Crowley, and awarded him $480,000 in back pay and an additional $2 million in punitive damages.  The jury also concluded that Crowley should be reinstated to his prior position.  After receiving the jury’s verdict, the presiding judge doubled the jury’s back pay award, as permitted under state law, and also granted Crowley $60,000 in interest.

Implications

Multi-million dollar judgments in state court whistleblower retaliation cases are trending at an alarming rate.  We recently reported on a $6 million whistleblower verdict in California and other large verdicts in Minnesota and New Jersey.   This trend highlights the serious risks employers face under state and federal whistleblower laws, and servers as a wake-up call for employers to carefully review and refine their whistleblower policies and related practices.

© 2014 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Article By:
Steven J Pearlman
Allison Lynn Martin

Of:

EEOC & FTC Issue Joint Background Check Guidance

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The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued joint informal guidance concerning the legal pitfalls employers may face when consulting background checks into a worker’s criminal record, financial history, medical history or use of social media.  The FTC enforces the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the law that protects the privacy and accuracy of the information in credit reports. The EEOC enforces laws against employment discrimination.

The two short guides, Background Checks: What Employers Need to Know andBackground Checks: What Job Applicants and Employees Should Know, explain the rights and responsibilities of both employers and employees.

The agency press releases state that the FTC and the EEOC want employers to know that they need written permission from job applicants before getting background reports about them from a company in the business of compiling background information. Employers also should know that it’s illegal to discriminate based on a person’s race, national origin, sex, religion, disability, or age (40 or older) when requesting or using background information for employment.

Additionally, the agencies want job applicants to know that it’s not illegal for potential employers to ask someone about their background as long as the employer does not unlawfully discriminate. Job applicants also should know that if they’ve been turned down for a job or denied a promotion based on information in a background report, they have a right to review the report for accuracy.

According to EEOC Legal Counsel Peggy Mastroianni, “The No. 1 goal here is to ensure that people on both sides of the desk understand their rights and responsibilities.”

Article by:

Jason C. Gavejian

Of:

Jackson Lewis P.C.

Keeping Current – Recent Changes in Employment Laws

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Is your FMLA policy up to date?

The federal Family Medical Leave Act regulations were revised in 2013, primarily to expand the circumstances under which employees can take military leaves. For example, leave is now available to care for covered veterans and for service members or veterans who aggravated an existing illness or injury while on active duty (as opposed to suffering a new injury while on duty). Qualifying exigency leave is now also available to care for a covered service member’s parent.

The Department of Labor is increasing the number of complaint-driven on-site audits it conducts under the FMLA. Auditors will come in with a checklist of updates they expect to see in an employer’s FMLA policy to comply with the 2008 and 2013 regulatory changes, as well as the DOL’s informal guidance. Having updated policies will show an auditor or investigator that you are up to speed on the latest changes in the law and may lend credibility to your FMLA practices.

If you are a federal contractor, are you preparing to comply with the new OFCCP regulations regarding veterans and individuals with disabilities?

The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (“OFCCP”) issued regulations in 2013 substantially increasing the obligations of federal contractors relating to veterans and individuals with disabilities. Many of these new requirements, including language to be included in all job postings and subcontracts, go into effect March 24, 2014. Additional requirements go into effect at the start of an employer’s next plan year after March 24, 2014, but may require substantial planning in advance. For example, federal contractors will now be required to conduct statistical analysis of the number of veterans and disabled individuals in their workforce, much like what was already required for race and gender. This requires inviting individuals to self-identify as a veteran or disabled. The regulations require this invitation be made to all applicants and again to those offered jobs. It also requires that an employer’s existing work force be invited to self-identify as disabled every five years. Tracking this information can be complicated, as it must be kept separate from general personnel files and treated as confidential. This is not only required by the regulations but is also essential to avoid increased risk of discrimination claims on the basis of disability.

Companies that provide products or services under contracts with the federal government should review their obligations to ensure they are complying with these new OFCCP regulations.

Was your employee terminated for misconduct or “substantial fault” on the job?

Wisconsin’s 2013 Budget Bill made changes to the statutes governing unemployment insurance, which took effect January 5, 2014. Even before these changes, employees would be ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits if they were terminated for misconduct. The definition of misconduct previously came from case law. The new statute defines misconduct and includes examples, which include:

  • Two or more absences (without notice or without valid reason) in 120 days, unless employer policy is more generous
  • Falsifying business records

The statute also adds a second basis under which employees may be disqualified for benefits, if they are terminated for “substantial fault” in their performance. This still does not disqualify an employee from unemployment benefits for minor infractions or inadvertent errors, but on its face it would disqualify an employee who was terminated for major failures. This basis is largely undefined and untested, so we will have to monitor the decisions of administrative law judges and the courts to determine how it will be defined in practice. The updated statutes also narrow the circumstances in which an employee can quit his/her job and still qualify for unemployment benefits.

These changes may mean that employers are more likely to prevail if they challenge a former employee’s unemployment compensation claims. This may be of particular benefit to non-profit employers who participate in the unemployment insurance system as reimbursing employers, and therefore pay dollar-for-dollar on each unemployment claim.

Article by:

Sarah J. Platt

Of:

von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

Do Your Plans Include a Time Limit on a Participant’s Right to Sue?

Poyner Spruill

 

Some, but far from all, employee benefit plans set a limit on the amount of time a participant has to file a lawsuit claiming benefits under the plan.  Until recently, however, not all courts would recognize these plan imposed lawsuit filing deadlines.  The Supreme Court case of Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life, decided in December 2013, changed that by ruling that employee benefit plan contractual provisions that limit the time to file a lawsuit to recover benefits are enforceable, provided the time limitations are not unreasonably short or contrary to a controlling statute.

The Heimeshoff decision involved a plan that provided a participant must file a lawsuit to recover benefits within three years from the date proof of loss was due.  The Supreme Court decision found that the three year limitation period was not too short, noting the plan’s internal claims review process would be concluded in plenty of time for a participant to file a lawsuit to recover benefits. Based on the court’s reasoning, it appears likely that a shorter limitation on filing claims might also be upheld as long as there is sufficient time for the participant to file a lawsuit once the claims procedure period has ended.

While Heimeshoff involved a disability plan, the decision applies equally to all ERISA covered health and welfare plans, retirement plans, and top hat plans.

So, do your employee benefit plans include a limitation on the time a participant has to file a lawsuit to recover benefits?  Don’t assume that they do.  Many plans do not provide a time limit for filing a lawsuit, and now would be a great time to amend those plans to add the limitation.

Article by:

Of:

Poyner Spruill LLP

United Auto Workers (UAW) and Volkswagen (VW) Efforts to Establish First Works Council in the U.S. Fails

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The United Auto Workers (UAW), which already represents most of the largest carmakers in the United States, was unsuccessful in its efforts to unionizeVolkswagen’s (VW) plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee. What makes this noteworthy is that leading up to the February 14th representation election, the German company was actually campaigning for the UAW not against it in an employer-union alliance seldom seen in this country.

While the “big three” American carmakers (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) are all unionized, foreign carmakers have avoided unionization by locating their plants in Southern states with strong Right to Work laws. Volkswagen, however, considers the creation of a so-called “works council” a crucial element of its business. Works councils are common under German law, and Volkswagen has established works councils at all its foreign plants, with the exception of Chattanooga and China.

Under these works councils, all workers in a factory regardless of position and whether they are unionized or not, help decide things like staffing schedules and working conditions, while the union bargains on wages and benefits. They also have the right to review certain types of information about how the company is doing financially, which means that they tend to be more sympathetic towards management’s desire to make cutbacks during tough financial times. Each Volkswagen plant throughout the world sends its delegates to a global works council that influences which products the company makes and where. This arrangement would have represented a new experience for the UAW, unlike its relationship with Chrysler, General Motors and Ford, which would have involved sharing control with the works council.

A tough question for Volkswagen and the UAW is whether a works council would be legal in the United States without a union. There is no provision in the NLRA for the kind of German-style works council Volkswagen seeks. Volkswagen’s best option for creating a works council would have been for its workers to accept UAW representation. Volkswagen must now rethink its options in seeking a way to create a works council. Options include talking with a different union that might be more popular with its workers or encouraging workers to organize their own independent union. Another option would be moving ahead without a union and risking an NLRB challenge.

After the UAW was defeated by a 712-626 vote in its bid to represent workers at the Volkswagen plant, the UAW promptly requested a new election claiming Tennessee politicians and outside organizations coordinated and vigorously promoted a coercive campaign to sow fear and deprive Volkswagen workers of their right to join a union. Senior state officials including United States Senator Bob Corker, TennesseeGovernor William Haslam, State House Speaker Beth Harwell, and State House Majority Leader Gerald McCormick, made statements in an effort to convince the workers to reject the UAW. The UAW’s alleges this was part of an unlawful campaign which included publicly announced and widely disseminated threats by elected officials that state-financed incentives would be withheld if workers exercised their right to join the UAW’s ranks. However, on February 25, 2014, a group of Volkswagen workers sought to intervene in the UAW‘s bid, and argued that the election results should stand.

Article by:

Of:

Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

Illinois Federal Court Issues Reminder That "100% Healed" Requirements Violate ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act)

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On February 11, 2014, an Illinois Federal District Court issued a decision reminding employers that “100% healed” return-to-work requirements violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). In EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed a lawsuit alleging that United Parcel Service’s (“UPS”) “100% healed” requirement violated the ADA. UPS moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that the EEOC could not state a claim that there was a violation of the ADA. The Court denied UPS’s motion and permitted the EEOC lawsuit to proceed.

UPS maintained a leave policy requiring employees to be “administratively separated from employment” after 12 months of leave. In 2007, an employee returned from a 12-month medical leave. After returning, the employee requested certain accommodations, including a hand cart. UPS refused to provide any accommodation. Shortly thereafter, the employee injured herself and needed additional medical leave. Instead of granting leave, UPS terminated the employee under its 12-month leave policy.

The EEOC alleged that UPS’s 12-month leave policy acted as a “100% healed” requirement because it functioned as a “qualification standard” under the ADA. UPS argued that the ability to regularly attend work was an essential job function and not an impermissible “qualification standard” and, therefore, not in violation of the ADA.

Although the Court conceded that regular job attendance is an essential job requirement, the court found that the lawsuit was not based on attendance requirements, but rather on the “100% healed” requirement that an employee must satisfy before returning to work. As a prerequisite to returning to work, the 12-month policy was a “qualification standard” and not an essential job function subject to accommodation. A “qualification standard” is “the personal and professional attributes, including the skill, experience, educational, physical, medical, safety and other requirements established by a covered entity as requirements an individual must meet in order to be eligible for the position held or desired.”

The court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s previous determination that a “100% healed” policy is per se impermissible because it “prevents individualized assessments” and “necessarily operates to exclude disabled people that are qualified to work.” A “100% healed” requirement limits the ability of qualified individuals with a disability to return to work. Thus, a “100% healed” acts as a prohibited “qualification standard” because it removes the opportunity for the employee to pursue reasonable accommodation, in violation of the ADA. Accordingly, the court denied UPS’s motion to dismiss and permitted the EEOC’s lawsuit to proceed.

Although this case does not provide a definitive answer to the EEOC’s lawsuit, it does provide a strong reminder to employers that “100% healed” policies violate the ADA. Employers should review their return to work policies to ensure that they do not contain “100% healed” requirements. When dealing with leave issues, employers also should remember to enter into the interactive process when necessary and balance obligations under federal, state and local disability and leave requirements, in addition to those created by contract or agreement.

Article by:

Geoffrey S. Trotier

Of:

von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

Federal Court Upholds Validity of 2011 H-2B Prevailing Wage

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The Temporary Non-agricultural Employment 2011 H-2B Wage Rule for calculating the prevailing wage rates (“Rule”) has cleared one of the last hurdles to implementation by the U.S. Department of Labor, with a ruling by a federal appeals court in Philadelphia upholding the regulation.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on February 5 that the DOL has authority to make rules regulating the H-2B program, that the Rule was lawfully promulgated and that it did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act or the Immigration and Naturalization Act.  The lawsuit was brought by employer associations that recruit H-2B workers and stand to face higher labor costs as a result of the Rule.  The case is La. Forestry Ass’n v. Sec’y United States DOL, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2167 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2014).

The Rule (76 Fed. Reg. 3,452 (Jan. 19, 2011) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 655.10)) eliminated the “four-tier wage methodology” in favor of the mean Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) wage for each occupational category, and established a wage calculation regime wherein the prevailing wage is the highest of the applicable collective bargaining agreement(s), the rate established under the DBA[???] or Service Contract Act, or the OES mean.  It also barred use of employer-submitted surveys if the prevailing wage can be determined based on OES data or the rates established under the DBA or SCA. According to DOL’s estimates, “the change in the method … will result in a $4.83 increase in the weighted average hourly wage for H-2B workers and similarly employed U.S. workers[,]” and a total annual transfer cost of $847.4 million.

This Third Circuit decision is welcomed by DOL, which has faced numerous court challenges in its efforts to promulgate new H-2B rules since 2008.  The 2011 H-2B Wage Rule was published in response to an August 2010 court order enjoining the agency from implementing its 2008 H-2B wage rule on the ground that it violated the APA, promulgated without seeking public comment.   The court ordered the DOL to promulgate new, APA-compliant rules.

Even though DOL published the 2011 Rule within the time ordered, its implementation has been held up by court action and by Congressional “appropriations concerns” denying DOL funding.  DOL continued to use its 2008 rule.  This was challenged and in March 2013, a federal district court vacated the 2008 wage rule and permanently enjoined the agency form implementing it (see www.globalimmigrationblog.com/2013/03).  The court gave the DOL 30 days to comply.  As a result, DOL and USCIS published a joint interim final rule in April 2013 that established a new methodology for calculating H-2B prevailing wages (seewww.globalimmigrationblog.com/2013/04), which DOL indicated would be effective only until the 2011 H-2B Wage Rule took effect.

Since Congress lifted the appropriations ban on the Rule when it enacted the DOL Appropriations Act, 2014 (see Pub. L. 113-76, Div. H, Title I (2014)), we anticipate DOL will now apprise the public of the status of H-2B prevailing wages and the effective date of the Rule by publishing a notice in the Federal Register.

The Third Circuit recognized its decision may lead to  a rift in the courts of appeals.   In Bayou Lawn & Landscape Servs. v. Sec. of Labor, 713 F.3d 1080 (11th Cir. 2013), the Atlanta court affirmed an injunction barring implementation of the interim rule preliminarily, finding DOL had no rulemaking authority over the program.  The Third  Circuit cautioned, however,   that Bayou may not be the last word on the subject from its sister circuit: “The three-member panel in Bayou opined only on whether the District Court abused its discretion…, not on whether the DOL actually has that authority or not….”

Article by:

Otieno B. Ombok

Of:

Jackson Lewis P.C.

 

The NLRB Revives Controversial Expedited Election Rules – National Labor Relations Board

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On February 6, 2014, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) reissued its controversial rules aimed at expediting union elections in the workplace. This rule, referred to as the “Ambush Election Rule,” could limit an employer’s right to express its views to employees and respond to union statements. The proposed rules mirror the NLRB’s June 2011 proposal, which ultimately was struck down by a district court in May 2012.

Analogous to the June 2011 proposal, the NLRB’s most recent proposal seeks to significantly impact the current union election process. The proposed reforms are aimed at shortening the election cycle from the current median of 38 days from petition to election to as little as 10 to 21 days. The proposed reforms also would move resolution of voter eligibility determination to after the election; reduce the NLRB’s review of representation cases; expand employer disclosure of employee contact information (including e-mail addresses); and allow more electronic filing with the NLRB.

Despite reducing the amount of time an employer has to communicate its message or rebut the union’s statements, NLRB Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce has stated the proposed rules are intended to “improve the process for all parties.” The NLRB is likely to issue a final rule governing union elections later this year.

Action Steps?

The NLRB has issued a proposed rule, and by law, will allow for public comments through April 7, 2014. Employers may direct comments regarding the proposed reforms to the NLRB here. Additionally, the NLRB will hold a public hearing on the proposed rules in Washington D.C. during the week of April 7, 2014, and employers may voice their concerns at the forum.

Finally, employers should consider conducting a vulnerability audit to identify any concerns that can be addressed now (rather than after a final rule is put in place) and should provide supervisors and management with training so they are prepared to address any potential NLRB election situation.

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Of:

Michael Best & Friedrich LLP