Tag: employment

Settlement Between U.S. Department of Labor and Oregon Blueberry Growers Vacated

Varnum LLP

In 2012, the Department of Labor accused Oregon blueberry growers of employing “ghost workers” resulting in minimum wage violations. The DOL then issued what is known as a “hot goods order” to block shipment of their product to market until the violations were remedied.  This, of course, created an untenable situation for the blueberry producers as their products were highly perishable. With no real alternative, the blueberry growers signed consent agreements with the DOL, in which they agreed to substantial fines and waived their rights to contest the allegations.

The blueberry growers later challenged the consent judgment and in January a federal magistrate judge agreed with the growers finding that “the tactic of putting millions of dollars of perishable goods in lock up was unlawfully coercive.” That decision was upheld just last week by the United States district judge. Invaliding consent judgments, particularly those with the federal government, is extremely difficult and rarely happens. But in this case, the combination of over-the-top, coercive of tactics by the DOL, as well as the court’s view that there was little or no evidence of underlying labor violations to begin with, paved the way for the growers in this case.

Article By:

Aaron M. Phelps
Of:
Varnum LLP

Rights of Job Applicants in Germany

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The German Federal Labor Court made a very clear ruling regarding job applicants in Germany who are not offered the position for which such applicants applied.  In the Federal Labor Court’s view, a rejected applicant has no right to know whether another applicant was offered or accepted the position.  (Federal Labor Court, verdict dated April 25, 2013, case number 8 AZR 287/08)

This case concerned a plaintiff who was born in the former Soviet Union in 1961.  She applied for a position that was advertised by a German company, the defendant in this case.  Even though the plaintiff fulfilled all required qualifications, she was rejected and did not receive a job offer.  The plaintiff presumed that this decision was based on discrimination for her gender, age and origin.  The Federal Labor Court submitted the case to the European Court of Justice to determine whether the job applicant had a right to information regarding why she was not selected, or if another applicant was selected for the position.  The European Court of Justice rendered its verdict on April 19, 2012 (case number C415/10), and stated that rejected job applicants had no right to this information under European law.

The German Federal Labor Court dismissed the case because it could not detect any evidence of discrimination.  The mere refusal of the defendant to disclose any information related to the application process and/or the hiring could not establish the presumption of an inadmissible discrimination, according to Section 7 of the German General Equal Treatment Act.

However, this ruling has to be viewed with great caution.  The German decision is not in line with the aforementioned ruling in the same matter of the European Court of Justice.  The European judges, in contrast to the German Court, stressed that the complete refusal to give out any information regarding the hiring could actually be evaluated as a presumption of possible discrimination.  This remarkable difference in the two verdicts was not explained by the German judges and as long as their reasoning remains unclear, German employers should provide a short explanation to rejected applicants when they ask the reason why they have been rejected for an open position (e.g., the other candidate better satisfies the qualification profile, made a better impression at the job interview, seems to be a more motivated and energetic person, etc.).

Article By:

Dr. Sandra Urban-Crell
Gudrun Germakowski
Of:
McDermott Will & Emery

 

Working Through Lunch: An Update on the Legal Risks

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Regular readers of this blog know that we’ve previously alerted you to the risks of using timekeeping software that automatically deducts the lunch hour from employees’ paychecks.  As we’ve explained before, such software can expose employers to liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act because, for one reason or another, employees sometimes work through lunch. And, even if an employer has a system in place for employees to request pay for lunchtime work, that is no “get out of jail free card,” because employees who bring FLSA lawsuits commonly argue that they did not use – or were discouraged from using – the system.

A lawsuit that was filed earlier this month in Texas federal court gives us another reason to sound the alert.  In Corcione v. Houston Methodist, the plaintiff alleges that she – and a class of some 5,000 nurses, nurses assistants, patient care assistants and other employees at seven different medical facilities – were required to keep their cellphones on hand during their meal breaks in case they were needed to respond to emergencies. And, even though the employers had systems in place for requesting pay for lunchtime work, the plaintiff claims that managers discouraged employees from making such requests. The plaintiff seeks to recover the unpaid wages (for the time claimed to have been worked, including overtime pay), liquidated damages, and legal fees.  In other words, the plaintiff wants tens of millions of dollars.

A policy requiring nurses (and similar employees) to be available so that they can respond to emergencies probably seems reasonable to you, and we feel the same way. Work “emergencies” aren’t limited to the medical field, of course, and many other types of employers have similar policies – written or unwritten. If you’re one of them, just remember that the ramifications of such policies can land you on the wrong side of the FLSA if you’re not careful. We’ve said it before, and we’ll say it again:  Work time must be compensated.  Even if that “work time” comes during what – on a normal day – would have been “lunch time.”

Article By:

James F. Ehrenberg
Of:
Barnes & Thornburg LLP

Flextime Consideration Is Now Law In Some Places

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The pros and cons of implementing “flextime” policies have long been debated. Two laws – one state and one municipal – went into effect at the beginning of this year, however, that made it mandatory for some employers in those jurisdictions to consider flexible working arrangements for their eligible employees.

Vermont passed a “flexible working arrangements” law, which grants employees the right to request a flexible working arrangement for any reason and requires employers to discuss and consider such requests at least twice per calendar year. “Flexible working arrangement” is defined to including changes in the number of days or hours worked, changes in the employee’s start or stop time, work from home, or job-sharing. The law identifies several factors the employer may consider in choosing to grant or deny the request, including costs, effect on employee morale, ability to meet demand, and effect on schedules and staff.

San Francisco passed the “Family Friendly Workplace Ordinance,” which applies to employers with 20 or more employees. It grants certain employees with caregiving responsibilities the right to request  a schedule, location, or assignment change in order to care for children, persons with a serious health condition with whom the employee is in a family relationship, or parents who are 65 or older. Employers must meet with the employee within 21 days of the request and provide a written response. In the case of a denial, the employer must set out a bona fide business reason for the denial.

These laws require conversations that many companies have already been having with their employees. If flextime arrangements are something your company is considering, it is important to remember that such policies require very careful drafting and execution. For example, policies should explain the jobs for which flextime arrangements are and are not possible to avoid potential discrimination claims. Further, FLSA considerations such as overtime and exempt/non-exempt distinctions must be kept in mind when rearranging schedules and tracking hours. Workers’ compensation claims from telecommuting employees injured at home will also require special attention.

Vermont’s law can be found here. More information and a link to the San Francisco ordinance is here.

Article By:

Kaitlyn N. Jakubowski
Of:
Barnes & Thornburg LLP

Unpaid Employer Contributions as Plan Assets: Expansion Of Liability Under ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act)

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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), requires trustees of multiemployer pension and benefit funds to collect contributions required to be made by contributing employers under their collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) with the labor union sponsoring the plans. This is not always an easy task—often, an employer is an incorporated entity with limited assets or financial resources to satisfy its contractual obligations. In some instances, an employer will resort to filing for bankruptcy to obtain a discharge of its debts to the pension or benefit funds.

In a distinct trend, federal courts have found that, depending on the text of the underlying plan documents, unpaid employer contributions due under a CBA may be viewed as plan assets, such that the representatives of an employer who exercise fiduciary control over those plan assets can be held individually liable for the unpaid amounts (together with interest and penalties) under ERISA. These cases will no doubt help plan trustees and administrators collect monies owed to the plan. They also should serve as cautionary warnings to contributing employers to ensure that they fully understand the obligations that they are undertaking when they agree to contribute to ERISA funds pursuant to CBAs.

Background

In the typical scenario, an employer will agree under one or more of its CBAs to make specified contributions to fund the pension and health and welfare benefits promised to plan participants under the trust fund’s plan of benefits. If an employer fails to timely remit those payments in violation of the CBA and the plan’s rules, the trustees of the fund have a legal duty to attempt to recover the unpaid contributions unless, after fully examining the facts and circumstances, the trustees conclude that the likelihood of recovery is outweighed by its costs. What happens if the trustees expend the fund’s resources to seek to collect the unpaid obligations and obtain a judgment against the employer, only to find the company’s coffers empty? Or what if the company files for bankruptcy?

Unlike employee contributions, which under U.S. Department of Labor regulations are explicitly deemed to be plan assets, employer contributions are typically found to be contractual obligations that do not become plan assets until such amounts are paid by the employer to the trust fund. Hence, while an employer’s failure to remit an employee contribution relegates the employer to the status of an ERISA plan fiduciary because it is has authority and control over plan assets, employer contributions have generally been held not to constitute plan assets. As a result, an employer who fails to make its contributions due under the CBA may have committed a contractual violation but has not breached an ERISA fiduciary duty.

The Potential for Individual Fiduciary Liability

Recently, courts have regularly carved out an exception to the general rule that unpaid contributions are not plan assets by finding that employer contributions are plan assets where the CBA explicitly defines them as such. In such cases, these courts will then proceed to consider the next question of whether the officers, directors or other representatives of such employer exercised a level of control over corporate assets sufficient to make them an ERISA plan fiduciary and thus individually liable for the contributions—effectively stripping them of the protections of the corporate form. Furthermore, if elevated to the status of a fiduciary breach, the debt may not be dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, the plan could proceed to collect the unpaid contributions against the principals of the debtor personally.

For over a decade, some federal district courts in the Second Circuit have applied a two-part test in delinquent employer contribution cases to find that: (i) such contributions are plan assets when so specified by the CBA; and (ii) the principals of the employer are an ERISA plan fiduciary. More recently, the Second Circuit concluded that delinquent contributions were not plan assets where there were no provisions in the relevant plan documents that stated that unpaid contributions are assets of the plan. See In re Halpin, 566 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court expressly stated, however, that “the trustees were free to contractually provide for some other result.” It further noted that merely finding that delinquent contributions constitute plan assets does not end the inquiry. A court must also determine whether an individual defendant has exercised sufficient fiduciary conduct over the unpaid contributions to be found to be a plan fiduciary under ERISA.

While the Court’s statements were extraneous to the holding of the case, some district courts within the Second Circuit have seized upon this language and have cited In re Halpin for the proposition that employer contributions can be plan assets where the plan documents so provide. See, e.g., Trustees of Sheet Metalworkers Int’l Assoc. v. Hopwood, 09-cv-5088, 2012 WL 4462048 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012); Sullivan v. Marble Unique Corp., 10-cv-3582, 2011 WL 5401987, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011).

Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011 (11th Cir. 2003), held that delinquent contributions can constitute plan assets when explicitly provided for in the plan documents and corporate officers are plan fiduciaries with respect to those assets. The Court demanded a high level of clarity in the plan documents, however, regarding the delinquent contribution’s status as plan assets. It explained that when a corporation is delinquent in its contributions, the fund “has a sufficient priority on the corporation’s available resources that individuals controlling corporate resources are controlling fund assets. This in effect places heavy responsibilities on employers, but only to the extent that . . . an employer freely accepts those responsibilities in collective bargaining.”

In addition, district courts in the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have found that employer contributions constitute plan assets when the plan documents so provide. See, e.g., Trustees of Construction Industry and Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Archie, No. 2:12-cv-00225 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2014) (holding that unpaid contributions were plan assets based upon the CBA’s language and finding that the company principals’ acts and responsibilities demonstrated sufficient control and authority over the company’s operations and financials to qualify as ERISA fiduciaries); Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295, 301 (M.D. Penn. 1987) (refusing to dismiss fiduciary breach claims for alleged failure to pay delinquent contributions based upon the “clear and undisputed language [of the agreement] stating that title to all monies ‘due and owing’ the plaintiff fund is ‘vested’ in the fund,” rendering “any delinquent employer contributions vested assets of the plaintiff fund.”; Connors v. Paybra Mining Co., 807 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.W.V. 1992) (finding company officers personally liable for delinquent contributions that were plan assets based upon CBA’s language since they breached their fiduciary duty by exercising authority over those assets by favoring other creditors over the fund); see also Secretary of Labor v. Doyle, 675 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that district court erred in failing to determine whether payments collected from various employers were plan assets subject to ERISA).

District courts in the Sixth Circuit have even signaled support for finding that contributions are plan assets as soon as they become due, “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.” See, e.g., Plumbers Local 98 Defined Benefit Funds v. M&P Master Plumbers of Michigan, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 873, 879 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding company principal personally liable for delinquent contributions since “the CBA and trust agreements . . . treat these unpaid contributions as inalienable plan assets” and signaling support for holding delinquent contributions plan assets “regardless of the language of the benefit plan.”).

In a related context, a federal bankruptcy court recently refused to discharge a debtor’s debt for delinquent contributions based upon the Bankruptcy Code’s “defalcation in the performance of fiduciary duty” exception. See In re Fahey, 494 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013). Although the court initially found that the debtor lacked the necessary discretion for fiduciary status under ERISA because the “option to breach a contract does not constitute discretion in the performance of one’s duty,” the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit reversed. The Panel ruled that “even if an ERISA fiduciary does not per se satisfy the § 523(a)(4) requirement for ‘fiduciary capacity,’ an analysis of [the Debtor’s] control and authority over the plan in functional terms nonetheless yields the conclusion that he acted as a fiduciary of a technical trust imposed by common law.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found that the debtor prioritized payments that were personally beneficial over his obligations to the ERISA funds and, consequently, committed defalcation as contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.

View from Proskauer

Although the general rule that employer contributions do not constitute plan assets until actually received by the trust fund continues, recent decisions indicate an increased willingness by courts to carve out an exception to this rule. Funds looking to protect their ability to collect contributions should explicitly define in the plan documents and agreements with employers that plan assets also include all unpaid contributions in the hands of the employer. Employers should be fully cognizant of these provisions; otherwise its officers, directors and other representatives who choose to pay other creditors rather than the trust fund might be held personally liable for the unpaid amounts and interest and penalties, and possibly be unable to escape this liability through bankruptcy.

Article By:

Neal S Schelberg
Aaron Feuer
Of:
Proskauer Rose LLP.

What To Look For Down The Road: France

Sheppard Mullin 2012

There is some legislation being debated in the French Parliament.  One piece of legislation would encourage fathers to take leave to care for their children.  The goal would be to curb the systemic disadvantages that women experience in their careers due to motherhood.

Another bill has been introduced with the goal of reforming the system of continuing vocational training, which could have major financial implications.  The bill provides for the creation of a so-called “individual learning account” in which rights to training hours earned each year would accumulate, within a total limit of 150 hours.  The account would not be related to the company: it would be personal and “follow” the employee throughout his/her entire working life.

 Article by:

Terese M. Connolly

Of:

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

 

Illinois Whistleblower Awarded $3 Million Following Jury Trial

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In what appears to be an alarming trend for employers, the Chicago Tribune recently reported that a former Chicago State University employee was awarded $3 million after a Cook County, Illinois jury found that the University retaliated against him for reporting alleged misconduct by top university officials in violation of the Illinois State Official and Employees Ethics Act (5 ILCS 430/15-5, et seq.) and the Illinois Whistleblower Act.  Crowley v. Chicago State University, No. 2010-L-012657.

Background

Plaintiff James Crowley (Crowley) was the Senior Legal Counsel for Chicago State University (University).  His responsibilities included reviewing contracts and processing Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests.  During his employment, the University hired a new President, Wayne Watson (Watson).  Watson did not commence his employment immediately due to a retirement benefits regulation; however, Watson allegedly made official University decisions and moved into the Presidential residence during the interim period.  Crowley received several FOIA requests inquiring about whether Watson was working unofficially in contravention of the benefits regulation.

Crowley alleged that Watson urged him to withhold certain documents from the FOIA requests, and threatened him by saying “If you read this my way, you are my friend. If you read it the other way, you are my enemy.”  Crowley refused Watson’s request, and released all documents relevant to the FOIA inquiry.  Crowley reported his concerns about the FOIA requests, as well as concerns about the University’s contracting practices, to the Illinois Attorney General’s Office.  The University subsequently terminated Crowley’s employment.  Crowley filed suit alleging that he was terminated for refusing to withhold documents from the FOIA requests and reporting the University’s alleged misconduct in violation of the Illinois State Official and Employees Ethics Act and the Illinois Whistleblower Act.

Jury Verdict

The jury found in favor of Crowley, and awarded him $480,000 in back pay and an additional $2 million in punitive damages.  The jury also concluded that Crowley should be reinstated to his prior position.  After receiving the jury’s verdict, the presiding judge doubled the jury’s back pay award, as permitted under state law, and also granted Crowley $60,000 in interest.

Implications

Multi-million dollar judgments in state court whistleblower retaliation cases are trending at an alarming rate.  We recently reported on a $6 million whistleblower verdict in California and other large verdicts in Minnesota and New Jersey.   This trend highlights the serious risks employers face under state and federal whistleblower laws, and servers as a wake-up call for employers to carefully review and refine their whistleblower policies and related practices.

© 2014 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Article By:
Steven J Pearlman
Allison Lynn Martin

Of:

EEOC & FTC Issue Joint Background Check Guidance

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The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued joint informal guidance concerning the legal pitfalls employers may face when consulting background checks into a worker’s criminal record, financial history, medical history or use of social media.  The FTC enforces the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the law that protects the privacy and accuracy of the information in credit reports. The EEOC enforces laws against employment discrimination.

The two short guides, Background Checks: What Employers Need to Know andBackground Checks: What Job Applicants and Employees Should Know, explain the rights and responsibilities of both employers and employees.

The agency press releases state that the FTC and the EEOC want employers to know that they need written permission from job applicants before getting background reports about them from a company in the business of compiling background information. Employers also should know that it’s illegal to discriminate based on a person’s race, national origin, sex, religion, disability, or age (40 or older) when requesting or using background information for employment.

Additionally, the agencies want job applicants to know that it’s not illegal for potential employers to ask someone about their background as long as the employer does not unlawfully discriminate. Job applicants also should know that if they’ve been turned down for a job or denied a promotion based on information in a background report, they have a right to review the report for accuracy.

According to EEOC Legal Counsel Peggy Mastroianni, “The No. 1 goal here is to ensure that people on both sides of the desk understand their rights and responsibilities.”

Article by:

Jason C. Gavejian

Of:

Jackson Lewis P.C.

Keeping Current – Recent Changes in Employment Laws

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Is your FMLA policy up to date?

The federal Family Medical Leave Act regulations were revised in 2013, primarily to expand the circumstances under which employees can take military leaves. For example, leave is now available to care for covered veterans and for service members or veterans who aggravated an existing illness or injury while on active duty (as opposed to suffering a new injury while on duty). Qualifying exigency leave is now also available to care for a covered service member’s parent.

The Department of Labor is increasing the number of complaint-driven on-site audits it conducts under the FMLA. Auditors will come in with a checklist of updates they expect to see in an employer’s FMLA policy to comply with the 2008 and 2013 regulatory changes, as well as the DOL’s informal guidance. Having updated policies will show an auditor or investigator that you are up to speed on the latest changes in the law and may lend credibility to your FMLA practices.

If you are a federal contractor, are you preparing to comply with the new OFCCP regulations regarding veterans and individuals with disabilities?

The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (“OFCCP”) issued regulations in 2013 substantially increasing the obligations of federal contractors relating to veterans and individuals with disabilities. Many of these new requirements, including language to be included in all job postings and subcontracts, go into effect March 24, 2014. Additional requirements go into effect at the start of an employer’s next plan year after March 24, 2014, but may require substantial planning in advance. For example, federal contractors will now be required to conduct statistical analysis of the number of veterans and disabled individuals in their workforce, much like what was already required for race and gender. This requires inviting individuals to self-identify as a veteran or disabled. The regulations require this invitation be made to all applicants and again to those offered jobs. It also requires that an employer’s existing work force be invited to self-identify as disabled every five years. Tracking this information can be complicated, as it must be kept separate from general personnel files and treated as confidential. This is not only required by the regulations but is also essential to avoid increased risk of discrimination claims on the basis of disability.

Companies that provide products or services under contracts with the federal government should review their obligations to ensure they are complying with these new OFCCP regulations.

Was your employee terminated for misconduct or “substantial fault” on the job?

Wisconsin’s 2013 Budget Bill made changes to the statutes governing unemployment insurance, which took effect January 5, 2014. Even before these changes, employees would be ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits if they were terminated for misconduct. The definition of misconduct previously came from case law. The new statute defines misconduct and includes examples, which include:

  • Two or more absences (without notice or without valid reason) in 120 days, unless employer policy is more generous
  • Falsifying business records

The statute also adds a second basis under which employees may be disqualified for benefits, if they are terminated for “substantial fault” in their performance. This still does not disqualify an employee from unemployment benefits for minor infractions or inadvertent errors, but on its face it would disqualify an employee who was terminated for major failures. This basis is largely undefined and untested, so we will have to monitor the decisions of administrative law judges and the courts to determine how it will be defined in practice. The updated statutes also narrow the circumstances in which an employee can quit his/her job and still qualify for unemployment benefits.

These changes may mean that employers are more likely to prevail if they challenge a former employee’s unemployment compensation claims. This may be of particular benefit to non-profit employers who participate in the unemployment insurance system as reimbursing employers, and therefore pay dollar-for-dollar on each unemployment claim.

Article by:

Sarah J. Platt

Of:

von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

Do Your Plans Include a Time Limit on a Participant’s Right to Sue?

Poyner Spruill

 

Some, but far from all, employee benefit plans set a limit on the amount of time a participant has to file a lawsuit claiming benefits under the plan.  Until recently, however, not all courts would recognize these plan imposed lawsuit filing deadlines.  The Supreme Court case of Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life, decided in December 2013, changed that by ruling that employee benefit plan contractual provisions that limit the time to file a lawsuit to recover benefits are enforceable, provided the time limitations are not unreasonably short or contrary to a controlling statute.

The Heimeshoff decision involved a plan that provided a participant must file a lawsuit to recover benefits within three years from the date proof of loss was due.  The Supreme Court decision found that the three year limitation period was not too short, noting the plan’s internal claims review process would be concluded in plenty of time for a participant to file a lawsuit to recover benefits. Based on the court’s reasoning, it appears likely that a shorter limitation on filing claims might also be upheld as long as there is sufficient time for the participant to file a lawsuit once the claims procedure period has ended.

While Heimeshoff involved a disability plan, the decision applies equally to all ERISA covered health and welfare plans, retirement plans, and top hat plans.

So, do your employee benefit plans include a limitation on the time a participant has to file a lawsuit to recover benefits?  Don’t assume that they do.  Many plans do not provide a time limit for filing a lawsuit, and now would be a great time to amend those plans to add the limitation.

Article by:

Of:

Poyner Spruill LLP