Tag: employment

Delaware Adds to Growing Patchwork of Social Media Laws

On August 7, Delaware Governor Jack Markell signed a law to prohibit employers from interfering with the personal social media accounts of their prospective and current employees.  The new law, which also took effect on August 7, defines “personal social media” to encompass any account on a social networking site created and operated by a prospective or current employee exclusively for his or her personal use.  The term does not include accounts created or operated by an employer and that are operated by an employee as part of his or her employment.

Specifically, the new law prohibits an employer from requesting or requiring a prospective or current employee to:

  • disclose a username or password for the purpose of allowing the employer to access personal social media;

  • access personal social media in the presence of the employer;

  • use personal social media as a condition of employment;

  • divulge any personal social media (except as otherwise permitted by the new law);

  • add a person, including the employer, to the list of contacts associated with the prospective or current employee’s personal social media,

  • invite or accept an invitation from any person, including the employer, to join a group associated with the prospective or current employee’s personal social media; or

  • alter settings on the prospective or current employee’s personal social media that affect a third party’s ability to view the contents of the medium.

The new law also forbids an employer from taking adverse action against a prospective or current employee for failing to comply with any of these requests or demands.

Despite these broad prohibitions, nothing in the new law prevents an employer from:

  • exercising its right or obligation under its personnel policies, federal or state law, case law, or other rules or regulations to require or request that an employee divulge a username, password, or social media “reasonably believed to be relevant” to an investigation of alleged employee misconduct or violation of applicable laws and regulations (so long as the social media is used solely for purposes of that investigation or a related proceeding);

  • requiring or requesting an employee to disclose a username, password, or other accessing credentials for (i) an electronic communication device supplied by or paid for in whole or in part by the employer; or (ii) an account or service provided by the employer, obtained by virtue of the employee’s employment relationship, or used for the employer’s business purposes;

  • accessing, blocking, monitoring, or reviewing electronic data stored on an employer’s network or on an electronic communications device supplied by or paid for in whole or in part by the employer;

  • complying with a duty to screen prospective or current employees, or to monitor or retain employee communications, (i) under federal or state law or by a self-regulatory organization, as defined in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (like FINRA); or (ii) in the course of a law enforcement employment application or officer conduct investigation performed by a law enforcement agency; or

  • accessing, using, or viewing information about a prospective or current employee otherwise available in the public domain.

The new Delaware law continues a growing trend across the country.  Twenty-one other states have similar laws restricting employer access to a prospective or current employee’s personal social media account, including Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.

ARTICLE BY Katharine H Parker & Daniel L. Saperstein of Proskauer Rose LLP

© 2015 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Temps May Have Multiple Employers

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that a temporary agency employee could be deemed an employee of the customer company as well as the temporary agency. The Fourth Circuit adopted a hybrid test and set forth nine factors that should be considered to determine if an employee is jointly employed by two or more entities. The nine factors are:

  1. Authority to hire and fire the individual;
  2. Day-to-day supervision of the individual, including employee discipline;
  3. Whether the customer furnishes the equipment used and the place of work;
  4. Possession of and responsibility over the individual’s employment records, including payroll, insurance, and taxes;
  5. The length of time during which the individual has worked for the customer;
  6. Whether the customer provides the individual with formal or informal training;
  7. Whether the individual’s duties are akin to the duties of the customer’s employees;
  8. Whether the individual is assigned solely to the customer; and
  9. Whether the parties intended to enter into an employment relationship.

The court made clear that none of the factors are dispositive, but that control is still the “principal guidepost” in making the determination. However, the court noted that the first, second and third factors were the most important in the analysis.

Based on the analysis of the factors provided by the court, prudent employers should note the following:

  • Authority to hire and fire can be found if the customer employer directs the temp agency to fire or discipline the employee even if the temp agency is actually the one that carries out the termination.
  • Temp employees working “side by side” with the company’s employees and performing the same tasks as the company employees is also an indicator of control.
  • Even though temp employees may wear a different uniform from the company employees, that is not dispositive of control.
  • Temp employees performing tasks essential to the business of the customer company such as producing goods or services core to the business also weighs in favor of control.
  • Although the temp agency may handle dispersal of paychecks, official terminations and employee discipline, this does not guarantee that the temp agency is the sole employer for purposes of liability.
ARTICLE BY Karla Turner Anderson of Poyner Spruill LLP

© 2015 Poyner Spruill LLP. All rights reserved.

New Joint Employer Doctrine and Hybrid Test Increase Possible Liability Under Title VII in Fourth Circuit

Over the last several years, there has been quite a push to broaden who is considered an employee – as well as who is considered an employer – under relevant federal (and even state) laws.  For instance, the Department of Labor has stepped up its efforts in singling out employers who misclassify workers as independent contractors.  Their recent memo on this subject – which we wrote about here – is the most recent evidence of that.  The National Labor Relations Board has also been active in this general area, issuing complaints against McDonald’s arguing that a number of its franchisors have as much control over employees as the franchisees do, and therefore are just as legally responsible for ensuring compliance with certain employment laws.  These arguments have been advanced by more than just government agencies, however.  They have been made by private plaintiffs under anti-discrimination law, too.

In a recent Fourth Circuit opinion, Butler v. Drive Automotive Industries of America, Inc., No. 14-1348, 2015 WL 4269615 (4th Cir. 2015), the court found that two parties can be considered joint employers under Title VII.  In reaching that conclusion, the Fourth Circuit adopted a new employee-friendly “hybrid test” to determine whether a company qualifies as an employer.  Employers everywhere – but especially those in the Fourth Circuit, including in West Virginia – should pay particular attention to this decision because it increases potential liability for them.  This is especially true for employers who use contract or temporary employees through staffing agencies.  Let’s take a deeper look at the case.

In Butler, the Plaintiff, Brenda Butler, was hired by ResourceMFG, a temporary employment agency, to work at Drive Automotive in Piedmont, South Carolina.  Butler sued ResourceMFG and Drive Automotive alleging sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  She alleged that her supervisor made constant, inappropriate comments about her body.  Additionally, she alleged that after she reported an altercation in which Butler’s supervisor called her an inappropriate name and told her to go home, she was referred to ResourceMFG for termination.  Further, Butler alleged that her supervisor called before she was terminated and suggested that he could save her job if she performed sexual favors for him.  Soon thereafter, she was terminated by ResourceMFG.  The key issue in the case was not whether the temp agency, ResourceMFG, was Butler’s employer – that was undisputed – but was whether Drive Automotive also was considered her employer.

The District Court for the District of South Carolina, where the case was originally filed, dismissed Butler’s claims against Drive Automotive, finding that Drive Automotive was not Butler’s “employer” under Title VII because it did not “exercise sufficient control over Butler’s employment.”

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit formally adopted the joint employer doctrine for Title VII claims.  The Fourth Circuit stated that two parties can be considered joint employers and therefore both be liable under Title VII if they “share or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment” over the same employees.  Additionally, the Fourth Circuit adopted a nine-factor “hybrid test” to determine who qualifies as an “employer” for Title VII.  The test is based on traditional common-law elements of control, as well as an “economic realities” test which has long been a factor used by the Department of Labor in issuing determinations in this area.  The nine factors are as follows:

(1) Authority to hire and fire the individual;

(2) Day-to-day supervision of the individual, including employee discipline;

(3) Whether the potential employer furnishes the equipment used and the place of work;

(4) Possession of and responsibility over the individual’s employment records, including payroll, insurance, and taxes;

(5) The length of time the individual has worked for the potential employer;

(6) Whether the potential employer provides the individual with formal or informal training;

(7) Whether the individual’s duties are similar to a regular employee’s duties;

(8) Whether the individual is assigned solely to the potential employer; and

(9) Whether the individual and potential employer intended to enter into an employment relationship.

According to the Fourth Circuit, the first three factors are most important.  However, the Court added that no one factor is determinative and courts can alter the test to fit specific industry contexts. In doing so, the Court said, the amount of control over the individual remains the principal guidepost in the analysis, with the first factor – the ability to hire and fire – being the most important to determine ultimate control.  In a footnote, the Court observed that the use of a form which disclaims an employment relationship will not defeat a finding of a joint employer relationship.

After setting out the new test, the Fourth Circuit concluded in Butler’s case that, while control remained the most important factor in the analysis, Drive Automotive was also Butler’s employer despite not having authority to hire, fire, discipline, or pay Butler.  In so concluding, the Fourth Circuit considered the aggregate circumstances, and found important the fact that Drive Automotive was responsible for determining Butler’s work schedule, training Butler, and supervising Butler’s work.

While these situations are always examined on a case-by-case basis, it’s hard to dispute that, in applying its new “hybrid test” and reaching the conclusion it did in Butler, the Fourth Circuit essentially created a very low threshold to qualify as an employer.  That, in turn, will make more entities – particularly in contracting and temporary relationships – more likely to be considered employers, including in discrimination claims under Title VII.

With another employee-friendly ruling from the Fourth Circuit court, businesses need to be especially vigilant about their employment practices in this area, which is why consulting competent counsel on the subject is becoming increasingly important.  At minimum, review your contracts and your policies to ensure that the practices you apply to your workers truly demonstrate and maintain the legal relationships which you wish to use.

ARTICLE BY Joseph U. Leonoro of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC

© Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. All Rights Reserved.

Workers Should Properly be Classified as Employees Under the FLSA

U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) yesterday issued an Administrator Interpretation Memorandum announcing its position that most American workers are employees (as opposed to independent contractors), and thus are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The announcement comes exactly two weeks after the DOL issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would significantly change the legal requirements for an employee to qualify as exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA.

Department of LaborAccording to the Memo, employers are intentionally misclassifying workers as independent contractors to cut costs and avoid compliance with various laws, which deprives workers of certain benefits of employment. Taken together, the two recent DOL actions make the DOL’s true intentions abundantly clear: to sweep more American workers under the umbrella of the FLSA, and in turn, have more of those covered employees earning overtime compensation (or significantly higher salaries).

In the Memorandum, the DOL sets forth its interpretation of the FLSA’s definition of “employ” and the multi-factored “economic realities test” utilized by the courts to guide the analysis of whether a worker is properly classified as an independent contractor under the law. According to the DOL, applying the economic realities test in view of the FLSA’s expansive definition of “employ” will result in most workers being employees, and not independent contractors. In other words, a worker is an employee unless a convincing argument can be made that the worker is properly classified as an independent contractor.

While the “economic realities test” might vary somewhat depending on the court applying the test, the traditional questions considered are:

  • Is the work done by the worker an integral part of the employer’s business?;
  • Does the worker’s managerial skill affect the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss?;
  • How does the worker’s relative investment compare to the employer’s investment?;
  • Does the work performed require special skill and initiative?;
  • Is the relationship between the worker and the employer permanent or indefinite?; and
  • What is the nature and degree of the employer’s control over the worker?

These questions should be considered under the guiding principle that workers who are economically dependent on the employer are employees, and only workers who are really in business for themselves are independent contractors. All factors must be considered in each case, no one factor is determinative, and the ultimate determination must be the degree of the worker’s economic independence from the employer.

ARTICLE BY Jeremy M. Brenner, John P. Hasman, Robert A. Kaiser, Daniel K. O’Toole, Jovita M. Foster & Dione C. Greene of Armstrong Teasdale

© Copyright 2015 Armstrong Teasdale LLP. All rights reserved

EEOC Sues Wal-Mart for Disability Discrimination And Harassment: Agency Says Retailer Denied Accommodations to Disabled Cancer Survivor

Agency Says Retailer Denied Accommodations to and Harassed a Disabled Cancer Survivor

CHICAGO – Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. violated federal law by failing to provide reasonable accommodations to an employee at its Hodgkins, Ill., store who was disabled by bone cancer and failing to stop harassment of the employee, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charged in a lawsuit it filed yesterday.

According to Julianne Bowman, the EEOC’s district director in Chicago, who managed EEOC’s pre-suit administrative investigation, the Walmart store initially agreed to comply with employee Nancy Stack’s request that the company provide a chair in her work area in the fitting room and limit her scheduled work hours because treatment for bone cancer in her leg limited her ability to walk and stand. After complying with her scheduling accommodation for many months, the store revoked it for no reason. And the store did not ensure that a chair was in Stack’s work area, at one point telling her that she had to haul a chair from the furniture department every day, which was of course hard for her to do given her disability. Finally, the store transferred Stack from the fitting room to a greeter position, which did not comply with her restrictions on standing.

To add insult to injury, Bowman added, a co-worker harassed Stack by calling her names like “cripple” and “chemo brain,” imitated her limp, and removed or hid the chair the employee needed in her work area. Stack complained repeatedly, but the store took no action to stop the co-worker’s harassment.

Such alleged conduct violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability, which can include denying reasonable accommodations to disabled employees and subjecting disabled employees to a hostile work environment.

The EEOC filed suit after first attempting to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its conciliation process. The case, EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civil Action No. 15-5796, was filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and was assigned to U.S. District Judge Sharon Coleman. The government’s litigation effort will be led by Trial Attorney Ann Henry and supervised by EEOC Supervisory Trial Attorney Diane Smason.

“It’s hard to believe a retailer the size of Wal-Mart could not manage to consistently provide such a simple accommodation as a chair,” said John Hendrickson, the regional attorney for EEOC’s Chicago District Office. “Telling a disabled employee that she needs to drag a chair across the store every day is no accommodation at all. Employers have to provide reasonable accommodations unless doing so would be an undue hardship. EEOC is aware of no hardship that required Wal-Mart to suddenly change Stack’s schedule, deny her the use of a chair, and transfer her out of the fitting room where she had performed her job well for years.”

EEOC Trial Attorney Ann Henry commented, “No employee should have to go to work and face mocking and name calling because she had cancer. Employers who know about such vile harassment in their workplace have an obligation to stop it. Wal-Mart did not do that here, and the EEOC will seek to hold the company liable for that violation.

In July 2014, the EEOC filed a lawsuit against Wal-Mart alleging that it violated the ADA by firing an intellectually disabled employee at a Rockford Walmart store after it rescinded his workplace accommodation.

The EEOC’s Chicago District Office is responsible for processing discrimination charges, administrative enforcement and the conduct of agency litigation in Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa and North and South Dakota, with Area Offices in Milwaukee and Minneapolis.

The EEOC is responsible for enforcing federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. Further information about the EEOC is available on its website at www.eeoc.gov.

This press release originally appeared in the EEOC Newsroom. 

ARTICLE BY U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
© Copyright U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

New York City Mayor Signs “Ban the Box” Law

Mayor Bill DeBlasio signed a bill (Int. No. 318) that amends the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) to further restrict employers (with four or more employees) from inquiring into or otherwise considering an applicant’s or employee’s criminal history in employment decisions.  The new NYC law will take effect on October 27, 2015.

As we detailed in our prior post, the new NYC law prohibits employers from asking about criminal history on an initial employment application (“ban the box”) and at any time prior to extending a conditional offer of employment.  The new NYC law also forbids employers from stating on any job advertisement or other solicitation or publication that employment is conditioned or limited based on an applicant’s arrest or conviction history.

For years, before an NYC employer could take adverse action on the basis of criminal history, it had to first engage in a multi-factor analysis under Article 23-A of the New York State Correction Law to determine whether a sufficient nexus exists between the offense and position sought.  Now, under the new NYC law, before taking adverse action the employer also must:

  • furnish a written copy of the criminal history inquiry to the applicant in a form determined by the New York City Commission on Human Rights (“NYCCHR”);

  • provide a written Article 23-A analysis to the applicant in a form determined by the NYCCHR, together with “supporting documents” setting forth the basis and reasons for the adverse action; and

  • after providing the applicant with the required documentation, allow him or her at least three business days to respond and, during that time, hold the position open for the applicant.

To redress violations of the new NYC law, aggrieved applicants and employees may file a complaint with the NYCCHR or in court, with the promise of lucrative remedies under the NYCHRL.

The new NYC law does not apply where the employer must take action pursuant to any federal, state, or local law that requires criminal background checks for employment purposes or bars employment based on criminal history.  For purposes of this exception, “federal law” includes the rules or regulations of a self-regulatory organization as defined by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (like FINRA).  The new NYC law also excepts various public employment positions.

NYC now joins a growing number of jurisdictions across the nation that have “banned the box” and otherwise regulated employer use of criminal history in hiring and other personnel decisions.  To ensure compliance with the new NYC law, employers should start to review and, where necessary, make changes to their background check procedures and forms.

ARTICLE BY Katharine H Parker & Daniel L. Saperstein of Proskauer Rose LLP
© 2015 Proskauer Rose LLP.

President Obama Makes Announcement on Overtime Regulations

On Monday, June 29, President Obama announced a change in rules that would expand overtime eligibility to millions of Americans.

CHARLOTTE NC - SEP 21: Democratic nomonee Barack Obama makes a campaign stop in Charlotte NC on Sept 21 2008Beginning with the observation that “It’s been a few good days for America,” Obama announced the salary threshold where workers wouldautomatically qualify for time-and-a-half overtime wages would be raised from  $23,660 to $50,440.  This change in regulation can be made by the Administration, with no need for Congressional approval. The announcement came through a blog post written by the President for the Huffington Post, you can read it here.

President Obama argued that by failing to change the regulations, they had modified their original intentions–instead of highly-paid white collar workers being exempt from overtime, this was negatively impacting workers making as little as $23,660 a year, no matter how many hours they put in during the week. He asserted that “A hard day’s work deserves a fair day’s pay,” and that’s “how America should do business.”  This study, published in late 2013 by Jared Bernstein and Ross Eisenbrey of the Economic Policy Institute, increased the momentum for movement on this issue.

Conservative and Retail groups oppose this idea, claiming it will cost jobs and negatively impact the industry, including negative impacts on customer service.  The National Retail Foundation argues against the measure, saying their research indicates, “overtime expansion would drive up retailers’ payroll costs while limiting opportunities to move up into management. Most workers would be unlikely to see an increase in take-home pay, the use of part-time workers could increase, and retailers operating in rural states could see a disproportionate impact.”

Observers don’t expect this rule to be set into motion until 2016.

Read more at the New York Times here.

ARTICLE BY Eilene Spear of The National Law Review / The National Law Forum LLC
Copyright ©2015 National Law Forum, LLC

U.S. Supreme Court Finds a Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage: Implications for Employee Benefit Plan Sponsors

On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a historic decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses require states to allow same-sex marriage and to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.  The decision comes exactly two years to the day from the Court’s decision in Windsor defining “spouse” to include same-sex spouses for purposes of federal law.

As a result of the Court’s decision, the existing 14 state bans on same-sex marriage are invalid, and same-sex spouses are entitled to all of the rights extended to opposite-sex spouses under both federal and state law.

From an employee benefits perspective, it appears thatObergefell may most significantly impact sponsors ofinsured health and welfare plans in states that currently ban same-sex marriage.  Employers and other plan sponsors in those states will be required to offer insured benefits to same-sex spouses because state insurance law will require that the term “spouse” be interpreted to include them.  Based on government guidance issued following the Windsor decision, it seems unlikely that the decision would have retroactive effect, though such claims are possible.

For sponsors of self-insured benefit plans, a question may exist as to whether Obergefell directly impacts a sponsor’s decision not to provide health coverage to same-sex spouses (because state law does not apply to such plans).  However, it would appear that there would be heightened risks under federal and state discrimination laws for plans that define “spouse” in a manner that is inconsistent with the federal and state definitions, particularly since the Court held that marriage is a fundamental right under the Constitution, and an ERISA preemption defense likely would be weaker in this new climate.

It is also noteworthy that, as a result of the Court’s decision, there will no longer be imputed income for state tax purposes with respect to employer-provided health coverage for same-sex spouses, allowing for consistent administration in all states in which an employer operates.  Since Windsor, there have not been federal tax consequences with respect to these benefits, but some states continued to impute income for state tax purposes.

Finally, with respect to federally-regulated benefits such as qualified retirement plans and Code Section 125 benefits (for example, flexible spending accounts), the Court’s decision does not necessarily warrant any change, since those plans have been required, since Windsor, to recognize same-sex spouses.  Of course, plan language should be reviewed for consistency with the decision, and employers in some states may find that there are new spouses seeking benefits under those plans.  There also will be some administrative and enrollment issues, similar to when Windsor was decided.

Employers, particularly those operating in states that currently ban same-sex marriage, should review their benefit plans and policies and consider whether any changes need to be made in light of Obergefell.  Some employers may also reconsider their domestic partner benefits programs now that same-sex couples have the right to marry and have their marriage recognized across the entire country.

We expect that there will be guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service regarding the employee benefit plan issues that emanate from Obergefell, so stay tuned.

ARTICLE BY Roberta K Chevlowe of Proskauer Rose LLP

© 2015 Proskauer Rose LLP.

New York City Council Passes Ban-the-Box Legislation

Joining many other jurisdictions, the New York City Council has passed the Fair Chance Act, an ordinance restricting when employer inquiries about applicants’ criminal histories may be made during the application process and imposing significant obligations on employers who intend to take action based on such information.

The Council passed the ordinance on June 10, 2015. The ordinance will become effective 120 days after receiving Mayor Bill de Blasio’s signature, which is expected shortly, as the Mayor has expressed support for the legislation.

Like other ban-the-box laws, the ordinance generally prohibits an employer with at least four employees from making an inquiry about an applicant’s pending arrest or criminal conviction record until after a conditional offer of employment has been extended. Limited exceptions are provided.

Under the ordinance’s definition of inquiry, employers are prohibited not only from asking an applicant prohibited questions — verbally or in writing — but also are prohibited from searching publicly available sources to obtain information about an applicant’s criminal history.

Exceptions

The main exception applies when an employer, under applicable federal, state, or local law, is required to conduct criminal background checks for employment purposes or to bar employment in a particular position based on criminal history.

Other exceptions remove prospective police officers, peace officers, and law enforcement agency and other law-enforcement-related employees from coverage. Therefore, these are unlikely to affect positions and employers in the private sector.

Notification Process

Employers who make inquiries into an applicant’s criminal history after a conditional offer of employment has been extended and determine that the information warrants an adverse employment action must follow a rigorous process. Specifically, employers must:

  1. Provide the applicant with a “written copy of the inquiry” which complies with the City’s Commission on Human Right’s required (but not-yet-issued) format;

  2. Perform the analysis required by Article 23(a) of the New York Correction Law, “Licensure and Employment of Persons Previously Convicted of One or More Criminal Offenses”;

  3. Provide the applicant with a copy of its analysis, also in a manner which complies with the Commission’s required format, which includes supporting documents and an explanation of the employer’s decision to take an adverse employment action; and

  4. Allow the applicant at least three business days to respond to the written analysis by holding the position open during this time.

Of course, for employers who conduct background checks through consumer reporting agencies, if such information is obtained from a background check, the above process must be integrated with the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) pre-adverse action requirements.

Supporters view the ordinance as ending discrimination against applicants with low-level arrests and providing assurance that applicants will be considered solely based on their qualifications. Critics see the ordinance as adding to the already-onerous mandates imposed on employers in New York City by favoring ideology over practicality, sending a bad message to employers doing business — or desiring to do business — in New York City.

The one undeniable fact is that all covered New York City employers must develop measures to ensure compliance with the ordinance.

ARTICLE BY Richard Greenberg, Daniel J. Jacobs, Susan M. Corcoran, Christopher M. Valentino & Ellen Bandel of Jackson Lewis P.C.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015

LinkedIn, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Real-World Implications of Online Activity

With the ever-increasing amount of information available on social media, employers should remember to exercise caution when utilizing social media as a part of their Human Resources/ Recruitment related activities. We live in a digital-age, and how people choose to define themselves is often readily showcased on social networking sites. Whether – and how – employers choose to interact with the online presence of their workforce will continue to develop as the relevant legal standards try to catch up.

A recent federal court filing in the Northern District of California against LinkedIn Corp. provides yet another example of the growing interaction between online personas and real-world employment law implications. There, in Sweet, et al v. LinkedIn Corp., the plaintiffs sought to expand the application of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) by alleging that LinkedIn’s practice of providing “reference reports” to members that subscribe to LinkedIn’s program for a fee, brought LinkedIn within the coverage of the FCRA as a Credit Reporting Agency (“CRA”). Briefly, the FCRA (and relevant state statutes like it) imposes specific requirements on an employer when working with “any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.” In other words, there are rules – such as providing requisite disclosures and obtaining prior authorization – that apply when an employer engages a CRA to perform background checks, reference checks and related inquiries.

In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that LinkedIn was a CRA – and that these various rules should apply – because LinkedIn collected and distributed consumer information to third parties and the resulting reference reports “bear on a consumer’s character, general reputation, mode of living, or personal characteristics, and/or other factors listed in 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d).” Further, according to the complaint, LinkedIn violated the FCRA because it should have provided FCRA compliant disclosure and followed the reporting obligations applicable to CRAs.

LinkedIn, which is touted as the “world’s largest professional network,” does not portray itself as a CRA and moved to dismiss the complaint. LinkedIn argued that the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute was too broad and, moreover, was inconsistent with the facts. A federal judge agreed and dismissed the complaint (although the plaintiffs have the opportunity to file another complaint). The Court ruled that these reference searches could not be considered “consumer reports” under the law – and LinkedIn was not acting as a CRA – because, in part, the plaintiffs had voluntarily provided their information to LinkedIn with the intention of it being published online. (The FCRA excludes from the definition of a consumer report a report that contains “information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report.”) The Court also noted that the allegations suggested that LinkedIn “gathers the information about the employment histories of the subjects of the Reference Searches not to make consumer reports but to ‘carry out consumers’ information-sharing objectives.’”

The LinkedIn case should still serve as a reminder of several important and interrelated trends. First, as it concerns the FCRA, the statute is broadly worded to cover “any written, oral or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency . . .” and the equally expansive definition of a CRA can apply in numerous situations that extend beyond the traditional notion of a consumer reporting agency. If applicable, the requirements of the FCRA must be followed. Second, employers need to continue to be mindful of the fact that their online activity can have real-world employment law implications. Third, as the law governing traditional employment law continues to evolve in response to online developments, the challenges to that activity will evolve as well.

Authored by: Ian Gabriel Nanos and Maxine Adams of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

©2015 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.