Tag: employment litigation

SCOTUS Takes a Pass on “Gap Time” Dispute

It’s two months into argument season at the Supreme Court, and we’re always keeping our fingers crossed that the justices will take up a wage and hour issue and clear up some ambiguities in the law or a circuit split.

Top billing this SCOTUS term goes to Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt, in which the Court will address whether a supervisor who earned more than $200,000 a year but was paid on a daily basis is exempt from the overtime laws as a “highly compensated employee” under 29 C.F.R. § 541.601, notwithstanding the salary basis rules in 29 C.F.R. § 541.602 and 29 C.F.R. § 541.604.  The Court held arguments on October 12, and you can read the transcript here.  We’ll report on that decision as soon as it’s published.

This week’s news is a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari in Cleveland County, North Carolina v. Conner, a case about gap time.  The plaintiff in the case—an EMT worker—was paid under a fairly complex set of ordinance-based and contractual terms, but the gist of her claim was that the county shorted her on straight-time pay she was owed under her contract, and by doing do violated the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The district court dismissed the claim, on the ground that the FLSA governs minimum wage and overtime pay, but not straight-time pay (assuming no minimum wage violation).  On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit noted that “there are situations … that fall between [the minimum wage and overtime] provisions of the FLSA.  It explained:

In addition to seeking unpaid overtime compensation, employees may seek to recover wages for uncompensated hours worked that fall between the minimum wage and the overtime provisions of the FLSA, otherwise known as gap time ….  Gap time refers to time that is not directly covered by the FLSA’s overtime provisions because it does not exceed the overtime limit, and to time that is not covered by the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions because … the employees are still being paid a minimum wage when their salaries are averaged across their actual time worked.  (Internal citations and alterations omitted.)

The Court of Appeals differentiated between two types of gap time—“pure gap time” and “overtime gap time”—with the former referring to unpaid straight time in a week in which an employee works no overtime, and the latter referring to unpaid straight time in a week in which the employee works overtime.  The court noted, correctly, that no provision of the FLSA addresses gap time of either type, and that there is no cause of action under the FLSA for “pure gap time” absent a minimum wage or overtime violation by the employer.  Such claims would arise, if at all, under state law.

On the other hand, the circuit court noted that courts are divided on whether an employee can bring an “overtime gap time claim” under the FLSA.  While the statute itself is silent on the issue, the U.S. Department of Labor’s interpretation of the FLSA—set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 778.315—states that:

[C]ompensation for … overtime work under the Act cannot be said to have been paid to an employee unless all the straight time compensation due him for the nonovertime hours under his contract (express or implied) or under any applicable statute has been paid.

In its simplest sense, the argument for recognizing “overtime gap time” claims under the FLSA is this:  Say an employer promises an overtime-eligible employee base pay of $1,000 per week for up to 40 hours of work, and the employee works more than 40 hours in a given week.  In that scenario, the employee’s hourly overtime rate would by $37.50 ($1000 ÷ 40 yields a regular rate of $25, and time-and-a-half on $25 is $37.50).  But if the employer only pays the employee $800 in base pay for the week and not the promised $1,000, the regular rate becomes $20 ($1000 ÷ 40) and the hourly overtime rate becomes $30 (time-and-a-half on $20).  So the employee is short-changed $7.50 on each overtime hour, which the Fourth Circuit found violates 29 C.F.R. § 778.315 and the spirit, if not the letter, of the FLSA.

“Pure gap time” is different, in this important sense:  it only arises when the employee has not worked any overtime in the week.  So there is no possibility of short-changing the employee on overtime pay, and—assuming the employee has, on average, received the minimum wage for all hours worked that week—no other provision of the FLSA that provides any relief.  (The employee is ostensibly free to seek relief under an applicable state wage payment law or common law for failure to pay promised compensation.)

The Fourth Circuit concluded that 29 C.F.R. § 778.315 has the “power to persuade,” and therefore is entitled to “considerable deference” under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  As such, the court held that “overtime gap time claims” are indeed cognizable under the FLSA, and that “courts must ensure employees are paid all of their straight time wages first under the relevant employment agreement, before overtime is counted.”  The court acknowledged a circuit split on the issue, with the Second Circuit declining to afford deference to 29 C.F.R. § 778.315 and rejecting “overtime gap time” claims as lacking a statutory basis (“So long as an employee is being paid the minimum wage or more, [the] FLSA does not provide recourse for unpaid hours below the 40–hour threshold, even if the employee also works overtime hours the same week.”).

The county filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, presenting not only the question of whether the FLSA permits “overtime gap time” but also seeking clarification on how federal courts should apply the Skidmore doctrine to agency interpretations such as 29 C.F.R. § 778.315.  The Supreme Court denied the petition on December 12, leaving both questions for another day.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.
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Bomb Squad Officer with Hand Tremors Can Be Temporarily Transferred Pending a Medical Exam

In a common sense ruling, an Arizona federal court has determined that a city was within its rights to temporarily transfer a bomb squad technician pending a medical exam. According to the court’s opinion, the transfer occurred after a fellow employee observed the plaintiff was having hand tremors and reported that the plaintiff had dropped some chemicals with which he had been working. The plaintiff, who argued that the spill was a common occurrence and that any hand tremors were not the cause of him dropping the chemical, sued the city after a neurologist cleared him to return to duty. The plaintiff alleged that the city perceived him as disabled and violated the ADA by forcing him to undergo a medical exam. Finding that the requested medical exam was related to the job the officer performed and was consistent with business necessity, the court rejected plaintiff’s claims and entered summary judgment in favor of the city.

It may seem obvious that a person who is assigned to diffuse bombs and has hand tremors can be temporarily reassigned and asked to undergo a medical exam. Still it’s important to note that the employer in this case benefitted from carefully following protocol. Too often, employers react to a report that an employer may have a physical impairment affecting his work by immediately discharging the worker, transferring him to another job, or asking for a fitness-for-duty examination. The ADA, however, requires the employer to be more thoughtful on how it approaches such a situation.

Carefully following protocol often involves an employer first asking whether the employee at issue showed objective signs of impairment, and then determining whether that impairment poses a danger to the employee or others or affects the employee’s ability to perform essential functions of the job. Based on those preliminary steps, the next step often requires the employer to assess whether a request for a medical exam makes sense in light of the report of impairment and the job the employee is performing. If the answer to those questions are yes, then the employer can temporarily transfer the employee (or place him or her off work) and direct the employee to undergo a targeted fitness-for-duty exam.

The conscientious employer will not make any permanent job decisions, however, until the results of the fitness-for-duty exam are returned and any follow up questions are asked. Moreover, because the very act of asking an employee to undergo a fitness-for-duty exam violates the ADA if it is not job related and consistent with business necessity, employers may choose to consult with their employment counsel before requesting an exam or otherwise taking an adverse employment action against an employee who exhibits a physical impairment at work.

 

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
This post was written by Richard P. Winegardner of Barnes & Thornburg LLP.
Read more from the Ninth Circuit.

For Whom the Class Tolls: “No Piggybacking Rule” Does In Would-Be Class in Ongoing Wal-Mart Saga

In 2011, the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Betty Dukes, et al., decertifying a putative class of approximately 1.6 million current and former female Wal-Mart employees who claimed gender discrimination in wages and promotions in violation of Title VII. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).  The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of class certification and determined the plaintiffs failed to meet the class “commonality” standard set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Id. at 349-60. The Dukes decision set in motion a number of spinoff regional cases, one of which – barring another grant of certiorari to the high court – met its end somewhat anticlimactically, when the Eleventh Circuit issued its August 3, 2017 order in Love, et. al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. No. 15-15260.

The Love plaintiffs included a sub-group of the Dukes plaintiffs who worked in the southeastern United States. These holdover Dukes plaintiffs were able to refile their claims because of the requirement that federal court discrimination plaintiffs first file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This rule effectively tolled the statute of limitations during the pendency of Dukes. But critically, under the Eleventh Circuit’s “no piggybacking rule”, tolling is limited to individual claims only, not class claims, which has also been adopted by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.  The Love court previously left little room for argument when it noted in a 2013 order that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit categorically refuses to toll the limitations period for subsequent class actions by members of the original class once class certification is denied in the original suit.”  Thus, on October 16, 2015 the individual named plaintiffs and Wal-Mart settled and jointly filed a “stipulation of voluntary dismissal.”

On November 6, 2015, the Love appellants, made up of unnamed members of the would-be class, filed a motion to intervene solely to appeal the dismissal of class claims. This motion was denied 13 days later as moot, which, to make matters worse for the appellants, took them outside of their 30-day deadline to appeal the October 16 stipulated dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit thus found the appeal jurisdictionally barred, providing a rather sudden end to the winding multi-year litigation.

In light of this tangled and technical history, employers and their counsel should be sure to understand the differences in treatment of class actions and individuals under the relevant rules, regulations, and statutes. Though it can be tempting to move immediately to the standard substantive arguments against numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of the proposed class, the Wal-Mart cases show that knowing your way around the procedural thicket is another useful skill in avoiding or minimizing the cost of class litigation.

 This post was written by Kelly J. Muensterman of  Polsinelli PC.

[1] https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf

[2] http://hr.cch.com/eld/LoveWalmart080317.pdf

[3] Salazar–Calderon v. Presido Valley Farmers Ass’n, 765 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir.1985) and Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146 (6th Cir.1988)

[4] 2013 WL 5434565, at *2.

 For more legal analysis check out the National Law Review’s homepage.

Employment Related Lawsuits Are on the Rise. Are You Covered?

Gilbert LLP Law FirmOn September 25, 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed the first two suits in its history challenging transgender discrimination under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  As discrimination litigation evolves, it is important to know whether your insurance coverage is evolving with it.

Coverage for employee-related lawsuits has always been important, but the increase in suits brought by the EEOC over the last several years (and the last several decades) has made employment practices liability (“EPL”) insurance of particular importance to protecting your company.  Last year, the EEOC recovered a record-setting $372.1 million.

Now, the scope of EEOC suits is increasing as a result of the EEOC’s ongoing efforts to implement its Strategic Enforcement Plan (“SEP”), adopted in December of 2012.  As part of its SEP, the EEOC makes “coverage of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions, as they may apply” a “top commission enforcement priority.”

Comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) policies, are a type of commercial third-party liability insurance.  Most businesses in the United States purchase CGL policies in order to protect against the risk of suits by third parties.  If a patron sues you for a slip and fall in your mom-and-pop shop, your CGL policy probably covers the suit.  Likewise, if you distribute across the entire country a product that allegedly causes bodily harm to thousands of people, your CGL policy probably covers the suits.

As broad as CGL coverage is, however, it is only one piece to a balanced insurance portfolio.  CGL policies typically exclude coverage for suits brought by employees of the company.  EPL polices step in to fill one part of the gap in coverage.  Other parts of the gap are filled by workman’s compensation policies and directors and officers liability policies.

A typical EPL policy may list a number of categories of protected classes covered by insurance, and then add coverage for “other protected classes.”  A policy may also protect against claims for “Discrimination,” and define that discrimination broadly to mean “any actual or alleged violation of any employment discrimination law.”  However, some polices offer more limited coverage.  For example, some carriers may restrict coverage to only sexual harassment.

Just as you protect your company from fire by installing sprinklers in your warehouses and doing regular safety inspections, it is imperative that you keep your employment practices up to date.  Educate your employees on proper workplace behavior, and try to think about ways to get ahead of the curve to minimize your liability for alleged workplace discriminations.

Just as discrimination litigation is evolving, other areas of litigation continue to evolve and create new risks for your company.  In addition, coverage law continues to evolve across the United States, on a state-by-state basis.  As coverage law evolves, it has a direct effect on the value of your insurance portfolio.

ARTICLE BY

João Santa-Rita
OF
Gilbert LLP