Tag: Employment Law

Equal Pay Act Claim Requires Show of Pay Disparity “Based on Sex” as Part of Prima Facie Case, Court Holds

Departing from other federal appeals courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that Equal Pay Act plaintiffs must establish that the pay differential between similarly situated employees is “historically or presently based on sex” to make out a prima facie case.

In Gordon v. U.S., No. 17-1845 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 7, 2018), two female emergency room physicians employed by a Veterans Administration hospital alleged they were underpaid compared to male emergency room physicians. Their pay discrimination claim related primarily to one male physician who was hired at the same time they were hired at the same pay rate in the same position, but he received a pay increase one year after they were hired that the female plaintiffs did not receive.

To state a claim of an EPA violation, an employee must show the employer:

  • Paid employees of opposite sexes different wages;

  • For substantially equal work;

  • In jobs that require substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and

  • That are performed under similar working conditions.

If an employee provides evidence establishing each of these elements, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the pay disparity is justified under one of four affirmative defenses: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a pay system based on quantity or quality of output; or (4) any factor other than sex.

Here, the employer argued that the plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case and that, even if they had, the pay differential was justified under the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense. The Court, which hears appeals involving federal employee EPA claims, held that the plaintiff doctors must meet an additional requirement to establish their prima facie EPA violation:

To make their prima facie case, however, [the doctors] must also establish that the pay differential between the similarly situated employees is “historically or presently based on sex.”

Id. at 9-10. The Court held that the plaintiffs could not make this showing and that the employer was entitled to summary judgment on this basis alone. Notably, the Court held the employer had not introduced sufficient evidence to establish the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense. Id. at 10 n. 4.

The holding was based on a prior ruling, Yant v. United States, 588 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Judge Reyna wrote the panel decision, but also wrote separately to express the view that Yant should be overturned because the additional requirement improperly shifts the burden of proof in a manner inconsistent with the text of the EPA and Supreme Court precedent. Judge Reyna also notes that no other Circuit Court of Appeals requires this additional showing as part of the prima facie case. Id. at 17.

 

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2018
This post was written by F. Christopher Chrisbens of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Federal Laws Do Not Preempt Connecticut Law Providing Employment Protections to Medical Marijuana Users

Connecticut employees using medical marijuana for certain debilitating medical conditions as allowed under Connecticut law for “qualified users” are protected under state law from being fired or refused employment based solely on their marijuana use. Employers who violate those protections risk being sued for discrimination, according to a recent federal district court decision.

Background

In Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operation Company (3:16-cv-01938; D. Conn. Aug. 8, 2017), the federal district court ruled that “qualified users” are protected from criminal prosecution and are not subject to penalty, sanction or being denied any right or privilege under federal laws, such as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), because the federal laws do not preempt Connecticut’s Palliative Use of Marijuana Act (PUMA).

PUMA prohibits employers from refusing to hire, fire, penalize, or threaten applicants or employees solely on the basis of being “qualified users” of medical marijuana. PUMA exempts patients, their caregivers and prescribing doctors from state penalties against those who use or distribute marijuana, and it explicitly prohibits discrimination by employers, schools and landlords.

In Noffsinger, Plaintiff was employed as a recreational therapist at Touchpoints, a long term care and rehabilitation provider, and she was recruited for a position as a director of recreational therapy at Bride Brook, a nursing facility. After a phone interview, she was offered the position at Bride Brook and accepted the offer, and she was told to give notice to Touchpoints, which she did to begin working at Bride Brook within a week. Plaintiff scheduled a meeting to complete paperwork and routine pre-employment drug screening for Bride Brook, and at the meeting, she disclosed her being qualified to use marijuana for PTSD under PUMA. The job offer was later rescinded because she tested positive for cannabis; in the meantime, Plaintiff’s position at Touchpoints was filled, so she could not remain employed there.

Litigation

Plaintiff sued for violation of PUMA’s anti-discrimination provisions, common law wrongful rescission of a job offer in violation of public policy and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant filed a Rule 12(b)(6) pre-answer motion to dismiss based on preemption under CSA, ADA, and FDCA. The federal court denied the motion and ruled that PUMA did not conflict with the CSA, ADA or FDCA, because those federal laws are not intended to preempt or supersede state employment discrimination laws. The court concluded that CSA does not make it illegal to employ a marijuana user, and it does not regulate employment practices; the ADA does not regulate non-workplace activity or illegal use of drugs outside the workplace or drug use that does not affect job performance; and the FDCA does not regulate employment and does not apply to PUMA’s prohibitions.

The court’s decision is notable in that it is the first federal decision to determine that the CSA does not preempt a state medical marijuana law’s anti-discrimination provision, and reaches a different result than the District of New Mexico, which concluded that requiring accommodation of medical marijuana use conflicts with the CSA because it would mandate the very conduct the CSA proscribes. The Noffsinger decision supplements a growing number of state court decisions that have upheld employment protections for medical marijuana users contained in other state statutes. These decisions stand in stark contrast to prior state court decisions California, Colorado, Montana, Oregon, and Washington that held that decriminalization laws – i.e., statutes that do not contain express employment protections – do not confer a legal right to smoke marijuana and do not protect medical marijuana users from adverse employment actions based on positive drug tests.

Key Takeaways

Employers may continue to prohibit use of marijuana at the workplace; and qualified users who come to work under the influence, impaired and unable to perform essential job functions are subject to adverse employment decisions. Employers in Connecticut, however, may risk being sued for discrimination for enforcing a drug testing policy against lawful medical marijuana users.  In those cases, employers may have to accommodate off-duty marijuana use, and may take disciplinary action only if the employee is impaired by marijuana at work or while on duty.

It remains unclear how employers can determine whether an employee is under the influence of marijuana at work. Unlike with alcohol, current drug tests do not indicate whether and to what extent an employee is impaired by marijuana. Reliance on observations from employees may be problematic, as witnesses may have differing views as to the level of impairment, and, in any event, observation alone does not indicate the source of impairment. Employers following this “impairment standard” are advised to obtain as many data points as possible before making an adverse employment decision.

All employers – and particularly federal contractors required to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act and those who employ a zero-tolerance policy – should review their drug-testing policy to ensure that it: (a) sets clear expectations of employees; (b) provides justifications for the need for drug-testing; and (c) expressly allows for adverse action (including termination or refusal to hire) as a consequence of a positive drug test.

Additionally, employers enforcing zero-tolerance policies should be prepared for future challenges in those states prohibiting discrimination against and/or requiring accommodation of medical marijuana users. Eight other states besides Connecticut have passed similar medical marijuana laws that have express anti-discrimination protections for adverse employment actions: Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Nevada, New York, Minnesota and Rhode Island. Those states may require the adjustment or relaxation of a hiring policy to accommodate a medical marijuana user. Additionally, courts in Massachusetts and Rhode Island have permitted employment discrimination lawsuits filed by medical marijuana users to proceed.

Finally, employers should be mindful of their drug policies’ applicability not only to current employees, but also to applicants.

This post was written by David S. Poppick & Nathaniel M. Glasser of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.  ©2017. All rights reserved.
For more Health Care Law legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Growing Questions About Employee Medical Marijuana Use Leave Employers in a Haze

The intersection of employment and marijuana laws has just gotten cloudier, thanks to a recent decision by the Rhode Island Superior Court interpreting that state’s medical marijuana and discrimination laws. In Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corporation, the court broke with the majority of courts in other states in holding that an employer’s enforcement of its neutral drug testing policy to deny employment to an applicant because she held a medical marijuana card violated the anti-discrimination provisions of the state medical marijuana law.

Background

Plaintiff applied for an internship at Darlington, and during an initial meeting, she signed a statement acknowledging she would be required to take a drug test prior to being hired.  At that meeting, Plaintiff disclosed that she had a medical marijuana card.  Several days later, Plaintiff indicated to Darlington’s human resources representative that she was currently using medical marijuana and that as a result she would test positive on the pre-employment drug test.  Darlington informed Plaintiff that it was unable to hire her because she would fail the drug test and thus could not comply with the company’s drug-free workplace policy.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging Darlington violated the Hawkins-Slater Act (“the Act”), the state’s medical marijuana law, and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”). The Hawkins-Slater Act provides that “[n]o school, employer, or landlord may refuse to enroll, employ, or lease to, or otherwise penalize, a person solely for his or her status as a cardholder.”  After concluding that Act provides for a private right of action, the court held that Darlington’s refusal to hire Plaintiff violated the Act’s prohibition against refusing to employ a cardholder.  Citing another provision that the Act should not be construed to require an employer to accommodate “the medical use of marijuana in any workplace,” Darlington contended that Act does not require employers to accommodate medical marijuana use, and that doing so here would create workplace safety concerns.  The court rejected this argument, concluding:

  • The use of the phrase “in any workplace” suggests that statute does require employers to accommodate medical marijuana use outside the workplace.
  • Darlington’s workplace safety argument ignored the language of the Act, which prohibits “any person to undertake any task under the influence of marijuana, when doing so would constitute negligence or professional malpractice.” In other words, employers can regulate medical marijuana use by prohibiting workers from being under the influence while on duty, rather than refusing to hire medical marijuana users at all.
  • By hiring Plaintiff, Darlington would not be required to make accommodations “as they are defined in the employment discrimination context,” such as restructuring jobs, modifying work schedules, or even modifying the existing drug and alcohol policy (which prohibited the illegal use or possession of drugs on company property, but did not state that a positive drug test would result in the rescission of a job offer or termination of employment).

The court thus granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on her Hawkins-Slater Act claims.

With respect to Plaintiff’s RICRA claim, the court found that Plaintiff’s status as a medical marijuana cardholder was a signal to Darlington that she could not have obtained the card without a debilitating medical condition that would have caused her to be disabled. Therefore, the Court found that Plaintiff is disabled and that she had stated a claim for disability discrimination under RICRA because Darlington refused to hire her due to her status as a cardholder.  Importantly, the court held that the allegations supported a disparate treatment theory.

Finally, while noting that “Plaintiff’s drug use is legal under Rhode Island law, but illegal under federal law [i.e. the Controlled Substances Act (the CSA”)],” the Court found that the CSA did not preempt the Hawkins-Slater Act or RICRA. According to the court, the CSA’s purpose of “illegal importation, manufacture, distribution and possession and improper use of controlled substances” was quite distant from the “realm of employment and anti-discrimination law.”

Key Takeaways

While this decision likely will be appealed, it certainly adds additional confusion for employers in this unsettled area of the law – particularly those who have and enforce zero-tolerance drug policies. The decision departs from cases in other jurisdictions – such as California, Colorado, Montana, Oregon, and Washington – that have held that employers may take adverse action against medical marijuana users.  The laws in those states, however, merely decriminalize marijuana and, unlike the Rhode Island law, do not provide statutory protections in favor of marijuana users.  In those states in which marijuana use may not form the basis for an adverse employment decision, or in which marijuana use must be accommodated, the Callaghan decision may signal a movement to uphold employment protections for medical marijuana users.

While this issue continues to wend its way through the courts in Rhode Island and elsewhere, employers clearly may continue to prohibit the on-duty use of or impairment by marijuana. Employers operating in states that provide employment protections to marijuana users may consider allowing legal, off-duty use, while taking adverse action against those users that come to work under the influence.

Of course, it remains unclear how employers can determine whether an employee is under the influence of marijuana at work. Unlike with alcohol, current drug tests do not indicate whether and to what extent an employee is impaired by marijuana.  Reliance on observations from employees may be problematic, as witnesses may have differing views as to the level of impairment and, in any event, observation alone does not indicate the source of impairment.  Employers choosing to follow this “impairment standard” are advised to obtain as many data points as possible before making an adverse employment decision.

All employers – and particularly federal contractors required to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act and those who employ a zero-tolerance policy – should review their drug-testing policy to ensure that it (a) sets clear expectations of employees; (b) provides justifications for the need for drug-testing; (b) expressly allows for adverse action (including termination or refusal to hire) as a consequence of a positive drug test. Additionally, employers enforcing zero-tolerance policies should be prepared for future challenges in those states prohibiting discrimination against and/or requiring accommodation of medical marijuana users.  Those states may require the adjustment or relaxation of a hiring policy to accommodate a medical marijuana user.

The Callaghan decision also serves as a reminder of the intersection of medical marijuana use and disability.  Here, the court allowed a disability discrimination claim to proceed even though Plaintiff never revealed the nature of her underlying disability because cardholder status and disability were so inextricably linked.

Finally, employers should be mindful of their drug policies’ applicability not only to current employees, but to applicants as well. In Callaghan, the court found the employer in violation of state law before the employee was even offered the internship or had taken the drug test.

This post was written byNathaniel M. Glasser and Carol J. Faherty of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

Yes, Your March Madness Office Bracket is Technically Illegal

march madness office bracket
marc

March Madness has arrived!  The 2017 NCAA Basketball Tournaments tip-off tonight (March 15) and continue through the Women’s and Men’s National Championship Games on April 2 and 3 respectively.  With this, comes the American tradition of companies and their employees betting on tournament outcomes through office bracket pools.

As lawyers, we have to point out that your company’s March Madness pool is very likely illegal under at least three federal gambling laws (the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, the Interstate Wire Act of 1961, and the Uniform Internet Gambling Enforcement Act) and many state laws.  And we would be remiss to not mention that there is a parade of horribles that could happen from permitting such workplace wagering.

With that said, the more practical reality is that office pools have become a widely-practiced and culturally accepted form of gambling, law enforcement authorities seem to have little interest in enforcing laws that technically prohibit them, and many employers view these office pools as a workplace morale booster.

For those employers – seemingly, most all of them – who will not shut down this popular practice, here are some best practices to help mitigate legal issues when sponsoring or allowing office pools:

  • Make sure that all entry fees are distributed solely to the winner or winners of the pool.  An employer, or employees organizing a pool, should never take a “cut” of entry fees.  Under various anti-gambling laws, profiting from the pool in this way raises a host of issues.

  • Limit pools to offices within a particular state.  Doing so may prevent the pool from violating federal laws, as they generally require the transmission of money or communications across state lines to be applicable.

  • Make participation completely voluntary and limit entry fees to nominal amounts.  Expensive or compelled buy-ins may encourage the predilections of employees who are problem gamblers, and expensive buy-ins may tempt those employees responsible for collecting and distributing entry fees to surreptitiously take a “cut.”  Compelled buy-ins could implicate wage and hour and religious anti-discrimination laws.  Following these guidelines helps ensure that an office pool is low-stakes and simply intended to promote friendly rivalry.

  • Do not retaliate against or single-out employees who may complain to the pools.  There are plaintiff’s lawyers out there who will try to tether an internal complaint of unlawful activity to later adverse action against the complainer.

  • Prohibit employees from gambling in other pools on company time or through company equipment.  Apart from a workplace pool, employees may choose to participate in other pools with non-employees, and there are many options to do so online (including through company-issued or owned computers).  These other pools can raise additional concerns about potential violations of the law, to the extent they involve large wagers, are structured to profit the organizer, or involve interstate communications.  Consequently, for reasons of both legality and ensuring employee productivity, employers are best served by a policy that prohibits employee gambling in other pools on company time or company equipment.

  • Consider sponsoring a free pool that provides a non-monetary award.  Although employees may not find it as interesting, an employer concerned about the legality of its office pool may consider sponsoring a pool that is free to enter, with a non-monetary award (a gift card or some other prize) for the winners.  The lack of an exchange of money in such a pool may avoid the reach of potentially applicable anti-gambling laws.

Putting legality aside, it is well-established that employee productivity takes a hit during March Madness, particularly since it is now possible to watch games online through work computers or personal mobile devices, and permitting an office pool could encourage distraction.

To accommodate employee interest in the tournaments while reducing productivity loss employers should consider airing the games in a breakroom or lunchroom. At the same time, add sports broadcasts and websites to blocked sites on company systems that monitor and limit Internet use on company-owned computers, systems and devices (certainly, gambling and unlawful activity websites should be blocked year-round).  And if productivity becomes a problem, communicate policies addressing these concerns to employees, including policies restricting viewing to non-break times or reminding employees (including those tempted to duck out early to catch a game) of applicable attendance and punctuality policies.

As March Madness begins, we wish you the home court advantage.

ARTICLE BY Mark E. Terman & Dennis M. Mulgrew, Jr. of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

©2017 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

Right to Disconnect: New Right for French Employees?

right to disconnect FranceA new law, called El Khomri law, passed on August 8th, 2016 in France providing a right to disconnect for employees.

Such right is entered into force on January 1st, 2017

According to the law, it belongs to the employers and the unions to negotiate this new right to determine its modalities of application and of control. Such negotiation should take place in companies having at least 50 employees and should provide for the implementation of mechanisms of regulation regarding the use of the new technologies in order to ensure the compliance with rest times and holidays and the familial and personal life of the employees.

Should no agreement be reached with the unions defining the methods of implementation of the right to disconnect, the employer shall unilaterally elaborate, after having consulted the work’s council committee, a policy which shall need to provide for the training actions and sensitization to the use of digital tools.

However, the idea to enable an employee to disconnect completely outside of his working hours is not new in France.  In 2004, the French Supreme Court had already judged that an employee could not be dismissed for serious misconduct due to the fact that he had not responded to professional solicitations during his lunch break (Cass. Soc. February 17, 2004 n°01-45889).

Furthermore, several collective bargaining agreements applicable in different sectors of industry had already provided for a right to disconnect (e.g. Syntec).

If the title of this right seems simple, its exact nature questions.

Indeed, no legal definition of what is exactly the right to disconnect is given.

The right is generally described as a right for the employee to not be connected to a digital professional tool (email, smartphone…) during off-duty and vacation time.  However, it is not easy to impose the right to disconnect in a professional environment in which the “BYOD” concept has experienced a takeoff without precedent and which therefore has the consequence of dimming a little more the barrier between professional and private life.

However, by sending back to the collective negotiation, the El Khomri law leaves it to unions and employers to guarantee the efficiency of such a right in a manner that matches with the way the company operates.  This relative flexibility obliges them however to be imaginative and to find devices adapted to the nature of the functions occupied by the employees to the variety of the means of communication used, considering evidently the needs of each company.

As such, the right to disconnect is not uniform and can materialize itself in several ways:

  • by a reinforced information of the employees on the use of digital tools (e.g. avoiding to reply to all recipients or to send emails during the week-end or holidays),

  • by the implementation of training actions or sensitization to new technologies (e.g. reminding the employees that they should not send emails after 9.00 pm or the absence of obligation of the recipient to answer emails outside of regular hours),

  • more radically, by automatically redirecting the emails of the employees who are out of the office to an appropriate available employee or the interruption of the professional mailbox during evenings and weekends, or even during holidays.

The new law does not provide for any sanction in case of noncompliance, however, companies should take into consideration that employers failing to implement it will likely be sanctioned by judges on the basis of the necessity to preserve the health and safety of the employees at the workplace as well as the necessity to comply with working time regulations.

ARTICLE BY Cécile Martin of Proskauer Rose LLP

© 2017 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Los Angeles Enacts ‘Ban the Box’ Legislation

ban the box Los AngelesLos Angeles is the latest in a growing list of jurisdictions to adopt an ordinance restricting employers from asking a job applicant about his or her criminal history during the application process also known as “Ban the Box”. Under the Ordinance, private employers with at least 10 employees will be barred from inquiring about a job applicant’s criminal history until a conditional offer of employment has been made.

The “Los Angeles Fair Chance Initiative for Hiring (Ban the Box),” signed by Mayor Eric Garcetti on December 9, 2016, goes into effect on January 22, 2017.

Los Angeles has taken a different approach than San Francisco, the other California city to have adopted a “ban the box” ordinance affecting private employers. For example, the San Francisco ordinance, enacted in 2014, restricts questions about applicants’ criminal records on applications for employment and generally prohibits any type of criminal history inquiry until after the initial job interview. (For details, see our article, San Francisco Enacts ‘Ban the Box’ Law.) The Los Angeles ordinance prohibits employers from inquiring about criminal histories until a conditional job offer has been made.

Applicant

An applicant for employment is broadly construed to include any individual who submits an application or other documentation for employment for work performed in the City, whether for full- or part-time work, contracted work, contingent work, work on commission, temporary or seasonal work, or work through an employment agency. It also includes any form of vocational or educational training, with or without pay.

Employer

An employer is defined as any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, labor organization, group of persons, association, or other organization that is located or doing business in the City and employs at least 10 employees.

The Ordinance does not apply to the City of Los Angeles or another local, state, or federal government unit.

Prohibitions

Under the Ordinance, employers are prohibited specifically from inquiring into or seeking a job applicant’s criminal history before a conditional offer has been made. This broadly precludes employers from:

  1. asking any question on a job application about an applicant’s criminal history;

  2. asking about or requiring disclosure of the applicant’s criminal history during a job interview; or

  3. independently searching the internet for criminal conviction information or running a criminal background check before a conditional offer of employment has been made.

Criminal history is defined as information regarding any felony or misdemeanor conviction from any jurisdiction for which the person was placed on probation, fined, imprisoned, or paroled.

Exceptions

The four common-sense exceptions to the prohibitions are where:

  1. an employer is required by law to run a criminal background check on an applicant to obtain information on an applicant’s conviction;

  2. the job sought requires the possession or use of a gun;

  3. a person who has been convicted of a crime is prohibited by law from holding the position sought; and

  4. an employer is prohibited by law from hiring an applicant who has been convicted of a crime.

Fair Chance Process

If, after a conditional offer of employment has been made, an employer enquires into an applicant’s criminal history and determines the information warrants an adverse action, it must follow a “Fair Chance Process.”

Prior to taking any adverse action against an applicant, the employer must:

  1. perform a “written assessment” that links the specific aspects of the applicant’s criminal history with the risks inherent in the duties of the position sought. In performing the assessment, an employer must “at a minimum,” consider the factors identified by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (e.g., conduct an individualized assessment) and follow any rules and regulations that may be issued by the Designated Administrative Agency (“DAA”) responsible for enforcement;

  2. provide the applicant with written notification of the proposed action, a copy of the written assessment, and any other information or documentation supporting the employer’s proposed adverse action;

  3. wait at least five business days after the applicant is informed of the proposed adverse action before taking any adverse action or filling the employment position; and

  4. if the applicant provides the employer with any information or documentation pursuant to the Fair Chance Process, the employer must consider that information and perform a “written reassessment” of the proposed adverse action. If the employer still elects to take the adverse action after such reassessment, it must notify the applicant of the decision and provide the applicant with a copy of the written reassessment.

Employers using a consumer reporting agency to conduct their criminal background checks, should proceed with the Fair Chance Process concurrently with the pre-adverse and adverse action requirements of both federal and state Fair Credit Reporting Act laws.

Recordkeeping, Notice

Employers must retain documents related to applicants’ employment applications and any written assessment and reassessment performed for three years.

The Ordinance’s notice and posting requirements provide that employers must state in all job advertisements and solicitations for employment that they will consider for employment qualified applicants with criminal histories “in a manner consistent with the requirements of this [Ordinance].”

To notify applicants of the Ordinance, an employer must post a notice about the law in a conspicuous place at every workplace, job site, or other City location under the employer’s control and visited by applicants. In addition, a copy of the notice must be sent to the appropriate labor unions.

Retaliation

The Ordinance makes it unlawful for an employer to take any adverse employment action against any employee for complaining to the City about the employer’s compliance or anticipated compliance with the Ordinance, for opposing any practice made unlawful by the Ordinance, for participating in proceedings related to this Ordinance, or for seeking to enforce or assert his or her rights under the Ordinance.

Civil and Administrative Enforcement

The law allows an individual to bring a civil action for violation of the Ordinance. However, as a prerequisite to pursuing a civil action against an employer, the individual first must report an administrative complaint to the DAA (Department of Public Works, Bureau of Contract Administration) within one year of the alleged violation.

Beginning July 1, 2017, the DAA may fine employers up to $500 for the first violation, up to $1,000 for the second, and up to $2,000 for the third and subsequent violations of the law. However, fines for violations of the record-retention and notice and posting requirements are capped at $500 for each violation. Prior to July 1, 2017, the DAA will not issue any monetary penalties. Instead, it will issue written warnings to employers that violate the Ordinance.

A civil lawsuit may be brought against the employer, but only after the alleged violation has been reported to the designated administrative agency and the administrative enforcement process has been completed or a hearing officer’s decision has been rendered, whichever is later. The DAA still needs to establish rules governing the administrative process for investigation and enforcement of alleged violations.

All covered Los Angeles employers should communicate and train their managers who are involved in the hiring process about the Los Angeles Fair Chance Initiative for Hiring (Ban the Box) ordinance and take steps to ensure compliance with its restrictions

ARTICLE BY Jamerson C. Allen, Susan M. Corcoran, Richard Greenberg &Alexandra Gilinsky of Jackson Lewis P.C.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016

FLSA Overtime Rules Enjoined, NY Overtime Laws, National Origin Discrimination: Employment Law This Week [VIDEO]

employment lawDistrict Court Enjoins FLSA Overtime Rules

Our top story: A federal court in Texas has temporarily enjoined new exemption rules issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The rules, which would have dramatically increased salary thresholds for overtime exemptions, were set to go into effect on December 1. The district court judge found that the 21 states that brought the suit established a prima facie case that the DOL overstepped its authority in establishing the new rules. Because the Fair Labor Standards Act makes no reference to salary thresholds, the court found that any new thresholds might have to be created by Congress and not the DOL. If the injunction is made permanent, it could be the beginning of a lengthy appeals process, which would leave employers in limbo.

New York State Overtime Laws Likely to Proceed

While overtime expansion is stalled at the federal level, New York State’s plan to increase salary thresholds remains on track. The comment period for the proposed increase closed on December 3. Under the rule, thresholds for exempt employees would rise to $825.00 per week for large employers in New York City and $787.50 per week for employers in Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties. If the New York State Department of Labor proceeds with the new rule, it will go into effect on December 31 of this year.

EEOC Issues Updated Guidelines on National Origin Discrimination

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released updated guidance on national origin discrimination. The new guidelines address legal developments on issues like human trafficking and harassment in the workplace. The guidance includes over 30 examples of national origin discrimination, as well as best practices to reduce the risk of violation. The guidance also states that, if an employee’s accent “materially interferes” with his or her ability to communicate in spoken English and effective spoken communication in English is a job requirement, an employer can legally move that worker.

USCIS Increases Stability for Foreign Workers

The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has issued a final rule that makes it easier for employers to sponsor and retain skilled foreign workers. The rule gives added job flexibility and protection to foreign workers in H-1B status or who are stuck in a long green card application process. USCIS’s rule also expands the eligibility of certain employers for H-1B cap exemptions and adds grace periods, so certain skilled workers can remain in the country for limited periods while in between jobs.

Tip of the Week

Last week, as part of the 21st Century Cures Act, the U.S. House of Representatives passed new mental health reform legislation intended to step up enforcement of rules requiring that insurers cover mental health care at the same level as they cover physical health care. The legislation could impact employers’ health insurance plans. For this week’s Tip of the Week, James Gelfand, Senior Vice President of Health Policy for The ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC), has some advice on how employers should update their plans in 2017 in order to remain compliant:

BY George Carroll Whipple, III  of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

©2016 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Election 2016, Title VII and Sexual Orientation, DOL Persuader Rule: Employment Law This Week – November 21, 2016 [VIDEO]

dol persuader rule employment lawElection 2016: New Laws Impacting Employers

Our top story: Election Day brings a wave of new laws affecting employers. While all eyes were on the battle for the White House, voters in a number of states approved new legislation that will directly impact employers. Arizona and Washington will soon require paid sick leave for workers, as well as minimum wage increases. Medical marijuana is now legal in Arkansas, Florida, and North Dakota, while recreational use was approved in California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada. The new laws in Arkansas and Maine explicitly prohibit employment discrimination against medical marijuana users.

Federal Court Agrees with EEOC: Title VII Covers Sexual Orientation

In another move toward sexual orientation protections in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania has denied a motion to dismiss a sexual orientation case brought by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), one of several claims that the agency is pursuing across the country. The employer in this case had argued for dismissal because it claimed that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination does not apply to sexual orientation discrimination. The court found that sexual orientation discrimination is a “subset of sexual stereotyping” covered by Title VII. This same issue is currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Second and Seventh Circuits, in cases where the district courts ruled that sexual orientation discrimination is not prohibited by Title VII.

DOL’s Amended Persuader Rule Is Permanently Blocked

A federal court in Texas has permanently enjoined the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) from enforcing its 2016 amended Persuader Rule, after concluding that the amended rule is unlawful. The decision applies nationwide, making permanent a preliminary injunction that the court issued in June. The rule would have required employers to report payments made to consultants, including lawyers, in connection with even indirect efforts to influence employees’ opinions on labor unions and a wide range of employment matters.

Fourth Circuit Rules That Nursing-Home Nurses Are Not “Supervisors”

The Fourth Circuit recently upheld a conclusion by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) that registered nurses and licensed practical nurses at a nursing home in South Carolina can unionize because they do not exercise enough independent judgment to be supervisors. The Fourth Circuit deferred to the NLRB’s position that employees do not exercise independent judgment because their decisions are controlled by company policies or rules. Because the nurses’ supervision mainly consisted of making sure that nursing assistants followed written rules and did not discipline assistants on their own, the nurses did not exercise independent judgement and, therefore, were not supervisors.

Tip of the Week

Lenora Billings-Harris—Diversity Strategist, an award-winning international speaker, and the author of The Diversity Advantage—is here with some advice on how to combat unconscious bias.

ARTICLE BY George Carroll Whipple, III of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.
©2016 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Same Sex and LGBT Protection Rights Flourish – Except in Workplaces?

In the last 20 years, the legal landscape has shifted dramatically for lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender (LGBT) individuals. In 1996, the Supreme Court used the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate an amendment to Colorado’s Constitution that would have prevented any branch or political subdivision of the state from protecting individuals against sexual orientation discrimination.1 Several years later, the Court determined that individuals’ rights to liberty under the Due Process Clause gave them the full right to engage in private consensual sexual conduct without the government’s intervention.2 Then, in 2013, the Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, finding that it violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.3 And finally, just last year, the Supreme Court ruled that under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples had the right to marry in every state.4

While each of these decisions had a profound impact on the lives of many Americans, none increased the workplace protections of LGBT employees under federal anti-discrimination laws. As a panel of the Seventh Circuit recently pointed out, “[m]any citizens would be surprised to learn that under federal law any private employer can summon an employee into his office and state, ‘You are a hard-working employee and have added much value to my company, but I am firing you because you are gay.’”5

In fact, every circuit court that has been asked whether Title VII – the federal law that prohibits discrimination against an employee because of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin – covers discrimination based on sexual orientation has answered the question “no.”6 However, in reaching this conclusion, every court has unequivocally condemned the practice of sexual orientation discrimination as unwise, unfair and immoral. So why the disconnect?

As most courts see it, the issue is that Title VII does not explicitly prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, and Congress has attempted for decades to pass legislation that would expand Title VII to cover sexual orientation discrimination but has come up short.7 Also, most states have not passed legislation that covers such discrimination.

But all of this is not to say that LGBT employees are without recourse. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Title VII has covered claims by employees who were discriminated against because they did not conform to traditional gender stereotypes.8 In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins failed to make partner at her accounting firm and was told she could improve her chances next time if she would walk, talk and dress more femininely, get her hair styled, and wear jewelry. The Supreme Court said this sort of gender stereotyping constitutes discrimination because of sex under Title VII.9

What arose from Price Waterhouse is a line of cases that protect LGBT employees from gender stereotyping discrimination but not from discrimination based on sexual orientation. The courts following this approach are forced to distinguish between behavior that would fall into the gender stereotyping category and be protected from those which would fall into the sexual orientation discrimination category and not be. At best, this is a difficult task. At worst, it’s an exercise in futility.

Some courts, unwilling or unable to differentiate between the two categories, have discarded this approach all together. For these courts, if it appears that the employee is trying to recast a sexual orientation discrimination case as one for gender stereotyping, they will deny all relief. In other words, these courts reject employees’ claims of gender stereotyping, as meritorious as they may be, when it appears the claims are intertwined with a sexual orientation discrimination claim.10

This could be primed for a change, though. While courts seem confused as to Title VII’s scope, the EEOC has no doubt: sexual orientation discrimination is, the EEOC says, discrimination because of sex. In Baldwin v. Foxx,11 the EEOC came to this conclusion for three main reasons. First, it concluded that “sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination because it necessarily entails treating an employee less favorably because of the employee’s sex.”12 To make its point, the EEOC gave the example of a woman who is suspended for placing a photo of her female spouse on her desk, and a man who faces no consequences for the same act. Second, it explained that “sexual orientation discrimination is also sex discrimination because it is associational discrimination on the basis of sex,” in which an employer discriminates against lesbian, gay, or bisexual employees based on who they date or marry.13 Finally, the EEOC described sexual orientation discrimination as a form of discrimination based on gender stereotypes in which employees are harassed or punished for failing to live up to societal norms about appropriate masculine and feminine behaviors, mannerisms and appearances.14 In emphasizing this last point, the EEOC rejected the numerous court decisions that have tried to distinguish between gender non-conformity claims and those for sexual orientation discrimination.

In its guidance on the subject, the EEOC has tracked the Baldwin decision and said that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is illegal under Title VII. In litigation involving the EEOC, it has pushed this tripartite approach with varying success. While no circuit court has followed Baldwin or the EEOC’s guidance, a number of district courts have taken notice. Courts in Alabama, the District of Columbia, California, Oregon and Pennsylvania have all sided with the EEOC’s position and found that Title VII does prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.15 So, at least in these courts, an employer may be held liable for discrimination based on sexual orientation, just like any other protected category under Title VII.

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not weighed in on this important topic to resolve the tension between the circuit courts and the EEOC (and certain district courts). It’s hard to say whether the Supreme Court will decide this issue soon, but the Court’s interest in cases addressing LGBT rights, such as the Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. case (involving issues of a school district’s obligations to a transgender student) that will be addressed this term, makes it likely that this issue will come before the Court eventually.

So until the Court decides whether Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, what’s an employer to do? After all, a mistake here –- even one made in good faith — could cost an employer Here are three things employers can do right now to minimize their liability:

  • Update your anti-harassment policy to include sexual orientation. While the weight of legal authority says that LGBT employees do not have claims for sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII, that trend is shifting. The EEOC’s position is clearly at odds with most of the case law, but as the agency enforcing federal discrimination laws, it has the authority to file lawsuits against employers who thumb their noses at it. A number of lower courts have listened, holding that Title VII does prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Even if you disagree with the EEOC’s position, do you want to be the long and expensive test case that goes to the Supreme Court?

  • Train your employees on your policies. A written policy isn’t any good unless your employees –– particularly your managers –– know about it. It’s smart to periodically train your employees on sexual and other types of harassment. Make training on sexual orientation discrimination part of it. Ensure your employees know that your company prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation just as it does discrimination on other protected bases.

  • Make sure to follow through. It’s easy to talk the talk, but make sure you walk the walk. Just as you should not tolerate racial slurs and derogatory comments about women in the workplace, employees need to know that offensive comments about gay, lesbian and transgender individuals are also out of bounds. If someone makes a complaint of sexual orientation discrimination, management should investigate and take prompt remedial action, just as it would with any other type of complaint.

When it comes to LGBT rights and protections, the legal world is in a state of flux. For employers, that means a lot of uncertainty, but you don’t have to be held captive by uncertain times. Be proactive now and help limit the potential of future liability.

1. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 

2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 

3. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 

4. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2696 (2015). 

5. Kimberly Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, No. 15-1720, slip op. at 33 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2016). 5.  

6. Id. at 6. 

7. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013). 

8. 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).

9. Id. at 251. 

10. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006). 

11. EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (July 16, 2015). 

12. Id. at 5. 

13. Id. at 6. 

14. Id. 

15. Isaacs v. Felder Services, LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 29, 2015) (holding claims of sexual orientation-based discrimination cognizable under Title VII); Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100 (D.D.C. 2014) (same); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222 (D. Or. 2002) (“Nothing in Title VII suggests that Congress intended to confine the benefits of that statute to heterosexual employees alone.”); Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2015) (finding sex discrimination necessarily includes sexual orientation discrimination under Title IX); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Scott Medical Health Center, No. 16-225 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2016) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and finding that allegations of sexual orientation discrimination are covered by Title VII). 

OSHA Clarifies Discipline, Retaliation and Drug Testing Commentary

When the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) released its 2016 final rule requiring the electronic reporting of workplace injury and illness reports, it included controversial provisions on discriminatory discipline, retaliation, and even post-incident drug testing by employers. The uproar was instantaneous, with industry groups quickly filing lawsuits challenging OSHA’s authority to enforce the rule. Originally scheduled to go into effect on August 10th, the effective date for the new anti-retaliation rule was pushed back by OSHA until November 1st, and more recently, until December 1st.

In the interim, Dorothy Dougherty, OSHA’s Deputy Assistant Secretary, issued an interpretation memorandum designed to explain the anti-retaliation and injury reporting procedures in more detail. The interpretation may help clarify what your organization must do in order to comply with the final rule – even if it doesn’t make the rule more palatable.

Reasonable Procedures For Employees To Report Workplace Injuries/Illnesses labor law elections

An employer violates OSHA’s new final rule if it either fails to have a procedure for employees to report work-related injuries or illnesses, or its reporting procedure is unreasonable. OSHA states that this requirement is not new, as it was implicit in the previous version of the rule. But now, it is an explicit employer requirement.

OSHA considers a reporting procedure to be reasonable if it is not unduly burdensome and would not deter a reasonable employee from reporting an injury or illness. Examples of what it considers reasonable and unreasonable are as follows:

Reasonable

  • Requiring employees to report a work-related injury or illness as soon as practicable after realizing they have a reportable incident, such as the same or next business day, when possible

  • Requiring employees to report work-related injuries or illnesses to a supervisor through reasonable means, such as by phone, email or in person.

Unreasonable

  • Requiring ill or injured employees to report in person if they are unable to do so

  • Disciplining employees for failing to report “immediately” if they are incapacitated because of the injury or illness

  • Disciplining employees for failing to report before they realize they have a work-related injury that they are required to report

  • Unnecessarily cumbersome or an excessive number of steps to report a work-related injury or illness

In short, if your procedure allows employees to report workplace injuries and illnesses within a reasonable amount of time after they realize they have experienced a reportable event, and the procedure does not make employees jump through too many hoops, it will be reasonable and comply with the final rule.

Anti-Retaliation Provision Explained

Retaliating against employees for reporting work-related injuries or illnesses has long been unlawful. To issue a citation under section 1904.35(b)(1)(iv), OSHA must have reasonable cause to believe that an employer retaliated against an employee by showing:

  1. The employee reported a work-related injury or illness;

  2. The employer took adverse action against the employee (i.e., action that would deter a reasonable employee from accurately reporting a work-related injury or illness); and

  3. The employer took the adverse action because the employee reported a work-related injury or illness.

As in most employment retaliation cases, the third element on causation is often the toughest to prove. The determination is made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the specifics facts in any particular case.

OSHA has focused its commentary primarily on three types of potentially retaliatory actions—discipline policies, incentive programs, and post-accident drug testing. OSHA’s recent interpretation helps shed light on how employers should address these three issues to avoid a citation for a violation of the anti-retaliation rule.

Disciplining Employees For Violating Work Safety Rules

Employers violate the anti-retaliation provision by disciplining or terminating employees for reporting a work-related injury or illness. But, if an employer has a legitimate business reason for imposing discipline, such as the employee’s violation of a workplace safety rule, then there is no retaliation and no violation.

OSHA states that the primary inquiry is whether the employer has treated other employees who similarly violated a safety rule the same way – in other words, did the employer impose the same adverse action regardless of whether the other employees reported a work-related injury or illness. If the rule is consistently applied, then no retaliation exists. However, if the employer disproportionately disciplined employees for violating a rule when they reported workplace injuries, or the employer ignored violations of the safety rule when there was no injury or illness, OSHA may find that the actual reason for the discipline was the reported injury or illness rather than the rule violation.

Incentive Programs

OSHA does not prohibit employers from having safety-related incentive programs. But, it does prohibit employers from withholding a benefit or otherwise penalizing an employee because of a reported injury or illness. OSHA provides this example: if an employer raffles off a $500 gift card at the end of each month in which there are no workplace injuries, such an incentive program would violate the anti-retaliation provision as it withholds the incentive (i.e., the $500 gift card) when an employee reports a work-related injury. On the other hand, an acceptable alternative would be for the employer to raffle off a gift card each month in which employees universally comply with legitimate safety rules, such as using required fall protection and following lockout-tagout rules. The key is whether the employer is withholding a benefit because of a reported work-related injury. Incentive programs that penalize the reporting of injuries and illnesses are likely to result in an OSHA citation.

Post-Accident Drug Testing

One of OSHA’s more troubling and confusing anti-retaliation position is its stance that drug testing employees who report a work-related injury or illness can be considered retaliation. Many employers impose drug testing following any workplace accident or incident that results in injuries. OSHA states that while it does not prohibit employers from drug testing employees who report work-related injuries, employers must have an objectively reasonable basis for such testing.

So what is an objectively reasonable basis for testing? OSHA states that it will consider factors including whether the employer has a reasonable basis for concluding that drug use could have contributed to the injury or illness, whether other employees involved in the incident that caused the injury were also tested (or whether only the employee who reported an injury was tested), and whether the employer has a heightened interest in determining if drug use could have contributed to the injury due to the hazardousness of the work being performed.

In addition, OSHA will consider whether the drug test is capable of measuring impairment at the time the injury occurred, where such test is available. In its interpretive memo, though, OSHA states that at this time, the agency will consider this factor for tests that measure alcohol use, but not for tests that measure the use of any other drugs.

The bottom line is that OSHA is looking whether an employer is using drug and/or alcohol testing as a form of discipline against employees who report a workplace injury, which would be retaliation. Consequently, post-accident drug testing is permitted if all workers involved in the accident are tested in order to gain insight into the cause of the accident. But drug testing an employee whose injury could not possibly be related to drug use, such as a repetitive strain injury, would be seen as retaliation. 

Key Takeaways

Assuming that the anti-retaliation rules survive their legal challenges, employers should prepare to implement a reasonable procedure for employees to report work-related injuries and illnesses. Organizations should review any safety-related incentive programs and remove any punitive effects or withholding of benefits/incentives if an employee reports a workplace injury. When adopting and enforcing drug testing policies, be certain to test all workers involved in a workplace incident, not just those who were injured or reported an injury. And last but not least, be very mindful when deciding to discipline or terminate an employee who has reported a workplace injury or illness. Without a legitimate, well-document business reason for the discipline that is unrelated to the injury report, you may find your business cited for retaliation.

ARTICLE BY Matthew Linton of Holland & Hart LLP
Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.