Reference Searches Through Social Media Do Not Create FCRA Claims

In their recruitment efforts, many employers will utilize social media to find suitable candidates for job openings. And, often employers will use the social media tools available to perform reference checks and/or verify a candidate’s employment history, experience and education history. Recently in California, a group of individuals challenged these social media background searches by suing the professional social media website, LinkedIn Corporation, because the information gleaned about these persons allegedly violated their rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).

In Sweet v. LinkedIn Corp., Tracee Sweet, one of the named plaintiffs for the class, alleged she had applied for a position through LinkedIn. Sweet claimed the potential employer advised she had been hired following a telephone interview. A week after, the potential employer rescinded the offer and this decision was based on the employer’s review of Sweet’s references through LinkedIn.

The employer had used the Reference Searches function on LinkedIn, which allows employers to find people with whom an applicant may have worked previously. According to the class plaintiffs, this search engine allows employers to “[g]et the real story on any candidate” and to “[f]ind references who can give real, honest feedback” about job candidates. The Reference Searches function produces two types of information for paid subscribers: (1) the name and list of the search target’s current and former employers; and (2) a list of other LinkedIn members who are in the same professional network of the search initiator and “who may have worked at the same company during the same time period as the search target.” The Referencence Searches then produces results which include for each possible reference, “the name of the employer in common between the reference and the job applicant, and the reference’s position and years employed at that common employer.”

According to the complaint, each member of the class had a similar experience as Sweet. Each plaintiff believed that LinkedIn’s Reference Searches function caused them to lose employment opportunities in violation of the FCRA. The U.S. District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims and dismissed the action. The court explained that FCRA did not apply to the social media site and, instead, only to “consumer reporting agencies” that provide “consumer reports.”

Under the FCRA, a “consumer report” is:

[A]ny written, oral or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part of the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for . . . . (B) employment purposes.

The district court stated that the publication of the plaintiffs’ employment histories were not consumer reports because that information came solely from LinkedIn’s transactions or experiences with the plaintiffs as members of the social media website. In other words, the information that was subsequently shared to a third-party occurred solely as a result of the plaintiffs’ voluntary provision of such information. As a result, that information is excluded from the protections of the FCRA. As the district court noted, the subsequent information sharing is precisely the reason why consumers such as the plaintiffs provide such information to LinkedIn.

Additionally, the district court found that LinkedIn was not a consumer reporting agency, as defined under the FCRA. The court explained that LinkedIn did not become a consumer reporting agency “solely because it conveys, with the consumer’s consent, information about the consumer to a third party to provide a specific product or service that the consumer has requested.”

Finally, the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the list of names and information about the references included in the Reference Searches bear on the “character, general reputation, mode of living” and other relevant characteristics of the consumers who are the subjects of these searches. Instead, the court found that the results from Reference Searches are those in the search initiator’s network and not in the target’s network. Therefore, the results only communicate whether the search initiator (not the target) have the characteristics protected under the FCRA (e.g., character, general reputation, mode of living).

Written by Tina A. Syring of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

© 2015 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

NLRB Shows Some Restraint in its Protection of Employee Social Media Communications: Employee Termination Arising From “Egregious” and “Insubordinate” Facebook Posts Was Legal Under the NLRA

Mintz Levin Law Firm

In the wake of the NLRB’s aggressive crackdown on social media policies, many employers have asked: “Is there any limit to what employees can post on social media about their employers?”  It appears that there is.  Just last week, a former employee of the Richmond District Neighborhood Teen Center in San Francisco learned this the hard way when the Board dismissed his complaint that the Center violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act after it pulled a rehire offer after it discovered that he particpated in an inappropriate Facebook exchange.

During the 2011-2012 school year, Ian Callaghan and Kenya Moore both worked for the Center’s afterschool program—Callaghan as a teen activity leader and Moore as the teen center program leader.  In May 2012, the Center held a staff meeting during which it solicited and received both positive and negative feedback from its staff, including Callaghan and Moore.  In July 2012, Callaghan and Moore received letters inviting them to return to the Center for the 2012-2013 school year; this time both as activity leaders.

The following month, Callaghan and Moore communicated over Facebook about (i) refusing to obtain permission before organizing youth activities (“ordering sh*t, having crazy events at the Beacon all the time.  I don’t want to ask permission…”; “Let’s do some cool sh*t and let them figure out the money”; “field trips all the time to wherever the f#@! we want!”), (ii) disregarding specific school district rules (“play music loud”; “teach the kids how to graffiti up the walls…”), (iii) undermining leadership (“we’ll take advantage”), (iv) neglecting their duties (“I ain’t go[]never be there”), and (v) jeopardizing the safety of participating youth and the program overall (“they start loosn kids I aint helpin”; “Let’s f#@! it up”).  When the Center’s administration became aware of the postings, it revoked the offers to rehire, and Callaghan filed a charge with the Board.

Under Section 7 of the Act, employees have the right to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection, including complaining to one another about the terms and conditions of their employment.  In that vein, an employer may not take adverse action against employees for exercising their Section 7 rights without violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.  That said, employees can take it too far and lose the protection of Section 7 when their conduct is particularly egregious or of such a character as to render the employees unfit for further service.

Here, although Callaghan and Moore previously had engaged in protected activity during the May 2012 staff meeting when they offered negative feedback about the Center, and although neither Callaghan nor Moore had ever engaged in any acts of insubordination, the Board held that they lost the Act’s protection because “[t]he magnitude and detail of insubordinate acts advocated in the [Facebook] posts reasonably gave [the Center] concern that Callaghan and Moore would act on their plans, a risk a reasonable employer would refuse to take.”

Several years ago, the Richmond District Neighborhood Center decision may have been a foregone conclusion.  But in light of the current Board’s aggressive approach to Section 7 protections, the decision provides employers with reassurance that Section 7 has retained at least some outer bounds.  The decision provides some guidance for defining “insubordination” in social media policies, for example, to include communications pervaded by detailed plans to jeopardize the employer’s very existence, violate legally enforceable employer policies, or neglect job duties.

For a full discussion of the Board’s recent approach to social media policies, see George Patterson’s September 3, 2014 posting “NLRB Continues Aggressive Crackdown on Social Media Polices.”

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Illinois Employers Beware: New Law Prohibits Employers from Seeking Social Media Password Information

The National Law Review recently published an article regarding Social Media Passwords and Illinois Employers written by Norma W. Zeitler of Barnes & Thornburg LLP:

Employers in Illinois will be prohibited from seeking social networking password information from employees and applicants starting Jan. 1, 2013, now that Illinois Governor Pat Quinn has signed into law Public Act 097-0875, which is an amendment to the Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act, 820 ILCS 55/10.

As we previously reported , the legislation makes it unlawful for an employer to require an employee or applicant to disclose passwords or other related social networking account information in order for the employer to access information that might otherwise be considered private by the employee or applicant. However, employers are not barred from accessing information that is in the public domain

Illinois becomes the second state, after Maryland, to enact such a law, according to a press release from Governor Quinn’s office announcing that he signed the legislation into law on August 1. The new law does not limit an employer’s right to promulgate and maintain otherwise lawful workplace policies regarding the use of the employer’s computer equipment, Internet use, social networking site use, and electronic mail use.

Illinois employers should consider reviewing existing policies and practices with an eye toward ensuring compliance with this new law.

© 2012 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP