Tag: Eminent Domain

Court Rejects Use of Eminent Domain for Recreational Trail

There has been a major development in the ongoing legal fight over the ability of the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District in Mahoning County to condemn private property for its bikeway project.

While previous efforts to stop the bikeway focused on a newly passed state law providing that a park district cannot take property for a recreational trail in counties with populations of a certain size (i.e., the size of Mahoning County), the property owner in The Board of Commissioners of the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District v. Hess tried a different tack, arguing that the statute authorizing park districts to take private property by eminent domain (Ohio Revised Code 1545.11) did not permit a taking for a recreational trail. Rather, it only permits such a taking for “conversion into forest reserves and for the conservation of the natural resources of the state.”

Although the trial court was not persuaded by this argument, the Seventh District Court of Appeals was. The Court of Appeals focused its analysis on whether the taking was to conserve natural resources, ultimately concluding it was not, despite the expansive definition of what constitutes a “natural resource,” i.e., any natural element of feature that supplies human needs; contributes to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community; and is essential for the well-being of such community and the proper enjoyment of its property.

In reaching its decision, the Court found it significant that another section of the Ohio Revised Code expressly empowers the Department of Natural Resources to condemn property for recreational trails. Based on this explicit statutory authorization, the Court was unwilling to read an implied authorization to exercise eminent domain for the same purpose into R.C. 1545.11.

The Court’s ruling was also influenced by the fact that the land at issue was in “a rural area where it appears the public need is speculative at best and the harm to the private property owners is great.”

Finally, the Court pointed out that the purpose of public recreation was not sufficient to authorize the Park District to take private property, reasoning that simply because something provides recreation does not mean it constitutes the conservation of natural resources. In this regard, the Court analogized the recreational trail at issue to movie theaters, shopping malls, and bowling alleys.

Based on these considerations, the Court held that the resolutions to appropriate passed by the Park District were insufficient because they did not include any language tying the demand for the recreational trail to the conservation of natural resources. The Court further held that the Park District abused its discretion by filing an eminent domain lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the property owner.

The Hess case demonstrates the well-established principle that statutory delegations of the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed in favor of property owners, and is a reminder to all eminent domain practitioners that the legal authority for a proposed taking must be closely scrutinized.

©2022 Roetzel & Andress
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Recent Utah Decision Enforces the Importance of Eminent Domain Provisions In Commercial Leases

A recent Utah case serves as a cautionary tale of the importance of eminent domain provisions in commercial leases. In Utah Dep’t of Transportation v. Kmart Corp., 2018 UT 54, 428 P.3d 1118, the Utah Supreme Court examined a provision in Kmart’s shopping center lease which provided the lease terminated if eminent domain left Kmart’s “points of ingress and egress to the public roadways…materially impaired.” In 2010, the Utah Department of Transportation (“UDOT”) condemned property which provided access to the property Kmart leased. Both Kmart, as tenant, and its landlord, FPA, sought compensation from UDOT for the condemnation of the access point. In 2012, the Utah Supreme Court held that Utah’s just compensation statute required courts and appraisers to determine the value of a condemnation award for each party’s property interest separately using the “aggregate-of-interests approach” and remanded it to the district court for further proceedings. Upon remand, after review of separate appraisals of FPA’s and Kmart’s respective property interests, the district court determined UDOT’s condemnation “materially impaired access and caused the [l]ease to terminate” and awarded Kmart $1.4 million plus interest. UDOT appealed.

On appeal, UDOT urged the Utah Supreme Court to adopt the “termination clause rule” which had been adopted by other jurisdictions. Under that rule, when a lease’s termination clause is triggered, the tenant loses its claim to just compensation because any of the tenant’s continuing interest in the leased property is extinguished.

Kmart argued the 2012 Utah Supreme Court decision, where the “aggregate of interests” approach was adopted, rendered UDOT’s “termination clause rule” argument meaningless. Kmart argued that a condemnation clause’s sole purpose is to determine the landlord’s and tenant’s separate shares of condemnation awards. Because the “aggregate of interests approach” determined the value of each party’s interests separately, there was no reason to contract for each party’s share of the award. Thus, said Kmart, the condemnation clause in its lease should have no effect.

The Utah Supreme Court disagreed with Kmart and instead adopted UDOT’s “termination clause rule.” In rejecting Kmart’s argument, the court explained the “aggregate of interests” rule addressed only the value of a party’s property interest. In contrast, the “termination clause rule” dictated whether a tenant even had a property interest following condemnation. Put another way, the “termination clause rule” determines what is owned where the valuation method determines what is owed.

In examining Kmart’s lease, the Utah Supreme Court determined the termination clause was triggered when condemnation left “points of ingress and egress to the public roadways…materially impaired.” Because the district court already concluded UDOT’s taking left access “materially impaired,” the termination clause—in terminating Kmart’s lease—extinguished Kmart’s property interest. Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court held Kmart was not entitled to just compensation since it no longer had an interest in the property.

Issues relating to condemnation clauses in leases have also arisen in Wisconsin. In 1980, the Wisconsin Supreme Court tacitly acknowledged that it had “become customary” to include condemnation clauses in leases. Like Utah, Wisconsin courts hold that these clauses can terminate the tenant’s interest and bar any claim the tenant would have had to a portion of a just compensation award.

The importance of reviewing condemnation clauses in leases is often undervalued. Unclear drafting of condemnation clauses may also result in landlords having to share condemnation proceeds with tenant. Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 288 N.W.2d 794 (1980). Clauses that fail to contemplate Wisconsin’s specific eminent domain rules can also result in the inability of landlords to collect attorney fees. Van Asten v. State, 214 Wis. 2d 135, 571 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1997).

The Kmart case serves as a warning as to the drastic effects that a condemnation clause can have on the compensation of leasehold interests in a condemnation. To avoid the potentially devastating results of a poorly worded condemnation provision, landlords and tenants should request their real estate attorneys review the condemnation provisions in their leases to confirm that their rights are adequately protected.

 

©2019 von Briesen & Roper, s.c
This post was written by Joseph J. Rolling of von Briesen & Roper, s.c.
Read more real estate news on NLR’s Real Estate type of law page.

They Are Taking Our Common Area!

The power of eminent domain, also referred to as condemnation, refers to the power of the government or other quasi-governmental entity, such as a utility company, to take private property for a public purpose.

The law requires “just compensation” to be paid when a taking occurs.  What happens, however, when the property taken is common area owned by a community association, property owners’ association (“POA”), or homeowners’ association (“HOA”) (collectively, “Association”)?

In a subdivision or planned community managed by an Association, the common area and elements are typically owned by the Association.  However, the individual property owners have easement rights granting them the right to use the common area (for example, parks, playgrounds, swimming pools, tennis courts, streets and walkways, and other commonly shared property).  An easement is a property right that, if taken, requires the payment of just compensation to the holder of the easement; in this case, the various lot owners in the planned community or subdivision.  In the case of a condominium, the condominium unit owners actually own the common area in fee simple as tenants in common.  This fee simple ownership, if taken, would normally require the payment of “just compensation” to the unit owners for the value of the property interest lost as a result of the taking.

The taking of common area and common elements can significantly impair the value of the lots, homes and units in a community.  Picture, for example, a DOT taking where an elevated highway is built where the community’s swimming pool once stood.  Are the lot and unit owners entitled to just compensation for the value of the common area taken and the damage done to their property values in a condemnation proceeding?  The answer is “yes, no, and maybe.”

Uniform Planned Community Act/Uniform Condominium Act

In states such as North Carolina that have enacted legislation that substantially follows the Uniform Planned Community Act (“UPCA”) and the Uniform Condominium Act (“UCA”), the Association is granted the power and authority to act for all of the lot owners or unit owners in a condemnation or eminent domain case where common area is taken.  The Acts provide that the portion of the just compensation award “attributable to the common elements taken” shall be paid to the Association.  The Acts and the governing documents of the planned community or condominium dictate how the just compensation paid to the Association can be used or disbursed.

It would seem that, despite this law, a lot owner or unit owner whose property value has been substantially affected by the taking of common area should also be entitled to compensation for the reduced value of the lot or unit.  In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas, for example, the Kansas DOT took lots in a subdivision that were subject to Restrictive Covenants preventing the construction of anything but single-family homes on the subdivision lots. The Court held that the single-family home restriction was a “property right” of the remaining lot owners in the subdivision that was taken when a highway bridge was constructed on the taken lots.  The Court sent the case back to the trial court with instructions to determine the damage that each lot owner had sustained as a result of the taking.

Fiduciary Duty

The officers and directors of an Association have a fiduciary duty to properly respond to and deal with a taking.  The Association should take advantage of any opportunities that arise before the taking actually occurs for input into the nature and extent of the taking, including, in the case of roads or highways, their location and design.  Typically, the condemning entity will have an appraisal done estimating the value of the property to be taken and the just compensation that should be paid to the property owner or, with common elements, the Association.  Often times it will be incumbent upon the Association to retain its own appraiser to ensure that a fair price is paid.  The condemning entity will certainly have legal counsel, and the Association would be wise to retain its own legal counsel to provide guidance through this process and to ensure that the Association is fulfilling its fiduciary duty.

Conclusion

The taking of a common area or common elements by a condemning entity can be a devastating and traumatic occurrence for an Association and its members.  The Association needs to understand the process and deal with it appropriately.  Having an attorney who is experienced in both the areas of community association law and eminent domain law will be essential.

 

© 2019 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.
This post was written by Ryal W. Tayloe and Allen N. Trask, III of Ward and Smith, P.A.

New Jersey Appellate Panel Countenances Beach Easement Condemnations for Federal Funding

A New Jersey appeals court recently upheld the Township of Long Beach’s exercise of eminent domain to acquire beachfront access easements in the consolidated appeal of Twp. of Long Beach v. Tomasi, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) – the latest chapter in a series of disputes between coastal New Jersey municipalities and owners of beachfront property within those municipalities.

The Township of Long Beach sought federal funding pursuant to the “Sandy Act,” which authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) to protect the New Jersey shoreline through beach replenishment and dune construction projects funded either in whole or in part by the federal government. See Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (Sandy Act), Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4. In order to obtain such federal participation and funding, the township was required to comply with conditions set forth in the Army Corps’ engineering regulations, including the requirement that participating municipalities provide “reasonable public access rights-of-way” to the beach, defined as “approximately every one-half mile or less.” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ER 1105-2-100, Planning Guidance Notebook 3-20 (2000); see also N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9.

As the township’s shoreline did not have the required public access, it resolved to obtain public access easements in various locations to achieve compliance with the Army Corps and NJDEP regulations such that it would be eligible for inclusion in an ongoing shoreline protection project undertaken by those entities. Accordingly, the township passed appropriate resolutions authorizing it to condemn and acquire via eminent domain four public access beach easements, including a ten-foot-wide strip of land along the defendants’ properties. After unsuccessfully negotiating with the defendants to purchase the easements, the township initiated condemnation proceedings in the Superior Court, giving rise to the Tomasilitigation.

In September 2017 the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the township and held that it had properly exercised its eminent domain power in acquiring the beach easements for public use. The defendants appealed and sought reversal based on their contention that the township was unable to establish either necessity or proper public purpose for the condemnations. More specifically, the defendants argued that reasonable beach access already existed in the township such that there was no necessity to condemn the easements under the Public Trust Doctrine or otherwise; and that the stated impetus for the condemnations, i.e. seeking federal funding, could not constitute a viable public purpose.

On December 20, 2018, the two-judge appellate panel issued its decision affirming the lower court and rejecting both of the defendant-appellants’ primary arguments. The court noted its “limited and deferential” review of municipal exercises of eminent domain power, cited the traditionally broad conceptual scope of public use, and held that the township’s undertaking to protect its shoreline – including conforming to state or federal requirements to obtain project funding – was a proper public use or purpose.

There are several relevant takeaways from the Tomasi decision, though they should be understood with an important caveat. The court resolved the narrow question before it without engaging in a comprehensive or detailed legal analysis and as a result, land use practitioners and municipal personnel should be cautious not to overstate the holding in this brief unpublished opinion. Nevertheless, the Tomasi decision is significant based on its factual distinctions from more traditional beach easement litigations.

Specifically, the easements at issue in Tomasi were for perpendicular access to the beach and ocean rather than for dune construction. Though both dune construction and access easements relate to shore protection, the former directly enable and contribute to such protection, whereas the latter are merely incidental to it. In that sense, the Tomasi easements are arguably less justifiable than dune construction easements in the eminent domain context – and the defendants in Tomasi appeared to base their public purpose-driven arguments on precisely that premise. However, the court evidently did not find the above-described “direct vs. incidental” distinction meaningful and rejected the defendants’ argument, finding that pursuing federal funding for shoreline protection was a sufficient public purpose for eminent domain purposes.

Under the facts of this case, that is a logically defensible outcome, as the township’s acquisition of the access easements was a de-facto prerequisite for constructing dunes and otherwise protecting its shoreline area, per the Army Corps and NJDEP regulations. Accordingly, a possible implication for future cases is that the precise nature of the condemnation easement in question will not necessarily be dispositive, and the focus of a reviewing court’s inquiry instead will be whether such an easement is ultimately necessary to effectuate the contemplated shoreline protection program.

It is unclear if this premise informed the court’s decision in Tomasi. To the extent that it may have, it would be valuable for municipalities, property owners, and land use practitioners to know that the court employs a functional analysis in evaluating public use / purpose in eminent domain cases. Similarly, but conversely, it would be equally valuable for those stakeholders to know that the court did not equate access easements with dune construction easements but rather expanded the scope of eminent domain by permitting condemnation for easements which are merely incidental to shore protection.

Accordingly, the ambiguity in this space following the Tomasi decision is worth monitoring, both in that litigation as the Supreme Court considers whether to hear a (presently unfiled but) likely forthcoming appeal, and in future cases with similar or slightly different facts. Though its implications are presently limited, the Tomasi case clearly stands for the proposition that beach access condemnation easements to obtain federal funding for shore protection projects are permissible exercises of municipal eminent domain power.

 

© 2018 Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C. All Rights Reserved